PURPOSE: to present the Commission’s Energy\nRoadmap 2050.
\nBACKGROUND: the EU is committed to reducing greenhouse\ngas emissions to 80-95% below 1990 levels by 2050 in the context of\nnecessary reductions by developed countries as a group. The\nCommission analysed the implications of this in its \"Roadmap for moving to a competitive low-carbon\neconomy in 2050\". The \"Roadmap to a Single European Transport\nArea\" focussed on solutions for the transport\nsector and on creating a Single European Transport Area.
\nThe EU policies and measures to achieve the Energy 2020 goals and the\nEnergy 2020 strategy are ambitious: by 2020, at least 20 %\nreduction in greenhouse gas emissions compared to 1990 (30% if\ninternational conditions are right); saving of 20 % of EU energy\nconsumption compared to projections for 2020; 20 % share of\nrenewable energies in EU energy consumption, 10% share in\ntransport. These measures will continue to deliver beyond 2020\nhelping to reduce emissions by about 40% by 2050. They will,\nhowever, still be insufficient to achieve the EU's 2050\ndecarbonisation objective as only less than half of the\ndecarbonisation goal will be achieved in 2050. This creates\nuncertainty among investors, governments and citizens.\nToday, there is inadequate direction as to what should follow\nthe 2020 agenda.
\nThe Roadmap does not replace national, regional and\nlocal efforts to modernise energy supply, but seeks to develop a\nlong-term European technology-neutral framework in which these\npolicies will be more effective. It argues that a European approach\nto the energy challenge will increase security and solidarity and\nlower costs by providing a market for new products and services.\nThe Commission estimates potential cost savings of around\n25% for some stakeholders if there were a more European\napproach for efficient use of renewable energy.
\nCONTENT: in this Energy Roadmap 2050, the Commission\nexplores the challenges posed by delivering the EU's\ndecarbonisation objective while at the same time ensuring\nsecurity of energy supply and competitiveness. The scenarios in\nthis Roadmap all imply major changes in carbon prices,\ntechnology and networks. A number of scenarios examined how to\nachieve an 80% reduction in greenhouse gas emissions implying some\n85% decline of energy-relatedCO2 emissions including from\ntransport. The Commission has also analysed Member States' and\nstakeholders' scenarios and views.
\nThe Energy Roadmap 2050 shows that decarbonisation\nis feasible. Whichever scenario is chosen, a number of \"no\nregret\" options emerge which can bring down emissions effectively\nand in an economically viable way. Furthermore, the\noverall system costs of transforming the energy system are similar\nin all scenarios. A common EU approach can help keep costs\ndown.
\nTo achieve this new energy system, ten conditions must\nbe met:
\n\n1. \nEnergy 2020:\nthe immediate priority is to implement fully the EU's Energy 2020\nstrategy. All existing legislation needs to be applied, and the\nproposals currently in discussion, notably on energy efficiency,\ninfrastructure, safety and international cooperation, need to be\nadopted swiftly. The path towards a new energy system also has a\nsocial dimension. The Commission will continue to encourage social\ndialogue and social partners' involvement to help a fair transition\nand an efficient management of change.
\n\n2. \nEnergy efficiency: the energy system and society as a whole need to be\ndramatically more energy efficient. The co-benefits of achieving\nenergy efficiency in a wider resource efficiency agenda should\ncontribute to meeting the goals in a faster and cost-efficient\nmanner.
\n\n3. \nRenewable energy sources: particular attention should continue to be given to\nthe development of renewable energy. Their rate of development,\nimpact in the market and rapidly growing share in energy demand\ncall for a modernisation of the policy framework. The EU's 20%\nrenewable energy target has so far proven an efficient driver in\ndevelopment of the renewable energy in the EU and timely\nconsideration should be given to options for 2030\nmilestones.
\n\n4. \nResearch and innovation: higher public and private investments in R&D and\ntechnological innovation are crucial in speeding-up the\ncommercialisation of all low-carbon solutions.
\n\n5. \nInternal energy market: the EU is committed to a fully integrated market by\n2014. There are regulatory and structural shortcomings that need to\nbe addressed. Well-designed market structure instruments and new\nways of cooperation are required for the internal energy market to\ndeliver its full potential as new investments are coming into the\nenergy market and the energy mix is changing.
\n\n6. \nEnergy prices need to better reflect\ncosts, notably of the new investments\nneeded throughout the energy system. The earlier prices reflect\ncosts, the easier the transformation will be in the long run.\nSpecial attention should be paid for the most vulnerable groups,\nfor which coping with the energy system transformation will be\nchallenging. Specific measures should be defined at national and\nlocal levels to avoid energy poverty.
\n\n7. \nNew infrastructure: a new sense of urgency and collective responsibility\nmust be brought to bear on the development of new energy\ninfrastructure and storage capacities across Europe and with\nneighbours.
\n\n8. \nSafety and security: there will be no compromise on safety and security\nfor either traditional or new energy sources. The EU must continue\nto strengthen the safety and security framework and lead\ninternational efforts in this field.
\n\n9. \nInternational aspects: a broader and more coordinated EU approach to\ninternational energy relations must become the norm, including\nredoubling work to strengthen international climate\naction.
\n\n10. Investment: Member\nStates and investors need concrete milestones. The Low carbon\neconomy roadmap has already indicated greenhouse gas emission\nmilestones. The next step is to define the 2030 policy framework,\nreasonably foreseeable and the focus of most current\ninvestors.
\nThe Commission will carry out discussions with other\nEU institutions, Member States and stakeholders on the basis of\nthis Roadmap. It will update it regularly, reassessing what is\nnecessary in the light of progress and changes.
\nOn the basis of the Roadmap, the Commission will\ncontinue to bring forward initiatives, starting with comprehensive\nproposals on the internal market, renewable energy and nuclear\nsafety next year.
\nThe Committee on Industry, Research and Energy adopted\nthe own-initiative report by Niki TZAVELA (EFD, EL) on the Energy\nRoadmap 2050: a future with energy, in response to the Commission\nCommunication on the subject.
\nObjectives of the EU2050\nEnergy Roadmap: Members stress\nthe importance of the EU’s energy policy amidst the economic\nand financial crisis, and the role that energy plays in\nspurring growth and economic competitiveness and creating jobs\nin the EU. The Commission is asked to propose post-2020\nstrategies and a policy framework for 2030, including\nmilestones and targets on greenhouse gas emissions, renewable\nenergy and energy efficiency, with the aim of establishing an\nambitious and stable legal and regulatory framework. Since defining\nenergy targets for 2050 and the intervening period assumes\npan-European governance, Members propose the adoption\nof a strategy that allows Member States to cooperate under the\nRoadmap in a spirit of solidarity – the creation of\na European Energy Community. They note that the 2030 policy\nframework must be defined within a timeframe that is appropriate\nfor providing investor security.
\nKey Elements of a long-term strategy: welcoming the Commission’s view that increased\ndeployment of renewables, energy efficiency and energy\ninfrastructure are the ‘no regret’ options,\nregardless of the specific path chosen to achieve a\n‘decarbonised 2050 energy system’, the\nreport invites the Commission to:
\n\n· \nexplore a combined “high renewables and\nhigh energy efficiency” scenario, noting that a choice\nmade about which path to take would help increase investment\ncertainty;
\n\n· \ntake decentralised generation explicitly\ninto account in future estimates of renewable energy in the EU\nenergy mix, and map financial, technical and infrastructural\nobstacles that hamper the growth of decentralised generation in\nMember States.
\nEnergy efficiency:\nMembers stress that the EU’s long-term energy-efficiency\npolicy should take the reduction of energy use in buildings as a\ncentral element, calling on Member States to adopt ambitious,\nlong-term building renovation strategies as required by the Energy Efficiency Directive.\nThe current quality of building renovation needs to be\nsubstantially scaled up in order to significant reduction of energy\nconsumption of the existing building stock by 80 %,\nrelative to 2010 levels, by 2050.
\nThe report calls, furthermore, for greater attention\nto be paid to the heat and cooling sectors in the transformation\nof the energy system, noting that this sector represents about\n45 % of the final energy consumption in Europe.
\nRenewable energy:\nMembers make a series of recommendations on increasing uptake.\nStressing the importance of stable regulatory frameworks, both on\nan EU as on a Member State level to stimulate investments, the\ncommittee is concerned by Member States’ increasingly abrupt\nchanges to support mechanisms for renewable energy, and it calls on\nthe Commission to monitor carefully the implementation of the\nRenewable Energy Directive and to take action if\nnecessary.
\nInfrastructure: energy\ninfrastructure projects are characterised by vast upfront\ninvestment and a 20-60 year operational lifetime. The current\nmarket environment is highly unpredictable, and Members note\nthat investors are hesitant when it comes to energy infrastructure\ndevelopment, stressing the need to promote new strategies and\ninnovative instruments in this regard.
\nSpecific energy sources:\nnoting that all types of low-carbon technology will be needed to\nachieve the goal of decarbonising the EU’s energy system,\nMembers agree that natural gas will play an important role,\nin the short to medium term, in the transformation of the energy\nsystem. They also note that carbon capture storage (CCS)\ncould play a role on the road to decarbonisation by 2050 and they\nadvocate strategies to this effect.
\nSocial dimension:\nlastly, special attention should be given to energy poverty and\nemployment, and Members add that the Commission, Member States and\nlocal authorities should find tailored solutions with a special\nemphasis on low-income and vulnerable households.
\nPURPOSE: to present the Commission’s Energy\nRoadmap 2050.
\nBACKGROUND: the EU is committed to reducing greenhouse\ngas emissions to 80-95% below 1990 levels by 2050 in the context of\nnecessary reductions by developed countries as a group. The\nCommission analysed the implications of this in its \"Roadmap for moving to a competitive low-carbon\neconomy in 2050\". The \"Roadmap to a Single European Transport\nArea\" focussed on solutions for the transport\nsector and on creating a Single European Transport Area.
\nThe EU policies and measures to achieve the Energy 2020 goals and the\nEnergy 2020 strategy are ambitious: by 2020, at least 20 %\nreduction in greenhouse gas emissions compared to 1990 (30% if\ninternational conditions are right); saving of 20 % of EU energy\nconsumption compared to projections for 2020; 20 % share of\nrenewable energies in EU energy consumption, 10% share in\ntransport. These measures will continue to deliver beyond 2020\nhelping to reduce emissions by about 40% by 2050. They will,\nhowever, still be insufficient to achieve the EU's 2050\ndecarbonisation objective as only less than half of the\ndecarbonisation goal will be achieved in 2050. This creates\nuncertainty among investors, governments and citizens.\nToday, there is inadequate direction as to what should follow\nthe 2020 agenda.
\nThe Roadmap does not replace national, regional and\nlocal efforts to modernise energy supply, but seeks to develop a\nlong-term European technology-neutral framework in which these\npolicies will be more effective. It argues that a European approach\nto the energy challenge will increase security and solidarity and\nlower costs by providing a market for new products and services.\nThe Commission estimates potential cost savings of around\n25% for some stakeholders if there were a more European\napproach for efficient use of renewable energy.
\nCONTENT: in this Energy Roadmap 2050, the Commission\nexplores the challenges posed by delivering the EU's\ndecarbonisation objective while at the same time ensuring\nsecurity of energy supply and competitiveness. The scenarios in\nthis Roadmap all imply major changes in carbon prices,\ntechnology and networks. A number of scenarios examined how to\nachieve an 80% reduction in greenhouse gas emissions implying some\n85% decline of energy-relatedCO2 emissions including from\ntransport. The Commission has also analysed Member States' and\nstakeholders' scenarios and views.
\nThe Energy Roadmap 2050 shows that decarbonisation\nis feasible. Whichever scenario is chosen, a number of \"no\nregret\" options emerge which can bring down emissions effectively\nand in an economically viable way. Furthermore, the\noverall system costs of transforming the energy system are similar\nin all scenarios. A common EU approach can help keep costs\ndown.
\nTo achieve this new energy system, ten conditions must\nbe met:
\n\n1. \nEnergy 2020:\nthe immediate priority is to implement fully the EU's Energy 2020\nstrategy. All existing legislation needs to be applied, and the\nproposals currently in discussion, notably on energy efficiency,\ninfrastructure, safety and international cooperation, need to be\nadopted swiftly. The path towards a new energy system also has a\nsocial dimension. The Commission will continue to encourage social\ndialogue and social partners' involvement to help a fair transition\nand an efficient management of change.
\n\n2. \nEnergy efficiency: the energy system and society as a whole need to be\ndramatically more energy efficient. The co-benefits of achieving\nenergy efficiency in a wider resource efficiency agenda should\ncontribute to meeting the goals in a faster and cost-efficient\nmanner.
\n\n3. \nRenewable energy sources: particular attention should continue to be given to\nthe development of renewable energy. Their rate of development,\nimpact in the market and rapidly growing share in energy demand\ncall for a modernisation of the policy framework. The EU's 20%\nrenewable energy target has so far proven an efficient driver in\ndevelopment of the renewable energy in the EU and timely\nconsideration should be given to options for 2030\nmilestones.
\n\n4. \nResearch and innovation: higher public and private investments in R&D and\ntechnological innovation are crucial in speeding-up the\ncommercialisation of all low-carbon solutions.
\n\n5. \nInternal energy market: the EU is committed to a fully integrated market by\n2014. There are regulatory and structural shortcomings that need to\nbe addressed. Well-designed market structure instruments and new\nways of cooperation are required for the internal energy market to\ndeliver its full potential as new investments are coming into the\nenergy market and the energy mix is changing.
\n\n6. \nEnergy prices need to better reflect\ncosts, notably of the new investments\nneeded throughout the energy system. The earlier prices reflect\ncosts, the easier the transformation will be in the long run.\nSpecial attention should be paid for the most vulnerable groups,\nfor which coping with the energy system transformation will be\nchallenging. Specific measures should be defined at national and\nlocal levels to avoid energy poverty.
\n\n7. \nNew infrastructure: a new sense of urgency and collective responsibility\nmust be brought to bear on the development of new energy\ninfrastructure and storage capacities across Europe and with\nneighbours.
\n\n8. \nSafety and security: there will be no compromise on safety and security\nfor either traditional or new energy sources. The EU must continue\nto strengthen the safety and security framework and lead\ninternational efforts in this field.
\n\n9. \nInternational aspects: a broader and more coordinated EU approach to\ninternational energy relations must become the norm, including\nredoubling work to strengthen international climate\naction.
\n\n10. Investment: Member\nStates and investors need concrete milestones. The Low carbon\neconomy roadmap has already indicated greenhouse gas emission\nmilestones. The next step is to define the 2030 policy framework,\nreasonably foreseeable and the focus of most current\ninvestors.
\nThe Commission will carry out discussions with other\nEU institutions, Member States and stakeholders on the basis of\nthis Roadmap. It will update it regularly, reassessing what is\nnecessary in the light of progress and changes.
\nOn the basis of the Roadmap, the Commission will\ncontinue to bring forward initiatives, starting with comprehensive\nproposals on the internal market, renewable energy and nuclear\nsafety next year.
\nPURPOSE: to present the Commission’s Energy\nRoadmap 2050.
\nBACKGROUND: the EU is committed to reducing greenhouse\ngas emissions to 80-95% below 1990 levels by 2050 in the context of\nnecessary reductions by developed countries as a group. The\nCommission analysed the implications of this in its \"Roadmap for moving to a competitive low-carbon\neconomy in 2050\". The \"Roadmap to a Single European Transport\nArea\" focussed on solutions for the transport\nsector and on creating a Single European Transport Area.
\nThe EU policies and measures to achieve the Energy 2020 goals and the\nEnergy 2020 strategy are ambitious: by 2020, at least 20 %\nreduction in greenhouse gas emissions compared to 1990 (30% if\ninternational conditions are right); saving of 20 % of EU energy\nconsumption compared to projections for 2020; 20 % share of\nrenewable energies in EU energy consumption, 10% share in\ntransport. These measures will continue to deliver beyond 2020\nhelping to reduce emissions by about 40% by 2050. They will,\nhowever, still be insufficient to achieve the EU's 2050\ndecarbonisation objective as only less than half of the\ndecarbonisation goal will be achieved in 2050. This creates\nuncertainty among investors, governments and citizens.\nToday, there is inadequate direction as to what should follow\nthe 2020 agenda.
\nThe Roadmap does not replace national, regional and\nlocal efforts to modernise energy supply, but seeks to develop a\nlong-term European technology-neutral framework in which these\npolicies will be more effective. It argues that a European approach\nto the energy challenge will increase security and solidarity and\nlower costs by providing a market for new products and services.\nThe Commission estimates potential cost savings of around\n25% for some stakeholders if there were a more European\napproach for efficient use of renewable energy.
\nCONTENT: in this Energy Roadmap 2050, the Commission\nexplores the challenges posed by delivering the EU's\ndecarbonisation objective while at the same time ensuring\nsecurity of energy supply and competitiveness. The scenarios in\nthis Roadmap all imply major changes in carbon prices,\ntechnology and networks. A number of scenarios examined how to\nachieve an 80% reduction in greenhouse gas emissions implying some\n85% decline of energy-relatedCO2 emissions including from\ntransport. The Commission has also analysed Member States' and\nstakeholders' scenarios and views.
\nThe Energy Roadmap 2050 shows that decarbonisation\nis feasible. Whichever scenario is chosen, a number of \"no\nregret\" options emerge which can bring down emissions effectively\nand in an economically viable way. Furthermore, the\noverall system costs of transforming the energy system are similar\nin all scenarios. A common EU approach can help keep costs\ndown.
\nTo achieve this new energy system, ten conditions must\nbe met:
\n\n1. \nEnergy 2020:\nthe immediate priority is to implement fully the EU's Energy 2020\nstrategy. All existing legislation needs to be applied, and the\nproposals currently in discussion, notably on energy efficiency,\ninfrastructure, safety and international cooperation, need to be\nadopted swiftly. The path towards a new energy system also has a\nsocial dimension. The Commission will continue to encourage social\ndialogue and social partners' involvement to help a fair transition\nand an efficient management of change.
\n\n2. \nEnergy efficiency: the energy system and society as a whole need to be\ndramatically more energy efficient. The co-benefits of achieving\nenergy efficiency in a wider resource efficiency agenda should\ncontribute to meeting the goals in a faster and cost-efficient\nmanner.
\n\n3. \nRenewable energy sources: particular attention should continue to be given to\nthe development of renewable energy. Their rate of development,\nimpact in the market and rapidly growing share in energy demand\ncall for a modernisation of the policy framework. The EU's 20%\nrenewable energy target has so far proven an efficient driver in\ndevelopment of the renewable energy in the EU and timely\nconsideration should be given to options for 2030\nmilestones.
\n\n4. \nResearch and innovation: higher public and private investments in R&D and\ntechnological innovation are crucial in speeding-up the\ncommercialisation of all low-carbon solutions.
\n\n5. \nInternal energy market: the EU is committed to a fully integrated market by\n2014. There are regulatory and structural shortcomings that need to\nbe addressed. Well-designed market structure instruments and new\nways of cooperation are required for the internal energy market to\ndeliver its full potential as new investments are coming into the\nenergy market and the energy mix is changing.
\n\n6. \nEnergy prices need to better reflect\ncosts, notably of the new investments\nneeded throughout the energy system. The earlier prices reflect\ncosts, the easier the transformation will be in the long run.\nSpecial attention should be paid for the most vulnerable groups,\nfor which coping with the energy system transformation will be\nchallenging. Specific measures should be defined at national and\nlocal levels to avoid energy poverty.
\n\n7. \nNew infrastructure: a new sense of urgency and collective responsibility\nmust be brought to bear on the development of new energy\ninfrastructure and storage capacities across Europe and with\nneighbours.
\n\n8. \nSafety and security: there will be no compromise on safety and security\nfor either traditional or new energy sources. The EU must continue\nto strengthen the safety and security framework and lead\ninternational efforts in this field.
\n\n9. \nInternational aspects: a broader and more coordinated EU approach to\ninternational energy relations must become the norm, including\nredoubling work to strengthen international climate\naction.
\n\n10. Investment: Member\nStates and investors need concrete milestones. The Low carbon\neconomy roadmap has already indicated greenhouse gas emission\nmilestones. The next step is to define the 2030 policy framework,\nreasonably foreseeable and the focus of most current\ninvestors.
\nThe Commission will carry out discussions with other\nEU institutions, Member States and stakeholders on the basis of\nthis Roadmap. It will update it regularly, reassessing what is\nnecessary in the light of progress and changes.
\nOn the basis of the Roadmap, the Commission will\ncontinue to bring forward initiatives, starting with comprehensive\nproposals on the internal market, renewable energy and nuclear\nsafety next year.
\nThe Committee on Industry, Research and Energy adopted\nthe own-initiative report by Niki TZAVELA (EFD, EL) on the Energy\nRoadmap 2050: a future with energy, in response to the Commission\nCommunication on the subject.
\nObjectives of the EU2050\nEnergy Roadmap: Members stress\nthe importance of the EU’s energy policy amidst the economic\nand financial crisis, and the role that energy plays in\nspurring growth and economic competitiveness and creating jobs\nin the EU. The Commission is asked to propose post-2020\nstrategies and a policy framework for 2030, including\nmilestones and targets on greenhouse gas emissions, renewable\nenergy and energy efficiency, with the aim of establishing an\nambitious and stable legal and regulatory framework. Since defining\nenergy targets for 2050 and the intervening period assumes\npan-European governance, Members propose the adoption\nof a strategy that allows Member States to cooperate under the\nRoadmap in a spirit of solidarity – the creation of\na European Energy Community. They note that the 2030 policy\nframework must be defined within a timeframe that is appropriate\nfor providing investor security.
\nKey Elements of a long-term strategy: welcoming the Commission’s view that increased\ndeployment of renewables, energy efficiency and energy\ninfrastructure are the ‘no regret’ options,\nregardless of the specific path chosen to achieve a\n‘decarbonised 2050 energy system’, the\nreport invites the Commission to:
\n\n· \nexplore a combined “high renewables and\nhigh energy efficiency” scenario, noting that a choice\nmade about which path to take would help increase investment\ncertainty;
\n\n· \ntake decentralised generation explicitly\ninto account in future estimates of renewable energy in the EU\nenergy mix, and map financial, technical and infrastructural\nobstacles that hamper the growth of decentralised generation in\nMember States.
\nEnergy efficiency:\nMembers stress that the EU’s long-term energy-efficiency\npolicy should take the reduction of energy use in buildings as a\ncentral element, calling on Member States to adopt ambitious,\nlong-term building renovation strategies as required by the Energy Efficiency Directive.\nThe current quality of building renovation needs to be\nsubstantially scaled up in order to significant reduction of energy\nconsumption of the existing building stock by 80 %,\nrelative to 2010 levels, by 2050.
\nThe report calls, furthermore, for greater attention\nto be paid to the heat and cooling sectors in the transformation\nof the energy system, noting that this sector represents about\n45 % of the final energy consumption in Europe.
\nRenewable energy:\nMembers make a series of recommendations on increasing uptake.\nStressing the importance of stable regulatory frameworks, both on\nan EU as on a Member State level to stimulate investments, the\ncommittee is concerned by Member States’ increasingly abrupt\nchanges to support mechanisms for renewable energy, and it calls on\nthe Commission to monitor carefully the implementation of the\nRenewable Energy Directive and to take action if\nnecessary.
\nInfrastructure: energy\ninfrastructure projects are characterised by vast upfront\ninvestment and a 20-60 year operational lifetime. The current\nmarket environment is highly unpredictable, and Members note\nthat investors are hesitant when it comes to energy infrastructure\ndevelopment, stressing the need to promote new strategies and\ninnovative instruments in this regard.
\nSpecific energy sources:\nnoting that all types of low-carbon technology will be needed to\nachieve the goal of decarbonising the EU’s energy system,\nMembers agree that natural gas will play an important role,\nin the short to medium term, in the transformation of the energy\nsystem. They also note that carbon capture storage (CCS)\ncould play a role on the road to decarbonisation by 2050 and they\nadvocate strategies to this effect.
\nSocial dimension:\nlastly, special attention should be given to energy poverty and\nemployment, and Members add that the Commission, Member States and\nlocal authorities should find tailored solutions with a special\nemphasis on low-income and vulnerable households.
\nThe Committee on Industry, Research and Energy adopted\nthe own-initiative report by Niki TZAVELA (EFD, EL) on the Energy\nRoadmap 2050: a future with energy, in response to the Commission\nCommunication on the subject.
\nObjectives of the EU2050\nEnergy Roadmap: Members stress\nthe importance of the EU’s energy policy amidst the economic\nand financial crisis, and the role that energy plays in\nspurring growth and economic competitiveness and creating jobs\nin the EU. The Commission is asked to propose post-2020\nstrategies and a policy framework for 2030, including\nmilestones and targets on greenhouse gas emissions, renewable\nenergy and energy efficiency, with the aim of establishing an\nambitious and stable legal and regulatory framework. Since defining\nenergy targets for 2050 and the intervening period assumes\npan-European governance, Members propose the adoption\nof a strategy that allows Member States to cooperate under the\nRoadmap in a spirit of solidarity – the creation of\na European Energy Community. They note that the 2030 policy\nframework must be defined within a timeframe that is appropriate\nfor providing investor security.
\nKey Elements of a long-term strategy: welcoming the Commission’s view that increased\ndeployment of renewables, energy efficiency and energy\ninfrastructure are the ‘no regret’ options,\nregardless of the specific path chosen to achieve a\n‘decarbonised 2050 energy system’, the\nreport invites the Commission to:
\n\n· \nexplore a combined “high renewables and\nhigh energy efficiency” scenario, noting that a choice\nmade about which path to take would help increase investment\ncertainty;
\n\n· \ntake decentralised generation explicitly\ninto account in future estimates of renewable energy in the EU\nenergy mix, and map financial, technical and infrastructural\nobstacles that hamper the growth of decentralised generation in\nMember States.
\nEnergy efficiency:\nMembers stress that the EU’s long-term energy-efficiency\npolicy should take the reduction of energy use in buildings as a\ncentral element, calling on Member States to adopt ambitious,\nlong-term building renovation strategies as required by the Energy Efficiency Directive.\nThe current quality of building renovation needs to be\nsubstantially scaled up in order to significant reduction of energy\nconsumption of the existing building stock by 80 %,\nrelative to 2010 levels, by 2050.
\nThe report calls, furthermore, for greater attention\nto be paid to the heat and cooling sectors in the transformation\nof the energy system, noting that this sector represents about\n45 % of the final energy consumption in Europe.
\nRenewable energy:\nMembers make a series of recommendations on increasing uptake.\nStressing the importance of stable regulatory frameworks, both on\nan EU as on a Member State level to stimulate investments, the\ncommittee is concerned by Member States’ increasingly abrupt\nchanges to support mechanisms for renewable energy, and it calls on\nthe Commission to monitor carefully the implementation of the\nRenewable Energy Directive and to take action if\nnecessary.
\nInfrastructure: energy\ninfrastructure projects are characterised by vast upfront\ninvestment and a 20-60 year operational lifetime. The current\nmarket environment is highly unpredictable, and Members note\nthat investors are hesitant when it comes to energy infrastructure\ndevelopment, stressing the need to promote new strategies and\ninnovative instruments in this regard.
\nSpecific energy sources:\nnoting that all types of low-carbon technology will be needed to\nachieve the goal of decarbonising the EU’s energy system,\nMembers agree that natural gas will play an important role,\nin the short to medium term, in the transformation of the energy\nsystem. They also note that carbon capture storage (CCS)\ncould play a role on the road to decarbonisation by 2050 and they\nadvocate strategies to this effect.
