The Committee on Foreign Affairs adopted the\nown-initiative report by Ioan Mircea PAŞCU (S&D, RO) on\nthe EU’s mutual defence and solidarity clauses: political and\noperational dimensions.
\nMembers recall that the\nframing of a common defence policy aims at a common defence is\nreinforcing the European identity and the strategic autonomy of the\nEU. They also recall that while Member States retain the primary\nresponsibility for the management of crises within their territory,\nserious and complex security threats, from armed attacks to\nterrorism to natural or CBRN disasters to cyber-attacks,\nincreasingly have a cross-border nature and may easily overwhelm\nthe capacities of any single Member State. They therefore urge the\nMember States, the Commission and the Vice-President/High\nRepresentative to make full use of the potential of all relevant\nTreaty provisions, and in particular the mutual defence clause\nand the solidarity clause, in order to provide all European\ncitizens with the same security guarantees against both traditional\nand non-conventional threats.
\nThey also make reference to Article 42(7) of the EU\nTreaty (‘mutual defence clause’ or ‘mutual\nassistance clause’) and Article 222 (‘solidarity\nclause’) of the Treaty on the functioning of the\nEU.
\nIn particular, the report details the manner in which\nthese clauses should be interpreted and enforced in terms of scope\nand capacities.
\n\n1) Mutual defence clause:
\nScope: Members remind\nthe Member States of their unequivocal\nobligation of aid and assistance by all the means in their power if\na Member State is the victim of armed aggression on its territory.\nAnd, while large-scale aggression against a Member State appears\nimprobable in the foreseeable future, both traditional territorial\ndefence and defence against new threats need to remain high on the\nagenda. In this regard, non-armed attacks, for instance cyber\nattacks against critical infrastructure, can be launched with\nthe aim of causing severe damage and disruption to a Member\nState.
\nMembers also recall that the Treaty stipulates that\ncommitments and cooperation in the area of mutual defence shall be\nconsistent with commitments under NATO. However, they stress the\nneed to be prepared for situations involving non-NATO EU Member\nStates or EU Member States’ territories that are outside the\nNorth Atlantic area, as foreseen in the Berlin Plus\nagreement.
\nCapacities: Members\nemphasise the need for European countries to possess credible\nmilitary capabilities. They therefore encourage Member States\nto step up their efforts in terms of collaborative military\ncapability development, notably through the complementary\n‘Pooling and Sharing‘ and ‘Smart Defence’\ninitiatives of the EU and NATO, which represent a critically\nimportant way ahead in times of restrained defence budgets. They\nconsider that, in order to consolidate their cooperation, both NATO\nand the EU should concentrate on strengthening their basic\ncapabilities, improving interoperability, and coordinating their\ndoctrines, planning, technologies, equipment and training\nmethods.
\nMembers reiterate their call for the systematic\nharmonisation of military requirements and for a harmonised EU\ndefence planning and acquisition process, matching up to the\nUnion’s level of ambition.
\nStructures and procedures: Members invite the\nVice-President/High Representative to propose practical\narrangements and guidelines for ensuring an effective response in\nthe event that a Member State invokes the mutual defence clause, as\nwell as an analysis of the role of the EU institutions should that\nclause be invoked. Where collective action is taken to defend a\nMember State under attack, Members consider it should be possible\nto make use of existing EU crisis management structures where\nappropriate, and in particular that the possibility of\nactivating an EU Operational Headquarters should be envisaged.\nThey reiterate their call on the Member States to establish such a\npermanent capacity, building on the recently activated EU\nOperations Centre.
\n2) Solidarity clause: if a Member State is the victim of a terrorist attack\nor of a natural or man-made disaster, the Union and the Member\nStates have an obligation to act jointly to assist it and mobilise\nall the instruments at their disposal, including the military\nresources made available by the Member States (e.g. in the\nevent of a terrorist threat). Members demand that account is taken\nof all sorts of threats, such as attacks in cyberspace, pandemics\nor energy shortages.
\nMember States are called upon to invest in their own security and disaster\nresponse capabilities and not to excessively rely on the solidarity\nof others. The solidarity clause is implemented only once it\nhas been invoked at the request of a Member\nState.
\nCapacities and resources: Members stress that the\nimplementation of the solidarity clause should form an integral\npart of a permanent EU crisis response, crisis management and\ncrisis coordination system, building on the existing sectoral\ninstruments and capabilities. To this end, they point out the\nfundamental role of the Civil\nProtection Mechanism and express their support for the future\nmechanism which will replace it.
\nMembers highlight the\nimportance of ensuring that solidarity is underpinned by adequate\nEU-level funding mechanisms offering a sufficient degree of\nflexibility in emergencies. In this regard, they welcome the\nproposed increased level of cofinancing under the Civil Protection\nMechanism, in particular for transport costs. They recall that the\nSolidarity Fund can provide financial assistance after a major\ndisaster and that further Union financial assistance may be granted\nby the Council pursuant to Article 122(2) TEU, when a Member State\nis in difficulties or is seriously threatened. They stress the\nimportance of seeing this provision as part of a comprehensive\nUnion solidarity toolbox for addressing new major security\nchallenges, such as those in the area of energy security and\nsecurity of supply.
\nStructures and procedures: Members stress that the EU\nneeds to possess capable crisis response structures with 24/7\nmonitoring and response capacity. They note the establishment\nof the Situation Room within the European External Action Service,\nas well as the existence of a number of sectoral monitoring centres\nwithin Commission departments and specialised EU bodies. They\nreiterate the need to avoid unnecessary duplication and to ensure\ncoherence and effective coordination in action, all the more so\ngiven the current scarcity of resources.
\nAs regards structures, Members consider that all specialised services at EU level should be\nintegrated within a single secured information system, for\nexample, within the ARGUS internal coordination platform. They\nhighlight the need for political coordination in the Council in\ncases of severe crises. They welcome the establishment of the new\nEU Emergency and Crisis Coordination Arrangements.
\nMembers also call for:
\nWith respect to the decision-making process in the\nCouncil following a request for assistance under the solidarity\nclause, Members consider it must not be\ndetrimental to EU reactivity, and that crisis response through the\nexisting mechanisms, such as the Civil Protection Mechanism, must\nbe able to start immediately, irrespective of any such political\ndecision. They point out the fact that the use of military\nassets to support civil protection operations is already possible\non operational level without the activation of the solidarity\nclause, as evidenced by the successful cooperation between the\nCommission and the EU Military Staff on past operations in\nPakistan or Libya.
\nMembers consider that threat\nassessments must be complemented with risk assessments analysing\nthreats in the light of existing vulnerabilities and thus\nidentifying the most pressing capability gaps to be addressed. They\ntherefore encourage the Member States to share their national risk\nassessments and risk management plans, to enable a joint appraisal\nto be made of the situation.
\nMembers stress that the European Parliament should be\nkept informed of the situation ‘on the ground’ in the\ncase of a disaster or attack that triggers the solidarity clause,\nas well as of the origins and possible consequences of these\nevent.
\nGeneral considerations: Members also make a series of general considerations,\nin particular in regard to the existing links between the EU and\nNATO. They call for increase political collaboration between\nthe Union’s VP/HR and NATO’s Secretary-General\nfor the purposes of risk assessment, resource\nmanagement, policy planning and the execution of operations, both\ncivil and military. They also reaffirm\nthat the use of force by the EU or its\nMember States is only admissible if legally justified on the basis\nof the UN Charter. In this context, they underline the inherent\nright of individual or collective self-defence.