\nSocial dimension:\nlastly, special attention should be given to energy poverty and\nemployment, and Members add that the Commission, Member States and\nlocal authorities should find tailored solutions with a special\nemphasis on low-income and vulnerable households.
\nPURPOSE: to present the Commission’s Energy\nRoadmap 2050.
\nBACKGROUND: the EU is committed to reducing greenhouse\ngas emissions to 80-95% below 1990 levels by 2050 in the context of\nnecessary reductions by developed countries as a group. The\nCommission analysed the implications of this in its \"Roadmap for moving to a competitive low-carbon\neconomy in 2050\". The \"Roadmap to a Single European Transport\nArea\" focussed on solutions for the transport\nsector and on creating a Single European Transport Area.
\nThe EU policies and measures to achieve the Energy 2020 goals and the\nEnergy 2020 strategy are ambitious: by 2020, at least 20 %\nreduction in greenhouse gas emissions compared to 1990 (30% if\ninternational conditions are right); saving of 20 % of EU energy\nconsumption compared to projections for 2020; 20 % share of\nrenewable energies in EU energy consumption, 10% share in\ntransport. These measures will continue to deliver beyond 2020\nhelping to reduce emissions by about 40% by 2050. They will,\nhowever, still be insufficient to achieve the EU's 2050\ndecarbonisation objective as only less than half of the\ndecarbonisation goal will be achieved in 2050. This creates\nuncertainty among investors, governments and citizens.\nToday, there is inadequate direction as to what should follow\nthe 2020 agenda.
\nThe Roadmap does not replace national, regional and\nlocal efforts to modernise energy supply, but seeks to develop a\nlong-term European technology-neutral framework in which these\npolicies will be more effective. It argues that a European approach\nto the energy challenge will increase security and solidarity and\nlower costs by providing a market for new products and services.\nThe Commission estimates potential cost savings of around\n25% for some stakeholders if there were a more European\napproach for efficient use of renewable energy.
\nCONTENT: in this Energy Roadmap 2050, the Commission\nexplores the challenges posed by delivering the EU's\ndecarbonisation objective while at the same time ensuring\nsecurity of energy supply and competitiveness. The scenarios in\nthis Roadmap all imply major changes in carbon prices,\ntechnology and networks. A number of scenarios examined how to\nachieve an 80% reduction in greenhouse gas emissions implying some\n85% decline of energy-relatedCO2 emissions including from\ntransport. The Commission has also analysed Member States' and\nstakeholders' scenarios and views.
\nThe Energy Roadmap 2050 shows that decarbonisation\nis feasible. Whichever scenario is chosen, a number of \"no\nregret\" options emerge which can bring down emissions effectively\nand in an economically viable way. Furthermore, the\noverall system costs of transforming the energy system are similar\nin all scenarios. A common EU approach can help keep costs\ndown.
\nTo achieve this new energy system, ten conditions must\nbe met:
\n\n1. \nEnergy 2020:\nthe immediate priority is to implement fully the EU's Energy 2020\nstrategy. All existing legislation needs to be applied, and the\nproposals currently in discussion, notably on energy efficiency,\ninfrastructure, safety and international cooperation, need to be\nadopted swiftly. The path towards a new energy system also has a\nsocial dimension. The Commission will continue to encourage social\ndialogue and social partners' involvement to help a fair transition\nand an efficient management of change.
\n\n2. \nEnergy efficiency: the energy system and society as a whole need to be\ndramatically more energy efficient. The co-benefits of achieving\nenergy efficiency in a wider resource efficiency agenda should\ncontribute to meeting the goals in a faster and cost-efficient\nmanner.
\n\n3. \nRenewable energy sources: particular attention should continue to be given to\nthe development of renewable energy. Their rate of development,\nimpact in the market and rapidly growing share in energy demand\ncall for a modernisation of the policy framework. The EU's 20%\nrenewable energy target has so far proven an efficient driver in\ndevelopment of the renewable energy in the EU and timely\nconsideration should be given to options for 2030\nmilestones.
\n\n4. \nResearch and innovation: higher public and private investments in R&D and\ntechnological innovation are crucial in speeding-up the\ncommercialisation of all low-carbon solutions.
\n\n5. \nInternal energy market: the EU is committed to a fully integrated market by\n2014. There are regulatory and structural shortcomings that need to\nbe addressed. Well-designed market structure instruments and new\nways of cooperation are required for the internal energy market to\ndeliver its full potential as new investments are coming into the\nenergy market and the energy mix is changing.
\n\n6. \nEnergy prices need to better reflect\ncosts, notably of the new investments\nneeded throughout the energy system. The earlier prices reflect\ncosts, the easier the transformation will be in the long run.\nSpecial attention should be paid for the most vulnerable groups,\nfor which coping with the energy system transformation will be\nchallenging. Specific measures should be defined at national and\nlocal levels to avoid energy poverty.
\n\n7. \nNew infrastructure: a new sense of urgency and collective responsibility\nmust be brought to bear on the development of new energy\ninfrastructure and storage capacities across Europe and with\nneighbours.
\n\n8. \nSafety and security: there will be no compromise on safety and security\nfor either traditional or new energy sources. The EU must continue\nto strengthen the safety and security framework and lead\ninternational efforts in this field.
\n\n9. \nInternational aspects: a broader and more coordinated EU approach to\ninternational energy relations must become the norm, including\nredoubling work to strengthen international climate\naction.
\n\n10. Investment: Member\nStates and investors need concrete milestones. The Low carbon\neconomy roadmap has already indicated greenhouse gas emission\nmilestones. The next step is to define the 2030 policy framework,\nreasonably foreseeable and the focus of most current\ninvestors.
\nThe Commission will carry out discussions with other\nEU institutions, Member States and stakeholders on the basis of\nthis Roadmap. It will update it regularly, reassessing what is\nnecessary in the light of progress and changes.
\nOn the basis of the Roadmap, the Commission will\ncontinue to bring forward initiatives, starting with comprehensive\nproposals on the internal market, renewable energy and nuclear\nsafety next year.
\nThe Committee on Industry, Research and Energy adopted\nthe own-initiative report by Niki TZAVELA (EFD, EL) on the Energy\nRoadmap 2050: a future with energy, in response to the Commission\nCommunication on the subject.
\nObjectives of the EU2050\nEnergy Roadmap: Members stress\nthe importance of the EU’s energy policy amidst the economic\nand financial crisis, and the role that energy plays in\nspurring growth and economic competitiveness and creating jobs\nin the EU. The Commission is asked to propose post-2020\nstrategies and a policy framework for 2030, including\nmilestones and targets on greenhouse gas emissions, renewable\nenergy and energy efficiency, with the aim of establishing an\nambitious and stable legal and regulatory framework. Since defining\nenergy targets for 2050 and the intervening period assumes\npan-European governance, Members propose the adoption\nof a strategy that allows Member States to cooperate under the\nRoadmap in a spirit of solidarity – the creation of\na European Energy Community. They note that the 2030 policy\nframework must be defined within a timeframe that is appropriate\nfor providing investor security.
\nKey Elements of a long-term strategy: welcoming the Commission’s view that increased\ndeployment of renewables, energy efficiency and energy\ninfrastructure are the ‘no regret’ options,\nregardless of the specific path chosen to achieve a\n‘decarbonised 2050 energy system’, the\nreport invites the Commission to:
\n\n· \nexplore a combined “high renewables and\nhigh energy efficiency” scenario, noting that a choice\nmade about which path to take would help increase investment\ncertainty;
\n\n· \ntake decentralised generation explicitly\ninto account in future estimates of renewable energy in the EU\nenergy mix, and map financial, technical and infrastructural\nobstacles that hamper the growth of decentralised generation in\nMember States.
\nEnergy efficiency:\nMembers stress that the EU’s long-term energy-efficiency\npolicy should take the reduction of energy use in buildings as a\ncentral element, calling on Member States to adopt ambitious,\nlong-term building renovation strategies as required by the Energy Efficiency Directive.\nThe current quality of building renovation needs to be\nsubstantially scaled up in order to significant reduction of energy\nconsumption of the existing building stock by 80 %,\nrelative to 2010 levels, by 2050.
\nThe report calls, furthermore, for greater attention\nto be paid to the heat and cooling sectors in the transformation\nof the energy system, noting that this sector represents about\n45 % of the final energy consumption in Europe.
\nRenewable energy:\nMembers make a series of recommendations on increasing uptake.\nStressing the importance of stable regulatory frameworks, both on\nan EU as on a Member State level to stimulate investments, the\ncommittee is concerned by Member States’ increasingly abrupt\nchanges to support mechanisms for renewable energy, and it calls on\nthe Commission to monitor carefully the implementation of the\nRenewable Energy Directive and to take action if\nnecessary.
\nInfrastructure: energy\ninfrastructure projects are characterised by vast upfront\ninvestment and a 20-60 year operational lifetime. The current\nmarket environment is highly unpredictable, and Members note\nthat investors are hesitant when it comes to energy infrastructure\ndevelopment, stressing the need to promote new strategies and\ninnovative instruments in this regard.
\nSpecific energy sources:\nnoting that all types of low-carbon technology will be needed to\nachieve the goal of decarbonising the EU’s energy system,\nMembers agree that natural gas will play an important role,\nin the short to medium term, in the transformation of the energy\nsystem. They also note that carbon capture storage (CCS)\ncould play a role on the road to decarbonisation by 2050 and they\nadvocate strategies to this effect.
\nSocial dimension:\nlastly, special attention should be given to energy poverty and\nemployment, and Members add that the Commission, Member States and\nlocal authorities should find tailored solutions with a special\nemphasis on low-income and vulnerable households.
\nPURPOSE: to present the Commission’s Energy\nRoadmap 2050.
\nBACKGROUND: the EU is committed to reducing greenhouse\ngas emissions to 80-95% below 1990 levels by 2050 in the context of\nnecessary reductions by developed countries as a group. The\nCommission analysed the implications of this in its \"Roadmap for moving to a competitive low-carbon\neconomy in 2050\". The \"Roadmap to a Single European Transport\nArea\" focussed on solutions for the transport\nsector and on creating a Single European Transport Area.
\nThe EU policies and measures to achieve the Energy 2020 goals and the\nEnergy 2020 strategy are ambitious: by 2020, at least 20 %\nreduction in greenhouse gas emissions compared to 1990 (30% if\ninternational conditions are right); saving of 20 % of EU energy\nconsumption compared to projections for 2020; 20 % share of\nrenewable energies in EU energy consumption, 10% share in\ntransport. These measures will continue to deliver beyond 2020\nhelping to reduce emissions by about 40% by 2050. They will,\nhowever, still be insufficient to achieve the EU's 2050\ndecarbonisation objective as only less than half of the\ndecarbonisation goal will be achieved in 2050. This creates\nuncertainty among investors, governments and citizens.\nToday, there is inadequate direction as to what should follow\nthe 2020 agenda.
\nThe Roadmap does not replace national, regional and\nlocal efforts to modernise energy supply, but seeks to develop a\nlong-term European technology-neutral framework in which these\npolicies will be more effective. It argues that a European approach\nto the energy challenge will increase security and solidarity and\nlower costs by providing a market for new products and services.\nThe Commission estimates potential cost savings of around\n25% for some stakeholders if there were a more European\napproach for efficient use of renewable energy.
\nCONTENT: in this Energy Roadmap 2050, the Commission\nexplores the challenges posed by delivering the EU's\ndecarbonisation objective while at the same time ensuring\nsecurity of energy supply and competitiveness. The scenarios in\nthis Roadmap all imply major changes in carbon prices,\ntechnology and networks. A number of scenarios examined how to\nachieve an 80% reduction in greenhouse gas emissions implying some\n85% decline of energy-relatedCO2 emissions including from\ntransport. The Commission has also analysed Member States' and\nstakeholders' scenarios and views.
\nThe Energy Roadmap 2050 shows that decarbonisation\nis feasible. Whichever scenario is chosen, a number of \"no\nregret\" options emerge which can bring down emissions effectively\nand in an economically viable way. Furthermore, the\noverall system costs of transforming the energy system are similar\nin all scenarios. A common EU approach can help keep costs\ndown.
\nTo achieve this new energy system, ten conditions must\nbe met:
\n\n1. \nEnergy 2020:\nthe immediate priority is to implement fully the EU's Energy 2020\nstrategy. All existing legislation needs to be applied, and the\nproposals currently in discussion, notably on energy efficiency,\ninfrastructure, safety and international cooperation, need to be\nadopted swiftly. The path towards a new energy system also has a\nsocial dimension. The Commission will continue to encourage social\ndialogue and social partners' involvement to help a fair transition\nand an efficient management of change.
\n\n2. \nEnergy efficiency: the energy system and society as a whole need to be\ndramatically more energy efficient. The co-benefits of achieving\nenergy efficiency in a wider resource efficiency agenda should\ncontribute to meeting the goals in a faster and cost-efficient\nmanner.
\n\n3. \nRenewable energy sources: particular attention should continue to be given to\nthe development of renewable energy. Their rate of development,\nimpact in the market and rapidly growing share in energy demand\ncall for a modernisation of the policy framework. The EU's 20%\nrenewable energy target has so far proven an efficient driver in\ndevelopment of the renewable energy in the EU and timely\nconsideration should be given to options for 2030\nmilestones.
\n\n4. \nResearch and innovation: higher public and private investments in R&D and\ntechnological innovation are crucial in speeding-up the\ncommercialisation of all low-carbon solutions.
\n\n5. \nInternal energy market: the EU is committed to a fully integrated market by\n2014. There are regulatory and structural shortcomings that need to\nbe addressed. Well-designed market structure instruments and new\nways of cooperation are required for the internal energy market to\ndeliver its full potential as new investments are coming into the\nenergy market and the energy mix is changing.
\n\n6. \nEnergy prices need to better reflect\ncosts, notably of the new investments\nneeded throughout the energy system. The earlier prices reflect\ncosts, the easier the transformation will be in the long run.\nSpecial attention should be paid for the most vulnerable groups,\nfor which coping with the energy system transformation will be\nchallenging. Specific measures should be defined at national and\nlocal levels to avoid energy poverty.
\n\n7. \nNew infrastructure: a new sense of urgency and collective responsibility\nmust be brought to bear on the development of new energy\ninfrastructure and storage capacities across Europe and with\nneighbours.
\n\n8. \nSafety and security: there will be no compromise on safety and security\nfor either traditional or new energy sources. The EU must continue\nto strengthen the safety and security framework and lead\ninternational efforts in this field.
\n\n9. \nInternational aspects: a broader and more coordinated EU approach to\ninternational energy relations must become the norm, including\nredoubling work to strengthen international climate\naction.
\n\n10. Investment: Member\nStates and investors need concrete milestones. The Low carbon\neconomy roadmap has already indicated greenhouse gas emission\nmilestones. The next step is to define the 2030 policy framework,\nreasonably foreseeable and the focus of most current\ninvestors.
\nThe Commission will carry out discussions with other\nEU institutions, Member States and stakeholders on the basis of\nthis Roadmap. It will update it regularly, reassessing what is\nnecessary in the light of progress and changes.
\nOn the basis of the Roadmap, the Commission will\ncontinue to bring forward initiatives, starting with comprehensive\nproposals on the internal market, renewable energy and nuclear\nsafety next year.
\nPURPOSE: to present the Commission’s Energy\nRoadmap 2050.
\nBACKGROUND: the EU is committed to reducing greenhouse\ngas emissions to 80-95% below 1990 levels by 2050 in the context of\nnecessary reductions by developed countries as a group. The\nCommission analysed the implications of this in its \"Roadmap for moving to a competitive low-carbon\neconomy in 2050\". The \"Roadmap to a Single European Transport\nArea\" focussed on solutions for the transport\nsector and on creating a Single European Transport Area.
\nThe EU policies and measures to achieve the Energy 2020 goals and the\nEnergy 2020 strategy are ambitious: by 2020, at least 20 %\nreduction in greenhouse gas emissions compared to 1990 (30% if\ninternational conditions are right); saving of 20 % of EU energy\nconsumption compared to projections for 2020; 20 % share of\nrenewable energies in EU energy consumption, 10% share in\ntransport. These measures will continue to deliver beyond 2020\nhelping to reduce emissions by about 40% by 2050. They will,\nhowever, still be insufficient to achieve the EU's 2050\ndecarbonisation objective as only less than half of the\ndecarbonisation goal will be achieved in 2050. This creates\nuncertainty among investors, governments and citizens.\nToday, there is inadequate direction as to what should follow\nthe 2020 agenda.
\nThe Roadmap does not replace national, regional and\nlocal efforts to modernise energy supply, but seeks to develop a\nlong-term European technology-neutral framework in which these\npolicies will be more effective. It argues that a European approach\nto the energy challenge will increase security and solidarity and\nlower costs by providing a market for new products and services.\nThe Commission estimates potential cost savings of around\n25% for some stakeholders if there were a more European\napproach for efficient use of renewable energy.
\nCONTENT: in this Energy Roadmap 2050, the Commission\nexplores the challenges posed by delivering the EU's\ndecarbonisation objective while at the same time ensuring\nsecurity of energy supply and competitiveness. The scenarios in\nthis Roadmap all imply major changes in carbon prices,\ntechnology and networks. A number of scenarios examined how to\nachieve an 80% reduction in greenhouse gas emissions implying some\n85% decline of energy-relatedCO2 emissions including from\ntransport. The Commission has also analysed Member States' and\nstakeholders' scenarios and views.
\nThe Energy Roadmap 2050 shows that decarbonisation\nis feasible. Whichever scenario is chosen, a number of \"no\nregret\" options emerge which can bring down emissions effectively\nand in an economically viable way. Furthermore, the\noverall system costs of transforming the energy system are similar\nin all scenarios. A common EU approach can help keep costs\ndown.
\nTo achieve this new energy system, ten conditions must\nbe met:
\n\n1. \nEnergy 2020:\nthe immediate priority is to implement fully the EU's Energy 2020\nstrategy. All existing legislation needs to be applied, and the\nproposals currently in discussion, notably on energy efficiency,\ninfrastructure, safety and international cooperation, need to be\nadopted swiftly. The path towards a new energy system also has a\nsocial dimension. The Commission will continue to encourage social\ndialogue and social partners' involvement to help a fair transition\nand an efficient management of change.
\n\n2. \nEnergy efficiency: the energy system and society as a whole need to be\ndramatically more energy efficient. The co-benefits of achieving\nenergy efficiency in a wider resource efficiency agenda should\ncontribute to meeting the goals in a faster and cost-efficient\nmanner.
\n\n3. \nRenewable energy sources: particular attention should continue to be given to\nthe development of renewable energy. Their rate of development,\nimpact in the market and rapidly growing share in energy demand\ncall for a modernisation of the policy framework. The EU's 20%\nrenewable energy target has so far proven an efficient driver in\ndevelopment of the renewable energy in the EU and timely\nconsideration should be given to options for 2030\nmilestones.
\n\n4. \nResearch and innovation: higher public and private investments in R&D and\ntechnological innovation are crucial in speeding-up the\ncommercialisation of all low-carbon solutions.
\n\n5. \nInternal energy market: the EU is committed to a fully integrated market by\n2014. There are regulatory and structural shortcomings that need to\nbe addressed. Well-designed market structure instruments and new\nways of cooperation are required for the internal energy market to\ndeliver its full potential as new investments are coming into the\nenergy market and the energy mix is changing.
\n\n6. \nEnergy prices need to better reflect\ncosts, notably of the new investments\nneeded throughout the energy system. The earlier prices reflect\ncosts, the easier the transformation will be in the long run.\nSpecial attention should be paid for the most vulnerable groups,\nfor which coping with the energy system transformation will be\nchallenging. Specific measures should be defined at national and\nlocal levels to avoid energy poverty.
\n\n7. \nNew infrastructure: a new sense of urgency and collective responsibility\nmust be brought to bear on the development of new energy\ninfrastructure and storage capacities across Europe and with\nneighbours.
\n\n8. \nSafety and security: there will be no compromise on safety and security\nfor either traditional or new energy sources. The EU must continue\nto strengthen the safety and security framework and lead\ninternational efforts in this field.
\n\n9. \nInternational aspects: a broader and more coordinated EU approach to\ninternational energy relations must become the norm, including\nredoubling work to strengthen international climate\naction.
\n\n10. Investment: Member\nStates and investors need concrete milestones. The Low carbon\neconomy roadmap has already indicated greenhouse gas emission\nmilestones. The next step is to define the 2030 policy framework,\nreasonably foreseeable and the focus of most current\ninvestors.
\nThe Commission will carry out discussions with other\nEU institutions, Member States and stakeholders on the basis of\nthis Roadmap. It will update it regularly, reassessing what is\nnecessary in the light of progress and changes.
\nOn the basis of the Roadmap, the Commission will\ncontinue to bring forward initiatives, starting with comprehensive\nproposals on the internal market, renewable energy and nuclear\nsafety next year.
\nThe Committee on Foreign Affairs adopted the report by\nJacek SARYUSZ-WOLSKI (EPP, PL) on\nthe EU foreign policy towards the BRICS and other emerging powers:\nobjectives and strategies.
\nMembers recall the growing political and economic\nrelevance of Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa (the\nBRICS) entails an increased relevance of these countries in foreign\npolicy terms. Seven emerging countries (Brazil, Russia, India,\nChina, Indonesia, Mexico and Turkey) are projected to have larger\neconomies than, collectively, the G-7 countries (USA, Japan,\nCanada, United Kingdom, Germany, France and Italy) in 2050. In\nterms of gross domestic product, China is projected to become the\nworld’s largest economy before 2020 and in 2050, China, the\nUSA and India could together represent 50% of the world’s\neconomy.
\nMembers stress that with the process of consolidation\nof strong economic and foreign policy powers such as the BRICS, a\nmulti-polar system has emerged, where global leadership is\nincreasingly shared amongst several countries and regional blocs of\ncountries, this may entail a progressive shift in global economic\npower to the BRICS and other emerging economies and may further\nentail a shift of leadership and positive leverage in foreign\npolicy terms from established powers to emerging powers.
\nThe report stresses how the current economic crisis\nhas demonstrated the interdependence between the emerged powers\nand the BRICS and other emerging countries. It points to the\ndeep,mutual link between stable economic growth of developed\neconomies and stable economic growth of emerging economies. It\nbelieves that further political dialogue and understanding with the\nBRICS and other emerging countries, including on an individual\nbasis, should thus be pursued by the EU and its Member States\nin a spirit of partnership and with the overall aim of achieving an\ninclusive new system of governance, based on shared responsibility,\ncommon approaches and more closely coordinated actions.
\nPolitical aspect of relations with the\nBRICS: Members believe that relations\nbetween, on the one hand, the established powers and, on the other,\nthe BRICS and other emerging powers maintain a relevant economic\ndimension, but are essentially political and should thus be\npolitically framed, as all the countries concerned share an\ninterest in ensuring an effective system of global governance and\nin tackling together, global stability and security risks.\nPolitical systems vary from strong authoritarian regimes to\ncredible and stable democracies. They call, in this respect, on the\nEU to step up relations and develop synergies, in particular, with\nthose BRICS that genuinely share and respect democratic values and\nstrive for a social market economy.
\nTowards global governance: the report points to the need to develop an\ninclusive system of global governance, based on cooperation\nand coordination with the BRICS and other emerging countries, as\nappropriate, for the benefit of all. Members take the view that the\nEU should act more strategically so as to bring Europe's true\nweight to bear internationally, in particular by managing the\nimplications of interdependence, instigating reforms of global\ngovernance, and mobilising collective action in areas such as the\nrule of law, sustainable environment and regional\nsecurity.
\nMembers welcome the concept of bilateral strategic\npartnerships and urge the Council and the EEAS to\noperationalise it. They recommend that this instrument be used by\nthe EU to pursue both multilateral and bilateral agendas and to\ndevelop meaningful linkages between the two. They note that in the past the BRICS have appeared to\ncoordinate their stances in foreign policy terms in the UN Security\nCouncil in certain instances, most notably at the onset of the\nLibyan and Syrian crises and, additionally, by deferring the vote\non the role of the EU in the UNGA and by adopting coinciding\npositions on Côte d'Ivoire and Sudan. A true partnership may\nbring to the fore positive synergies and facilitate a new inclusive\nsystem of global governance.
\nCountry-by country relationships: Members believe that, in light of their political\nand economic interests and their scale, regional role and\naspirations, the BRICS may attempt to act as a group in foreign\npolicy terms, but acknowledges that individual dimensions\nare also relevant. They consider, in this connection, that besides\nfocusing on the BRICS as a potentially cohesive group of States in\nforeign policy terms, the EU should focus also on the BRICS on a\ncountry-by-country basis, whilst maintaining a systemic and\ncoordinated approach. They believe\nfurther that the considerable divergences in the political and\neconomic systems, demographic and social trends, and foreign policy\noutlooks of the BRICS should inform, and be reflected in, a nuanced\nEU policy towards these countries aimed at creating synergies with\nindividual BRICS countries and other emerging countries and at\ndiscouraging the creation or consolidation of potentially cohesive\nalternative groups of States in foreign policy\nterms.
\nBilateral dialogues:\nMembers take the view that relations with the BRICS countries\nshould be built upon bilateral dialogues focusing on and fostering\nfurther democratisation and the consolidation of the rule of law,\ngood governance, regulatory convergence, coordination of common\npositions in international fora and intensified relations with the\nEU. The report focuses on the relations to be established with each\nof the countries:
\nG-20: Members believe\nthat the G-20 could prove a useful and particularly appropriate\nforum for consensus building and for a decision-making process\nwhich is inclusive. They support the G-20 parliamentary dimension\nand believe that it should be further consolidated and involved in\nthe decision-making processes to ensure reinforced democratic\ndialogue and scrutiny. They also support the creation of a parallel\nG-20 consultative forum bringing together non-governmental\norganisations and leading representatives of civil society and\nbusiness from G-20 states. They believe that the current sovereign\ndebt crisis will be an important test for the G-20 as an effective\nforum for strategic political dialogue able to promote a truly\nglobal system of economic and financial governance.
\nRegional organisations and transatlantic\nrelations: Members consider that the\nemerged powers should support regional organisations which include\nthe BRICS and other emerging countries, such as ASEAN or Mercosur.\nBoth the USA and the EU may progressively\nshift their primary attention, political investment and resources\nto the Pacific and perceive the North Atlantic dimension and mutual\ncooperation as less strategic. The report calls for more\ncoordination of the US and EU policies towards China, India and\nother emerging countries in Asia in order to avoid a decoupling of\nsuch policies. It recalls that transatlantic relations are of\nutmost importance both economically and politically and stresses\nthe mutual strong economic relationship between the US and the EU.\nMembers believe that, with a view to achieving a coherent\npolicy stance towards the BRICS and other emerging powers, it is of\nfundamental importance that Member States develop their bilateral\nrelations with maximum transparency and bearing in mind the\npotential impact of such relations on EU policies and\nstances.
\nStrengthen the EU’s position\non the international scene: Members believe that the EU should strive to\nachieve more political and economic cohesion and growth in order to\nmaintain political leverage and a key role in the multipolar\nsystem that is taking shape and be perceived as a necessary\nvaluable counterpart by the BRICS and the new emerging\ncountries.