\nLastly, Members call on the\nCommission and the Vice-President/High Representative, before the\nend of 2012, to make their joint proposal for a Council Decision\ndefining the arrangements for the implementation of the solidarity\nclause according to the provisions of Article 222(3) TFEU,\nclarifying in particular the roles and competences of the different\nactors.
\nIt should be noted that a minority opinion in\nthe context of this report was tabled by several GUE/NGL Members\nwho reject the solidarity clause because of the lack of definition\nof its real scope and the fact that it would favour military to\ncivil measures outside and inside the Union. These Members call for\na civil European Union favouring the resolution of civil\nconflicts.
\nThe Committee on Foreign Affairs adopted the\nown-initiative report by Ioan Mircea PAŞCU (S&D, RO) on\nthe EU’s mutual defence and solidarity clauses: political and\noperational dimensions.
\nMembers recall that the\nframing of a common defence policy aims at a common defence is\nreinforcing the European identity and the strategic autonomy of the\nEU. They also recall that while Member States retain the primary\nresponsibility for the management of crises within their territory,\nserious and complex security threats, from armed attacks to\nterrorism to natural or CBRN disasters to cyber-attacks,\nincreasingly have a cross-border nature and may easily overwhelm\nthe capacities of any single Member State. They therefore urge the\nMember States, the Commission and the Vice-President/High\nRepresentative to make full use of the potential of all relevant\nTreaty provisions, and in particular the mutual defence clause\nand the solidarity clause, in order to provide all European\ncitizens with the same security guarantees against both traditional\nand non-conventional threats.
\nThey also make reference to Article 42(7) of the EU\nTreaty (‘mutual defence clause’ or ‘mutual\nassistance clause’) and Article 222 (‘solidarity\nclause’) of the Treaty on the functioning of the\nEU.
\nIn particular, the report details the manner in which\nthese clauses should be interpreted and enforced in terms of scope\nand capacities.
\n\n1) Mutual defence clause:
\nScope: Members remind\nthe Member States of their unequivocal\nobligation of aid and assistance by all the means in their power if\na Member State is the victim of armed aggression on its territory.\nAnd, while large-scale aggression against a Member State appears\nimprobable in the foreseeable future, both traditional territorial\ndefence and defence against new threats need to remain high on the\nagenda. In this regard, non-armed attacks, for instance cyber\nattacks against critical infrastructure, can be launched with\nthe aim of causing severe damage and disruption to a Member\nState.
\nMembers also recall that the Treaty stipulates that\ncommitments and cooperation in the area of mutual defence shall be\nconsistent with commitments under NATO. However, they stress the\nneed to be prepared for situations involving non-NATO EU Member\nStates or EU Member States’ territories that are outside the\nNorth Atlantic area, as foreseen in the Berlin Plus\nagreement.
\nCapacities: Members\nemphasise the need for European countries to possess credible\nmilitary capabilities. They therefore encourage Member States\nto step up their efforts in terms of collaborative military\ncapability development, notably through the complementary\n‘Pooling and Sharing‘ and ‘Smart Defence’\ninitiatives of the EU and NATO, which represent a critically\nimportant way ahead in times of restrained defence budgets. They\nconsider that, in order to consolidate their cooperation, both NATO\nand the EU should concentrate on strengthening their basic\ncapabilities, improving interoperability, and coordinating their\ndoctrines, planning, technologies, equipment and training\nmethods.
\nMembers reiterate their call for the systematic\nharmonisation of military requirements and for a harmonised EU\ndefence planning and acquisition process, matching up to the\nUnion’s level of ambition.
\nStructures and procedures: Members invite the\nVice-President/High Representative to propose practical\narrangements and guidelines for ensuring an effective response in\nthe event that a Member State invokes the mutual defence clause, as\nwell as an analysis of the role of the EU institutions should that\nclause be invoked. Where collective action is taken to defend a\nMember State under attack, Members consider it should be possible\nto make use of existing EU crisis management structures where\nappropriate, and in particular that the possibility of\nactivating an EU Operational Headquarters should be envisaged.\nThey reiterate their call on the Member States to establish such a\npermanent capacity, building on the recently activated EU\nOperations Centre.
\n2) Solidarity clause: if a Member State is the victim of a terrorist attack\nor of a natural or man-made disaster, the Union and the Member\nStates have an obligation to act jointly to assist it and mobilise\nall the instruments at their disposal, including the military\nresources made available by the Member States (e.g. in the\nevent of a terrorist threat). Members demand that account is taken\nof all sorts of threats, such as attacks in cyberspace, pandemics\nor energy shortages.
\nMember States are called upon to invest in their own security and disaster\nresponse capabilities and not to excessively rely on the solidarity\nof others. The solidarity clause is implemented only once it\nhas been invoked at the request of a Member\nState.
\nCapacities and resources: Members stress that the\nimplementation of the solidarity clause should form an integral\npart of a permanent EU crisis response, crisis management and\ncrisis coordination system, building on the existing sectoral\ninstruments and capabilities. To this end, they point out the\nfundamental role of the Civil\nProtection Mechanism and express their support for the future\nmechanism which will replace it.
\nMembers highlight the\nimportance of ensuring that solidarity is underpinned by adequate\nEU-level funding mechanisms offering a sufficient degree of\nflexibility in emergencies. In this regard, they welcome the\nproposed increased level of cofinancing under the Civil Protection\nMechanism, in particular for transport costs. They recall that the\nSolidarity Fund can provide financial assistance after a major\ndisaster and that further Union financial assistance may be granted\nby the Council pursuant to Article 122(2) TEU, when a Member State\nis in difficulties or is seriously threatened. They stress the\nimportance of seeing this provision as part of a comprehensive\nUnion solidarity toolbox for addressing new major security\nchallenges, such as those in the area of energy security and\nsecurity of supply.
\nStructures and procedures: Members stress that the EU\nneeds to possess capable crisis response structures with 24/7\nmonitoring and response capacity. They note the establishment\nof the Situation Room within the European External Action Service,\nas well as the existence of a number of sectoral monitoring centres\nwithin Commission departments and specialised EU bodies. They\nreiterate the need to avoid unnecessary duplication and to ensure\ncoherence and effective coordination in action, all the more so\ngiven the current scarcity of resources.
\nAs regards structures, Members consider that all specialised services at EU level should be\nintegrated within a single secured information system, for\nexample, within the ARGUS internal coordination platform. They\nhighlight the need for political coordination in the Council in\ncases of severe crises. They welcome the establishment of the new\nEU Emergency and Crisis Coordination Arrangements.
\nMembers also call for:
\nWith respect to the decision-making process in the\nCouncil following a request for assistance under the solidarity\nclause, Members consider it must not be\ndetrimental to EU reactivity, and that crisis response through the\nexisting mechanisms, such as the Civil Protection Mechanism, must\nbe able to start immediately, irrespective of any such political\ndecision. They point out the fact that the use of military\nassets to support civil protection operations is already possible\non operational level without the activation of the solidarity\nclause, as evidenced by the successful cooperation between the\nCommission and the EU Military Staff on past operations in\nPakistan or Libya.
\nMembers consider that threat\nassessments must be complemented with risk assessments analysing\nthreats in the light of existing vulnerabilities and thus\nidentifying the most pressing capability gaps to be addressed. They\ntherefore encourage the Member States to share their national risk\nassessments and risk management plans, to enable a joint appraisal\nto be made of the situation.
\nMembers stress that the European Parliament should be\nkept informed of the situation ‘on the ground’ in the\ncase of a disaster or attack that triggers the solidarity clause,\nas well as of the origins and possible consequences of these\nevent.
\nGeneral considerations: Members also make a series of general considerations,\nin particular in regard to the existing links between the EU and\nNATO. They call for increase political collaboration between\nthe Union’s VP/HR and NATO’s Secretary-General\nfor the purposes of risk assessment, resource\nmanagement, policy planning and the execution of operations, both\ncivil and military. They also reaffirm\nthat the use of force by the EU or its\nMember States is only admissible if legally justified on the basis\nof the UN Charter. In this context, they underline the inherent\nright of individual or collective self-defence.
\nLastly, Members call on the\nCommission and the Vice-President/High Representative, before the\nend of 2012, to make their joint proposal for a Council Decision\ndefining the arrangements for the implementation of the solidarity\nclause according to the provisions of Article 222(3) TFEU,\nclarifying in particular the roles and competences of the different\nactors.
\nIt should be noted that a minority opinion in\nthe context of this report was tabled by several GUE/NGL Members\nwho reject the solidarity clause because of the lack of definition\nof its real scope and the fact that it would favour military to\ncivil measures outside and inside the Union. These Members call for\na civil European Union favouring the resolution of civil\nconflicts.
\nPURPOSE: to present the special report from the\nEuropean Court of Auditors on EU Assistance to the Turkish Cypriot\nCommunity.
\nCONTENT: the Court of Auditors (ECA) assessed whether\nthe European Commission is managing EU financial support to the\nTurkish Cypriot community (TCc) in the northern part of Cyprus\neffectively. Specifically, the ECA examined whether the Commission\ndrew up an assistance programme which reflected the\ninstrument’s objectives; whether appropriate implementing\narrangements were put in place; and whether the individual projects\nwere achieving their intended results. The audit did not seek to\nassess whether the programme is contributing to the political\nobjective of reunification.
\nThe performance audit covered the period from February\n2006, to the third quarter of 2011. It included the examination of\na sample of 34 contracts. This represents approximately one third\n(€97.5 million) of all budget allocations to the instrument\nfrom 2006-11.
\nECA’s conclusions:\ndespite facing difficult political and legal circumstances and a\ntight timetable, the Commission developed a programme which was\ngenerally in line with the regulation’s objectives. It quickly\nset up a programme management office and generally suitable\nimplementation arrangements. However a problem was that temporary\nstaff in the programme support office could only be employed for\nthree years (in contrast to EU delegation staff) making it\ndifficult for them to follow projects from start to finish. The\nprogramme has assisted a great number of different beneficiaries\nacross the TCc and some important results have already been\nachieved. However, the construction of a seawater desalination\nplant, which is the programme’s largest project (€27.5\nmillion), ended in failure. More generally, the sustainability\nof projects is often in doubt.
\nCourt’s recommendations: the Court makes a set of recommendations to the\nCommission covering different possible scenarios based both on\ndevelopments in the reunification process and the level of future\nEU assistance:
\nThe Committee on Budgetary Control adopted the report\nby Ivailo KALFIN (S&D, BG) on Special Report No 6/2012\n(discharge 2011) - 'European Union Assistance to the Turkish\nCypriot Community'.
\nTurkish Cypriot assistance programme: Members recall the historical context of this\nEuropean programme. They recall that the existing de facto division\nof Cyprus dates back to Turkey's military invasion of the northern\npart of the island in July 1974. As a result of the events of 1974,\nthe vast majority of Greek Cypriots and Turkish Cypriots live\nseparately, on their respective sides of the buffer zone, and that\nthe resulting property issue has been one of the most\ndifficult problems to solve as part of the ongoing efforts to\nreach a settlement. The report acknowledges that a particular issue\nconcerning the smooth implementation of the programme relates to\nthe fact that an estimated 78% of privately owned land in the\nnorthern part of Cyprus legally belongs to Greek Cypriots, whose\nconsent is required for Union-funded infrastructure investments on\ntheir land. It is essential to find a comprehensive solution of\nthe Cyprus problem and the support of future reunification\nplans.
\nFurthermore, the report states that the whole island\nis legally part of the Union for the purpose of Protocol 10 of the\nAct of Accession, yet the acquis communautaire is suspended in the\nnorthern part of Cyprus, an area over which the Government does not\nexercise effective control. The objective of the programme, by\nvirtue of Regulation (EC) No 389/2006,\nis for the Union to facilitate the reunification of Cyprus\nand the granting of assistance shall not imply recognition of any\npublic authority other than the Government in the areas in which\nthe government does not exercise effective control. This means that\nthe Commission has to work within a difficult political context\nwhen providing capacity building to beneficiaries.
\nAudit of the programme and the findings of the Special\nReport of the Court of Auditors:\nMembers observe that the sample of 34 contracts selected from nine\nof the main projects out of 24 projects funded through the\nprogramme and covering all five policy objectives of Regulation\n(EC) No 389/2006 concern (developing and restructuring of\ninfrastructure, promoting social and economic development,\nfostering reconciliation, confidence-building measures and support\nto the civil society, bringing the Turkish Cypriot community closer\nto the Union and preparing for the introduction and implementing\nthe acquis communautaire upon the reunification of Cyprus. They\nnote that aid under the instrument of financial support for\nencouraging the economic development of the Turkish Cypriot\ncommunity has amounted to EUR 259 million for the 2006-2011 period\nand that it is currently relying on annual allocations of EUR 28\nmillion.
\nMembers agree that the programme has already achieved\nsome positive results but their sustainability is often\nin doubt, particularly given the uncertainty over future EU\nfunding and issues of decentralised management.
\nOverall, Members take note of the conclusions and\nrecommendations of Special Report 6/2012 (please refer to the\nsummary of the report dated 23/05/2012). They do, however,\nhighlight that it is necessary to continue to support the\nreunification process in Cyprus and to keep pursuing the objectives\nof Regulation (EC) No 389/2006, supporting among others,\nbi-communal measures.
\nMember also takes note of the Court of Auditor's\nrecommendations which cover different scenarios, based both on\ndevelopments in the reunification process and the level of the\nfuture Union assistance.
\nParliament's observations: Members note with concern that the Commission is\nfaced with significant constraints in the establishment and\nimplementation of the programme, that the effectiveness of the\nCommission's local support office has been undermined by several\nfactors. They regret the loss of the seawater desalination plant\nproject, which was an unfortunate setback (this project was the\nlargest project amounting to approximately 10% of total contracted\nfunding) due to restrictions imposed on the Greek Cypriot\ncontractor by the Turkish army, and once these restrictions were\nlifted in March 2010, the contractor was unwilling to continue the\nwork. Although the Commission’s financial interests have been\nprotected (no payments have been made under the construction\ncontract), Members deeply regret that delays have affected most of\nthe actions on local and urban infrastructures.