\nThey stress that the overall coordination of EU\nforeign policy towards the BRICS and other emerging powers should\nbe ensured by the High Representative of the Union for Foreign\nAffairs and Security Policy/Vice-President of the Commission in\naccordance with Articles 18(4) and 21(3) TEU. They believe that the\nEU should strive to achieve a better linking of foreign and\nsecurity policy with EU sectoral policies, such as development,\nenergy security, trade, access to raw materials and rare earths,\nclimate change and migration, with a view to exploiting synergies\nand ensuring a coherent and systemic foreign policy approach.\nMembers take the view that a coherent foreign policy approach at EU\nlevel also entails enhanced coordination between the President of\nthe European Council, the High Representative, the Council,\nParliament and the Commission on issues related to the agendas of\nthe G-7, G-8 and G-20. In this context, Members stress the role to\nbe played by the EEAS and state that it should establish an\nad hoc coordinating mechanism to ensure that all individual\npolicies towards the BRICS are compatible from a systemic point of\nview and that the policy lines adopted are reflected in the EU\ndialogue with emerged powers such as the USA, Canada and Japan.\nMoreover, the EU delegations in BRICS countries should\nanalyse the positions of BRICS countries on governance and global\nchallenges and on relations with other BRICS countries.
\nMembers believe that the staff of EU Delegations in\nBRICS countries should include Parliament liaison officers in order\nto foster a greater understanding of the national parliamentary\ndimension in each of those countries.
\nDemocratic\nscrutiny: Members\nbelieve that, with a view to ensuring effective democratic scrutiny\nof EU policy-making towards the BRICS and other emerging countries,\nand in order to facilitate an enhanced interparliamentary dialogue\nwith such countries, relevant Parliament staff should develop\nspecialised competence and thus have appropriate analytical tools\nand monitoring capacity and be able to assist Members in promoting\neffective dialogue.
\nBudgetary issues: Members welcome the Commission Communication on ‘A\nBudget for Europe 2020’, which draws up a proposal for the\ndesign of financial instruments and programmes under the next\nMultiannual Financial Framework 2014-2020. They underlinethat the\nnew partnership instrument aimed at supporting EU political and\neconomic interests in the rest of the world and including\nnon-ODA-eligible activities should be a foreign policy instrument.\nThey take the view, however, that provision should also be made for\nadditional resources supporting democratisation, the\nconsolidation of the rule of law, better education and the\nreduction of social disparities. These resources should give\nparticular relevance to ad hoc financing lines supporting emerging\npowers and potentially emerging powers in consolidating democratic\nstructures and developing good governance and the rule of law.\nLastly, they welcome the proposal by the Commission to include the\nprinciple of conditionality in all EU programmes and\ninstruments.
\nThe Committee on Foreign Affairs adopted the report by\nJacek SARYUSZ-WOLSKI (EPP, PL) on\nthe EU foreign policy towards the BRICS and other emerging powers:\nobjectives and strategies.
\nMembers recall the growing political and economic\nrelevance of Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa (the\nBRICS) entails an increased relevance of these countries in foreign\npolicy terms. Seven emerging countries (Brazil, Russia, India,\nChina, Indonesia, Mexico and Turkey) are projected to have larger\neconomies than, collectively, the G-7 countries (USA, Japan,\nCanada, United Kingdom, Germany, France and Italy) in 2050. In\nterms of gross domestic product, China is projected to become the\nworld’s largest economy before 2020 and in 2050, China, the\nUSA and India could together represent 50% of the world’s\neconomy.
\nMembers stress that with the process of consolidation\nof strong economic and foreign policy powers such as the BRICS, a\nmulti-polar system has emerged, where global leadership is\nincreasingly shared amongst several countries and regional blocs of\ncountries, this may entail a progressive shift in global economic\npower to the BRICS and other emerging economies and may further\nentail a shift of leadership and positive leverage in foreign\npolicy terms from established powers to emerging powers.
\nThe report stresses how the current economic crisis\nhas demonstrated the interdependence between the emerged powers\nand the BRICS and other emerging countries. It points to the\ndeep,mutual link between stable economic growth of developed\neconomies and stable economic growth of emerging economies. It\nbelieves that further political dialogue and understanding with the\nBRICS and other emerging countries, including on an individual\nbasis, should thus be pursued by the EU and its Member States\nin a spirit of partnership and with the overall aim of achieving an\ninclusive new system of governance, based on shared responsibility,\ncommon approaches and more closely coordinated actions.
\nPolitical aspect of relations with the\nBRICS: Members believe that relations\nbetween, on the one hand, the established powers and, on the other,\nthe BRICS and other emerging powers maintain a relevant economic\ndimension, but are essentially political and should thus be\npolitically framed, as all the countries concerned share an\ninterest in ensuring an effective system of global governance and\nin tackling together, global stability and security risks.\nPolitical systems vary from strong authoritarian regimes to\ncredible and stable democracies. They call, in this respect, on the\nEU to step up relations and develop synergies, in particular, with\nthose BRICS that genuinely share and respect democratic values and\nstrive for a social market economy.
\nTowards global governance: the report points to the need to develop an\ninclusive system of global governance, based on cooperation\nand coordination with the BRICS and other emerging countries, as\nappropriate, for the benefit of all. Members take the view that the\nEU should act more strategically so as to bring Europe's true\nweight to bear internationally, in particular by managing the\nimplications of interdependence, instigating reforms of global\ngovernance, and mobilising collective action in areas such as the\nrule of law, sustainable environment and regional\nsecurity.
\nMembers welcome the concept of bilateral strategic\npartnerships and urge the Council and the EEAS to\noperationalise it. They recommend that this instrument be used by\nthe EU to pursue both multilateral and bilateral agendas and to\ndevelop meaningful linkages between the two. They note that in the past the BRICS have appeared to\ncoordinate their stances in foreign policy terms in the UN Security\nCouncil in certain instances, most notably at the onset of the\nLibyan and Syrian crises and, additionally, by deferring the vote\non the role of the EU in the UNGA and by adopting coinciding\npositions on Côte d'Ivoire and Sudan. A true partnership may\nbring to the fore positive synergies and facilitate a new inclusive\nsystem of global governance.
\nCountry-by country relationships: Members believe that, in light of their political\nand economic interests and their scale, regional role and\naspirations, the BRICS may attempt to act as a group in foreign\npolicy terms, but acknowledges that individual dimensions\nare also relevant. They consider, in this connection, that besides\nfocusing on the BRICS as a potentially cohesive group of States in\nforeign policy terms, the EU should focus also on the BRICS on a\ncountry-by-country basis, whilst maintaining a systemic and\ncoordinated approach. They believe\nfurther that the considerable divergences in the political and\neconomic systems, demographic and social trends, and foreign policy\noutlooks of the BRICS should inform, and be reflected in, a nuanced\nEU policy towards these countries aimed at creating synergies with\nindividual BRICS countries and other emerging countries and at\ndiscouraging the creation or consolidation of potentially cohesive\nalternative groups of States in foreign policy\nterms.
\nBilateral dialogues:\nMembers take the view that relations with the BRICS countries\nshould be built upon bilateral dialogues focusing on and fostering\nfurther democratisation and the consolidation of the rule of law,\ngood governance, regulatory convergence, coordination of common\npositions in international fora and intensified relations with the\nEU. The report focuses on the relations to be established with each\nof the countries:
\nG-20: Members believe\nthat the G-20 could prove a useful and particularly appropriate\nforum for consensus building and for a decision-making process\nwhich is inclusive. They support the G-20 parliamentary dimension\nand believe that it should be further consolidated and involved in\nthe decision-making processes to ensure reinforced democratic\ndialogue and scrutiny. They also support the creation of a parallel\nG-20 consultative forum bringing together non-governmental\norganisations and leading representatives of civil society and\nbusiness from G-20 states. They believe that the current sovereign\ndebt crisis will be an important test for the G-20 as an effective\nforum for strategic political dialogue able to promote a truly\nglobal system of economic and financial governance.
\nRegional organisations and transatlantic\nrelations: Members consider that the\nemerged powers should support regional organisations which include\nthe BRICS and other emerging countries, such as ASEAN or Mercosur.\nBoth the USA and the EU may progressively\nshift their primary attention, political investment and resources\nto the Pacific and perceive the North Atlantic dimension and mutual\ncooperation as less strategic. The report calls for more\ncoordination of the US and EU policies towards China, India and\nother emerging countries in Asia in order to avoid a decoupling of\nsuch policies. It recalls that transatlantic relations are of\nutmost importance both economically and politically and stresses\nthe mutual strong economic relationship between the US and the EU.\nMembers believe that, with a view to achieving a coherent\npolicy stance towards the BRICS and other emerging powers, it is of\nfundamental importance that Member States develop their bilateral\nrelations with maximum transparency and bearing in mind the\npotential impact of such relations on EU policies and\nstances.
\nStrengthen the EU’s position\non the international scene: Members believe that the EU should strive to\nachieve more political and economic cohesion and growth in order to\nmaintain political leverage and a key role in the multipolar\nsystem that is taking shape and be perceived as a necessary\nvaluable counterpart by the BRICS and the new emerging\ncountries.
\nThey stress that the overall coordination of EU\nforeign policy towards the BRICS and other emerging powers should\nbe ensured by the High Representative of the Union for Foreign\nAffairs and Security Policy/Vice-President of the Commission in\naccordance with Articles 18(4) and 21(3) TEU. They believe that the\nEU should strive to achieve a better linking of foreign and\nsecurity policy with EU sectoral policies, such as development,\nenergy security, trade, access to raw materials and rare earths,\nclimate change and migration, with a view to exploiting synergies\nand ensuring a coherent and systemic foreign policy approach.\nMembers take the view that a coherent foreign policy approach at EU\nlevel also entails enhanced coordination between the President of\nthe European Council, the High Representative, the Council,\nParliament and the Commission on issues related to the agendas of\nthe G-7, G-8 and G-20. In this context, Members stress the role to\nbe played by the EEAS and state that it should establish an\nad hoc coordinating mechanism to ensure that all individual\npolicies towards the BRICS are compatible from a systemic point of\nview and that the policy lines adopted are reflected in the EU\ndialogue with emerged powers such as the USA, Canada and Japan.\nMoreover, the EU delegations in BRICS countries should\nanalyse the positions of BRICS countries on governance and global\nchallenges and on relations with other BRICS countries.
\nMembers believe that the staff of EU Delegations in\nBRICS countries should include Parliament liaison officers in order\nto foster a greater understanding of the national parliamentary\ndimension in each of those countries.
\nDemocratic\nscrutiny: Members\nbelieve that, with a view to ensuring effective democratic scrutiny\nof EU policy-making towards the BRICS and other emerging countries,\nand in order to facilitate an enhanced interparliamentary dialogue\nwith such countries, relevant Parliament staff should develop\nspecialised competence and thus have appropriate analytical tools\nand monitoring capacity and be able to assist Members in promoting\neffective dialogue.
\nBudgetary issues: Members welcome the Commission Communication on ‘A\nBudget for Europe 2020’, which draws up a proposal for the\ndesign of financial instruments and programmes under the next\nMultiannual Financial Framework 2014-2020. They underlinethat the\nnew partnership instrument aimed at supporting EU political and\neconomic interests in the rest of the world and including\nnon-ODA-eligible activities should be a foreign policy instrument.\nThey take the view, however, that provision should also be made for\nadditional resources supporting democratisation, the\nconsolidation of the rule of law, better education and the\nreduction of social disparities. These resources should give\nparticular relevance to ad hoc financing lines supporting emerging\npowers and potentially emerging powers in consolidating democratic\nstructures and developing good governance and the rule of law.\nLastly, they welcome the proposal by the Commission to include the\nprinciple of conditionality in all EU programmes and\ninstruments.
\nThe Committee on Foreign Affairs adopted the report by\nJacek SARYUSZ-WOLSKI (EPP, PL) on\nthe EU foreign policy towards the BRICS and other emerging powers:\nobjectives and strategies.
\nMembers recall the growing political and economic\nrelevance of Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa (the\nBRICS) entails an increased relevance of these countries in foreign\npolicy terms. Seven emerging countries (Brazil, Russia, India,\nChina, Indonesia, Mexico and Turkey) are projected to have larger\neconomies than, collectively, the G-7 countries (USA, Japan,\nCanada, United Kingdom, Germany, France and Italy) in 2050. In\nterms of gross domestic product, China is projected to become the\nworld’s largest economy before 2020 and in 2050, China, the\nUSA and India could together represent 50% of the world’s\neconomy.
\nMembers stress that with the process of consolidation\nof strong economic and foreign policy powers such as the BRICS, a\nmulti-polar system has emerged, where global leadership is\nincreasingly shared amongst several countries and regional blocs of\ncountries, this may entail a progressive shift in global economic\npower to the BRICS and other emerging economies and may further\nentail a shift of leadership and positive leverage in foreign\npolicy terms from established powers to emerging powers.
\nThe report stresses how the current economic crisis\nhas demonstrated the interdependence between the emerged powers\nand the BRICS and other emerging countries. It points to the\ndeep,mutual link between stable economic growth of developed\neconomies and stable economic growth of emerging economies. It\nbelieves that further political dialogue and understanding with the\nBRICS and other emerging countries, including on an individual\nbasis, should thus be pursued by the EU and its Member States\nin a spirit of partnership and with the overall aim of achieving an\ninclusive new system of governance, based on shared responsibility,\ncommon approaches and more closely coordinated actions.
\nPolitical aspect of relations with the\nBRICS: Members believe that relations\nbetween, on the one hand, the established powers and, on the other,\nthe BRICS and other emerging powers maintain a relevant economic\ndimension, but are essentially political and should thus be\npolitically framed, as all the countries concerned share an\ninterest in ensuring an effective system of global governance and\nin tackling together, global stability and security risks.\nPolitical systems vary from strong authoritarian regimes to\ncredible and stable democracies. They call, in this respect, on the\nEU to step up relations and develop synergies, in particular, with\nthose BRICS that genuinely share and respect democratic values and\nstrive for a social market economy.
\nTowards global governance: the report points to the need to develop an\ninclusive system of global governance, based on cooperation\nand coordination with the BRICS and other emerging countries, as\nappropriate, for the benefit of all. Members take the view that the\nEU should act more strategically so as to bring Europe's true\nweight to bear internationally, in particular by managing the\nimplications of interdependence, instigating reforms of global\ngovernance, and mobilising collective action in areas such as the\nrule of law, sustainable environment and regional\nsecurity.
\nMembers welcome the concept of bilateral strategic\npartnerships and urge the Council and the EEAS to\noperationalise it. They recommend that this instrument be used by\nthe EU to pursue both multilateral and bilateral agendas and to\ndevelop meaningful linkages between the two. They note that in the past the BRICS have appeared to\ncoordinate their stances in foreign policy terms in the UN Security\nCouncil in certain instances, most notably at the onset of the\nLibyan and Syrian crises and, additionally, by deferring the vote\non the role of the EU in the UNGA and by adopting coinciding\npositions on Côte d'Ivoire and Sudan. A true partnership may\nbring to the fore positive synergies and facilitate a new inclusive\nsystem of global governance.
\nCountry-by country relationships: Members believe that, in light of their political\nand economic interests and their scale, regional role and\naspirations, the BRICS may attempt to act as a group in foreign\npolicy terms, but acknowledges that individual dimensions\nare also relevant. They consider, in this connection, that besides\nfocusing on the BRICS as a potentially cohesive group of States in\nforeign policy terms, the EU should focus also on the BRICS on a\ncountry-by-country basis, whilst maintaining a systemic and\ncoordinated approach. They believe\nfurther that the considerable divergences in the political and\neconomic systems, demographic and social trends, and foreign policy\noutlooks of the BRICS should inform, and be reflected in, a nuanced\nEU policy towards these countries aimed at creating synergies with\nindividual BRICS countries and other emerging countries and at\ndiscouraging the creation or consolidation of potentially cohesive\nalternative groups of States in foreign policy\nterms.
\nBilateral dialogues:\nMembers take the view that relations with the BRICS countries\nshould be built upon bilateral dialogues focusing on and fostering\nfurther democratisation and the consolidation of the rule of law,\ngood governance, regulatory convergence, coordination of common\npositions in international fora and intensified relations with the\nEU. The report focuses on the relations to be established with each\nof the countries:
\nG-20: Members believe\nthat the G-20 could prove a useful and particularly appropriate\nforum for consensus building and for a decision-making process\nwhich is inclusive. They support the G-20 parliamentary dimension\nand believe that it should be further consolidated and involved in\nthe decision-making processes to ensure reinforced democratic\ndialogue and scrutiny. They also support the creation of a parallel\nG-20 consultative forum bringing together non-governmental\norganisations and leading representatives of civil society and\nbusiness from G-20 states. They believe that the current sovereign\ndebt crisis will be an important test for the G-20 as an effective\nforum for strategic political dialogue able to promote a truly\nglobal system of economic and financial governance.
\nRegional organisations and transatlantic\nrelations: Members consider that the\nemerged powers should support regional organisations which include\nthe BRICS and other emerging countries, such as ASEAN or Mercosur.\nBoth the USA and the EU may progressively\nshift their primary attention, political investment and resources\nto the Pacific and perceive the North Atlantic dimension and mutual\ncooperation as less strategic. The report calls for more\ncoordination of the US and EU policies towards China, India and\nother emerging countries in Asia in order to avoid a decoupling of\nsuch policies. It recalls that transatlantic relations are of\nutmost importance both economically and politically and stresses\nthe mutual strong economic relationship between the US and the EU.\nMembers believe that, with a view to achieving a coherent\npolicy stance towards the BRICS and other emerging powers, it is of\nfundamental importance that Member States develop their bilateral\nrelations with maximum transparency and bearing in mind the\npotential impact of such relations on EU policies and\nstances.
\nStrengthen the EU’s position\non the international scene: Members believe that the EU should strive to\nachieve more political and economic cohesion and growth in order to\nmaintain political leverage and a key role in the multipolar\nsystem that is taking shape and be perceived as a necessary\nvaluable counterpart by the BRICS and the new emerging\ncountries.
\nThey stress that the overall coordination of EU\nforeign policy towards the BRICS and other emerging powers should\nbe ensured by the High Representative of the Union for Foreign\nAffairs and Security Policy/Vice-President of the Commission in\naccordance with Articles 18(4) and 21(3) TEU. They believe that the\nEU should strive to achieve a better linking of foreign and\nsecurity policy with EU sectoral policies, such as development,\nenergy security, trade, access to raw materials and rare earths,\nclimate change and migration, with a view to exploiting synergies\nand ensuring a coherent and systemic foreign policy approach.\nMembers take the view that a coherent foreign policy approach at EU\nlevel also entails enhanced coordination between the President of\nthe European Council, the High Representative, the Council,\nParliament and the Commission on issues related to the agendas of\nthe G-7, G-8 and G-20. In this context, Members stress the role to\nbe played by the EEAS and state that it should establish an\nad hoc coordinating mechanism to ensure that all individual\npolicies towards the BRICS are compatible from a systemic point of\nview and that the policy lines adopted are reflected in the EU\ndialogue with emerged powers such as the USA, Canada and Japan.\nMoreover, the EU delegations in BRICS countries should\nanalyse the positions of BRICS countries on governance and global\nchallenges and on relations with other BRICS countries.
\nMembers believe that the staff of EU Delegations in\nBRICS countries should include Parliament liaison officers in order\nto foster a greater understanding of the national parliamentary\ndimension in each of those countries.
\nDemocratic\nscrutiny: Members\nbelieve that, with a view to ensuring effective democratic scrutiny\nof EU policy-making towards the BRICS and other emerging countries,\nand in order to facilitate an enhanced interparliamentary dialogue\nwith such countries, relevant Parliament staff should develop\nspecialised competence and thus have appropriate analytical tools\nand monitoring capacity and be able to assist Members in promoting\neffective dialogue.
\nBudgetary issues: Members welcome the Commission Communication on ‘A\nBudget for Europe 2020’, which draws up a proposal for the\ndesign of financial instruments and programmes under the next\nMultiannual Financial Framework 2014-2020. They underlinethat the\nnew partnership instrument aimed at supporting EU political and\neconomic interests in the rest of the world and including\nnon-ODA-eligible activities should be a foreign policy instrument.\nThey take the view, however, that provision should also be made for\nadditional resources supporting democratisation, the\nconsolidation of the rule of law, better education and the\nreduction of social disparities. These resources should give\nparticular relevance to ad hoc financing lines supporting emerging\npowers and potentially emerging powers in consolidating democratic\nstructures and developing good governance and the rule of law.\nLastly, they welcome the proposal by the Commission to include the\nprinciple of conditionality in all EU programmes and\ninstruments.
\nThe Committee on Foreign Affairs adopted the report by\nJacek SARYUSZ-WOLSKI (EPP, PL) on\nthe EU foreign policy towards the BRICS and other emerging powers:\nobjectives and strategies.
\nMembers recall the growing political and economic\nrelevance of Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa (the\nBRICS) entails an increased relevance of these countries in foreign\npolicy terms. Seven emerging countries (Brazil, Russia, India,\nChina, Indonesia, Mexico and Turkey) are projected to have larger\neconomies than, collectively, the G-7 countries (USA, Japan,\nCanada, United Kingdom, Germany, France and Italy) in 2050. In\nterms of gross domestic product, China is projected to become the\nworld’s largest economy before 2020 and in 2050, China, the\nUSA and India could together represent 50% of the world’s\neconomy.
\nMembers stress that with the process of consolidation\nof strong economic and foreign policy powers such as the BRICS, a\nmulti-polar system has emerged, where global leadership is\nincreasingly shared amongst several countries and regional blocs of\ncountries, this may entail a progressive shift in global economic\npower to the BRICS and other emerging economies and may further\nentail a shift of leadership and positive leverage in foreign\npolicy terms from established powers to emerging powers.
\nThe report stresses how the current economic crisis\nhas demonstrated the interdependence between the emerged powers\nand the BRICS and other emerging countries. It points to the\ndeep,mutual link between stable economic growth of developed\neconomies and stable economic growth of emerging economies. It\nbelieves that further political dialogue and understanding with the\nBRICS and other emerging countries, including on an individual\nbasis, should thus be pursued by the EU and its Member States\nin a spirit of partnership and with the overall aim of achieving an\ninclusive new system of governance, based on shared responsibility,\ncommon approaches and more closely coordinated actions.
\nPolitical aspect of relations with the\nBRICS: Members believe that relations\nbetween, on the one hand, the established powers and, on the other,\nthe BRICS and other emerging powers maintain a relevant economic\ndimension, but are essentially political and should thus be\npolitically framed, as all the countries concerned share an\ninterest in ensuring an effective system of global governance and\nin tackling together, global stability and security risks.\nPolitical systems vary from strong authoritarian regimes to\ncredible and stable democracies. They call, in this respect, on the\nEU to step up relations and develop synergies, in particular, with\nthose BRICS that genuinely share and respect democratic values and\nstrive for a social market economy.
\nTowards global governance: the report points to the need to develop an\ninclusive system of global governance, based on cooperation\nand coordination with the BRICS and other emerging countries, as\nappropriate, for the benefit of all. Members take the view that the\nEU should act more strategically so as to bring Europe's true\nweight to bear internationally, in particular by managing the\nimplications of interdependence, instigating reforms of global\ngovernance, and mobilising collective action in areas such as the\nrule of law, sustainable environment and regional\nsecurity.
\nMembers welcome the concept of bilateral strategic\npartnerships and urge the Council and the EEAS to\noperationalise it. They recommend that this instrument be used by\nthe EU to pursue both multilateral and bilateral agendas and to\ndevelop meaningful linkages between the two. They note that in the past the BRICS have appeared to\ncoordinate their stances in foreign policy terms in the UN Security\nCouncil in certain instances, most notably at the onset of the\nLibyan and Syrian crises and, additionally, by deferring the vote\non the role of the EU in the UNGA and by adopting coinciding\npositions on Côte d'Ivoire and Sudan. A true partnership may\nbring to the fore positive synergies and facilitate a new inclusive\nsystem of global governance.
\nCountry-by country relationships: Members believe that, in light of their political\nand economic interests and their scale, regional role and\naspirations, the BRICS may attempt to act as a group in foreign\npolicy terms, but acknowledges that individual dimensions\nare also relevant. They consider, in this connection, that besides\nfocusing on the BRICS as a potentially cohesive group of States in\nforeign policy terms, the EU should focus also on the BRICS on a\ncountry-by-country basis, whilst maintaining a systemic and\ncoordinated approach. They believe\nfurther that the considerable divergences in the political and\neconomic systems, demographic and social trends, and foreign policy\noutlooks of the BRICS should inform, and be reflected in, a nuanced\nEU policy towards these countries aimed at creating synergies with\nindividual BRICS countries and other emerging countries and at\ndiscouraging the creation or consolidation of potentially cohesive\nalternative groups of States in foreign policy\nterms.
\nBilateral dialogues:\nMembers take the view that relations with the BRICS countries\nshould be built upon bilateral dialogues focusing on and fostering\nfurther democratisation and the consolidation of the rule of law,\ngood governance, regulatory convergence, coordination of common\npositions in international fora and intensified relations with the\nEU. The report focuses on the relations to be established with each\nof the countries:
\nG-20: Members believe\nthat the G-20 could prove a useful and particularly appropriate\nforum for consensus building and for a decision-making process\nwhich is inclusive. They support the G-20 parliamentary dimension\nand believe that it should be further consolidated and involved in\nthe decision-making processes to ensure reinforced democratic\ndialogue and scrutiny. They also support the creation of a parallel\nG-20 consultative forum bringing together non-governmental\norganisations and leading representatives of civil society and\nbusiness from G-20 states. They believe that the current sovereign\ndebt crisis will be an important test for the G-20 as an effective\nforum for strategic political dialogue able to promote a truly\nglobal system of economic and financial governance.
\nRegional organisations and transatlantic\nrelations: Members consider that the\nemerged powers should support regional organisations which include\nthe BRICS and other emerging countries, such as ASEAN or Mercosur.\nBoth the USA and the EU may progressively\nshift their primary attention, political investment and resources\nto the Pacific and perceive the North Atlantic dimension and mutual\ncooperation as less strategic. The report calls for more\ncoordination of the US and EU policies towards China, India and\nother emerging countries in Asia in order to avoid a decoupling of\nsuch policies. It recalls that transatlantic relations are of\nutmost importance both economically and politically and stresses\nthe mutual strong economic relationship between the US and the EU.\nMembers believe that, with a view to achieving a coherent\npolicy stance towards the BRICS and other emerging powers, it is of\nfundamental importance that Member States develop their bilateral\nrelations with maximum transparency and bearing in mind the\npotential impact of such relations on EU policies and\nstances.
\nStrengthen the EU’s position\non the international scene: Members believe that the EU should strive to\nachieve more political and economic cohesion and growth in order to\nmaintain political leverage and a key role in the multipolar\nsystem that is taking shape and be perceived as a necessary\nvaluable counterpart by the BRICS and the new emerging\ncountries.
\nThey stress that the overall coordination of EU\nforeign policy towards the BRICS and other emerging powers should\nbe ensured by the High Representative of the Union for Foreign\nAffairs and Security Policy/Vice-President of the Commission in\naccordance with Articles 18(4) and 21(3) TEU. They believe that the\nEU should strive to achieve a better linking of foreign and\nsecurity policy with EU sectoral policies, such as development,\nenergy security, trade, access to raw materials and rare earths,\nclimate change and migration, with a view to exploiting synergies\nand ensuring a coherent and systemic foreign policy approach.\nMembers take the view that a coherent foreign policy approach at EU\nlevel also entails enhanced coordination between the President of\nthe European Council, the High Representative, the Council,\nParliament and the Commission on issues related to the agendas of\nthe G-7, G-8 and G-20. In this context, Members stress the role to\nbe played by the EEAS and state that it should establish an\nad hoc coordinating mechanism to ensure that all individual\npolicies towards the BRICS are compatible from a systemic point of\nview and that the policy lines adopted are reflected in the EU\ndialogue with emerged powers such as the USA, Canada and Japan.\nMoreover, the EU delegations in BRICS countries should\nanalyse the positions of BRICS countries on governance and global\nchallenges and on relations with other BRICS countries.