\nConclusion: Members\nendorse the conclusions of the Court of Auditors that the programme\nhas already achieved some positive results and assisted many\nbeneficiaries across the Turkish Cypriot community even if its\nsustainability is often in doubt, particularly given the\nuncertainty over the future EU funding. They stress the\ntransitional and exceptional character of Union aid to the Turkish\nCypriot community, pending the reunification of Cyprus. They note\nthat the Commission supports the continuation of assistance to\nthe Turkish Cypriot community until there is a comprehensive\nsettlement of the Cyprus problem.
\nMembers recommend the Commission to take into\nconsideration the accumulated experience in the implementation of\nthe programme and, if necessary, propose measures for its further\nimprovement and inform Parliament accordingly. It should keep\npursuing the five objectives of the current Regulation. Lastly,\nthey ask the Commission to maximise the circulation of information\non tenders for reconciliation and civil society strengthening\nprogrammes.
\nThe Committee on Budgetary Control adopted the report\nby Ivailo KALFIN (S&D, BG) on Special Report No 6/2012\n(discharge 2011) - 'European Union Assistance to the Turkish\nCypriot Community'.
\nTurkish Cypriot assistance programme: Members recall the historical context of this\nEuropean programme. They recall that the existing de facto division\nof Cyprus dates back to Turkey's military invasion of the northern\npart of the island in July 1974. As a result of the events of 1974,\nthe vast majority of Greek Cypriots and Turkish Cypriots live\nseparately, on their respective sides of the buffer zone, and that\nthe resulting property issue has been one of the most\ndifficult problems to solve as part of the ongoing efforts to\nreach a settlement. The report acknowledges that a particular issue\nconcerning the smooth implementation of the programme relates to\nthe fact that an estimated 78% of privately owned land in the\nnorthern part of Cyprus legally belongs to Greek Cypriots, whose\nconsent is required for Union-funded infrastructure investments on\ntheir land. It is essential to find a comprehensive solution of\nthe Cyprus problem and the support of future reunification\nplans.
\nFurthermore, the report states that the whole island\nis legally part of the Union for the purpose of Protocol 10 of the\nAct of Accession, yet the acquis communautaire is suspended in the\nnorthern part of Cyprus, an area over which the Government does not\nexercise effective control. The objective of the programme, by\nvirtue of Regulation (EC) No 389/2006,\nis for the Union to facilitate the reunification of Cyprus\nand the granting of assistance shall not imply recognition of any\npublic authority other than the Government in the areas in which\nthe government does not exercise effective control. This means that\nthe Commission has to work within a difficult political context\nwhen providing capacity building to beneficiaries.
\nAudit of the programme and the findings of the Special\nReport of the Court of Auditors:\nMembers observe that the sample of 34 contracts selected from nine\nof the main projects out of 24 projects funded through the\nprogramme and covering all five policy objectives of Regulation\n(EC) No 389/2006 concern (developing and restructuring of\ninfrastructure, promoting social and economic development,\nfostering reconciliation, confidence-building measures and support\nto the civil society, bringing the Turkish Cypriot community closer\nto the Union and preparing for the introduction and implementing\nthe acquis communautaire upon the reunification of Cyprus. They\nnote that aid under the instrument of financial support for\nencouraging the economic development of the Turkish Cypriot\ncommunity has amounted to EUR 259 million for the 2006-2011 period\nand that it is currently relying on annual allocations of EUR 28\nmillion.
\nMembers agree that the programme has already achieved\nsome positive results but their sustainability is often\nin doubt, particularly given the uncertainty over future EU\nfunding and issues of decentralised management.
\nOverall, Members take note of the conclusions and\nrecommendations of Special Report 6/2012 (please refer to the\nsummary of the report dated 23/05/2012). They do, however,\nhighlight that it is necessary to continue to support the\nreunification process in Cyprus and to keep pursuing the objectives\nof Regulation (EC) No 389/2006, supporting among others,\nbi-communal measures.
\nMember also takes note of the Court of Auditor's\nrecommendations which cover different scenarios, based both on\ndevelopments in the reunification process and the level of the\nfuture Union assistance.
\nParliament's observations: Members note with concern that the Commission is\nfaced with significant constraints in the establishment and\nimplementation of the programme, that the effectiveness of the\nCommission's local support office has been undermined by several\nfactors. They regret the loss of the seawater desalination plant\nproject, which was an unfortunate setback (this project was the\nlargest project amounting to approximately 10% of total contracted\nfunding) due to restrictions imposed on the Greek Cypriot\ncontractor by the Turkish army, and once these restrictions were\nlifted in March 2010, the contractor was unwilling to continue the\nwork. Although the Commission’s financial interests have been\nprotected (no payments have been made under the construction\ncontract), Members deeply regret that delays have affected most of\nthe actions on local and urban infrastructures.
\nConclusion: Members\nendorse the conclusions of the Court of Auditors that the programme\nhas already achieved some positive results and assisted many\nbeneficiaries across the Turkish Cypriot community even if its\nsustainability is often in doubt, particularly given the\nuncertainty over the future EU funding. They stress the\ntransitional and exceptional character of Union aid to the Turkish\nCypriot community, pending the reunification of Cyprus. They note\nthat the Commission supports the continuation of assistance to\nthe Turkish Cypriot community until there is a comprehensive\nsettlement of the Cyprus problem.
\nMembers recommend the Commission to take into\nconsideration the accumulated experience in the implementation of\nthe programme and, if necessary, propose measures for its further\nimprovement and inform Parliament accordingly. It should keep\npursuing the five objectives of the current Regulation. Lastly,\nthey ask the Commission to maximise the circulation of information\non tenders for reconciliation and civil society strengthening\nprogrammes.
\nPURPOSE: to present the special report from the\nEuropean Court of Auditors on EU Assistance to the Turkish Cypriot\nCommunity.
\nCONTENT: the Court of Auditors (ECA) assessed whether\nthe European Commission is managing EU financial support to the\nTurkish Cypriot community (TCc) in the northern part of Cyprus\neffectively. Specifically, the ECA examined whether the Commission\ndrew up an assistance programme which reflected the\ninstrument’s objectives; whether appropriate implementing\narrangements were put in place; and whether the individual projects\nwere achieving their intended results. The audit did not seek to\nassess whether the programme is contributing to the political\nobjective of reunification.
\nThe performance audit covered the period from February\n2006, to the third quarter of 2011. It included the examination of\na sample of 34 contracts. This represents approximately one third\n(€97.5 million) of all budget allocations to the instrument\nfrom 2006-11.
\nECA’s conclusions:\ndespite facing difficult political and legal circumstances and a\ntight timetable, the Commission developed a programme which was\ngenerally in line with the regulation’s objectives. It quickly\nset up a programme management office and generally suitable\nimplementation arrangements. However a problem was that temporary\nstaff in the programme support office could only be employed for\nthree years (in contrast to EU delegation staff) making it\ndifficult for them to follow projects from start to finish. The\nprogramme has assisted a great number of different beneficiaries\nacross the TCc and some important results have already been\nachieved. However, the construction of a seawater desalination\nplant, which is the programme’s largest project (€27.5\nmillion), ended in failure. More generally, the sustainability\nof projects is often in doubt.
\nCourt’s recommendations: the Court makes a set of recommendations to the\nCommission covering different possible scenarios based both on\ndevelopments in the reunification process and the level of future\nEU assistance:
\nPURPOSE: to present the special report from the\nEuropean Court of Auditors on EU Assistance to the Turkish Cypriot\nCommunity.