\nMembers believe that the staff of EU Delegations in\nBRICS countries should include Parliament liaison officers in order\nto foster a greater understanding of the national parliamentary\ndimension in each of those countries.
\nDemocratic\nscrutiny: Members\nbelieve that, with a view to ensuring effective democratic scrutiny\nof EU policy-making towards the BRICS and other emerging countries,\nand in order to facilitate an enhanced interparliamentary dialogue\nwith such countries, relevant Parliament staff should develop\nspecialised competence and thus have appropriate analytical tools\nand monitoring capacity and be able to assist Members in promoting\neffective dialogue.
\nBudgetary issues: Members welcome the Commission Communication on ‘A\nBudget for Europe 2020’, which draws up a proposal for the\ndesign of financial instruments and programmes under the next\nMultiannual Financial Framework 2014-2020. They underlinethat the\nnew partnership instrument aimed at supporting EU political and\neconomic interests in the rest of the world and including\nnon-ODA-eligible activities should be a foreign policy instrument.\nThey take the view, however, that provision should also be made for\nadditional resources supporting democratisation, the\nconsolidation of the rule of law, better education and the\nreduction of social disparities. These resources should give\nparticular relevance to ad hoc financing lines supporting emerging\npowers and potentially emerging powers in consolidating democratic\nstructures and developing good governance and the rule of law.\nLastly, they welcome the proposal by the Commission to include the\nprinciple of conditionality in all EU programmes and\ninstruments.
\nPURPOSE: to amend the Staff Regulations of Officials\nof the European Communities and the Conditions of Employment of\nOther Servants of those Communities to take account of the setting\nup of the European\nExternal Action Service (EEAS).
\nPROPOSED ACT: Regulation of the European Parliament\nand of the Council.
\nBACKGROUND: the Treaty of Lisbon, which entered into\nforce on 1 December 2009, created the office of the High\nRepresentative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy\nand Vice-President of the Commission. According to the Treaty, the\nHigh Representative and Vice-President is to be assisted by the\nEuropean External Action Service (EEAS). Article 27(3) of the\nTreaty on European Union stipulates that the EEAS is to work in\ncooperation with the diplomatic services of the Member States and\nis to comprise officials from relevant departments of the General\nSecretariat of the Council and of the Commission as well as staff\nseconded from national diplomatic services of the Member\nStates.
\nAs is the case for all the institutions and bodies of\nthe Union, the EEAS staffing and personnel policy will operate\nwithin the framework established by the Staff Regulations of\nOfficials of the European Communities and the Conditions of\nEmployment of Other Servants of those Communities. In order to\nallow the EEAS to operate, certain amendments to the Staff\nRegulations and the Conditions of Employment are required. Apart\nfrom adaptations to the new terminology resulting from the entry\ninto force of the Treaty of Lisbon, the proposed amendments are\nlimited to what is necessary for the establishment and functioning\nof the EEAS.
\nThis proposal is one of the legislative measures that\nneed to be adopted in that context.
\nIMPACT ASSESSMENT: no impact assessment was carried\nout.
\nLEGAL BASIS: Article 336 of the Treaty on the\nFunctioning of the European Union (TFEU).
\nCONTENT: in order to be operational right from its\ninception, the EEAS must have qualified and experienced staff at\nits disposal. The Regulation confirms that - where it is stipulated\nin the Council Decision establishing the EEAS that an entity from\nthe Council or Commission organisation chart is transferred to the\nEEAS - the officials and temporary staff occupying posts in that\nentity and other staff assigned to that entity are transferred\nfrom their respective institutions to the EEAS.
\nEqual treatment: a\nfundamental aspect of the EEAS is the equality of treatment between\nthe sources of EEAS staffing. Selection procedures for posts will\nthus be open on an equal basis (as opposed to the current\nsituation, where internal candidates, followed by\ninter-institutional candidates, have priority). Hence, the\nAppointing Authority will consider applications for vacant posts in\nthe EEAS from different categories of staff - staff of national\ndiplomatic services, officials of the Commission, the Council and\nthe EEAS, as well as temporary staff of the EEAS from national\ndiplomatic services - without giving any priority to any of\nthem. After the start-up phase, but on 1 July 2013 at the\nlatest, this facilitated access to vacant posts in the EEAS will be\nextended to officials of other institutions of the Union. In order\nto guarantee proper representation of staff from national\ndiplomatic services in the EEAS, it should be possible, until 30\nJune 2013, to give priority to candidates from national diplomatic\nservices of the Member States for AD posts in case of substantially\nequal qualifications.
\nSpecific category of temporary staff: staff will be employed by the EEAS as a specific\ncategory of temporary staff. For this particular category of\ntemporary staff, certain rules (retirement age, possibility of\nsecondment, and leave on personal grounds) are aligned to those\napplicable to officials. These staff members will thus benefit from\nthe same working conditions as officials.
\nFlexibility: officials\nof the EEAS who were officials of either the Council or the\nCommission before taking up their duties in the EEAS will be able\nto apply for vacant posts in their institution of origin on the\nsame basis as officials inside those institutions. Their\napplications will thus be considered as applications from internal\ncandidates. In exceptional circumstances, a transfer in the\ninterests of the service, i.e. without prior publication of the\npost, from the EEAS to the Council or the Commission and vice\nversa will be made possible.
\nAuthority entrusted with powers: the EEAS will be treated as an institution\nfor the purposes of the Staff Regulations. The High Representative\nand Vice-President will be the Appointing Authority for the staff\nof the EEAS (with a possibility to entrust EEAS staff members with\nthese powers). Special arrangements are foreseen for cases where\nEEAS staff will have to perform functions on behalf of the\nCommission. In this respect they will have to take instructions\nfrom the Commission. Moreover, the Commission will be involved\nin the recruitment and evaluation of these members of staff, as\nwell as in disciplinary matters. In addition, account is also\ntaken of the situation of Commission officials working in Union\ndelegations who will have to take instructions in certain areas\nfrom the Head of delegation (who will be an official or a temporary\nagent of the EEAS).
\nOther technical measures: these concern Annex X to the Staff Regulations\n(applicable to staff serving in third countries), contract staff\nand local staff. They should improve the functioning of the Union\ndelegations.
\nThe whole of Annex X (and not only certain provisions)\nwill apply to contract staff serving in a third country, including\nCommission staff. Contract staff engaged to perform duties in\ndelegations will be able to take part in the rotation between\ndelegations and Headquarters.
\nIn order to ensure better gender balance in\ndelegations, staff serving in third countries will be able to take\nparental leave while continuing to benefit from certain provisions\nof Annex X (accommodation provided by the institution or\nreimbursement of rent, supplementary sickness insurance and\neducation allowance) for a restricted period of time.
\nThe amendments concerning local staff are aimed\nat improving their social security protection. Currently, local\nstaff working in countries with no, or insufficient, social\nsecurity systems are asked to contribute to an EU-established\nscheme, while the Commission pays the employer's contribution. A\nspecific provision should be introduced in the Conditions of\nEmployment, as this scheme provides for minimum social guarantees,\nwhich are not ensured by national law.
\nBUDGETARY IMPLICATION: the proposal is broadly\nbudgetary neutral, although some provisions have a small\nbudgetary impact:
\nThe Court of Auditors presented an opinion on the\nCouncil's request on 21 June 2010 on the proposal for a regulation\nof the European Parliament and of the Council amending the Staff\nRegulations of Officials of the European Communities and the\nConditions of Employment of Other Servants of those\nCommunities.
\nThe main elements of this opinion may be summarised as\nfollows:
\nOn a general note: the\nCourt considers that it will be a major challenge to form, from the\ndifferent components of the EEAS, a homogeneous service with an\nappropriate esprit de corps to serve the interests of the Union. A\nprecondition for success will be that staff from all components of\nthe EEAS will be treated in an equal manner, having the same\nrights and obligations, regardless of whether they are officials of\nthe EU or temporary agents coming from the diplomatic services of\nthe Member State.
\nThe Court recalls that the EEAS will be a\nfunctionally autonomous body of a sui generis nature, benefiting\nfrom its own section of the budget, while, at the same time, the\nEEAS will remain at Union Delegation level the relevant service to\nthe Commission for the implementation of a wide range of\noperational appropriations from the 'Commission' section of the\nbudget.
\nThe staff in Union Delegations will comprise\nEEAS staff and Commission staff. The Heads of Delegation will have\nauthority over all staff in the Union Delegation, whatever their\nstatus, and for all its activities. They shall be accountable to\nthe High Representative but the Commission will also be entitled to\nissue instructions to Union Delegations, which shall be executed\nunder the overall responsibility of the Heads of Delegation. This\nwill mean that the Heads of Delegation will report to two different\nauthorities which may give rise to conflicts of priority. The Court\nconsiders of utmost importance to preserve and enhance\naccountability, responsibility, and quality of management at Union\nDelegation level.
\nThe Court also made a series of specific\ncomments:
\n(a) on the amendments to the Staff\nRegulations, includingCEOS (Conditions of Employment of Other\nServants):\nthe Court stresses the need to: (i) better define the level of\nresponsibility as regards the Heads of Delegation; they should in\nparticular: (ii) define the scope of the competences of a distinct\nDisciplinary Board; (iii) clarify, in the CEOS, other\nprovisions concerning seconded staff from national diplomatic\nservices who will fill temporarily permanent posts in the EEAS and\nto reinforce the provisions are regards equal treatment and social\nsecurity cover for these agents;
\n(b) on the other provisions in connection with the\nEEAS: provisions are set out that\nwould allow the High Representative to give priority to candidates\nfrom national diplomatic services of the Member States in order to\nguarantee adequate representation. In their current form, these\nprovisions will not be incorporated into the text of the amended\nStaff Regulations or of the amended CEOS. This is not consistent\nwith the purpose of the proposal to amend the Staff Regulations and\nthe CEOS. For reasons of clarity and legal certainty, all\nprovisions should be laid down in the body of the text of the\namended Staff Regulations and CEOS or in their annexes.
\nThe Committee on Legal Affairs adopted the report\ndrafted by Bernhard RAPKAY (S&D, DE) on the proposal for a\nregulation of the European Parliament and of the Council amending\nthe Staff Regulations of Officials of the European Communities and\nthe Conditions of Employment of Other Servants of those\nCommunities.
\nIt recommended that the European Parliament adopts its\nposition at first reading under the ordinary legislative procedure\n(former co-decision procedure) amending the Commission's proposal\nas follows:
\nEnsuring equal treatment:Officials of the Union and temporary agents coming\nfrom the diplomatic services of the Member States should have the\nsame rights and obligations and be treated equally, in particular\nas concerns their eligibility to assume all positions under\nequivalent conditions. No distinction should be made between\ntemporary agents coming from national diplomatic services and\nofficials of the Union as regards the assignment of duties to\nperform in all areas of activities and policies implemented by the\nEEAS.
\nOrganising staff transfers to the EEAS:staff transfers and seconded staff from Member States\nshould be organised in the following way:
\nRecruiting seconded national experts: the EEAS may, in specific cases, have recourse to a\nlimited number of specialised seconded national experts (SNEs),\nseconded with a view to their performing specific tasks, in\nparticular related to crisis management or military functions, over\nwhom the High Representative should have authority. Their\nsecondment should not be counted in the one third of all EEAS staff\nat AD level which staff from Member States should represent when\nthe EEAS reaches its full capacity.
\nEnsuring a proper balance amongst the different staff\ncomponents of the EEAS: in order to\nensure a proper balance amongst the different staff components of\nthe EEAS and in accordance with Council Decision 2010/427/EU, when\nthe EEAS has reached its full capacity, personnel from the\ndiplomatic services of the Member States appointed as temporary\nagents should represent at least one third of all EEAS staff\nat AD level and Union officials should represent at least 60% of\nall EEAS staff at AD level. This should include staff coming\nfrom the diplomatic services of the Member States who have become\npermanent officials of the Union in accordance with the provisions\nof the Staff Regulations.
\nRecruiting highly qualified staff: recruitment or engagement should be directed to\nsecuring for the EEAS the services of officials and temporary staff\nof the highest standard of ability, efficiency and integrity,\nrecruited on the broadest possible geographical basis from among\nnationals of Member States of the Union. This will apply to the\nEEAS as a whole and to its different staff components, including\ntemporary staff. In addition, the staff of the EEAS should comprise\nan appropriate and meaningful presence of nationals from all the\nMember States.
\nPromoting gender equality:the High Representative will take appropriate\nmeasures to promote equal opportunities for the under-represented\ngender in certain function groups, more particularly in function\ngroup AD.
\nDuration of contracts of seconded staff engaged as\ntemporary EEAS staff: the proposal\nprovides that the engagement of seconded staff should not exceed\neight years. However, in exceptional circumstances and in the\ninterest of the service, at the end of the eighth year, the\ncontract may be extended for a maximum period of two years. After\nthis delay, staff may reintegrate immediately their posts in the\nnational administrations.
\nSetting up a Disciplinary Board and a Staff Committee\nby 31 December 2011: a Disciplinary\nBoard should be established by the HR for the EEAS by 31 December\n2011 at the latest. The Disciplinary Board established in the\nCommission should also serve as the Disciplinary Board for the\nEEAS, until the High Representative decides to establish a\nDisciplinary Board for the EEAS. Similarly, a Staff Committee\nshould also be set up within the EEAS by 31 December 2011 at the\nlatest. Until as such time as this happens, the Staff Committee of\nthe Commission shall also represent EEAS staff, who would be\nentitled to vote and stand as candidates in its\nelections.
\nStatement from the High Representative (HR) on\ngeographical balance in the EEAS: the\nHigh Representative, Mrs Ashton, should attach the highest\nimportance to the recruitment on the broadest possible geographical\nbasis from among the nationals of the Member States of the Union,\nas well as to ensuring an appropriate and meaningful presence of\nnationals from all Member States in the Service. The HR should\nattach the highest importance to the promotion of gender balance in\nthe staffing of the EEAS. A key to the promotion of gender balance\nis the encouragement of applications from women for posts in the\nEEAS and the removal of barriers in this respect. She will also\nidentify best practices from national diplomatic services and apply\nthem whenever possible to the EEAS. Full use of all the\npossibilities in promoting the employment of women in the Service\nshould be made.
\nBy mid-2013, the High Representative shall submit a\nreport to the European Parliament, the Council and the Commission\non the implementation of this Regulation, with a particular\nemphasis on gender and geographical balance of staff within the\nEEAS.
\nThe European Parliament adopted by 513 votes to 51\nagainst, with 98 abstentions, a legislative resolution on the\nproposal for a regulation of the European Parliament and of the\nCouncil amending the Staff Regulations of Officials of the European\nCommunities and the Conditions of Employment of Other Servants of\nthose Communities.
\nThe European Parliament adopted its position at first\nreading under the ordinary legislative procedure (former\nco-decision procedure). The amendments adopted in plenary are the\nresult of a compromise reached between the European Parliament and\nthe Council. They amend the Commission's proposal as\nfollows:
\nOrganising staff transfers to the EEAS:staff transfers and seconded staff from Member States\nshould be organised in the following way:
\nRecruiting seconded national experts: the compromise reached in plenary states that the\nEEAS may, in specific cases, have recourse to a limited number of\nspecialised seconded national experts (SNEs), seconded with a view\nto their performing specific tasks, in particular related to crisis\nmanagement or military functions, over whom the High Representative\nshould have authority. Their secondment should not be counted in\nthe one third of all EEAS staff at AD level which staff from Member\nStates should represent when the EEAS reaches its full\ncapacity.
\nEnsuring a proper balance amongst the different staff\ncomponents of the EEAS: in order to\nensure a proper balance amongst the different staff components of\nthe EEAS and in accordance with Council Decision 2010/427/EU,\nwhen the EEAS has reached its full capacity, personnel from the\ndiplomatic services of the Member States appointed as temporary\nagents should represent at least one third of all EEAS staff\nat AD level and Union officials should represent at least 60% of\nall EEAS staff at AD level. This should include staff coming\nfrom the diplomatic services of the Member States who have become\npermanent officials of the Union in accordance with the provisions\nof the Staff Regulations.
\nRecruiting highly qualified staff: the amended text stipulates that recruitment or\nengagement should be directed to securing for the EEAS the services\nof officials and temporary staff of the highest standard of\nability, efficiency and integrity, recruited on the broadest\npossible geographical basis from among nationals of Member States\nof the Union. This will apply to the EEAS as a whole and to its\ndifferent staff components, including temporary staff. In addition,\nthe staff of the EEAS should comprise an appropriate and meaningful\npresence of nationals from all the Member States.
\nPromoting gender equality:it is also stipulated thatthe High Representative\nwill take appropriate measures to promote equal opportunities for\nthe under-represented gender in certain function groups, more\nparticularly in function group AD.
\nDuration of contracts of seconded staff engaged as\ntemporary EEAS staff: the proposal\nprovides that the engagement of seconded staff should not exceed\neight years. However, in exceptional circumstances and in the\ninterest of the service, at the end of the eighth year, the\ncontract may be extended for a maximum period of two years. After\nthis delay, staff may reintegrate immediately their posts in the\nnational administrations.
\nSetting up a Disciplinary Board and a Staff Committee\nby 31 December 2011: the compromise\nstates that a Disciplinary Board should be established by the HR\nfor the EEAS by 31 December 2011 at the latest. The Disciplinary\nBoard established in the Commission should also serve as the\nDisciplinary Board for the EEAS, until the High Representative\ndecides to establish a Disciplinary Board for the EEAS. Similarly,\na Staff Committee should also be set up within the EEAS by 31\nDecember 2011 at the latest. Until as such time as this happens,\nthe Staff Committee of the Commission shall also represent EEAS\nstaff, who would be entitled to vote and stand as candidates in its\nelections.
\nStatement from the High Representative (HR) on\ngeographical balance in the EEAS: the\nHigh Representative, Mrs Ashton, should attach the highest\nimportance to the recruitment on the broadest possible geographical\nbasis from among the nationals of the Member States of the Union,\nas well as to ensuring an appropriate and meaningful presence of\nnationals from all Member States in the Service. The HR should\nattach the highest importance to the promotion of gender balance in\nthe staffing of the EEAS. A key to the promotion of gender balance\nis the encouragement of applications from women for posts in the\nEEAS and the removal of barriers in this respect. She will also\nidentify best practices from national diplomatic services and apply\nthem whenever possible to the EEAS. Full use of all the\npossibilities in promoting the employment of women in the Service\nshould be made.
\nBy mid-2013, the High Representative shall submit a\nreport to the European Parliament, the Council and the Commission\non the implementation of this Regulation, with a particular\nemphasis on gender and geographical balance of staff within the\nEEAS.
\nPURPOSE: PURPOSE: to amend the\nStaff Regulations of Officials of the European Communities and the\nConditions of Employment of Other Servants of those Communities to\ntake account of the setting up of the European External Action Service\n(EEAS).
\nLEGISLATIVE ACT: Regulation (EU, Euratom) No 1080/2010\nof the European Parliament and of the Council amending the Staff\nRegulations of Officials of the European Communities and the\nConditions of Employment of Other Servants of those\nCommunities.
\nCONTENT: the Council adopted revised versions of\nthe EU staff and financial regulation necessary for the functioning\nof the European External Action Service (EEAS). This follows a\nfirst-reading agreement with the European Parliament. The\nmodifications reflect and concretise agreements made in the context\nof the Council decision on the establishment and functioning of the\nEEAS which was adopted on 26 July 2010. This service is to work in\ncooperation with the diplomatic services of the Member States and\nis to comprise officials from relevant departments of the General\nSecretariat of the Council and of the Commission as well as staff\nseconded from national diplomatic services of the Member States.\nThe EEAS should be granted autonomy and be treated as an\ninstitution of the Union.
\nThe main characteristics of the amended Staff\nRegulations of Officials of the European Communities may be\nsummarised as follows:
\nEqual treatment:\nOfficials of the Union and temporary agents coming from the\ndiplomatic services of the Member States should have the same\nrights and obligations and be treated equally, in particular as\nconcerns their eligibility to assume all positions under equivalent\nconditions. No distinction should be made between temporary agents\ncoming from national diplomatic services and officials of the Union\nas regards the assignment of duties to perform in all areas of\nactivities and policies implemented by the EEAS.
\nSelected candidates who are seconded by the national\ndiplomatic services of the Member States should be employed as\ntemporary agents and thus be put on an equal footing with\nofficials. They should be recruited on the basis of an objective\nand transparent procedure and the implementing provisions to be\nadopted by the EEAS should guarantee equivalent career prospects\nwithin the EEAS for temporary agents and officials.
\nOrganising staff transfers to the EEAS: staff transfers and seconded staff from Member\nStates should be organised in the following way:
\nPower to appoint and rules applicable to delegating\npowers: the High Representative\nshould act as Appointing Authority and Authority to conclude\ncontracts for the staff of the EEAS, with the possibility of\ndelegating powers in that capacity to the EEAS. As the Heads\nof Delegations will have to carry out tasks for the Commission as\npart of their normal duties, provision should be made for the\nparticipation of the Commission in certain decisions concerning\nthose staff members. It is appropriate to clarify that staff of the\nEEAS who carry out tasks for the Commission as part of their duties\nshould follow instructions given by the Commission. Likewise,\nCommission officials working in Union delegations should follow\ninstructions from the Head of Delegation.
\nGuaranteeing a proper balance amongst the different\nstaff components of the EEAS: in\norder to ensure a proper balance amongst the different staff\ncomponents of the EEAS and in accordance with Decision 2010/427/EU,\nwhen the EEAS has reached its full capacity, personnel from the\ndiplomatic services of the Member States appointed as temporary\nagents should represent at least one third of all EEAS staff at\nAD level and Union officials should represent at least 60% of all\nEEAS staff at AD level.
\nRecruiting seconded national experts: the EEAS may, in specific cases, have recourse to a\nlimited number of specialised seconded national experts (SNEs),\nseconded with a view to their performing specific tasks, in\nparticular related to crisis management or military functions, over\nwhom the High Representative should have authority. Their\nsecondment should not be counted in the one third of all EEAS staff\nat AD level which staff from Member States should represent when\nthe EEAS reaches its full capacity.
\nRecruiting highly qualified staff: recruitment or engagement should be directed to\nsecuring for the EEAS the services of officials and temporary staff\nof the highest standard of ability, efficiency and integrity,\nrecruited on the broadest possible geographical basis from among\nnationals of Member States of the Union. This will apply to the\nEEAS as a whole and to its different staff components, including\ntemporary staff. In addition, the staff of the EEAS should comprise\nan appropriate and meaningful presence of nationals from all the\nMember States
\nPromoting gender equality: it is also stipulated that the High Representative\nwill take appropriate measures to promote equal opportunities for\nthe under-represented gender in certain function groups, more\nparticularly in function group AD. It should be noted that specific\nprovisions are laid down to better apply the rules applicable to\nparental or family leave.
\nDuration of contracts of seconded staff engaged as\ntemporary EEAS staff: the proposal\nprovides that the engagement of seconded staff should not exceed\neight years. However, in exceptional circumstances and in the\ninterest of the service, at the end of the eighth year, the\ncontract may be extended for a maximum period of two years. After\nthis delay, staff may reintegrate immediately their posts in the\nnational administrations. The rules on secondment and maximum\nretirement age should be aligned with those applicable to\nofficials.
\nOther particular measures are as follows:
\nReport: by mid-2013, the\nHigh Representative shall submit a report to the European\nParliament, the Council and the Commission on the implementation of\nthis Regulation, with a particular emphasis on gender and\ngeographical balance of staff within the EEAS.
\nENTRY INTO FORCE:\n27/11/2010.
\nPURPOSE: to amend the Staff Regulations of Officials\nof the European Communities and the Conditions of Employment of\nOther Servants of those Communities to take account of the setting\nup of the European\nExternal Action Service (EEAS).
\nPROPOSED ACT: Regulation of the European Parliament\nand of the Council.
\nBACKGROUND: the Treaty of Lisbon, which entered into\nforce on 1 December 2009, created the office of the High\nRepresentative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy\nand Vice-President of the Commission. According to the Treaty, the\nHigh Representative and Vice-President is to be assisted by the\nEuropean External Action Service (EEAS). Article 27(3) of the\nTreaty on European Union stipulates that the EEAS is to work in\ncooperation with the diplomatic services of the Member States and\nis to comprise officials from relevant departments of the General\nSecretariat of the Council and of the Commission as well as staff\nseconded from national diplomatic services of the Member\nStates.
\nAs is the case for all the institutions and bodies of\nthe Union, the EEAS staffing and personnel policy will operate\nwithin the framework established by the Staff Regulations of\nOfficials of the European Communities and the Conditions of\nEmployment of Other Servants of those Communities. In order to\nallow the EEAS to operate, certain amendments to the Staff\nRegulations and the Conditions of Employment are required. Apart\nfrom adaptations to the new terminology resulting from the entry\ninto force of the Treaty of Lisbon, the proposed amendments are\nlimited to what is necessary for the establishment and functioning\nof the EEAS.
\nThis proposal is one of the legislative measures that\nneed to be adopted in that context.
\nIMPACT ASSESSMENT: no impact assessment was carried\nout.
\nLEGAL BASIS: Article 336 of the Treaty on the\nFunctioning of the European Union (TFEU).
\nCONTENT: in order to be operational right from its\ninception, the EEAS must have qualified and experienced staff at\nits disposal. The Regulation confirms that - where it is stipulated\nin the Council Decision establishing the EEAS that an entity from\nthe Council or Commission organisation chart is transferred to the\nEEAS - the officials and temporary staff occupying posts in that\nentity and other staff assigned to that entity are transferred\nfrom their respective institutions to the EEAS.
\nEqual treatment: a\nfundamental aspect of the EEAS is the equality of treatment between\nthe sources of EEAS staffing. Selection procedures for posts will\nthus be open on an equal basis (as opposed to the current\nsituation, where internal candidates, followed by\ninter-institutional candidates, have priority). Hence, the\nAppointing Authority will consider applications for vacant posts in\nthe EEAS from different categories of staff - staff of national\ndiplomatic services, officials of the Commission, the Council and\nthe EEAS, as well as temporary staff of the EEAS from national\ndiplomatic services - without giving any priority to any of\nthem. After the start-up phase, but on 1 July 2013 at the\nlatest, this facilitated access to vacant posts in the EEAS will be\nextended to officials of other institutions of the Union. In order\nto guarantee proper representation of staff from national\ndiplomatic services in the EEAS, it should be possible, until 30\nJune 2013, to give priority to candidates from national diplomatic\nservices of the Member States for AD posts in case of substantially\nequal qualifications.
\nSpecific category of temporary staff: staff will be employed by the EEAS as a specific\ncategory of temporary staff. For this particular category of\ntemporary staff, certain rules (retirement age, possibility of\nsecondment, and leave on personal grounds) are aligned to those\napplicable to officials. These staff members will thus benefit from\nthe same working conditions as officials.
\nFlexibility: officials\nof the EEAS who were officials of either the Council or the\nCommission before taking up their duties in the EEAS will be able\nto apply for vacant posts in their institution of origin on the\nsame basis as officials inside those institutions. Their\napplications will thus be considered as applications from internal\ncandidates. In exceptional circumstances, a transfer in the\ninterests of the service, i.e. without prior publication of the\npost, from the EEAS to the Council or the Commission and vice\nversa will be made possible.
\nAuthority entrusted with powers: the EEAS will be treated as an institution\nfor the purposes of the Staff Regulations. The High Representative\nand Vice-President will be the Appointing Authority for the staff\nof the EEAS (with a possibility to entrust EEAS staff members with\nthese powers). Special arrangements are foreseen for cases where\nEEAS staff will have to perform functions on behalf of the\nCommission. In this respect they will have to take instructions\nfrom the Commission. Moreover, the Commission will be involved\nin the recruitment and evaluation of these members of staff, as\nwell as in disciplinary matters. In addition, account is also\ntaken of the situation of Commission officials working in Union\ndelegations who will have to take instructions in certain areas\nfrom the Head of delegation (who will be an official or a temporary\nagent of the EEAS).
\nOther technical measures: these concern Annex X to the Staff Regulations\n(applicable to staff serving in third countries), contract staff\nand local staff. They should improve the functioning of the Union\ndelegations.
\nThe whole of Annex X (and not only certain provisions)\nwill apply to contract staff serving in a third country, including\nCommission staff. Contract staff engaged to perform duties in\ndelegations will be able to take part in the rotation between\ndelegations and Headquarters.
\nIn order to ensure better gender balance in\ndelegations, staff serving in third countries will be able to take\nparental leave while continuing to benefit from certain provisions\nof Annex X (accommodation provided by the institution or\nreimbursement of rent, supplementary sickness insurance and\neducation allowance) for a restricted period of time.
\nThe amendments concerning local staff are aimed\nat improving their social security protection. Currently, local\nstaff working in countries with no, or insufficient, social\nsecurity systems are asked to contribute to an EU-established\nscheme, while the Commission pays the employer's contribution. A\nspecific provision should be introduced in the Conditions of\nEmployment, as this scheme provides for minimum social guarantees,\nwhich are not ensured by national law.
\nBUDGETARY IMPLICATION: the proposal is broadly\nbudgetary neutral, although some provisions have a small\nbudgetary impact:
\nThe Court of Auditors presented an opinion on the\nCouncil's request on 21 June 2010 on the proposal for a regulation\nof the European Parliament and of the Council amending the Staff\nRegulations of Officials of the European Communities and the\nConditions of Employment of Other Servants of those\nCommunities.
\nThe main elements of this opinion may be summarised as\nfollows:
\nOn a general note: the\nCourt considers that it will be a major challenge to form, from the\ndifferent components of the EEAS, a homogeneous service with an\nappropriate esprit de corps to serve the interests of the Union. A\nprecondition for success will be that staff from all components of\nthe EEAS will be treated in an equal manner, having the same\nrights and obligations, regardless of whether they are officials of\nthe EU or temporary agents coming from the diplomatic services of\nthe Member State.
\nThe Court recalls that the EEAS will be a\nfunctionally autonomous body of a sui generis nature, benefiting\nfrom its own section of the budget, while, at the same time, the\nEEAS will remain at Union Delegation level the relevant service to\nthe Commission for the implementation of a wide range of\noperational appropriations from the 'Commission' section of the\nbudget.
\nThe staff in Union Delegations will comprise\nEEAS staff and Commission staff. The Heads of Delegation will have\nauthority over all staff in the Union Delegation, whatever their\nstatus, and for all its activities. They shall be accountable to\nthe High Representative but the Commission will also be entitled to\nissue instructions to Union Delegations, which shall be executed\nunder the overall responsibility of the Heads of Delegation. This\nwill mean that the Heads of Delegation will report to two different\nauthorities which may give rise to conflicts of priority. The Court\nconsiders of utmost importance to preserve and enhance\naccountability, responsibility, and quality of management at Union\nDelegation level.
\nThe Court also made a series of specific\ncomments:
\n(a) on the amendments to the Staff\nRegulations, includingCEOS (Conditions of Employment of Other\nServants):\nthe Court stresses the need to: (i) better define the level of\nresponsibility as regards the Heads of Delegation; they should in\nparticular: (ii) define the scope of the competences of a distinct\nDisciplinary Board; (iii) clarify, in the CEOS, other\nprovisions concerning seconded staff from national diplomatic\nservices who will fill temporarily permanent posts in the EEAS and\nto reinforce the provisions are regards equal treatment and social\nsecurity cover for these agents;
\n(b) on the other provisions in connection with the\nEEAS: provisions are set out that\nwould allow the High Representative to give priority to candidates\nfrom national diplomatic services of the Member States in order to\nguarantee adequate representation. In their current form, these\nprovisions will not be incorporated into the text of the amended\nStaff Regulations or of the amended CEOS. This is not consistent\nwith the purpose of the proposal to amend the Staff Regulations and\nthe CEOS. For reasons of clarity and legal certainty, all\nprovisions should be laid down in the body of the text of the\namended Staff Regulations and CEOS or in their annexes.
\nThe Committee on Legal Affairs adopted the report\ndrafted by Bernhard RAPKAY (S&D, DE) on the proposal for a\nregulation of the European Parliament and of the Council amending\nthe Staff Regulations of Officials of the European Communities and\nthe Conditions of Employment of Other Servants of those\nCommunities.
\nIt recommended that the European Parliament adopts its\nposition at first reading under the ordinary legislative procedure\n(former co-decision procedure) amending the Commission's proposal\nas follows:
\nEnsuring equal treatment:Officials of the Union and temporary agents coming\nfrom the diplomatic services of the Member States should have the\nsame rights and obligations and be treated equally, in particular\nas concerns their eligibility to assume all positions under\nequivalent conditions. No distinction should be made between\ntemporary agents coming from national diplomatic services and\nofficials of the Union as regards the assignment of duties to\nperform in all areas of activities and policies implemented by the\nEEAS.
\nOrganising staff transfers to the EEAS:staff transfers and seconded staff from Member States\nshould be organised in the following way:
\nRecruiting seconded national experts: the EEAS may, in specific cases, have recourse to a\nlimited number of specialised seconded national experts (SNEs),\nseconded with a view to their performing specific tasks, in\nparticular related to crisis management or military functions, over\nwhom the High Representative should have authority. Their\nsecondment should not be counted in the one third of all EEAS staff\nat AD level which staff from Member States should represent when\nthe EEAS reaches its full capacity.
\nEnsuring a proper balance amongst the different staff\ncomponents of the EEAS: in order to\nensure a proper balance amongst the different staff components of\nthe EEAS and in accordance with Council Decision 2010/427/EU, when\nthe EEAS has reached its full capacity, personnel from the\ndiplomatic services of the Member States appointed as temporary\nagents should represent at least one third of all EEAS staff\nat AD level and Union officials should represent at least 60% of\nall EEAS staff at AD level. This should include staff coming\nfrom the diplomatic services of the Member States who have become\npermanent officials of the Union in accordance with the provisions\nof the Staff Regulations.
\nRecruiting highly qualified staff: recruitment or engagement should be directed to\nsecuring for the EEAS the services of officials and temporary staff\nof the highest standard of ability, efficiency and integrity,\nrecruited on the broadest possible geographical basis from among\nnationals of Member States of the Union. This will apply to the\nEEAS as a whole and to its different staff components, including\ntemporary staff. In addition, the staff of the EEAS should comprise\nan appropriate and meaningful presence of nationals from all the\nMember States.
\nPromoting gender equality:the High Representative will take appropriate\nmeasures to promote equal opportunities for the under-represented\ngender in certain function groups, more particularly in function\ngroup AD.
\nDuration of contracts of seconded staff engaged as\ntemporary EEAS staff: the proposal\nprovides that the engagement of seconded staff should not exceed\neight years. However, in exceptional circumstances and in the\ninterest of the service, at the end of the eighth year, the\ncontract may be extended for a maximum period of two years. After\nthis delay, staff may reintegrate immediately their posts in the\nnational administrations.
\nSetting up a Disciplinary Board and a Staff Committee\nby 31 December 2011: a Disciplinary\nBoard should be established by the HR for the EEAS by 31 December\n2011 at the latest. The Disciplinary Board established in the\nCommission should also serve as the Disciplinary Board for the\nEEAS, until the High Representative decides to establish a\nDisciplinary Board for the EEAS. Similarly, a Staff Committee\nshould also be set up within the EEAS by 31 December 2011 at the\nlatest. Until as such time as this happens, the Staff Committee of\nthe Commission shall also represent EEAS staff, who would be\nentitled to vote and stand as candidates in its\nelections.
\nStatement from the High Representative (HR) on\ngeographical balance in the EEAS: the\nHigh Representative, Mrs Ashton, should attach the highest\nimportance to the recruitment on the broadest possible geographical\nbasis from among the nationals of the Member States of the Union,\nas well as to ensuring an appropriate and meaningful presence of\nnationals from all Member States in the Service. The HR should\nattach the highest importance to the promotion of gender balance in\nthe staffing of the EEAS. A key to the promotion of gender balance\nis the encouragement of applications from women for posts in the\nEEAS and the removal of barriers in this respect. She will also\nidentify best practices from national diplomatic services and apply\nthem whenever possible to the EEAS. Full use of all the\npossibilities in promoting the employment of women in the Service\nshould be made.
\nBy mid-2013, the High Representative shall submit a\nreport to the European Parliament, the Council and the Commission\non the implementation of this Regulation, with a particular\nemphasis on gender and geographical balance of staff within the\nEEAS.
\nThe European Parliament adopted by 513 votes to 51\nagainst, with 98 abstentions, a legislative resolution on the\nproposal for a regulation of the European Parliament and of the\nCouncil amending the Staff Regulations of Officials of the European\nCommunities and the Conditions of Employment of Other Servants of\nthose Communities.
\nThe European Parliament adopted its position at first\nreading under the ordinary legislative procedure (former\nco-decision procedure). The amendments adopted in plenary are the\nresult of a compromise reached between the European Parliament and\nthe Council. They amend the Commission's proposal as\nfollows:
\nOrganising staff transfers to the EEAS:staff transfers and seconded staff from Member States\nshould be organised in the following way:
\nRecruiting seconded national experts: the compromise reached in plenary states that the\nEEAS may, in specific cases, have recourse to a limited number of\nspecialised seconded national experts (SNEs), seconded with a view\nto their performing specific tasks, in particular related to crisis\nmanagement or military functions, over whom the High Representative\nshould have authority. Their secondment should not be counted in\nthe one third of all EEAS staff at AD level which staff from Member\nStates should represent when the EEAS reaches its full\ncapacity.
\nEnsuring a proper balance amongst the different staff\ncomponents of the EEAS: in order to\nensure a proper balance amongst the different staff components of\nthe EEAS and in accordance with Council Decision 2010/427/EU,\nwhen the EEAS has reached its full capacity, personnel from the\ndiplomatic services of the Member States appointed as temporary\nagents should represent at least one third of all EEAS staff\nat AD level and Union officials should represent at least 60% of\nall EEAS staff at AD level. This should include staff coming\nfrom the diplomatic services of the Member States who have become\npermanent officials of the Union in accordance with the provisions\nof the Staff Regulations.
\nRecruiting highly qualified staff: the amended text stipulates that recruitment or\nengagement should be directed to securing for the EEAS the services\nof officials and temporary staff of the highest standard of\nability, efficiency and integrity, recruited on the broadest\npossible geographical basis from among nationals of Member States\nof the Union. This will apply to the EEAS as a whole and to its\ndifferent staff components, including temporary staff. In addition,\nthe staff of the EEAS should comprise an appropriate and meaningful\npresence of nationals from all the Member States.
\nPromoting gender equality:it is also stipulated thatthe High Representative\nwill take appropriate measures to promote equal opportunities for\nthe under-represented gender in certain function groups, more\nparticularly in function group AD.
\nDuration of contracts of seconded staff engaged as\ntemporary EEAS staff: the proposal\nprovides that the engagement of seconded staff should not exceed\neight years. However, in exceptional circumstances and in the\ninterest of the service, at the end of the eighth year, the\ncontract may be extended for a maximum period of two years. After\nthis delay, staff may reintegrate immediately their posts in the\nnational administrations.
\nSetting up a Disciplinary Board and a Staff Committee\nby 31 December 2011: the compromise\nstates that a Disciplinary Board should be established by the HR\nfor the EEAS by 31 December 2011 at the latest. The Disciplinary\nBoard established in the Commission should also serve as the\nDisciplinary Board for the EEAS, until the High Representative\ndecides to establish a Disciplinary Board for the EEAS. Similarly,\na Staff Committee should also be set up within the EEAS by 31\nDecember 2011 at the latest. Until as such time as this happens,\nthe Staff Committee of the Commission shall also represent EEAS\nstaff, who would be entitled to vote and stand as candidates in its\nelections.
\nStatement from the High Representative (HR) on\ngeographical balance in the EEAS: the\nHigh Representative, Mrs Ashton, should attach the highest\nimportance to the recruitment on the broadest possible geographical\nbasis from among the nationals of the Member States of the Union,\nas well as to ensuring an appropriate and meaningful presence of\nnationals from all Member States in the Service. The HR should\nattach the highest importance to the promotion of gender balance in\nthe staffing of the EEAS. A key to the promotion of gender balance\nis the encouragement of applications from women for posts in the\nEEAS and the removal of barriers in this respect. She will also\nidentify best practices from national diplomatic services and apply\nthem whenever possible to the EEAS. Full use of all the\npossibilities in promoting the employment of women in the Service\nshould be made.
\nBy mid-2013, the High Representative shall submit a\nreport to the European Parliament, the Council and the Commission\non the implementation of this Regulation, with a particular\nemphasis on gender and geographical balance of staff within the\nEEAS.
\nPURPOSE: PURPOSE: to amend the\nStaff Regulations of Officials of the European Communities and the\nConditions of Employment of Other Servants of those Communities to\ntake account of the setting up of the European External Action Service\n(EEAS).
\nLEGISLATIVE ACT: Regulation (EU, Euratom) No 1080/2010\nof the European Parliament and of the Council amending the Staff\nRegulations of Officials of the European Communities and the\nConditions of Employment of Other Servants of those\nCommunities.
\nCONTENT: the Council adopted revised versions of\nthe EU staff and financial regulation necessary for the functioning\nof the European External Action Service (EEAS). This follows a\nfirst-reading agreement with the European Parliament. The\nmodifications reflect and concretise agreements made in the context\nof the Council decision on the establishment and functioning of the\nEEAS which was adopted on 26 July 2010. This service is to work in\ncooperation with the diplomatic services of the Member States and\nis to comprise officials from relevant departments of the General\nSecretariat of the Council and of the Commission as well as staff\nseconded from national diplomatic services of the Member States.\nThe EEAS should be granted autonomy and be treated as an\ninstitution of the Union.
\nThe main characteristics of the amended Staff\nRegulations of Officials of the European Communities may be\nsummarised as follows:
\nEqual treatment:\nOfficials of the Union and temporary agents coming from the\ndiplomatic services of the Member States should have the same\nrights and obligations and be treated equally, in particular as\nconcerns their eligibility to assume all positions under equivalent\nconditions. No distinction should be made between temporary agents\ncoming from national diplomatic services and officials of the Union\nas regards the assignment of duties to perform in all areas of\nactivities and policies implemented by the EEAS.
\nSelected candidates who are seconded by the national\ndiplomatic services of the Member States should be employed as\ntemporary agents and thus be put on an equal footing with\nofficials. They should be recruited on the basis of an objective\nand transparent procedure and the implementing provisions to be\nadopted by the EEAS should guarantee equivalent career prospects\nwithin the EEAS for temporary agents and officials.
\nOrganising staff transfers to the EEAS: staff transfers and seconded staff from Member\nStates should be organised in the following way:
\nPower to appoint and rules applicable to delegating\npowers: the High Representative\nshould act as Appointing Authority and Authority to conclude\ncontracts for the staff of the EEAS, with the possibility of\ndelegating powers in that capacity to the EEAS. As the Heads\nof Delegations will have to carry out tasks for the Commission as\npart of their normal duties, provision should be made for the\nparticipation of the Commission in certain decisions concerning\nthose staff members. It is appropriate to clarify that staff of the\nEEAS who carry out tasks for the Commission as part of their duties\nshould follow instructions given by the Commission. Likewise,\nCommission officials working in Union delegations should follow\ninstructions from the Head of Delegation.
\nGuaranteeing a proper balance amongst the different\nstaff components of the EEAS: in\norder to ensure a proper balance amongst the different staff\ncomponents of the EEAS and in accordance with Decision 2010/427/EU,\nwhen the EEAS has reached its full capacity, personnel from the\ndiplomatic services of the Member States appointed as temporary\nagents should represent at least one third of all EEAS staff at\nAD level and Union officials should represent at least 60% of all\nEEAS staff at AD level.
\nRecruiting seconded national experts: the EEAS may, in specific cases, have recourse to a\nlimited number of specialised seconded national experts (SNEs),\nseconded with a view to their performing specific tasks, in\nparticular related to crisis management or military functions, over\nwhom the High Representative should have authority. Their\nsecondment should not be counted in the one third of all EEAS staff\nat AD level which staff from Member States should represent when\nthe EEAS reaches its full capacity.
\nRecruiting highly qualified staff: recruitment or engagement should be directed to\nsecuring for the EEAS the services of officials and temporary staff\nof the highest standard of ability, efficiency and integrity,\nrecruited on the broadest possible geographical basis from among\nnationals of Member States of the Union. This will apply to the\nEEAS as a whole and to its different staff components, including\ntemporary staff. In addition, the staff of the EEAS should comprise\nan appropriate and meaningful presence of nationals from all the\nMember States
\nPromoting gender equality: it is also stipulated that the High Representative\nwill take appropriate measures to promote equal opportunities for\nthe under-represented gender in certain function groups, more\nparticularly in function group AD. It should be noted that specific\nprovisions are laid down to better apply the rules applicable to\nparental or family leave.
\nDuration of contracts of seconded staff engaged as\ntemporary EEAS staff: the proposal\nprovides that the engagement of seconded staff should not exceed\neight years. However, in exceptional circumstances and in the\ninterest of the service, at the end of the eighth year, the\ncontract may be extended for a maximum period of two years. After\nthis delay, staff may reintegrate immediately their posts in the\nnational administrations. The rules on secondment and maximum\nretirement age should be aligned with those applicable to\nofficials.
\nOther particular measures are as follows:
\nReport: by mid-2013, the\nHigh Representative shall submit a report to the European\nParliament, the Council and the Commission on the implementation of\nthis Regulation, with a particular emphasis on gender and\ngeographical balance of staff within the EEAS.
\nENTRY INTO FORCE:\n27/11/2010.
\nPURPOSE: to establish measures aimed at\nsafeguarding the security of gas supply, and repealing Directive\n2004/67/EC.
\nPROPOSED ACT: Regulation of the European\nParliament and of the Council.
\nBACKGROUND: Council\nDirective 2004/67/EC established a legal framework at Community\nlevel to safeguard security of natural gas supply and to contribute\nto the proper functioning of the internal gas market in the case of\nsupply disruptions. However, under the current measures, Member\nStates still enjoy a large margin of discretion as to the choice of\nmeasures. Where the security of supply of a Member State is\nthreatened, there is a clear risk that measures developed\nunilaterally by that Member State may jeopardise the proper\nfunctioning of the internal gas market. Recent experience has\ndemonstrated the reality of that risk.
\nTo allow the internal gas market to function\neven in the face of a shortage of supply, it is therefore necessary\nto provide for a more coordinated response to supply crises,\nboth concerning preventive action and the reaction to concrete\ndisruptions of supply. In response to the Russian-Ukrainian gas\ncrisis in January 2009 causing an unprecedented disruption of gas\nsupplies to the Community via Ukraine, the European Council and the\nEuropean Parliament have called for an accelerated revision of the\nexisting Directive.
\nIMPACT ASSESSMENT: the impact assessment has\nconsidered five policy options: 1) no new Community action;\n2) better enforcement of Directive 2004/67/EC; 3) voluntary\napproach by industry; 4) a revised directive; 5) a new\nregulation.
\nWith regard to options 1 and 2, the Commission\nconcluded that the existing Directive is insufficient given the\ngrowing import dependence and increased supply and transit risks in\nthird countries as well as, increasing gas flows and the\ndevelopment of the internal gas market within the Community. With\nregard to option 3, a major disadvantage of a voluntary approach is\nthat participation of all players in a consistent manner cannot be\nguaranteed. Moreover, the extra capacity to ensure security of\nsupply is not necessarily provided by market forces. With regard to\noptions 4 and 5 (choice of legal instrument) the Commission\nconsiders that a Regulation is a more appropriate instrument\nthan a Directive for the following main reasons: (i) a\nRegulation is directly applicable to the competent authorities in\nthe Member States, to natural gas undertakings and to customers;\n(ii) it does not require lengthy transposition; it ensures clarity\nand coherence of standards and obligations across the Community and\nit defines directly the involvement of Community\ninstitutions.
\nCONTENT: the proposed Regulation on security of\ngas supply would provide a common indicator to define a\nserious gas supply disruption. This is known as N-1, i.e. the\nshutdown of a major supply infrastructure or equivalent (e.g.\nimport pipeline or production facility). It would require all\nMember States to have a competent authority that would be\nresponsible for monitoring gas supply developments, assessing risks\nto supplies, establishing preventive action plans and setting up\nemergency plans. It would also oblige Member States to collaborate\nclosely in a crisis, including through a strengthened Gas\nCoordination Group and through shared access to reliable supply\ninformation and data.
\nThe main objective of the proposal is to\nincrease the security of gas supply by creating the incentives\nto invest in necessary interconnections to meet the N-1 indicator,\nas well as the reverse flows.
\nThe Regulation places primary emphasis on the\nrole of the internal gas market to ensure the security of\ngas supply. It states that security of gas supply is a task of the\nnatural gas undertakings, Competent Authorities of the Member\nStates, the industrial gas customers, and the Commission within\ntheir respective areas of responsibility. It requires a high degree\nof cooperation between them. The Regulation allows the recourse to\nnon-market based measures decided by the competent authority only\nas the last resort in emergency situations when all market based\nmeasures are exhausted and the natural gas undertakings are no\nlonger able to deal with a supply disruption. The Commission is\nalso given a stronger role to ensure that the internal market works\nfor as long as possible and that measures decided at national level\nare compatible with this principle.
\nThe proposed Regulation would improve the\nframework for investment in new cross-border interconnections,\nnew import corridors, reverse flows capacities and storages,\nsupported also by the European Economic Recovery Plan. It confirms\nthe greater interdependence of gas supplies within a single\nEuropean gas market, and provides a sound basis for the EU to\ndefend its interests more effectively in its relations with\nexternal gas suppliers. Those interconnections are at the same time\nnecessary for the proper functioning of the internal gas\nmarket.
\nThe following points should be\nnoted:
\nBUDGETARY IMPLICATIONS: the proposal will have\na limited impact on the Community budget, covering the costs of\nmeetings of the Gas Coordination Group and the costs of the\nmonitoring task force which can be deployed to monitor the gas\nflows within and outside the Community. Missions outside the\nCommunity in moments of crisis may draw on funds from the\nInstrument for Stability.
\nThis Commission Staff Working Paper accompanies the\nproposal for a Regulation concerning measures to safeguard security\nof gas supply and repealing Directive 2004/67/EC. It provides an\nassessment of the January 2009 gas supply disruption to the\nEU.
\nTo recall: from 6-20\nJanuary 2009, gas flows were interrupted from Russia to the EU via\nUkraine. A majority of Member States were affected directly and\nindirectly. Although the disruption was a commercial matter between\nGazprom of Russia and Naftogaz of Ukraine, the EU was in regular\ncontact with both parties before the onset of the disruption and\nthroughout the event and was instrumental in the agreement on\ncreating an international monitoring mission as well as\nfacilitating negotiations on an agreement for gas supplies into the\nEU to resume.
\nThis paper considers how the crisis developed and why\nexisting provisions were not enough to avoid major disruptions to\nEU gas supplies in January 2009. It considers what the EU can learn\nfrom these events in order to make the framework more resilient and\neffective in responding to gas supply threats, both in an emergency\nsituation and over the medium to longer term.
\nThis paper also responds to a specific request from\nthe European Parliament and from four individual MEP's for an\nanalysis of the Russia-Ukraine gas crisis including the lessons\nlearned.
\nMain conclusions: the\nCommission's concerns that the EU energy security strategy must be\nstrengthened are therefore completely vindicated.
\nThe crisis highlighted weaknesses in each stage of the\ngas supply security approach at EU level:
\nThe crisis also confirmed the importance of certain\nprinciples of EU energy policy which deserve to be\nstrengthened:
\nThe crisis also served as a wake-up call to\npolicy makers to strengthen their energy strategies:
\nThe crisis also confirmed the benefits of EU\ncollaboration and confirmed the importance of having emergency\nplans and measures in place at a national level, the need to\nimprove the Community dimension and the added value of a coherent\nEU approach to the EU's external energy security.
\nThe document concludes that the disruption of supplies\naffected a large number of Member States and the ad-hoc measures\nfacilitated at a Community level did help to mitigate somewhat the\nmajor economic impact the dispute had on some EU Member States.\nClearly there is a need to formalise these arrangements and\nensure that the Community is better placed to face such\nsituations in the future.
\nIn order to strengthen the security of gas supply in\nthe internal market, Council\nDirective 2004/67/EC concerning measures to safeguard security\nof natural gas supplies was adopted.
\nThe Directive provides that the Commission shall\npresent an evaluation report on the implementation of the Directive\nby Member States, which is the purpose of this Commission Staff\nWorking Document.
\nTransposition: most of\nthe Member States have transposed the security of gas supply\nprovisions of the Directive as part of their internal gas market\nlegislation.
\nDifferences in the security of gas supply roles of\nmarket players: Member States have\ndefined the roles for their market players in a different way,\nwhich has created distortion for security of gas supply in European\ninternal gas markets.
\nSecurity of supply standards: Member States have set very heterogeneous security\nof supply standards and in some Member States the definition of\nstandards has not been made. These differences may create a barrier\nto the solidarity mechanism and to the finalisation of the internal\ngas market.
\nSecurity of gas supply instruments: the balance of various instruments is essential to\nenhancing the security of gas supply. The most frequent measures\nare gas storage, long term contracts, flexibility of production and\nimports and diversifications of gas supply. The general conclusion\nis that the level playing field within the EU has not been reached\nin terms of security of gas supply instruments.
\nNational emergency measures: the two-step approach used by Member States has\ncreated a delay in full transposition of this provision and means\nthat the Commission could only assess national emergency measures\nof 18 Member States. In any event, most of the Member States have\ndefined their national emergency measures in a systematic way\ncreating the national emergency plans. In these plans they also\nincluded prevention mechanisms, nominal level of gas market\noperation and different pre-emergency and emergency levels defined\nby disruption volume and by the economic impact.
\nMonitoring and reporting: Member States' reporting obligations are set out in\ntwo gas Directives. Member States have not prepared their annual\ninternal market report in a proper way and much of the mandated\ninformation is not included in those reports. Therefore, the\nCommission had to prepare additional questionnaires and data tables\nto fulfil its monitoring obligation, which created an additional\nadministrative burden. Moreover, the obligation concerning what to\nmonitor is not sufficient to assess either the current long-term\nand short-term, or any future security of supply situation of the\nEU and the effectiveness of the mitigation tools. In addition,\nreporting obligations are limited in frequency and scope and only\nthree Member States provided complete reporting. Greater\ntransparency is therefore needed.
\nThe Council held a policy debate on the\nproposed regulation, on the basis of a questionnaire prepared by\nthe Presidency, and following a presentation by the Commissioner\nfor Energy, Mr Piebalgs.
\nIn principle, the general approach of the Commission's\nproposal was well received. Ministers highlighted, however, certain\npoints of concern regarding specific aspects of the draft\nregulation.