\nCONTENT: the Court of Auditors (ECA) assessed whether\nthe European Commission is managing EU financial support to the\nTurkish Cypriot community (TCc) in the northern part of Cyprus\neffectively. Specifically, the ECA examined whether the Commission\ndrew up an assistance programme which reflected the\ninstrument’s objectives; whether appropriate implementing\narrangements were put in place; and whether the individual projects\nwere achieving their intended results. The audit did not seek to\nassess whether the programme is contributing to the political\nobjective of reunification.
\nThe performance audit covered the period from February\n2006, to the third quarter of 2011. It included the examination of\na sample of 34 contracts. This represents approximately one third\n(€97.5 million) of all budget allocations to the instrument\nfrom 2006-11.
\nECA’s conclusions:\ndespite facing difficult political and legal circumstances and a\ntight timetable, the Commission developed a programme which was\ngenerally in line with the regulation’s objectives. It quickly\nset up a programme management office and generally suitable\nimplementation arrangements. However a problem was that temporary\nstaff in the programme support office could only be employed for\nthree years (in contrast to EU delegation staff) making it\ndifficult for them to follow projects from start to finish. The\nprogramme has assisted a great number of different beneficiaries\nacross the TCc and some important results have already been\nachieved. However, the construction of a seawater desalination\nplant, which is the programme’s largest project (€27.5\nmillion), ended in failure. More generally, the sustainability\nof projects is often in doubt.
\nCourt’s recommendations: the Court makes a set of recommendations to the\nCommission covering different possible scenarios based both on\ndevelopments in the reunification process and the level of future\nEU assistance:
\nPURPOSE: to present the special report from the\nEuropean Court of Auditors on EU Assistance to the Turkish Cypriot\nCommunity.
\nCONTENT: the Court of Auditors (ECA) assessed whether\nthe European Commission is managing EU financial support to the\nTurkish Cypriot community (TCc) in the northern part of Cyprus\neffectively. Specifically, the ECA examined whether the Commission\ndrew up an assistance programme which reflected the\ninstrument’s objectives; whether appropriate implementing\narrangements were put in place; and whether the individual projects\nwere achieving their intended results. The audit did not seek to\nassess whether the programme is contributing to the political\nobjective of reunification.
\nThe performance audit covered the period from February\n2006, to the third quarter of 2011. It included the examination of\na sample of 34 contracts. This represents approximately one third\n(€97.5 million) of all budget allocations to the instrument\nfrom 2006-11.
\nECA’s conclusions:\ndespite facing difficult political and legal circumstances and a\ntight timetable, the Commission developed a programme which was\ngenerally in line with the regulation’s objectives. It quickly\nset up a programme management office and generally suitable\nimplementation arrangements. However a problem was that temporary\nstaff in the programme support office could only be employed for\nthree years (in contrast to EU delegation staff) making it\ndifficult for them to follow projects from start to finish. The\nprogramme has assisted a great number of different beneficiaries\nacross the TCc and some important results have already been\nachieved. However, the construction of a seawater desalination\nplant, which is the programme’s largest project (€27.5\nmillion), ended in failure. More generally, the sustainability\nof projects is often in doubt.
\nCourt’s recommendations: the Court makes a set of recommendations to the\nCommission covering different possible scenarios based both on\ndevelopments in the reunification process and the level of future\nEU assistance:
\nPURPOSE: to present the special report from the\nEuropean Court of Auditors on EU Assistance to the Turkish Cypriot\nCommunity.
\nCONTENT: the Court of Auditors (ECA) assessed whether\nthe European Commission is managing EU financial support to the\nTurkish Cypriot community (TCc) in the northern part of Cyprus\neffectively. Specifically, the ECA examined whether the Commission\ndrew up an assistance programme which reflected the\ninstrument’s objectives; whether appropriate implementing\narrangements were put in place; and whether the individual projects\nwere achieving their intended results. The audit did not seek to\nassess whether the programme is contributing to the political\nobjective of reunification.
\nThe performance audit covered the period from February\n2006, to the third quarter of 2011. It included the examination of\na sample of 34 contracts. This represents approximately one third\n(€97.5 million) of all budget allocations to the instrument\nfrom 2006-11.
\nECA’s conclusions:\ndespite facing difficult political and legal circumstances and a\ntight timetable, the Commission developed a programme which was\ngenerally in line with the regulation’s objectives. It quickly\nset up a programme management office and generally suitable\nimplementation arrangements. However a problem was that temporary\nstaff in the programme support office could only be employed for\nthree years (in contrast to EU delegation staff) making it\ndifficult for them to follow projects from start to finish. The\nprogramme has assisted a great number of different beneficiaries\nacross the TCc and some important results have already been\nachieved. However, the construction of a seawater desalination\nplant, which is the programme’s largest project (€27.5\nmillion), ended in failure. More generally, the sustainability\nof projects is often in doubt.
\nCourt’s recommendations: the Court makes a set of recommendations to the\nCommission covering different possible scenarios based both on\ndevelopments in the reunification process and the level of future\nEU assistance:
\nPURPOSE: to present the special report from the\nEuropean Court of Auditors on EU Assistance to the Turkish Cypriot\nCommunity.
\nCONTENT: the Court of Auditors (ECA) assessed whether\nthe European Commission is managing EU financial support to the\nTurkish Cypriot community (TCc) in the northern part of Cyprus\neffectively. Specifically, the ECA examined whether the Commission\ndrew up an assistance programme which reflected the\ninstrument’s objectives; whether appropriate implementing\narrangements were put in place; and whether the individual projects\nwere achieving their intended results. The audit did not seek to\nassess whether the programme is contributing to the political\nobjective of reunification.
\nThe performance audit covered the period from February\n2006, to the third quarter of 2011. It included the examination of\na sample of 34 contracts. This represents approximately one third\n(€97.5 million) of all budget allocations to the instrument\nfrom 2006-11.
\nECA’s conclusions:\ndespite facing difficult political and legal circumstances and a\ntight timetable, the Commission developed a programme which was\ngenerally in line with the regulation’s objectives. It quickly\nset up a programme management office and generally suitable\nimplementation arrangements. However a problem was that temporary\nstaff in the programme support office could only be employed for\nthree years (in contrast to EU delegation staff) making it\ndifficult for them to follow projects from start to finish. The\nprogramme has assisted a great number of different beneficiaries\nacross the TCc and some important results have already been\nachieved. However, the construction of a seawater desalination\nplant, which is the programme’s largest project (€27.5\nmillion), ended in failure. More generally, the sustainability\nof projects is often in doubt.
\nCourt’s recommendations: the Court makes a set of recommendations to the\nCommission covering different possible scenarios based both on\ndevelopments in the reunification process and the level of future\nEU assistance:
\nPURPOSE: to improve the regulatory framework on the\nstatute and funding of European political parties and European\npolitical foundations with a view to reinforcing and encouraging\nrepresentative democracy at the European Union level.
\nPROPOSED ACT: Regulation of the European Parliament\nand of the Council.
\nCONTEXT: Article 10 of the Treaty on European Union\nstates that \"political parties at European level contribute to\nforming European political awareness and to expressing the will of\ncitizens of the Union\". Truly transnational European political\nparties and political foundations are key to\narticulating the voices of the citizens at European\nlevel.