\nMany ministers stressed, in particular, the need to\nclarify further the roles and responsibilities of the market\nactors, the Member States and the Commission, in line with the\nsubsidiarity principle. For ensuring gas supply, the hierarchy\ngoing from gas undertakings, Member States, to the regional and the\nEU level was underlined. Crisis management should be based on an\nin-depth risk analysis, and their must be a balance between\nsolidarity, the market's responsibilities and Member States'\nresponsibility for their own gas supply.
\nA majority of ministers welcomed the Commission's\nproposal of mandatory infrastructure and supply standards, while\nasking for increased flexibility in order to take account of\nnational circumstances and specificities. The implementation\nof the standards should be based on a cost-benefit analysis, with\ndue priority given to market-based instruments. Regional and\nbilateral cooperation has been strongly supported in the debate,\nbut more details will be needed, in particular regarding the\nbreakdown of costs.
\nA clear-cut definition of protected\ncustomers was esteemed necessary, allowing nevertheless for\nsufficient flexibility to take national or regional circumstances\ninto account, including financial issues. Several delegations also\nasked for this definition to be based on a cost-benefit\nanalysis.
\nThe incoming Spanish Presidency announced its\nintention of reaching a political agreement on the Commission's\nproposal before the end of June 2010.
\nThe Committee on Industry, Research and Energy adopted\nthe report drawn up by Alejo Vidal-Quadras (EPP, ES) on the\nproposal for a regulation of the European Parliament and of the\nCouncil concerning measures to safeguard security of gas supply and\nrepealing Directive 2004/67/EC. It recommended that the European\nParliament's position at first reading under the ordinary\nlegislative procedure (formerly known as the codecision\nprocedure) should be to amend the Commission\nproposal as follows:
\nThree level approach:\nthe committee states that roles and responsibilities should be\nestablished in such a way as to ensure that a three-level\napproach is respected which would first involve the\nrelevant undertakings and industry, then\nMember States at national or regional level, and then\nthe Union. In the event of a supply disruption, market players\nshould be given sufficient opportunity to respond to the situation\nby market-based measures such as those listed in Annex II. If the\nreactions of market players are\nnot adequate, Member States and their Competent\nAuthorities should take measures such as those listed in Annex III\nto remove or mitigate the effects of the supply disruption. Only if\nthese measures are inadequate should measures be taken at\nregional or Union level to remove or mitigate the effects of the\nsupply disruption. Regional solutions should be preferred to Union\naction as far as possible.
\nSubject-matter: Members\nstressed that the proposal must establish exceptional measures to\nbe implemented when the market can no longer deliver the required\ngas supplies, as well as measures aimed at safeguarding the\nsecurity of gas supply by ensuring the proper and\ncontinuous functioning of the internal market for gas.
\nCompetent authority: the\ndefinition of competent authority is amended to show that the tasks\nof the latter include ensuring the security of gas supply as well\nas enforcing and implementing the measures and Plans set out\nin the Regulation.
\nResponsibility for security of gas\nsupply: Members inserted an amendment\nstating that the Commission together with the Competent Authority\nshall ensure that no clauses having the effect of a destination\nclause exist in contracts for natural gas concluded\nbetween Member States or their natural gas\nundertakings and third countries. This is without prejudice to the\ncompetences of competition authorities. They note that contracts\nconcerning gas supplies from third countries should not\ncontain provisions violating EU internal market rules, notably\nrestrictions to re-export or clauses that have the same\neffect as destination clauses.
\nLong-term security of supply measures: Members stress the importance of diversification\nthroughout the text. A new clause is inserted stating that one year\nafter entry into force of the legislation, the Commission shall, as\nan element in the development of a long-term supply strategy,\npresent a report on instruments and measures to increase the\ndiversification of gas supply sources for the Union and\nthe routes of supply into the Union. The report shall include\nproposals to the different Member States concerning activities and\nmeasures in order to enhance security of gas supply, including an\nassessment of the role of LNG installations and an overview of\nstorage capacities for gas in different Member States. In addition,\nthe report shall make an assessment of existing regional\ncooperation and include recommendations for improvement in the\njoint preventive and emergency action plans. Any regional\ncooperation for the purpose of the implementation of the Regulation\nshall be conducted by the Competent Authorities of the Member\nStates, involving the natural gas undertakings, the regulatory\nauthorities and the industrial consumers and in close cooperation\nwith the Commission. Such regional cooperation\nshall promote, and must\nnot conflict with, general principles of\nEuropean solidarity.
\nLastly the Union shall work together with supply and\ntransit third countries to share best practices in energy\nefficiency, for example in the framework of existing energy\ncooperation agreements such as the Energy\nCharter Treaty.
\nEstablishment of Preventive Action Plan and Emergency\nPlan: a new clause states that where\nthe regulatory authority is not the Competent\nAuthority, it shall be formally involved in the processes\nof establishing the Preventive Action Plan and the Emergency Plan.\nThe Competent Authority shall take utmost account of the\nassessments made by the regulatory authority insofar as they refer\nto network-related regulatory issues in particular concerning the\ndevelopment of the impact assessment regarding the fulfilment of\ninfrastructure standards with regard to future approval of tariffs\nand consistency with network development plans.
\nWhere Member States have\nexisting public service obligations that relate to\nsecurity of supply, the Competent Authorities shall\npublish them not later than 2 months after the\nentry into force of the Regulation and update as necessary,\nfollowing adoption of their Preventative and Emergency\nPlans.
\nFurthermore, Members add that the Competent Authority\nshall review the Preventive Action Plan and\nthe Emergency Plan every two years on the basis of\naltered assessments of the risks affecting the security of gas\nsupply.
\nContent of the Preventive Action Plan: where the Member State so decides on the basis\nof the risk assessment, the Plan must contain a description\nof obligations to supply relevant customers, that are\nconnected to the gas distribution network and\nthat deliver important public services such as schools and\nhospitals. Those obligations must not affect their\nability to supply the protected customers in the event of a crisis.\nThese additional obligations must not conflict with the\nprinciples of European or regional solidarity towards countries\nwith supply problems. The Plan must also contain the mechanisms\nused for cooperation with other Member States for preparing\nregional preventive action plans.
\nThe committee specifies that, in addition, the\nPreventive Action Plan shall be based on, and consistent\nwith, the ten-year network development plan to be drawn\nup by the ENTSO-G, and the actions to meet the infrastructure\nstandard shall be binding on system operators.
\nThe Plan must be based primarily on market measures,\nand take into account the economic impact and\neffectiveness and efficiency of the measures\nadopted, their effects on the functioning of the internal\nenergy market, the impact on consumers, the environmental\nimpact and relevant international situations and developments,\nparticularly in major supply and transit countries.
\nLastly, Members state that the Commission shall\ndevelop an EU preventive action plan building\non all national and regional plans, identifying possible crisis\nscenarios and the most efficient measures to mitigate such crisis\nin order to guarantee efficient coordination of actions during a\nUnion emergency.
\nInfrastructure standard:\nin the event of a disruption of the largest gas supply\ninfrastructure, the remaining infrastructure (N-1) should have the\ntechnical capacity to satisfy total daily gas demand of\nthe calculated area during a day of exceptionally high\ngas demand statistically occurring once every twenty\nyears. The Commission proposal had specified a period of sixty\ndays of exceptionally high gas demand during the coldest\nperiod statistically occurring every twenty years. The report\nadds the following:
\nSupply standard: there\nmust be measures to ensure the gas supply to the protected\ncustomers in the case of a) extreme temperatures during a\nseven days peak period statistically occurring once every twenty\nyears; and b) any period of forty five days (rather\nthan sixty days) of exceptionally high gas demand during the\ncoldest weather periods statistically occurring every twenty years.\nMembers note that the longest crisis experienced lasted\napproximately two weeks.
\nMembers add that the production facilities required to\nmaintain supplies (such as power stations, refineries, gas storage\nfacilities) shall be enabled to operate with as little hindrance as\npossible in order to guarantee supplies of natural gas, electricity\nand heat. The prescribed limit values may be exceeded to an extent\nto be determined. Modification of the conditions imposed by water\nlegislation shall be permitted to an extent to be determined. In\nthis context, dangers to the environment shall be\navoided.
\nRisk assessment: a new\nclause states that the Commission shall fully assess the\nrisks to the security of gas supply at Union level and\nadopt and publish a report to be presented to the Competent\nAuthorities, the Gas Coordination Group, ACER, ENTSO-G and to the\nEuropean Parliament.
\nMembers add that in the risk assessment, the Member\nStates may lay down, on the basis of a technical and economic\nanalysis, obligations to supply customers, other than\nprotected customers, that are already connected to the\ngas distribution network and that deliver important public\nservices such as schools and hospitals.\nThose obligations must not affect their ability to\nsupply the protected customers in the event of a crisis and must\nnot conflict with the principles of European or regional\nsolidarity towards countries with supply problems.
\nFollowing the recommendation of the Commission, the\nrisk assessment shall also be carried out at regional\nlevel.
\nEmergency plans:\nthe national and regional Emergency Plans must\ndefine the role and responsibilities of all relevant market\nparticipants, taking account of the different extents to which\nthey are affected in the event of gas supply disruptions and\nnot solely the natural gas undertakings and of the industrial\ncustomers.
\nThe report adds that the Commission shall\ndevelop a Union Emergency Plan identifying possible\ninconsistencies between national and regional plans as well as\npossible coordination measures to be taken by the Commission during\na Union emergency. It shall also describe the mechanisms used\nto activate mediation with third countries.
\nAt the Early Warning Level and the Alert Level, the\ncommittee specifies that the market is expected to solve the\nproblem without the intervention of the Competent Authority. The\nreport defines the Emergency level as a supply disruption\nor an exceptionally high demand where market-based\nmechanisms alone can no longer ensure supplies to protected\ncustomers. The Competent Authority is required to intervene\nwithin the framework of the Emergency Plan. Market-based mechanisms\nand non-market-based mechanisms may operate alongside each other in\nthis phase. The Emergency Plan shall also identify the necessary\nmeasures and actions to be taken to mitigate the impact of a gas\nsupply disruption on the supply of electricity generated\nfrom gas and district heating to protected customers.
\nWhere the Commission is notified by the Competent\nAuthority that an early warning level has been declared in a Member\nState or where a threat of disruption of gas supplies might have a\nclear geopolitical dimension, the Union, represented at the\nhighest level, shall take appropriate diplomatic actions having\nregard to the special role given by the Lisbon Treaty to the\nVice-President/ High Representative.
\nThe Commission shall verify within three\ndays (rather than one week as apecified by the Commission)\nwhether the declaration of an Emergency fulfils the criteria\nindicated.
\nThe report adds the following:
\nCommunity emergency responses: the report states that the Commission may declare a\nUnion Emergency at the request of one Competent\nAuthority. It shall declare a Union Emergency where\nmore than one Competent Authority has declared Emergency following\nverification in accordance with the text or where\nthe Union loses more than 20% of its daily gas import\nfrom third countries as calculated by ENTSO-G(rather than 10%\nas proposed by the Commission.) It shall declare\na Union Emergency for specifically affected geographical\nregions, defined in accordance with the provisions in the text\ncomprising more than one Member State where one Competent Authority\nfrom the concerned region has declared an emergency or where\nthe affected geographical region loses more than 10% of its daily\ngas import from third countries as calculated by\nENTSO-G.
\nGas Coordination Group:\nMembers stress the need to involve the Gas Coordination\nGroup throughout the text. In order to achieve solidarity at\nregional level, the Gas Coordination Group shall create specific\nsub-groups addressing security of supply issues at regional\nlevel.
\nInformation exchange:\nthe Commission shall analyse the assessments of the Competent\nAuthorities on Emergency and inform the Member States, the\nEuropean Parliament and the Gas Coordination Group of its\nresults in aggregated form.
\nMonitoring and reporting of security of gas\nsupply: the committee deleted from\nthe obligation to report data on progress made in investments\nneeded to cope with N-1, country specific difficulties encountered\nin the implementation new alternative solutions. It stated that the\ncommunication of confidential information may seriously harm the\ncommercial interests of undertakings, undermine the implementation\nof contracts, lead to market distortions and even be prejudicial to\nsecurity of supply (notably as regards the necessity to preserve\nthe bargaining power of EU gas suppliers in their negotiations with\nexternal producers).
\nA new clause is inserted specifying that the\nCommission shall establish a system of continuous\nmonitoring of and reporting on security of gas\nsupply, which shall include the following measures: (a)\npreparation of annual reports concerning observance of the rules\ngoverning the internal market in the energy sector, notably as\nregards transparency and compliance with EU competition law by\nthird-country companies, especially main suppliers, together with\nall of their subsidiaries; (b) assessment of the impact of\nvertically integrated energy companies from third countries on the\ninternal market and implementation of the principle of reciprocity;\nc) application of appropriate measures designed to prevent\nuncontrolled investment by state-owned foreign companies in\nthe Union's energy sector, in particular the gas and\nelectricity transmission networks; (d) monitoring of contracts for\nnatural gas concluded between Member States and third\ncountries as regards their conformity with EU internal market\nrules. The Commission shall enforce the abolition of any clauses\nhaving the effect of a destination clause in so far as they are\nprohibited by EU law.
\nMonitoring by the European Commission: the Commission shall carry out continuous monitoring\nand reporting of security of gas supply measures, including\nmonitoring of contracts for gas supply concluded between Member\nStates and third countries, in order to ensure that comply\nwith the rules of the EU internal market, security of supply\nand competition law.
\nThe committee adds that in order to enable Member\nStates lacking infrastructure to reach N-1 standard, the Commission\nshall monitor the achievements on market interconnectivity and,\nafter consulting the Gas Coordination Group, propose possible\ninstruments to improve the market.
\nLastly, a new clause states that\nthe EU institutions shall give particular priority to\nthe Nabucco gas pipeline project as regards its political\nprofile and financing.
\nAmendments to Annex: the\nreport makes amendments to Annex I with regard to calculation of\nthe N-1 indicator and of the N1 formula, giving supply side and\ndemand side definitions for each. It also makes some amendments to\nAnnex II and inserts a new Annex IIIa on regional\ncooperation.
\nThe European Parliament adopted by 601 votes to 27,\nwith 23 abstentions, a legislative resolution concerning measures\nto safeguard security of gas supply and repealing Directive\n2004/67/EC.
\nIt adopted its position at first reading under the\nordinary legislative procedure (formerly known as the\ncodecision procedure). The amendments adopted in plenary are the\nresult of a compromise reached between the European Parliament and\nthe Council. They amend the Commission's position as\nfollows:
\nSubject matter: the\namended text states that the Regulation establishes provisions\naimed at safeguarding the security of gas supply by ensuring the\nproper and continuous functioning of the internal market in natural\ngas, by allowing for exceptional measures to be implemented when\nthe market can no longer deliver the required gas\nsupplies.
\nThis Regulation also provides transparent mechanisms,\nin a spirit of solidarity, for the coordination of planning for,\nand response to, an emergency at Member State, regional and Union\nlevels.
\nProtected customers:\nthis definition covers all household customers connected to a gas\ndistribution network and, in addition, where the Member State\nconcerned so decides, may also include: (a) small and medium-sized\nenterprises, provided that they are connected to a gas distribution\nnetwork, and essential social services, provided that they are\nconnected to a gas distribution or transmission network, and\nprovided that all these additional customers do not represent more\nthan 20% of the final use of gas; and/or (b) district heating\ninstallations to the extent that they deliver heating to household\ncustomers and to the customers referred to in point (a) provided\nthat these installations are not able to switch to other fuels and\nare connected to a gas distribution or transmission\nnetwork.
\nResponsibility for security of gas\nsupply: the text stipulates that the\nsecurity of gas supply is a shared responsibility of natural gas\nundertakings, Member States, notably through their Competent\nAuthorities, and the Commission, within their respective areas of\nactivities and competence. Such shared responsibility requires a\nhigh degree of cooperation between them.
\nAs soon as possible and no later than 12 months\nfollowing the entry into force of the Regulation, each Member State\nshall designate a Competent Authority that ensures the\nimplementation of the measures provided for in this\nRegulation.
\nEstablishment of a Preventive Action Plan and an\nEmergency Plan: before adopting a\nPreventive Action Plan and an Emergency Plan at national level, the\nCompetent Authorities shall exchange their draft Plans and consult\neach other at the appropriate regional level. They should consult\nthe Commission, with a view to ensuring that their draft Plans and\nmeasures are not inconsistent with the Preventive Action Plan and\nthe Emergency Plan of another Member State and that they comply\nwith this Regulation and with other provisions of Union law. Such\nconsultation shall be carried out in particular between\nneighbouring Member States, notably between isolated systems\nforming gas islands and their neighbouring Member\nStates.
\nThe Competent Authorities concerned may decide to\nestablish joint Preventive Action Plans and joint Emergency Plans\nat regional level, in addition to the Plans established at national\nlevel. In the case of joint Plans, the Competent Authorities\nconcerned shall endeavour, where appropriate, to conclude\nagreements in order to implement regional cooperation.
\nWhen establishing and implementing the Preventive\nAction Plan and the Emergency Plan at national and/or regional\nlevel, the Competent Authority shall take due account of the safe\noperation of the gas system at all times and address and set out in\nthose Plans the technical constraints affecting the operation of\nthe network, including the technical and safety reasons which may\nlead to the reduction of flows in the event of an\nemergency.
\nNo later than two years following the entry into force\nof the Regulation, the Preventive Action Plans and Emergency Plans,\nincluding, where applicable, joint Plans, shall be adopted and made\npublic. Such Plans shall be notified to the Commission without\ndelay. The Commission shall inform the Gas Coordination Group.\nCompetent Authorities shall ensure the regular monitoring of the\nimplementation of such Plans.
\nContent of the national and joint Preventive Action\nPlans: the national and joint\nPreventive Action Plans shall contain: (a) the results of the risk\nassessment; (b) the measures, volumes, capacities and the timing\nneeded to fulfil the infrastructure and supply standards, including\nwhere applicable, the extent to which demand-side measures can\nsufficiently compensate, in a timely manner, for a supply\ndisruption; (c) obligations imposed on natural gas undertakings and\nother relevant bodies, including for the safe operation of the gas\nsystem; (d) the other preventive measures, such as\nthose relating to the need to enhance interconnections between\nneighbouring Member States and the possibility to diversify gas\nroutes and sources of supply, if appropriate, to address the risks\nidentified in order to maintain gas supply to all customers as far\nas possible; (e) the mechanisms to be used for cooperation with\nother Member States for preparing and implementing joint Preventive\nAction Plans and joint Emergency Plans; (f) information on existing\nand future interconnections, including those providing access to\nthe gas network of the Union, cross-border flows, cross-border\naccess to storage facilities and the physical capacity to transport\ngas in both directions (\"bi-directional capacity\"), in particular\nin the event of an emergency; (g) information on all public service\nobligations that relate to security of gas supply.
\nThe national and joint Preventive Action Plans shall\nbe based primarily on market measures, and shall take into account\nthe economic impact, effectiveness and efficiency of the measures,\nthe effects on the functioning of the internal energy market and\nthe impact on the environment and on consumers, and shall not put\nan undue burden on natural gas undertakings, nor negatively impact\non the functioning of the internal market in gas.
\nInfrastructure standard:\nthe amended text provides that Member States or, where a Member\nState so provides, the Competent Authority shall ensure that the\nnecessary measures are taken so that by four years after entry into\nforce of this Regulation at the latest, in the event of a\ndisruption of the single largest gas infrastructure, the capacity\nof the remaining infrastructure, determined according to the N-1\nformula as , is able to satisfy total gas demand of the calculated\narea during a day of exceptionally high gas demand occurring with a\nstatistical probability of once in 20 years.
\nBy three years following the entry into force of the\nRegulation, the transmission system operators shall adapt the\nfunctioning of the transmission systems in part or as a whole so as\nto enable physical gas flows in both directions on cross-border\ninterconnections.
\nLuxembourg, Slovenia and Sweden shall, by way of\nexception, not be bound by, but shall endeavour to meet, the\nobligation on infrastructure standards, while ensuring the gas\nsupplies to protected customers.
\nProcedure for enabling bi-directional capacity or\nseeking exemption: for each\ncross-border interconnection between Member States, transmission\nsystem operators shall, not later than 15 months after the entry\ninto force of this Regulation, submit to their Member States or,\nwhere Member States so provide, their Competent Authorities or\ntheir regulatory authorities, after consulting with all other\ntransmission system operators concerned: (a) a proposal for\nbi-directional capacity concerning the reverse direction (\"reverse\nflow capacity\"); or (b) a request for an exemption from the\nobligation to enable bi-directional capacity.
\nThe proposal for reverse flow capacity or the request\nfor exemptions shall be based on an assessment of market demand,\nprojections for demand and supply, technical feasibility, the costs\nof reverse flow capacity, including the consequent reinforcement of\nthe transmission system, and the benefits for security of\nsupply.
\nThe authority concerned receiving the proposal or\nexemption request shall notify the authorities concerned of the\nother Member States that could, according to the risk assessment,\nbenefit from reverse flow capacity and the Commission of the\nproposal or the exemption request without delay. That authority\nconcerned shall give those authorities concerned and the Commission\nthe possibility to issue an opinion within a period of four months\nfollowing receipt of that notification.
\nSupply standard: the\nCompetent Authority shall require the natural gas undertakings,\nthat it identifies, to take measures to ensure gas supply to the\nprotected customers of the Member State in the following cases: (a)\nextreme temperatures during a seven-day peak period occurring with\na statistical probability of once in 20 years; (b) any period of at\nleast 30 days of exceptionally high gas demand, occurring with a\nstatistical probability of once in 20 years; and (c) for a period\nof at least 30 days in case of the disruption of the single largest\ngas infrastructure under average winter conditions.
\nEmergency Plans and Crisis Levels: the national and joint Emergency Plans shall inter\nalia: (a) define the role and responsibilities of natural gas\nundertakings and of industrial gas customers including relevant\nelectricity producers, taking account of the different extents to\nwhich they are affected in the event of gas supply disruptions ,\nand their interaction with the Competent Authorities and where\nappropriate with the national regulatory authorities at each of the\ncrisis levels; (c) define the role and responsibilities of the\nCompetent Authorities and of the other bodies to which tasks have\nbeen delegated at each of the crisis levels; (d) ensure that\nnatural gas undertakings and industrial gas customers are given\nsufficient opportunity to respond at each crisis level; (e)\nidentify, if appropriate, the measures and actions to be taken to\nmitigate the potential impact of a gas supply disruption on\ndistrict heating and the supply of electricity generated from gas;\n(f) establish detailed procedures and measures to be followed for\neach crisis level.
\nThe three main crisis levels shall be as\nfollows:
\nThe national and joint Emergency Plans shall ensure\nthat cross-border access to infrastructure in accordance with\nRegulation (EC) No 715/2009 is maintained as far as technically and\nsafely possible in the event of an emergency. The Plans shall not\nintroduce any measure unduly restricting the flow of gas across\nborders.
\nWhen the Competent Authority declares any of the\ncrisis levels, it shall immediately inform the Commission and\nprovide it with all the necessary information, in particular with\ninformation on the action it intends to take. In the event of an\nemergency which may result in a call for assistance from the Union\nand its Member States the Competent Authority of the Member State\nconcerned shall without delay notify the Commission's Civil\nProtection Monitoring and Information Centre.
\nThe Member States and, in particular, the Competent\nAuthorities shall ensure that: (a) no measures are introduced which\nunduly restrict the flow of gas within the internal market at any\ntime; (b) no measures are introduced that are likely to endanger\nseriously the gas supply situation in another Member State; and (c)\ncross-border access to infrastructure in accordance with Regulation\n(EC) No 715/2009 is maintained as far as technically and safely\npossible, in accordance with the Emergency Plan.
\nThe national and joint Emergency Plans shall be\nupdated every two years, unless circumstances warrant more frequent\nupdates, and shall reflect the updated risk assessment.
\nUnion and regional emergency responses: at the request of a Competent Authority that has\ndeclared an emergency, the Commission may declare a Union emergency\nor a regional emergency for a specifically affected geographical\nregion. At the request of at least two Competent Authorities that\nhave declared an emergency, the Commission shall declare, as\nappropriate, a Union or regional emergency. In all cases, the\nCommission, using the means of communication most appropriate to\nthe situation, shall gather the views of, and take due account of\nall the relevant information provided by, the other Competent\nAuthorities. When it assesses that the underlying basis for the\nUnion or regional emergency no longer justifies a declaration of\nemergency, the Commission shall declare an end to the Union or\nregional emergency. In all cases, the Commission shall give its\nreasons and inform the Council of its decision.
\nIn a Union or regional emergency, the Commission shall\ncoordinate the action of the Competent Authorities, taking full\naccount of relevant information from, and the results of, the\nconsultation of the Gas Coordination Group.
\nMonitoring by the Commission: the Commission shall carry out continuous monitoring\nof, and reporting on, security of gas supply measures. By four\nyears following the entry into force of the Regulation at the\nlatest the Commission, on the basis of the report and after\nconsulting the Gas Coordination Group shall:
\nDerogation: the\nRegulation shall not apply to Malta and Cyprus for as long as no\ngas is supplied on their respective territories.
\nPURPOSE: to safeguard the security of gas\nsupply in the Union.
\nLEGISLATIVE ACT: Regulation (EU) No 994/2010 of the\nEuropean Parliament and of the Council concerning measures to\nsafeguard security of gas supply and repealing Council Directive\n2004/67/EC
\nCONTENT: the Council has adopted a Regulation\nconcerning measures to safeguard security\nof gas supply, following an agreement at first reading with the\nEuropean Parliament. The aim of the Regulation is to establish\nmeasures for safeguarding the security of gas supply by i) ensuring\nthe proper and continuous functioning of the internal natural gas\nmarket, ii) permitting the introduction of exceptional measures\nwhen the market can no longer provide the necessary gas supplies,\nand iii) providing for a clear definition and allocation of\nresponsibilities between the gas supplying companies, the Member\nStates and the Union.
\nThe Regulation also provides transparent mechanisms,\nin a spirit of solidarity, for the coordination of planning for,\nand response to, an emergency at Member State, regional and Union\nlevels.
\nResponsibility for security of gas supply:\nthe Regulation stipulates that the security of\ngas supply is a shared responsibility of natural gas undertakings,\nMember States, notably through their Competent Authorities, and the\nCommission, within their respective areas of activities and\ncompetence. Such shared responsibility requires a high degree of\ncooperation between them. As soon as possible and no later than 3\nDecember 2011, each Member State shall designate a Competent\nAuthority that ensures the implementation of the measures provided\nfor in this Regulation.
\nEstablishment of a Preventive Action Plan and an\nEmergency Plan: the Competent\nAuthority of each Member State, after consulting the natural gas\nundertakings, the relevant organisations representing the interests\nof household and industrial gas customers and the national\nregulatory authority, where it is not the Competent Authority,\nshall establish at national level:
\nBefore adopting a Preventive Action Plan and an\nEmergency Plan at national level, the Competent Authorities shall\nexchange their draft Preventive Action Plans and Emergency Plans\nand consult each other at the appropriate regional level. They\nshall consult the Commission, with a view to ensuring that their\ndraft Plans and measures are not inconsistent with the Preventive\nAction Plan and the Emergency Plan of another Member State and that\nthey comply with this Regulation.
\nThe national and joint emergency plans will be defined\nin terms of three main crisis levels:
\nRisk assessment: by 3\nDecember 2011, each Competent Authority shall make a full\nassessment, on the basis of the following common elements, of the\nrisks affecting the security of gas supply in its Member\nState.