\nNine years after the entry into force of Regulation\n(EC) No 2004/2003 on the regulations governing political parties at\nEuropean level and the rules regarding their funding, and five\nyears after its revision in 2007, which, inter alia, introduced\naffiliated political foundations at European level within the scope\nof the Regulation, the Commission has conducted a comprehensive\nassessment of the current financing and regulatory framework of\nEuropean political parties and foundations.
\nIt has done so following the adoption, on the one\nhand, of a report by the Secretary General of the European\nParliament (EP) on party funding at European level, and, on the\nother hand, of the EP's resolution of 6 April 2011 on the application of Regulation (EC) No 2004/2003\n(hereafter referred to as \"the Giannakou report\"). The Giannakou\nreport covers two main areas by:
\n· \ncalling on the Commission to propose a statute\nfor European political parties and political foundations, referring\nalso to related issues of internal party democracy; and
\n· \nsuggesting a number of changes linked to the\nfunding regime applicable to the political parties and their\naffiliated political foundations, requesting stricter conditions\nfor access to funding, on the one hand, and a more flexible system,\non the other.
\n\n
As part of its assessment of the\nexisting rules governing European-level political parties and\npolitical foundations, the Commission has taken due\nconsideration of the conclusions reached by the EP in the Giannakou\nreport. It shares the view that European political parties and\nfoundations have an important role to play to reinforce and foster\nrepresentative democracy at EU level, and bridge the divide between\nEU politics and the Union's citizens.
\nIMPACT ASSESSMENT: the Commission has prepared the\ncurrent proposal in close dialogue and consultation with relevant\nstakeholders: representatives of the political parties and\nfoundations at European level, the political groups in the EP,\nnational and academic experts, the President of the EP, the EP's\nSecretary General, and the rapporteur of the EP's evaluation\nreport.
\nLEGAL BASE: Article 224 of the Treaty on the\nFunctioning of the European Union (TFEU).
\nCONTENT: In the present proposal for a Regulation on\nthe statute and funding of European political parties and European\npolitical foundations, the Commission is proposing a series of\nimprovements to Regulation (EC) No 2004/2003. Their overarching\nobjective is to increase the visibility, recognition,\neffectiveness, transparency and accountability of European\npolitical parties and foundations.
\nEuropean legal statute:\nthis proposal introduces a European legal statute. The European\nstatute provides for the possibility to register as a European\npolitical party or a European political foundation and thus obtain\na legal status based on EU law.
\n· \nObtaining a European legal status will be\nconditional on respecting high standards of governance,\naccountability and transparency. The specific conditions and\nrequirements for obtaining a European legal status include strict\nrespect for the values on which the EU is founded, and, in the case\nof political parties, satisfying minimum rules on internal party\ndemocracy.
\n· \nAlthough it will be possible to register\nstatutes as a European political party or as a European political\nfoundation but not apply for EU funding, the opposite is\nnot true.
\n· \nAs requested by the European Parliament, the\nCommission is proposing that only those political parties - and, by\nextension, affiliated political foundations - that are represented\nin the European Parliament by at least one of their members\nshould be entitled to receive EU funding.
\nMode of funding: the\npresent proposal raises the level of donations permitted per\nyear and per donor to foster the ability of the political\nparties and foundations to generate their own resources.
\n· \nEuropean political parties and European\npolitical foundations may accept donations from natural or legal\npersons of up to a value of EUR 25 000 per year and per\ndonor.
\n· \nSingle donations exceeding a value of EUR 12\n000 that have been accepted by the European political parties\nand European political foundations shall be immediately reported to\nthe European Parliament in writing.
\nIn order to counterbalance the increased flexibility,\na comprehensive and transparent regulatory and control\nframework is established, encompassing all aspects linked to\nthe activities and financing of European political parties and\ntheir affiliated political foundations, covering all of their\nfinancial operations, irrespective of the source of\nfunding.
\nThis framework reinforces reporting and transparency\nobligations, it strengthens the accounting and control mechanisms,\nand it introduces a new regime of proportionate administrative and\nfinancial sanctions for breaches of the conditions of the\nRegulation, including breaches of the values on which the EU is\nfounded.
\nBUDGETARY IMPLICATION: the EU funding provided to\nEuropean political parties and European political foundations will\ncontinue to come from the budget of the European Parliament. The\npresent proposal has no significant additional implications for the\nEU budget.
\nThe Council took note of the presentation by the\nCommission of proposals aimed at improving the rules and funding\narrangements of European political parties and foundations\n(please refer to the summary dated 12/09/2012).
\nThe Commission signalled its wish that the new rules\nbe agreed in time for the 2014 European election\ncampaign.
\nThe Council took note of the presentation by the\nCommission of proposals aimed at improving the rules and funding\narrangements of European political parties and foundations\n(please refer to the summary dated 12/09/2012).
\nThe Commission signalled its wish that the new rules\nbe agreed in time for the 2014 European election\ncampaign.
\nThe Council took note of the presentation by the\nCommission of proposals aimed at improving the rules and funding\narrangements of European political parties and foundations\n(please refer to the summary dated 12/09/2012).
\nThe Commission signalled its wish that the new rules\nbe agreed in time for the 2014 European election\ncampaign.
\nPURPOSE: to improve the regulatory framework on the\nstatute and funding of European political parties and European\npolitical foundations with a view to reinforcing and encouraging\nrepresentative democracy at the European Union level.
\nPROPOSED ACT: Regulation of the European Parliament\nand of the Council.
\nCONTEXT: Article 10 of the Treaty on European Union\nstates that \"political parties at European level contribute to\nforming European political awareness and to expressing the will of\ncitizens of the Union\". Truly transnational European political\nparties and political foundations are key to\narticulating the voices of the citizens at European\nlevel.
\nNine years after the entry into force of Regulation\n(EC) No 2004/2003 on the regulations governing political parties at\nEuropean level and the rules regarding their funding, and five\nyears after its revision in 2007, which, inter alia, introduced\naffiliated political foundations at European level within the scope\nof the Regulation, the Commission has conducted a comprehensive\nassessment of the current financing and regulatory framework of\nEuropean political parties and foundations.
\nIt has done so following the adoption, on the one\nhand, of a report by the Secretary General of the European\nParliament (EP) on party funding at European level, and, on the\nother hand, of the EP's resolution of 6 April 2011 on the application of Regulation (EC) No 2004/2003\n(hereafter referred to as \"the Giannakou report\"). The Giannakou\nreport covers two main areas by:
\n· \ncalling on the Commission to propose a statute\nfor European political parties and political foundations, referring\nalso to related issues of internal party democracy; and
\n· \nsuggesting a number of changes linked to the\nfunding regime applicable to the political parties and their\naffiliated political foundations, requesting stricter conditions\nfor access to funding, on the one hand, and a more flexible system,\non the other.
\nAs part of its assessment of the existing rules\ngoverning European-level political parties and political\nfoundations, the Commission has taken due consideration of the\nconclusions reached by the EP in the Giannakou report. It\nshares the view that European political parties and foundations\nhave an important role to play to reinforce and foster\nrepresentative democracy at EU level, and bridge the divide between\nEU politics and the Union's citizens.
\nIMPACT ASSESSMENT: the Commission has prepared the\ncurrent proposal in close dialogue and consultation with relevant\nstakeholders: representatives of the political parties and\nfoundations at European level, the political groups in the EP,\nnational and academic experts, the President of the EP, the EP's\nSecretary General, and the rapporteur of the EP's evaluation\nreport.
\nLEGAL BASE: Article 224 of the Treaty on the\nFunctioning of the European Union (TFEU).
\nCONTENT: In the present proposal for a Regulation on\nthe statute and funding of European political parties and European\npolitical foundations, the Commission is proposing a series of\nimprovements to Regulation (EC) No 2004/2003. Their overarching\nobjective is to increase the visibility, recognition,\neffectiveness, transparency and accountability of European\npolitical parties and foundations.
\nEuropean legal statute:\nthis proposal introduces a European legal statute. The European\nstatute provides for the possibility to register as a European\npolitical party or a European political foundation and thus obtain\na legal status based on EU law.
\n\n· \nObtaining a European legal status will be\nconditional on respecting high standards of governance,\naccountability and transparency. The specific conditions and\nrequirements for obtaining a European legal status include strict\nrespect for the values on which the EU is founded, and, in the case\nof political parties, satisfying minimum rules on internal party\ndemocracy.
\n\n· \nAlthough it will be possible to register\nstatutes as a European political party or as a European political\nfoundation but not apply for EU funding, the opposite is\nnot true.
\n\n· \nAs requested by the European Parliament, the\nCommission is proposing that only those political parties –\nand, by extension, affiliated political foundations – that are\nrepresented in the European Parliament by at least one of their\nmembers should be entitled to receive EU funding.
\nMode of funding: the\npresent proposal raises the level of donations permitted per\nyear and per donor to foster the ability of the political\nparties and foundations to generate their own resources.
\n\n· \nEuropean political parties and European\npolitical foundations may accept donations from natural or legal\npersons of up to a value of EUR 25 000 per year and per\ndonor.
\n\n· \nSingle donations exceeding a value of EUR 12\n000 that have been accepted by the European political parties\nand European political foundations shall be immediately reported to\nthe European Parliament in writing.
\nIn order to counterbalance the increased flexibility,\na comprehensive and transparent regulatory and control\nframework is established, encompassing all aspects linked to\nthe activities and financing of European political parties and\ntheir affiliated political foundations, covering all of their\nfinancial operations, irrespective of the source of\nfunding.
\nThis framework reinforces reporting and transparency\nobligations, it strengthens the accounting and control mechanisms,\nand it introduces a new regime of proportionate administrative and\nfinancial sanctions for breaches of the conditions of the\nRegulation, including breaches of the values on which the EU is\nfounded.
\nBUDGETARY IMPLICATION: the EU funding provided to\nEuropean political parties and European political foundations will\ncontinue to come from the budget of the European Parliament. The\npresent proposal has no significant additional implications for the\nEU budget.
\nPURPOSE: to improve the regulatory framework on the\nstatute and funding of European political parties and European\npolitical foundations with a view to reinforcing and encouraging\nrepresentative democracy at the European Union level.
\nPROPOSED ACT: Regulation of the European Parliament\nand of the Council.
\nCONTEXT: Article 10 of the Treaty on European Union\nstates that \"political parties at European level contribute to\nforming European political awareness and to expressing the will of\ncitizens of the Union\". Truly transnational European political\nparties and political foundations are key to\narticulating the voices of the citizens at European\nlevel.
\nNine years after the entry into force of Regulation\n(EC) No 2004/2003 on the regulations governing political parties at\nEuropean level and the rules regarding their funding, and five\nyears after its revision in 2007, which, inter alia, introduced\naffiliated political foundations at European level within the scope\nof the Regulation, the Commission has conducted a comprehensive\nassessment of the current financing and regulatory framework of\nEuropean political parties and foundations.
\nIt has done so following the adoption, on the one\nhand, of a report by the Secretary General of the European\nParliament (EP) on party funding at European level, and, on the\nother hand, of the EP's resolution of 6 April 2011 on the application of Regulation (EC) No 2004/2003\n(hereafter referred to as \"the Giannakou report\"). The Giannakou\nreport covers two main areas by:
\n· \ncalling on the Commission to propose a statute\nfor European political parties and political foundations, referring\nalso to related issues of internal party democracy; and
\n· \nsuggesting a number of changes linked to the\nfunding regime applicable to the political parties and their\naffiliated political foundations, requesting stricter conditions\nfor access to funding, on the one hand, and a more flexible system,\non the other.
\nAs part of its assessment of the existing rules\ngoverning European-level political parties and political\nfoundations, the Commission has taken due consideration of the\nconclusions reached by the EP in the Giannakou report. It\nshares the view that European political parties and foundations\nhave an important role to play to reinforce and foster\nrepresentative democracy at EU level, and bridge the divide between\nEU politics and the Union's citizens.
\nIMPACT ASSESSMENT: the Commission has prepared the\ncurrent proposal in close dialogue and consultation with relevant\nstakeholders: representatives of the political parties and\nfoundations at European level, the political groups in the EP,\nnational and academic experts, the President of the EP, the EP's\nSecretary General, and the rapporteur of the EP's evaluation\nreport.
\nLEGAL BASE: Article 224 of the Treaty on the\nFunctioning of the European Union (TFEU).
\nCONTENT: In the present proposal for a Regulation on\nthe statute and funding of European political parties and European\npolitical foundations, the Commission is proposing a series of\nimprovements to Regulation (EC) No 2004/2003. Their overarching\nobjective is to increase the visibility, recognition,\neffectiveness, transparency and accountability of European\npolitical parties and foundations.
\nEuropean legal statute:\nthis proposal introduces a European legal statute. The European\nstatute provides for the possibility to register as a European\npolitical party or a European political foundation and thus obtain\na legal status based on EU law.
\n\n· \nObtaining a European legal status will be\nconditional on respecting high standards of governance,\naccountability and transparency. The specific conditions and\nrequirements for obtaining a European legal status include strict\nrespect for the values on which the EU is founded, and, in the case\nof political parties, satisfying minimum rules on internal party\ndemocracy.
\n\n· \nAlthough it will be possible to register\nstatutes as a European political party or as a European political\nfoundation but not apply for EU funding, the opposite is\nnot true.
\n\n· \nAs requested by the European Parliament, the\nCommission is proposing that only those political parties –\nand, by extension, affiliated political foundations – that are\nrepresented in the European Parliament by at least one of their\nmembers should be entitled to receive EU funding.
\nMode of funding: the\npresent proposal raises the level of donations permitted per\nyear and per donor to foster the ability of the political\nparties and foundations to generate their own resources.
\n\n· \nEuropean political parties and European\npolitical foundations may accept donations from natural or legal\npersons of up to a value of EUR 25 000 per year and per\ndonor.
\n\n· \nSingle donations exceeding a value of EUR 12\n000 that have been accepted by the European political parties\nand European political foundations shall be immediately reported to\nthe European Parliament in writing.
\nIn order to counterbalance the increased flexibility,\na comprehensive and transparent regulatory and control\nframework is established, encompassing all aspects linked to\nthe activities and financing of European political parties and\ntheir affiliated political foundations, covering all of their\nfinancial operations, irrespective of the source of\nfunding.
\nThis framework reinforces reporting and transparency\nobligations, it strengthens the accounting and control mechanisms,\nand it introduces a new regime of proportionate administrative and\nfinancial sanctions for breaches of the conditions of the\nRegulation, including breaches of the values on which the EU is\nfounded.