\nInfrastructure standard: by 3 December 2014 at the latest, the Competent\nAuthority shall ensure that the necessary measures are taken in the\nevent of a disruption of the single largest gas infrastructure, the\ncapacity of the remaining infrastructure, determined according to\nthe N - 1 formula, is able to satisfy total gas demand of the\ncalculated area during a day of exceptionally high gas demand\noccurring with a statistical probability of once in 20\nyears.
\nSupply standard: the\nCompetent Authority shall require the natural gas undertakings,\nthat it identifies, to take measures to ensure gas supply to the\nprotected customers of the Member State in the following cases: a)\nextreme temperatures during a 7-day peak period occurring with a\nstatistical probability of once in 20 years; b) any period of at\nleast 30 days of exceptionally high gas demand, occurring with a\nstatistical probability of once in 20 years; and c) for a period of\nat least 30 days in case of the disruption of the single largest\ngas infrastructure under average winter conditions.
\nUnion and regional emergency responses:\nat the request of a Competent Authority that has\ndeclared an emergency, the Commission may declare a Union emergency\nor a regional emergency for a specifically affected geographical\nregion.
\nIn a Union or regional emergency, the Commission shall\ncoordinate the action of the Competent Authorities, taking full\naccount of relevant information from, and the results of, the\nconsultation of the Gas Coordination Group.
\nMonitoring by the Commission: the Commission shall carry out continuous monitoring\nof, and reporting on, security of gas supply measures and present\nreports on the subject. By 3 December 2014 at the latest, the\nCommission must submit a report to the European Parliament and to\nthe Council on the overall consistency of Member States' Preventive\nAction Plans and Emergency Plans as well as their contribution to\nsolidarity and preparedness from a Union perspective.
\nENTRY INTO FORCE:\n02/12/2010.
\nPURPOSE: to establish measures aimed at\nsafeguarding the security of gas supply, and repealing Directive\n2004/67/EC.
\nPROPOSED ACT: Regulation of the European\nParliament and of the Council.
\nBACKGROUND: Council\nDirective 2004/67/EC established a legal framework at Community\nlevel to safeguard security of natural gas supply and to contribute\nto the proper functioning of the internal gas market in the case of\nsupply disruptions. However, under the current measures, Member\nStates still enjoy a large margin of discretion as to the choice of\nmeasures. Where the security of supply of a Member State is\nthreatened, there is a clear risk that measures developed\nunilaterally by that Member State may jeopardise the proper\nfunctioning of the internal gas market. Recent experience has\ndemonstrated the reality of that risk.
\nTo allow the internal gas market to function\neven in the face of a shortage of supply, it is therefore necessary\nto provide for a more coordinated response to supply crises,\nboth concerning preventive action and the reaction to concrete\ndisruptions of supply. In response to the Russian-Ukrainian gas\ncrisis in January 2009 causing an unprecedented disruption of gas\nsupplies to the Community via Ukraine, the European Council and the\nEuropean Parliament have called for an accelerated revision of the\nexisting Directive.
\nIMPACT ASSESSMENT: the impact assessment has\nconsidered five policy options: 1) no new Community action;\n2) better enforcement of Directive 2004/67/EC; 3) voluntary\napproach by industry; 4) a revised directive; 5) a new\nregulation.
\nWith regard to options 1 and 2, the Commission\nconcluded that the existing Directive is insufficient given the\ngrowing import dependence and increased supply and transit risks in\nthird countries as well as, increasing gas flows and the\ndevelopment of the internal gas market within the Community. With\nregard to option 3, a major disadvantage of a voluntary approach is\nthat participation of all players in a consistent manner cannot be\nguaranteed. Moreover, the extra capacity to ensure security of\nsupply is not necessarily provided by market forces. With regard to\noptions 4 and 5 (choice of legal instrument) the Commission\nconsiders that a Regulation is a more appropriate instrument\nthan a Directive for the following main reasons: (i) a\nRegulation is directly applicable to the competent authorities in\nthe Member States, to natural gas undertakings and to customers;\n(ii) it does not require lengthy transposition; it ensures clarity\nand coherence of standards and obligations across the Community and\nit defines directly the involvement of Community\ninstitutions.
\nCONTENT: the proposed Regulation on security of\ngas supply would provide a common indicator to define a\nserious gas supply disruption. This is known as N-1, i.e. the\nshutdown of a major supply infrastructure or equivalent (e.g.\nimport pipeline or production facility). It would require all\nMember States to have a competent authority that would be\nresponsible for monitoring gas supply developments, assessing risks\nto supplies, establishing preventive action plans and setting up\nemergency plans. It would also oblige Member States to collaborate\nclosely in a crisis, including through a strengthened Gas\nCoordination Group and through shared access to reliable supply\ninformation and data.
\nThe main objective of the proposal is to\nincrease the security of gas supply by creating the incentives\nto invest in necessary interconnections to meet the N-1 indicator,\nas well as the reverse flows.
\nThe Regulation places primary emphasis on the\nrole of the internal gas market to ensure the security of\ngas supply. It states that security of gas supply is a task of the\nnatural gas undertakings, Competent Authorities of the Member\nStates, the industrial gas customers, and the Commission within\ntheir respective areas of responsibility. It requires a high degree\nof cooperation between them. The Regulation allows the recourse to\nnon-market based measures decided by the competent authority only\nas the last resort in emergency situations when all market based\nmeasures are exhausted and the natural gas undertakings are no\nlonger able to deal with a supply disruption. The Commission is\nalso given a stronger role to ensure that the internal market works\nfor as long as possible and that measures decided at national level\nare compatible with this principle.
\nThe proposed Regulation would improve the\nframework for investment in new cross-border interconnections,\nnew import corridors, reverse flows capacities and storages,\nsupported also by the European Economic Recovery Plan. It confirms\nthe greater interdependence of gas supplies within a single\nEuropean gas market, and provides a sound basis for the EU to\ndefend its interests more effectively in its relations with\nexternal gas suppliers. Those interconnections are at the same time\nnecessary for the proper functioning of the internal gas\nmarket.
\nThe following points should be\nnoted:
\nBUDGETARY IMPLICATIONS: the proposal will have\na limited impact on the Community budget, covering the costs of\nmeetings of the Gas Coordination Group and the costs of the\nmonitoring task force which can be deployed to monitor the gas\nflows within and outside the Community. Missions outside the\nCommunity in moments of crisis may draw on funds from the\nInstrument for Stability.
\nThis Commission Staff Working Paper accompanies the\nproposal for a Regulation concerning measures to safeguard security\nof gas supply and repealing Directive 2004/67/EC. It provides an\nassessment of the January 2009 gas supply disruption to the\nEU.
\nTo recall: from 6-20\nJanuary 2009, gas flows were interrupted from Russia to the EU via\nUkraine. A majority of Member States were affected directly and\nindirectly. Although the disruption was a commercial matter between\nGazprom of Russia and Naftogaz of Ukraine, the EU was in regular\ncontact with both parties before the onset of the disruption and\nthroughout the event and was instrumental in the agreement on\ncreating an international monitoring mission as well as\nfacilitating negotiations on an agreement for gas supplies into the\nEU to resume.
\nThis paper considers how the crisis developed and why\nexisting provisions were not enough to avoid major disruptions to\nEU gas supplies in January 2009. It considers what the EU can learn\nfrom these events in order to make the framework more resilient and\neffective in responding to gas supply threats, both in an emergency\nsituation and over the medium to longer term.
\nThis paper also responds to a specific request from\nthe European Parliament and from four individual MEP's for an\nanalysis of the Russia-Ukraine gas crisis including the lessons\nlearned.
\nMain conclusions: the\nCommission's concerns that the EU energy security strategy must be\nstrengthened are therefore completely vindicated.
\nThe crisis highlighted weaknesses in each stage of the\ngas supply security approach at EU level:
\nThe crisis also confirmed the importance of certain\nprinciples of EU energy policy which deserve to be\nstrengthened:
\nThe crisis also served as a wake-up call to\npolicy makers to strengthen their energy strategies:
\nThe crisis also confirmed the benefits of EU\ncollaboration and confirmed the importance of having emergency\nplans and measures in place at a national level, the need to\nimprove the Community dimension and the added value of a coherent\nEU approach to the EU's external energy security.
\nThe document concludes that the disruption of supplies\naffected a large number of Member States and the ad-hoc measures\nfacilitated at a Community level did help to mitigate somewhat the\nmajor economic impact the dispute had on some EU Member States.\nClearly there is a need to formalise these arrangements and\nensure that the Community is better placed to face such\nsituations in the future.
\nIn order to strengthen the security of gas supply in\nthe internal market, Council\nDirective 2004/67/EC concerning measures to safeguard security\nof natural gas supplies was adopted.
\nThe Directive provides that the Commission shall\npresent an evaluation report on the implementation of the Directive\nby Member States, which is the purpose of this Commission Staff\nWorking Document.
\nTransposition: most of\nthe Member States have transposed the security of gas supply\nprovisions of the Directive as part of their internal gas market\nlegislation.
\nDifferences in the security of gas supply roles of\nmarket players: Member States have\ndefined the roles for their market players in a different way,\nwhich has created distortion for security of gas supply in European\ninternal gas markets.
\nSecurity of supply standards: Member States have set very heterogeneous security\nof supply standards and in some Member States the definition of\nstandards has not been made. These differences may create a barrier\nto the solidarity mechanism and to the finalisation of the internal\ngas market.
\nSecurity of gas supply instruments: the balance of various instruments is essential to\nenhancing the security of gas supply. The most frequent measures\nare gas storage, long term contracts, flexibility of production and\nimports and diversifications of gas supply. The general conclusion\nis that the level playing field within the EU has not been reached\nin terms of security of gas supply instruments.
\nNational emergency measures: the two-step approach used by Member States has\ncreated a delay in full transposition of this provision and means\nthat the Commission could only assess national emergency measures\nof 18 Member States. In any event, most of the Member States have\ndefined their national emergency measures in a systematic way\ncreating the national emergency plans. In these plans they also\nincluded prevention mechanisms, nominal level of gas market\noperation and different pre-emergency and emergency levels defined\nby disruption volume and by the economic impact.
\nMonitoring and reporting: Member States' reporting obligations are set out in\ntwo gas Directives. Member States have not prepared their annual\ninternal market report in a proper way and much of the mandated\ninformation is not included in those reports. Therefore, the\nCommission had to prepare additional questionnaires and data tables\nto fulfil its monitoring obligation, which created an additional\nadministrative burden. Moreover, the obligation concerning what to\nmonitor is not sufficient to assess either the current long-term\nand short-term, or any future security of supply situation of the\nEU and the effectiveness of the mitigation tools. In addition,\nreporting obligations are limited in frequency and scope and only\nthree Member States provided complete reporting. Greater\ntransparency is therefore needed.
\nThe Council held a policy debate on the\nproposed regulation, on the basis of a questionnaire prepared by\nthe Presidency, and following a presentation by the Commissioner\nfor Energy, Mr Piebalgs.
\nIn principle, the general approach of the Commission's\nproposal was well received. Ministers highlighted, however, certain\npoints of concern regarding specific aspects of the draft\nregulation.
\nMany ministers stressed, in particular, the need to\nclarify further the roles and responsibilities of the market\nactors, the Member States and the Commission, in line with the\nsubsidiarity principle. For ensuring gas supply, the hierarchy\ngoing from gas undertakings, Member States, to the regional and the\nEU level was underlined. Crisis management should be based on an\nin-depth risk analysis, and their must be a balance between\nsolidarity, the market's responsibilities and Member States'\nresponsibility for their own gas supply.
\nA majority of ministers welcomed the Commission's\nproposal of mandatory infrastructure and supply standards, while\nasking for increased flexibility in order to take account of\nnational circumstances and specificities. The implementation\nof the standards should be based on a cost-benefit analysis, with\ndue priority given to market-based instruments. Regional and\nbilateral cooperation has been strongly supported in the debate,\nbut more details will be needed, in particular regarding the\nbreakdown of costs.
\nA clear-cut definition of protected\ncustomers was esteemed necessary, allowing nevertheless for\nsufficient flexibility to take national or regional circumstances\ninto account, including financial issues. Several delegations also\nasked for this definition to be based on a cost-benefit\nanalysis.
\nThe incoming Spanish Presidency announced its\nintention of reaching a political agreement on the Commission's\nproposal before the end of June 2010.
\nThe Committee on Industry, Research and Energy adopted\nthe report drawn up by Alejo Vidal-Quadras (EPP, ES) on the\nproposal for a regulation of the European Parliament and of the\nCouncil concerning measures to safeguard security of gas supply and\nrepealing Directive 2004/67/EC. It recommended that the European\nParliament's position at first reading under the ordinary\nlegislative procedure (formerly known as the codecision\nprocedure) should be to amend the Commission\nproposal as follows:
\nThree level approach:\nthe committee states that roles and responsibilities should be\nestablished in such a way as to ensure that a three-level\napproach is respected which would first involve the\nrelevant undertakings and industry, then\nMember States at national or regional level, and then\nthe Union. In the event of a supply disruption, market players\nshould be given sufficient opportunity to respond to the situation\nby market-based measures such as those listed in Annex II. If the\nreactions of market players are\nnot adequate, Member States and their Competent\nAuthorities should take measures such as those listed in Annex III\nto remove or mitigate the effects of the supply disruption. Only if\nthese measures are inadequate should measures be taken at\nregional or Union level to remove or mitigate the effects of the\nsupply disruption. Regional solutions should be preferred to Union\naction as far as possible.
\nSubject-matter: Members\nstressed that the proposal must establish exceptional measures to\nbe implemented when the market can no longer deliver the required\ngas supplies, as well as measures aimed at safeguarding the\nsecurity of gas supply by ensuring the proper and\ncontinuous functioning of the internal market for gas.
\nCompetent authority: the\ndefinition of competent authority is amended to show that the tasks\nof the latter include ensuring the security of gas supply as well\nas enforcing and implementing the measures and Plans set out\nin the Regulation.
\nResponsibility for security of gas\nsupply: Members inserted an amendment\nstating that the Commission together with the Competent Authority\nshall ensure that no clauses having the effect of a destination\nclause exist in contracts for natural gas concluded\nbetween Member States or their natural gas\nundertakings and third countries. This is without prejudice to the\ncompetences of competition authorities. They note that contracts\nconcerning gas supplies from third countries should not\ncontain provisions violating EU internal market rules, notably\nrestrictions to re-export or clauses that have the same\neffect as destination clauses.
\nLong-term security of supply measures: Members stress the importance of diversification\nthroughout the text. A new clause is inserted stating that one year\nafter entry into force of the legislation, the Commission shall, as\nan element in the development of a long-term supply strategy,\npresent a report on instruments and measures to increase the\ndiversification of gas supply sources for the Union and\nthe routes of supply into the Union. The report shall include\nproposals to the different Member States concerning activities and\nmeasures in order to enhance security of gas supply, including an\nassessment of the role of LNG installations and an overview of\nstorage capacities for gas in different Member States. In addition,\nthe report shall make an assessment of existing regional\ncooperation and include recommendations for improvement in the\njoint preventive and emergency action plans. Any regional\ncooperation for the purpose of the implementation of the Regulation\nshall be conducted by the Competent Authorities of the Member\nStates, involving the natural gas undertakings, the regulatory\nauthorities and the industrial consumers and in close cooperation\nwith the Commission. Such regional cooperation\nshall promote, and must\nnot conflict with, general principles of\nEuropean solidarity.
\nLastly the Union shall work together with supply and\ntransit third countries to share best practices in energy\nefficiency, for example in the framework of existing energy\ncooperation agreements such as the Energy\nCharter Treaty.
\nEstablishment of Preventive Action Plan and Emergency\nPlan: a new clause states that where\nthe regulatory authority is not the Competent\nAuthority, it shall be formally involved in the processes\nof establishing the Preventive Action Plan and the Emergency Plan.\nThe Competent Authority shall take utmost account of the\nassessments made by the regulatory authority insofar as they refer\nto network-related regulatory issues in particular concerning the\ndevelopment of the impact assessment regarding the fulfilment of\ninfrastructure standards with regard to future approval of tariffs\nand consistency with network development plans.
\nWhere Member States have\nexisting public service obligations that relate to\nsecurity of supply, the Competent Authorities shall\npublish them not later than 2 months after the\nentry into force of the Regulation and update as necessary,\nfollowing adoption of their Preventative and Emergency\nPlans.
\nFurthermore, Members add that the Competent Authority\nshall review the Preventive Action Plan and\nthe Emergency Plan every two years on the basis of\naltered assessments of the risks affecting the security of gas\nsupply.
\nContent of the Preventive Action Plan: where the Member State so decides on the basis\nof the risk assessment, the Plan must contain a description\nof obligations to supply relevant customers, that are\nconnected to the gas distribution network and\nthat deliver important public services such as schools and\nhospitals. Those obligations must not affect their\nability to supply the protected customers in the event of a crisis.\nThese additional obligations must not conflict with the\nprinciples of European or regional solidarity towards countries\nwith supply problems. The Plan must also contain the mechanisms\nused for cooperation with other Member States for preparing\nregional preventive action plans.
\nThe committee specifies that, in addition, the\nPreventive Action Plan shall be based on, and consistent\nwith, the ten-year network development plan to be drawn\nup by the ENTSO-G, and the actions to meet the infrastructure\nstandard shall be binding on system operators.
\nThe Plan must be based primarily on market measures,\nand take into account the economic impact and\neffectiveness and efficiency of the measures\nadopted, their effects on the functioning of the internal\nenergy market, the impact on consumers, the environmental\nimpact and relevant international situations and developments,\nparticularly in major supply and transit countries.
\nLastly, Members state that the Commission shall\ndevelop an EU preventive action plan building\non all national and regional plans, identifying possible crisis\nscenarios and the most efficient measures to mitigate such crisis\nin order to guarantee efficient coordination of actions during a\nUnion emergency.
\nInfrastructure standard:\nin the event of a disruption of the largest gas supply\ninfrastructure, the remaining infrastructure (N-1) should have the\ntechnical capacity to satisfy total daily gas demand of\nthe calculated area during a day of exceptionally high\ngas demand statistically occurring once every twenty\nyears. The Commission proposal had specified a period of sixty\ndays of exceptionally high gas demand during the coldest\nperiod statistically occurring every twenty years. The report\nadds the following:
\nSupply standard: there\nmust be measures to ensure the gas supply to the protected\ncustomers in the case of a) extreme temperatures during a\nseven days peak period statistically occurring once every twenty\nyears; and b) any period of forty five days (rather\nthan sixty days) of exceptionally high gas demand during the\ncoldest weather periods statistically occurring every twenty years.\nMembers note that the longest crisis experienced lasted\napproximately two weeks.
\nMembers add that the production facilities required to\nmaintain supplies (such as power stations, refineries, gas storage\nfacilities) shall be enabled to operate with as little hindrance as\npossible in order to guarantee supplies of natural gas, electricity\nand heat. The prescribed limit values may be exceeded to an extent\nto be determined. Modification of the conditions imposed by water\nlegislation shall be permitted to an extent to be determined. In\nthis context, dangers to the environment shall be\navoided.
\nRisk assessment: a new\nclause states that the Commission shall fully assess the\nrisks to the security of gas supply at Union level and\nadopt and publish a report to be presented to the Competent\nAuthorities, the Gas Coordination Group, ACER, ENTSO-G and to the\nEuropean Parliament.
\nMembers add that in the risk assessment, the Member\nStates may lay down, on the basis of a technical and economic\nanalysis, obligations to supply customers, other than\nprotected customers, that are already connected to the\ngas distribution network and that deliver important public\nservices such as schools and hospitals.\nThose obligations must not affect their ability to\nsupply the protected customers in the event of a crisis and must\nnot conflict with the principles of European or regional\nsolidarity towards countries with supply problems.
\nFollowing the recommendation of the Commission, the\nrisk assessment shall also be carried out at regional\nlevel.
\nEmergency plans:\nthe national and regional Emergency Plans must\ndefine the role and responsibilities of all relevant market\nparticipants, taking account of the different extents to which\nthey are affected in the event of gas supply disruptions and\nnot solely the natural gas undertakings and of the industrial\ncustomers.
\nThe report adds that the Commission shall\ndevelop a Union Emergency Plan identifying possible\ninconsistencies between national and regional plans as well as\npossible coordination measures to be taken by the Commission during\na Union emergency. It shall also describe the mechanisms used\nto activate mediation with third countries.
\nAt the Early Warning Level and the Alert Level, the\ncommittee specifies that the market is expected to solve the\nproblem without the intervention of the Competent Authority. The\nreport defines the Emergency level as a supply disruption\nor an exceptionally high demand where market-based\nmechanisms alone can no longer ensure supplies to protected\ncustomers. The Competent Authority is required to intervene\nwithin the framework of the Emergency Plan. Market-based mechanisms\nand non-market-based mechanisms may operate alongside each other in\nthis phase. The Emergency Plan shall also identify the necessary\nmeasures and actions to be taken to mitigate the impact of a gas\nsupply disruption on the supply of electricity generated\nfrom gas and district heating to protected customers.
\nWhere the Commission is notified by the Competent\nAuthority that an early warning level has been declared in a Member\nState or where a threat of disruption of gas supplies might have a\nclear geopolitical dimension, the Union, represented at the\nhighest level, shall take appropriate diplomatic actions having\nregard to the special role given by the Lisbon Treaty to the\nVice-President/ High Representative.
\nThe Commission shall verify within three\ndays (rather than one week as apecified by the Commission)\nwhether the declaration of an Emergency fulfils the criteria\nindicated.
\nThe report adds the following:
\nCommunity emergency responses: the report states that the Commission may declare a\nUnion Emergency at the request of one Competent\nAuthority. It shall declare a Union Emergency where\nmore than one Competent Authority has declared Emergency following\nverification in accordance with the text or where\nthe Union loses more than 20% of its daily gas import\nfrom third countries as calculated by ENTSO-G(rather than 10%\nas proposed by the Commission.) It shall declare\na Union Emergency for specifically affected geographical\nregions, defined in accordance with the provisions in the text\ncomprising more than one Member State where one Competent Authority\nfrom the concerned region has declared an emergency or where\nthe affected geographical region loses more than 10% of its daily\ngas import from third countries as calculated by\nENTSO-G.
\nGas Coordination Group:\nMembers stress the need to involve the Gas Coordination\nGroup throughout the text. In order to achieve solidarity at\nregional level, the Gas Coordination Group shall create specific\nsub-groups addressing security of supply issues at regional\nlevel.
\nInformation exchange:\nthe Commission shall analyse the assessments of the Competent\nAuthorities on Emergency and inform the Member States, the\nEuropean Parliament and the Gas Coordination Group of its\nresults in aggregated form.
\nMonitoring and reporting of security of gas\nsupply: the committee deleted from\nthe obligation to report data on progress made in investments\nneeded to cope with N-1, country specific difficulties encountered\nin the implementation new alternative solutions. It stated that the\ncommunication of confidential information may seriously harm the\ncommercial interests of undertakings, undermine the implementation\nof contracts, lead to market distortions and even be prejudicial to\nsecurity of supply (notably as regards the necessity to preserve\nthe bargaining power of EU gas suppliers in their negotiations with\nexternal producers).
\nA new clause is inserted specifying that the\nCommission shall establish a system of continuous\nmonitoring of and reporting on security of gas\nsupply, which shall include the following measures: (a)\npreparation of annual reports concerning observance of the rules\ngoverning the internal market in the energy sector, notably as\nregards transparency and compliance with EU competition law by\nthird-country companies, especially main suppliers, together with\nall of their subsidiaries; (b) assessment of the impact of\nvertically integrated energy companies from third countries on the\ninternal market and implementation of the principle of reciprocity;\nc) application of appropriate measures designed to prevent\nuncontrolled investment by state-owned foreign companies in\nthe Union's energy sector, in particular the gas and\nelectricity transmission networks; (d) monitoring of contracts for\nnatural gas concluded between Member States and third\ncountries as regards their conformity with EU internal market\nrules. The Commission shall enforce the abolition of any clauses\nhaving the effect of a destination clause in so far as they are\nprohibited by EU law.
\nMonitoring by the European Commission: the Commission shall carry out continuous monitoring\nand reporting of security of gas supply measures, including\nmonitoring of contracts for gas supply concluded between Member\nStates and third countries, in order to ensure that comply\nwith the rules of the EU internal market, security of supply\nand competition law.
\nThe committee adds that in order to enable Member\nStates lacking infrastructure to reach N-1 standard, the Commission\nshall monitor the achievements on market interconnectivity and,\nafter consulting the Gas Coordination Group, propose possible\ninstruments to improve the market.
\nLastly, a new clause states that\nthe EU institutions shall give particular priority to\nthe Nabucco gas pipeline project as regards its political\nprofile and financing.
\nAmendments to Annex: the\nreport makes amendments to Annex I with regard to calculation of\nthe N-1 indicator and of the N1 formula, giving supply side and\ndemand side definitions for each. It also makes some amendments to\nAnnex II and inserts a new Annex IIIa on regional\ncooperation.
\nThe European Parliament adopted by 601 votes to 27,\nwith 23 abstentions, a legislative resolution concerning measures\nto safeguard security of gas supply and repealing Directive\n2004/67/EC.
\nIt adopted its position at first reading under the\nordinary legislative procedure (formerly known as the\ncodecision procedure). The amendments adopted in plenary are the\nresult of a compromise reached between the European Parliament and\nthe Council. They amend the Commission's position as\nfollows:
\nSubject matter: the\namended text states that the Regulation establishes provisions\naimed at safeguarding the security of gas supply by ensuring the\nproper and continuous functioning of the internal market in natural\ngas, by allowing for exceptional measures to be implemented when\nthe market can no longer deliver the required gas\nsupplies.
\nThis Regulation also provides transparent mechanisms,\nin a spirit of solidarity, for the coordination of planning for,\nand response to, an emergency at Member State, regional and Union\nlevels.
\nProtected customers:\nthis definition covers all household customers connected to a gas\ndistribution network and, in addition, where the Member State\nconcerned so decides, may also include: (a) small and medium-sized\nenterprises, provided that they are connected to a gas distribution\nnetwork, and essential social services, provided that they are\nconnected to a gas distribution or transmission network, and\nprovided that all these additional customers do not represent more\nthan 20% of the final use of gas; and/or (b) district heating\ninstallations to the extent that they deliver heating to household\ncustomers and to the customers referred to in point (a) provided\nthat these installations are not able to switch to other fuels and\nare connected to a gas distribution or transmission\nnetwork.
\nResponsibility for security of gas\nsupply: the text stipulates that the\nsecurity of gas supply is a shared responsibility of natural gas\nundertakings, Member States, notably through their Competent\nAuthorities, and the Commission, within their respective areas of\nactivities and competence. Such shared responsibility requires a\nhigh degree of cooperation between them.
\nAs soon as possible and no later than 12 months\nfollowing the entry into force of the Regulation, each Member State\nshall designate a Competent Authority that ensures the\nimplementation of the measures provided for in this\nRegulation.
\nEstablishment of a Preventive Action Plan and an\nEmergency Plan: before adopting a\nPreventive Action Plan and an Emergency Plan at national level, the\nCompetent Authorities shall exchange their draft Plans and consult\neach other at the appropriate regional level. They should consult\nthe Commission, with a view to ensuring that their draft Plans and\nmeasures are not inconsistent with the Preventive Action Plan and\nthe Emergency Plan of another Member State and that they comply\nwith this Regulation and with other provisions of Union law. Such\nconsultation shall be carried out in particular between\nneighbouring Member States, notably between isolated systems\nforming gas islands and their neighbouring Member\nStates.
\nThe Competent Authorities concerned may decide to\nestablish joint Preventive Action Plans and joint Emergency Plans\nat regional level, in addition to the Plans established at national\nlevel. In the case of joint Plans, the Competent Authorities\nconcerned shall endeavour, where appropriate, to conclude\nagreements in order to implement regional cooperation.
\nWhen establishing and implementing the Preventive\nAction Plan and the Emergency Plan at national and/or regional\nlevel, the Competent Authority shall take due account of the safe\noperation of the gas system at all times and address and set out in\nthose Plans the technical constraints affecting the operation of\nthe network, including the technical and safety reasons which may\nlead to the reduction of flows in the event of an\nemergency.
\nNo later than two years following the entry into force\nof the Regulation, the Preventive Action Plans and Emergency Plans,\nincluding, where applicable, joint Plans, shall be adopted and made\npublic. Such Plans shall be notified to the Commission without\ndelay. The Commission shall inform the Gas Coordination Group.\nCompetent Authorities shall ensure the regular monitoring of the\nimplementation of such Plans.
\nContent of the national and joint Preventive Action\nPlans: the national and joint\nPreventive Action Plans shall contain: (a) the results of the risk\nassessment; (b) the measures, volumes, capacities and the timing\nneeded to fulfil the infrastructure and supply standards, including\nwhere applicable, the extent to which demand-side measures can\nsufficiently compensate, in a timely manner, for a supply\ndisruption; (c) obligations imposed on natural gas undertakings and\nother relevant bodies, including for the safe operation of the gas\nsystem; (d) the other preventive measures, such as\nthose relating to the need to enhance interconnections between\nneighbouring Member States and the possibility to diversify gas\nroutes and sources of supply, if appropriate, to address the risks\nidentified in order to maintain gas supply to all customers as far\nas possible; (e) the mechanisms to be used for cooperation with\nother Member States for preparing and implementing joint Preventive\nAction Plans and joint Emergency Plans; (f) information on existing\nand future interconnections, including those providing access to\nthe gas network of the Union, cross-border flows, cross-border\naccess to storage facilities and the physical capacity to transport\ngas in both directions (\"bi-directional capacity\"), in particular\nin the event of an emergency; (g) information on all public service\nobligations that relate to security of gas supply.
\nThe national and joint Preventive Action Plans shall\nbe based primarily on market measures, and shall take into account\nthe economic impact, effectiveness and efficiency of the measures,\nthe effects on the functioning of the internal energy market and\nthe impact on the environment and on consumers, and shall not put\nan undue burden on natural gas undertakings, nor negatively impact\non the functioning of the internal market in gas.
\nInfrastructure standard:\nthe amended text provides that Member States or, where a Member\nState so provides, the Competent Authority shall ensure that the\nnecessary measures are taken so that by four years after entry into\nforce of this Regulation at the latest, in the event of a\ndisruption of the single largest gas infrastructure, the capacity\nof the remaining infrastructure, determined according to the N-1\nformula as , is able to satisfy total gas demand of the calculated\narea during a day of exceptionally high gas demand occurring with a\nstatistical probability of once in 20 years.
\nBy three years following the entry into force of the\nRegulation, the transmission system operators shall adapt the\nfunctioning of the transmission systems in part or as a whole so as\nto enable physical gas flows in both directions on cross-border\ninterconnections.
\nLuxembourg, Slovenia and Sweden shall, by way of\nexception, not be bound by, but shall endeavour to meet, the\nobligation on infrastructure standards, while ensuring the gas\nsupplies to protected customers.
\nProcedure for enabling bi-directional capacity or\nseeking exemption: for each\ncross-border interconnection between Member States, transmission\nsystem operators shall, not later than 15 months after the entry\ninto force of this Regulation, submit to their Member States or,\nwhere Member States so provide, their Competent Authorities or\ntheir regulatory authorities, after consulting with all other\ntransmission system operators concerned: (a) a proposal for\nbi-directional capacity concerning the reverse direction (\"reverse\nflow capacity\"); or (b) a request for an exemption from the\nobligation to enable bi-directional capacity.
\nThe proposal for reverse flow capacity or the request\nfor exemptions shall be based on an assessment of market demand,\nprojections for demand and supply, technical feasibility, the costs\nof reverse flow capacity, including the consequent reinforcement of\nthe transmission system, and the benefits for security of\nsupply.
\nThe authority concerned receiving the proposal or\nexemption request shall notify the authorities concerned of the\nother Member States that could, according to the risk assessment,\nbenefit from reverse flow capacity and the Commission of the\nproposal or the exemption request without delay. That authority\nconcerned shall give those authorities concerned and the Commission\nthe possibility to issue an opinion within a period of four months\nfollowing receipt of that notification.
\nSupply standard: the\nCompetent Authority shall require the natural gas undertakings,\nthat it identifies, to take measures to ensure gas supply to the\nprotected customers of the Member State in the following cases: (a)\nextreme temperatures during a seven-day peak period occurring with\na statistical probability of once in 20 years; (b) any period of at\nleast 30 days of exceptionally high gas demand, occurring with a\nstatistical probability of once in 20 years; and (c) for a period\nof at least 30 days in case of the disruption of the single largest\ngas infrastructure under average winter conditions.
\nEmergency Plans and Crisis Levels: the national and joint Emergency Plans shall inter\nalia: (a) define the role and responsibilities of natural gas\nundertakings and of industrial gas customers including relevant\nelectricity producers, taking account of the different extents to\nwhich they are affected in the event of gas supply disruptions ,\nand their interaction with the Competent Authorities and where\nappropriate with the national regulatory authorities at each of the\ncrisis levels; (c) define the role and responsibilities of the\nCompetent Authorities and of the other bodies to which tasks have\nbeen delegated at each of the crisis levels; (d) ensure that\nnatural gas undertakings and industrial gas customers are given\nsufficient opportunity to respond at each crisis level; (e)\nidentify, if appropriate, the measures and actions to be taken to\nmitigate the potential impact of a gas supply disruption on\ndistrict heating and the supply of electricity generated from gas;\n(f) establish detailed procedures and measures to be followed for\neach crisis level.
\nThe three main crisis levels shall be as\nfollows:
\nThe national and joint Emergency Plans shall ensure\nthat cross-border access to infrastructure in accordance with\nRegulation (EC) No 715/2009 is maintained as far as technically and\nsafely possible in the event of an emergency. The Plans shall not\nintroduce any measure unduly restricting the flow of gas across\nborders.
\nWhen the Competent Authority declares any of the\ncrisis levels, it shall immediately inform the Commission and\nprovide it with all the necessary information, in particular with\ninformation on the action it intends to take. In the event of an\nemergency which may result in a call for assistance from the Union\nand its Member States the Competent Authority of the Member State\nconcerned shall without delay notify the Commission's Civil\nProtection Monitoring and Information Centre.
\nThe Member States and, in particular, the Competent\nAuthorities shall ensure that: (a) no measures are introduced which\nunduly restrict the flow of gas within the internal market at any\ntime; (b) no measures are introduced that are likely to endanger\nseriously the gas supply situation in another Member State; and (c)\ncross-border access to infrastructure in accordance with Regulation\n(EC) No 715/2009 is maintained as far as technically and safely\npossible, in accordance with the Emergency Plan.
\nThe national and joint Emergency Plans shall be\nupdated every two years, unless circumstances warrant more frequent\nupdates, and shall reflect the updated risk assessment.
\nUnion and regional emergency responses: at the request of a Competent Authority that has\ndeclared an emergency, the Commission may declare a Union emergency\nor a regional emergency for a specifically affected geographical\nregion. At the request of at least two Competent Authorities that\nhave declared an emergency, the Commission shall declare, as\nappropriate, a Union or regional emergency. In all cases, the\nCommission, using the means of communication most appropriate to\nthe situation, shall gather the views of, and take due account of\nall the relevant information provided by, the other Competent\nAuthorities. When it assesses that the underlying basis for the\nUnion or regional emergency no longer justifies a declaration of\nemergency, the Commission shall declare an end to the Union or\nregional emergency. In all cases, the Commission shall give its\nreasons and inform the Council of its decision.
\nIn a Union or regional emergency, the Commission shall\ncoordinate the action of the Competent Authorities, taking full\naccount of relevant information from, and the results of, the\nconsultation of the Gas Coordination Group.
\nMonitoring by the Commission: the Commission shall carry out continuous monitoring\nof, and reporting on, security of gas supply measures. By four\nyears following the entry into force of the Regulation at the\nlatest the Commission, on the basis of the report and after\nconsulting the Gas Coordination Group shall:
\nDerogation: the\nRegulation shall not apply to Malta and Cyprus for as long as no\ngas is supplied on their respective territories.
\nPURPOSE: to safeguard the security of gas\nsupply in the Union.
\nLEGISLATIVE ACT: Regulation (EU) No 994/2010 of the\nEuropean Parliament and of the Council concerning measures to\nsafeguard security of gas supply and repealing Council Directive\n2004/67/EC
\nCONTENT: the Council has adopted a Regulation\nconcerning measures to safeguard security\nof gas supply, following an agreement at first reading with the\nEuropean Parliament. The aim of the Regulation is to establish\nmeasures for safeguarding the security of gas supply by i) ensuring\nthe proper and continuous functioning of the internal natural gas\nmarket, ii) permitting the introduction of exceptional measures\nwhen the market can no longer provide the necessary gas supplies,\nand iii) providing for a clear definition and allocation of\nresponsibilities between the gas supplying companies, the Member\nStates and the Union.
\nThe Regulation also provides transparent mechanisms,\nin a spirit of solidarity, for the coordination of planning for,\nand response to, an emergency at Member State, regional and Union\nlevels.
\nResponsibility for security of gas supply:\nthe Regulation stipulates that the security of\ngas supply is a shared responsibility of natural gas undertakings,\nMember States, notably through their Competent Authorities, and the\nCommission, within their respective areas of activities and\ncompetence. Such shared responsibility requires a high degree of\ncooperation between them. As soon as possible and no later than 3\nDecember 2011, each Member State shall designate a Competent\nAuthority that ensures the implementation of the measures provided\nfor in this Regulation.
\nEstablishment of a Preventive Action Plan and an\nEmergency Plan: the Competent\nAuthority of each Member State, after consulting the natural gas\nundertakings, the relevant organisations representing the interests\nof household and industrial gas customers and the national\nregulatory authority, where it is not the Competent Authority,\nshall establish at national level:
\nBefore adopting a Preventive Action Plan and an\nEmergency Plan at national level, the Competent Authorities shall\nexchange their draft Preventive Action Plans and Emergency Plans\nand consult each other at the appropriate regional level. They\nshall consult the Commission, with a view to ensuring that their\ndraft Plans and measures are not inconsistent with the Preventive\nAction Plan and the Emergency Plan of another Member State and that\nthey comply with this Regulation.
\nThe national and joint emergency plans will be defined\nin terms of three main crisis levels:
\nRisk assessment: by 3\nDecember 2011, each Competent Authority shall make a full\nassessment, on the basis of the following common elements, of the\nrisks affecting the security of gas supply in its Member\nState.
\nInfrastructure standard: by 3 December 2014 at the latest, the Competent\nAuthority shall ensure that the necessary measures are taken in the\nevent of a disruption of the single largest gas infrastructure, the\ncapacity of the remaining infrastructure, determined according to\nthe N - 1 formula, is able to satisfy total gas demand of the\ncalculated area during a day of exceptionally high gas demand\noccurring with a statistical probability of once in 20\nyears.
\nSupply standard: the\nCompetent Authority shall require the natural gas undertakings,\nthat it identifies, to take measures to ensure gas supply to the\nprotected customers of the Member State in the following cases: a)\nextreme temperatures during a 7-day peak period occurring with a\nstatistical probability of once in 20 years; b) any period of at\nleast 30 days of exceptionally high gas demand, occurring with a\nstatistical probability of once in 20 years; and c) for a period of\nat least 30 days in case of the disruption of the single largest\ngas infrastructure under average winter conditions.
\nUnion and regional emergency responses:\nat the request of a Competent Authority that has\ndeclared an emergency, the Commission may declare a Union emergency\nor a regional emergency for a specifically affected geographical\nregion.
\nIn a Union or regional emergency, the Commission shall\ncoordinate the action of the Competent Authorities, taking full\naccount of relevant information from, and the results of, the\nconsultation of the Gas Coordination Group.
\nMonitoring by the Commission: the Commission shall carry out continuous monitoring\nof, and reporting on, security of gas supply measures and present\nreports on the subject. By 3 December 2014 at the latest, the\nCommission must submit a report to the European Parliament and to\nthe Council on the overall consistency of Member States' Preventive\nAction Plans and Emergency Plans as well as their contribution to\nsolidarity and preparedness from a Union perspective.
\nENTRY INTO FORCE:\n02/12/2010.
\nThe Committee on Foreign Affairs adopted the own\ninitiative report by Jacek SARYUSZ-WOLSKI (EPP-ED, PL) on\nthe annual report from the Council to the European Parliament on\nthe main aspects and basic choices of the Common Foreign and\nSecurity Policy (CFSP) in 2007, reiterating that the CFSP must be\nunderpinned and guided by the values which the European Union and\nits Member States cherish and must fight for the common\ninterests of its citizens, including their right to live in\npeace and security in a clean environment and to have diversified\naccess to vital resources such as energy.
\nMEPs strongly believe that the European Union can make\nan impact only if it speaks with one voice and if it further\nstrengthens its cooperation with the UN, and reiterate that the EU\nmust also establish its democratic legitimacy through informed\nscrutiny by both the European and national parliaments. In this\nrespect, MEPs believe that members of the committees on foreign\naffairs and defence of national parliaments should be invited by\nthe European Parliament to scrutinise the main developments in the\nCFSP.
\nMEPs also make comments on the other main points of\nthe Common Foreign and Security Policy:
\nBudgetary aspects: once\nagain, MEPs regret the fact that the CFSP budget is seriously\nunder-funded and recall that, in order to be credible, the CFSP\nmust be adequately financed. MEPs would also welcome more\ninformation from the Council on the activities financed by its\nbudget or via the ATHENA mechanism (particularly on how those\nappropriations complement the funds for CFSP actions under the EU\nbudget), in the interest of transparency. In particular,\nMEPs wish to receive all relevant information on CFSP missions in\nGeorgia (EUMM) and in Kosovo (EULEX).
\n2007 Annual Report on the CFSP: MEPs consider that, rather than content itself with\nproviding an exhaustive catalogue of the activities carried out,\nthe Council's annual report should provide the opportunity to\nestablish a dialogue with the European Parliament aimed at\ndeveloping a more strategic approach to the CFSP. MEPs therefore\ncall on the Council to reconsider the general rationale of the\nreport in order to ensure that it includes an in-depth assessment\nof the Union's policy towards third countries and the Union's\nresponse to humanitarian and security crises, as well as specific\nproposals for future action.
\nCFSP horizontal aspects:\nMEPs believe that the CFSP should continue to focus on upholding\nhuman rights, on promoting peace and security at global level, on\nsupport for effective multilateralism, on the fight against\nterrorism, on non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and\ndisarmament, and on climate change and energy security. MEPs also\nask that better account be taken of Parliament's views and call on\nthe Council to pursue with determination the recommendations made\nby Parliament for the development of a common European external\nenergy policy. MEPs also believe that the war in Georgia\nconfirms the need for further development of EU preventive\ndiplomacy, matched by adequate crisis-prevention tools.
\nA new transatlantic agenda: MEPs believe that the coming months will provide a\nunique opportunity for the EU to work out a new transatlantic\nagenda with the new US administration, covering strategic issues of\ncommon concern, such as the financial crisis, the establishment of\na new set of Euro-Atlantic institutions, measures to tackle climate\nchange, energy security, the promotion of a durable peace in the\nMiddle East, the situation in Iran, Iraq and Afghanistan, the fight\nagainst terrorism and organised crime, nuclear non-proliferation\nand disarmament, and the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs). MEPs\nalso make the following comments on the main EU security\nconcerns:
\nThe European Parliament adopted, by 535 votes to 71\nwith 51 abstentions a resolution on the annual report from the\nCouncil to the European Parliament on the main aspects and basic\nchoices of the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) in\n2007.
\nThe resolution reiterates that the CFSP must be\nunderpinned and guided by the values which the European Union and\nits Member States cherish and must fight for the common\ninterests of its citizens, including their right to live in\npeace and security in a clean environment and to have diversified\naccess to vital resources such as energy.
\nParliament strongly believes that the European Union\ncan make an impact only if it speaks with one voice and if it\nfurther strengthens its cooperation with the UN, and reiterate that\nthe EU must also establish its democratic legitimacy through\ninformed scrutiny by both the European and national parliaments. It\nalso considers that Parliament's structures and organisation should\nbe reviewed in order to pool together and better exploit all\nexpertise in matters relating to CFSP, so as to provide a more\neffective and coherent contribution to the development of a more\nstrategic and democratic CFSP.
\nParliament also makes comments on the other main\npoints of the Common Foreign and Security Policy:
\nBudgetary aspects: once\nagain, Parliament regrets the fact that the CFSP budget is\nseriously under-funded and recalls that, in order to be credible,\nthe CFSP must be adequately financed. Parliament would also welcome\nmore information from the Council on the activities financed by its\nbudget or via the ATHENA mechanism (particularly on how those\nappropriations complement the funds for CFSP actions under the EU\nbudget), in the interest of transparency. In particular,\nParliament wishes to receive all relevant information on CFSP\nmissions in Georgia (EUMM) and in Kosovo (EULEX).
\n2007 Annual Report on the CFSP: Parliament considers that, rather than content\nitself with providing an exhaustive catalogue of the activities\ncarried out, the Council's annual report should provide the\nopportunity to establish a dialogue with the European Parliament\naimed at developing a more strategic approach to the CFSP. It\ntherefore calls on the Council to reconsider the general rationale\nof the report in order to ensure that it includes an in-depth\nassessment of the Union's policy towards third countries and the\nUnion's response to humanitarian and security crises, as well as\nspecific proposals for future action.
\nCFSP horizontal aspects:\nParliament believes that the CFSP should continue to focus on\nupholding human rights, on promoting peace and security at global\nlevel, on support for effective multilateralism, on the fight\nagainst terrorism, on non-proliferation of weapons of mass\ndestruction and disarmament, and on climate change and energy\nsecurity. Parliament also asks that better account be taken of\nParliament's views and call on the Council to pursue with\ndetermination the recommendations made by Parliament for the\ndevelopment of a common European external energy policy.\nParliament believes that the war in Georgia confirms the need for\nfurther development of EU preventive diplomacy, matched by adequate\ncrisis-prevention tools. In relation to the kidnapping and murder\nof hostages by Islamic terrorists, Parliament underlines the need\nfor enhanced cooperation and coordination of anti-terrorist policy\nas between EU Member States, the US and NATO, aiming in particular\nat improving the effectiveness of rescue operations launched with a\nview to saving hostages' lives.
\nA new transatlantic agenda: Parliament believes that the coming months will\nprovide a unique opportunity for the EU to work out a new\ntransatlantic agenda with the new US administration, covering\nstrategic issues of common concern, such as the financial crisis,\nthe establishment of a new set of Euro-Atlantic institutions,\nmeasures to tackle climate change, energy security, the promotion\nof a durable peace in the Middle East, the situation in Iran, Iraq\nand Afghanistan, the fight against terrorism and organised crime,\nnuclear non-proliferation and disarmament, and the Millennium\nDevelopment Goals (MDGs).
\nParliament also makes the following comments on the\nmain EU security concerns:
\nThe Committee on Foreign Affairs adopted the own\ninitiative report by Jacek SARYUSZ-WOLSKI (EPP-ED, PL) on\nthe annual report from the Council to the European Parliament on\nthe main aspects and basic choices of the Common Foreign and\nSecurity Policy (CFSP) in 2007, reiterating that the CFSP must be\nunderpinned and guided by the values which the European Union and\nits Member States cherish and must fight for the common\ninterests of its citizens, including their right to live in\npeace and security in a clean environment and to have diversified\naccess to vital resources such as energy.
\nMEPs strongly believe that the European Union can make\nan impact only if it speaks with one voice and if it further\nstrengthens its cooperation with the UN, and reiterate that the EU\nmust also establish its democratic legitimacy through informed\nscrutiny by both the European and national parliaments. In this\nrespect, MEPs believe that members of the committees on foreign\naffairs and defence of national parliaments should be invited by\nthe European Parliament to scrutinise the main developments in the\nCFSP.
\nMEPs also make comments on the other main points of\nthe Common Foreign and Security Policy:
\nBudgetary aspects: once\nagain, MEPs regret the fact that the CFSP budget is seriously\nunder-funded and recall that, in order to be credible, the CFSP\nmust be adequately financed. MEPs would also welcome more\ninformation from the Council on the activities financed by its\nbudget or via the ATHENA mechanism (particularly on how those\nappropriations complement the funds for CFSP actions under the EU\nbudget), in the interest of transparency. In particular,\nMEPs wish to receive all relevant information on CFSP missions in\nGeorgia (EUMM) and in Kosovo (EULEX).
\n2007 Annual Report on the CFSP: MEPs consider that, rather than content itself with\nproviding an exhaustive catalogue of the activities carried out,\nthe Council's annual report should provide the opportunity to\nestablish a dialogue with the European Parliament aimed at\ndeveloping a more strategic approach to the CFSP. MEPs therefore\ncall on the Council to reconsider the general rationale of the\nreport in order to ensure that it includes an in-depth assessment\nof the Union's policy towards third countries and the Union's\nresponse to humanitarian and security crises, as well as specific\nproposals for future action.
\nCFSP horizontal aspects:\nMEPs believe that the CFSP should continue to focus on upholding\nhuman rights, on promoting peace and security at global level, on\nsupport for effective multilateralism, on the fight against\nterrorism, on non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and\ndisarmament, and on climate change and energy security. MEPs also\nask that better account be taken of Parliament's views and call on\nthe Council to pursue with determination the recommendations made\nby Parliament for the development of a common European external\nenergy policy. MEPs also believe that the war in Georgia\nconfirms the need for further development of EU preventive\ndiplomacy, matched by adequate crisis-prevention tools.
\nA new transatlantic agenda: MEPs believe that the coming months will provide a\nunique opportunity for the EU to work out a new transatlantic\nagenda with the new US administration, covering strategic issues of\ncommon concern, such as the financial crisis, the establishment of\na new set of Euro-Atlantic institutions, measures to tackle climate\nchange, energy security, the promotion of a durable peace in the\nMiddle East, the situation in Iran, Iraq and Afghanistan, the fight\nagainst terrorism and organised crime, nuclear non-proliferation\nand disarmament, and the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs). MEPs\nalso make the following comments on the main EU security\nconcerns:
\nThe European Parliament adopted, by 535 votes to 71\nwith 51 abstentions a resolution on the annual report from the\nCouncil to the European Parliament on the main aspects and basic\nchoices of the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) in\n2007.
\nThe resolution reiterates that the CFSP must be\nunderpinned and guided by the values which the European Union and\nits Member States cherish and must fight for the common\ninterests of its citizens, including their right to live in\npeace and security in a clean environment and to have diversified\naccess to vital resources such as energy.
\nParliament strongly believes that the European Union\ncan make an impact only if it speaks with one voice and if it\nfurther strengthens its cooperation with the UN, and reiterate that\nthe EU must also establish its democratic legitimacy through\ninformed scrutiny by both the European and national parliaments. It\nalso considers that Parliament's structures and organisation should\nbe reviewed in order to pool together and better exploit all\nexpertise in matters relating to CFSP, so as to provide a more\neffective and coherent contribution to the development of a more\nstrategic and democratic CFSP.
\nParliament also makes comments on the other main\npoints of the Common Foreign and Security Policy:
\nBudgetary aspects: once\nagain, Parliament regrets the fact that the CFSP budget is\nseriously under-funded and recalls that, in order to be credible,\nthe CFSP must be adequately financed. Parliament would also welcome\nmore information from the Council on the activities financed by its\nbudget or via the ATHENA mechanism (particularly on how those\nappropriations complement the funds for CFSP actions under the EU\nbudget), in the interest of transparency. In particular,\nParliament wishes to receive all relevant information on CFSP\nmissions in Georgia (EUMM) and in Kosovo (EULEX).
\n2007 Annual Report on the CFSP: Parliament considers that, rather than content\nitself with providing an exhaustive catalogue of the activities\ncarried out, the Council's annual report should provide the\nopportunity to establish a dialogue with the European Parliament\naimed at developing a more strategic approach to the CFSP. It\ntherefore calls on the Council to reconsider the general rationale\nof the report in order to ensure that it includes an in-depth\nassessment of the Union's policy towards third countries and the\nUnion's response to humanitarian and security crises, as well as\nspecific proposals for future action.
\nCFSP horizontal aspects:\nParliament believes that the CFSP should continue to focus on\nupholding human rights, on promoting peace and security at global\nlevel, on support for effective multilateralism, on the fight\nagainst terrorism, on non-proliferation of weapons of mass\ndestruction and disarmament, and on climate change and energy\nsecurity. Parliament also asks that better account be taken of\nParliament's views and call on the Council to pursue with\ndetermination the recommendations made by Parliament for the\ndevelopment of a common European external energy policy.\nParliament believes that the war in Georgia confirms the need for\nfurther development of EU preventive diplomacy, matched by adequate\ncrisis-prevention tools. In relation to the kidnapping and murder\nof hostages by Islamic terrorists, Parliament underlines the need\nfor enhanced cooperation and coordination of anti-terrorist policy\nas between EU Member States, the US and NATO, aiming in particular\nat improving the effectiveness of rescue operations launched with a\nview to saving hostages' lives.
\nA new transatlantic agenda: Parliament believes that the coming months will\nprovide a unique opportunity for the EU to work out a new\ntransatlantic agenda with the new US administration, covering\nstrategic issues of common concern, such as the financial crisis,\nthe establishment of a new set of Euro-Atlantic institutions,\nmeasures to tackle climate change, energy security, the promotion\nof a durable peace in the Middle East, the situation in Iran, Iraq\nand Afghanistan, the fight against terrorism and organised crime,\nnuclear non-proliferation and disarmament, and the Millennium\nDevelopment Goals (MDGs).
\nParliament also makes the following comments on the\nmain EU security concerns:
\nThe Committee on Constitutional Affairs adopted the\nreport drawn up by Jo LEINEN (PES, DE) on Parliament's new role and\nresponsibilities in implementing the Treaty of Lisbon.
\n1. New policies
\n2. New powers for the European\nParliament: overall, the report\nwelcomes the fact that, with a few exceptions, the new Treaty would\nplace the European Parliament on an equal footing with the Council\nas a lawmaker in areas where this has not been case so far, notably\nin setting the EU budget (the European Parliament would\nenjoy full parity), agriculture policy and justice and home\naffairs. On this last issue, the area of freedom, security and\njustice is fully integrated into the TFEU, formally putting an end\nto the third pillar.
\nMEPs believe that the responsibility of the European\nCentral Bank to report on monetary policy is now greater, since the\nECB is recognised as an institution of the European Union. They\nwelcome the fact that several provisions of the Statute of the\nEuropean System of Central Banks (ESCB) and of the ECB can be\nmodified after consulting Parliament.
\nConcerning the implementation of the Structural\nFunds, the Lisbon Treaty places Parliament on an equal footing\nwith the Council by replacing the current assent procedure by the\nordinary legislative procedure. Legislation prohibiting\ndiscrimination based on sex, racial or ethnic origin, religion or\nbelief, disability, age or sexual orientation will become subject\nto a special legislative procedure and will require Parliament's\nconsent.
\nMEPs welcome the fact that codecision will\nhenceforth apply to the Staff Regulations of Officials of the\nEuropean Union, inasmuch as this will allow Parliament to take part\non an equal footing with the Council in the adjustment of those\nregulations.
\n3. New procedures:
\n