\nBUDGETARY IMPLICATION: the EU funding provided to\nEuropean political parties and European political foundations will\ncontinue to come from the budget of the European Parliament. The\npresent proposal has no significant additional implications for the\nEU budget.
\nPURPOSE: to improve the regulatory framework on the\nstatute and funding of European political parties and European\npolitical foundations with a view to reinforcing and encouraging\nrepresentative democracy at the European Union level.
\nPROPOSED ACT: Regulation of the European Parliament\nand of the Council.
\nCONTEXT: Article 10 of the Treaty on European Union\nstates that \"political parties at European level contribute to\nforming European political awareness and to expressing the will of\ncitizens of the Union\". Truly transnational European political\nparties and political foundations are key to\narticulating the voices of the citizens at European\nlevel.
\nNine years after the entry into force of Regulation\n(EC) No 2004/2003 on the regulations governing political parties at\nEuropean level and the rules regarding their funding, and five\nyears after its revision in 2007, which, inter alia, introduced\naffiliated political foundations at European level within the scope\nof the Regulation, the Commission has conducted a comprehensive\nassessment of the current financing and regulatory framework of\nEuropean political parties and foundations.
\nIt has done so following the adoption, on the one\nhand, of a report by the Secretary General of the European\nParliament (EP) on party funding at European level, and, on the\nother hand, of the EP's resolution of 6 April 2011 on the application of Regulation (EC) No 2004/2003\n(hereafter referred to as \"the Giannakou report\"). The Giannakou\nreport covers two main areas by:
\n· \ncalling on the Commission to propose a statute\nfor European political parties and political foundations, referring\nalso to related issues of internal party democracy; and
\n· \nsuggesting a number of changes linked to the\nfunding regime applicable to the political parties and their\naffiliated political foundations, requesting stricter conditions\nfor access to funding, on the one hand, and a more flexible system,\non the other.
\nAs part of its assessment of the existing rules\ngoverning European-level political parties and political\nfoundations, the Commission has taken due consideration of the\nconclusions reached by the EP in the Giannakou report. It\nshares the view that European political parties and foundations\nhave an important role to play to reinforce and foster\nrepresentative democracy at EU level, and bridge the divide between\nEU politics and the Union's citizens.
\nIMPACT ASSESSMENT: the Commission has prepared the\ncurrent proposal in close dialogue and consultation with relevant\nstakeholders: representatives of the political parties and\nfoundations at European level, the political groups in the EP,\nnational and academic experts, the President of the EP, the EP's\nSecretary General, and the rapporteur of the EP's evaluation\nreport.
\nLEGAL BASE: Article 224 of the Treaty on the\nFunctioning of the European Union (TFEU).
\nCONTENT: In the present proposal for a Regulation on\nthe statute and funding of European political parties and European\npolitical foundations, the Commission is proposing a series of\nimprovements to Regulation (EC) No 2004/2003. Their overarching\nobjective is to increase the visibility, recognition,\neffectiveness, transparency and accountability of European\npolitical parties and foundations.
\nEuropean legal statute:\nthis proposal introduces a European legal statute. The European\nstatute provides for the possibility to register as a European\npolitical party or a European political foundation and thus obtain\na legal status based on EU law.
\n\n· \nObtaining a European legal status will be\nconditional on respecting high standards of governance,\naccountability and transparency. The specific conditions and\nrequirements for obtaining a European legal status include strict\nrespect for the values on which the EU is founded, and, in the case\nof political parties, satisfying minimum rules on internal party\ndemocracy.
\n\n· \nAlthough it will be possible to register\nstatutes as a European political party or as a European political\nfoundation but not apply for EU funding, the opposite is\nnot true.
\n\n· \nAs requested by the European Parliament, the\nCommission is proposing that only those political parties –\nand, by extension, affiliated political foundations – that are\nrepresented in the European Parliament by at least one of their\nmembers should be entitled to receive EU funding.
\nMode of funding: the\npresent proposal raises the level of donations permitted per\nyear and per donor to foster the ability of the political\nparties and foundations to generate their own resources.
\n\n· \nEuropean political parties and European\npolitical foundations may accept donations from natural or legal\npersons of up to a value of EUR 25 000 per year and per\ndonor.
\n\n· \nSingle donations exceeding a value of EUR 12\n000 that have been accepted by the European political parties\nand European political foundations shall be immediately reported to\nthe European Parliament in writing.
\nIn order to counterbalance the increased flexibility,\na comprehensive and transparent regulatory and control\nframework is established, encompassing all aspects linked to\nthe activities and financing of European political parties and\ntheir affiliated political foundations, covering all of their\nfinancial operations, irrespective of the source of\nfunding.
\nThis framework reinforces reporting and transparency\nobligations, it strengthens the accounting and control mechanisms,\nand it introduces a new regime of proportionate administrative and\nfinancial sanctions for breaches of the conditions of the\nRegulation, including breaches of the values on which the EU is\nfounded.
\nBUDGETARY IMPLICATION: the EU funding provided to\nEuropean political parties and European political foundations will\ncontinue to come from the budget of the European Parliament. The\npresent proposal has no significant additional implications for the\nEU budget.
\nThe Council took note of the presentation by the\nCommission of proposals aimed at improving the rules and funding\narrangements of European political parties and foundations\n(please refer to the summary dated 12/09/2012).
\nThe Commission signalled its wish that the new rules\nbe agreed in time for the 2014 European election\ncampaign.
\nPURPOSE: to improve the regulatory framework on the\nstatute and funding of European political parties and European\npolitical foundations with a view to reinforcing and encouraging\nrepresentative democracy at the European Union level.
\nPROPOSED ACT: Regulation of the European Parliament\nand of the Council.
\nCONTEXT: Article 10 of the Treaty on European Union\nstates that \"political parties at European level contribute to\nforming European political awareness and to expressing the will of\ncitizens of the Union\". Truly transnational European political\nparties and political foundations are key to\narticulating the voices of the citizens at European\nlevel.
\nNine years after the entry into force of Regulation\n(EC) No 2004/2003 on the regulations governing political parties at\nEuropean level and the rules regarding their funding, and five\nyears after its revision in 2007, which, inter alia, introduced\naffiliated political foundations at European level within the scope\nof the Regulation, the Commission has conducted a comprehensive\nassessment of the current financing and regulatory framework of\nEuropean political parties and foundations.
\nIt has done so following the adoption, on the one\nhand, of a report by the Secretary General of the European\nParliament (EP) on party funding at European level, and, on the\nother hand, of the EP's resolution of 6 April 2011 on the application of Regulation (EC) No 2004/2003\n(hereafter referred to as \"the Giannakou report\"). The Giannakou\nreport covers two main areas by:
\n· \ncalling on the Commission to propose a statute\nfor European political parties and political foundations, referring\nalso to related issues of internal party democracy; and
\n· \nsuggesting a number of changes linked to the\nfunding regime applicable to the political parties and their\naffiliated political foundations, requesting stricter conditions\nfor access to funding, on the one hand, and a more flexible system,\non the other.
\nAs part of its assessment of the existing rules\ngoverning European-level political parties and political\nfoundations, the Commission has taken due consideration of the\nconclusions reached by the EP in the Giannakou report. It\nshares the view that European political parties and foundations\nhave an important role to play to reinforce and foster\nrepresentative democracy at EU level, and bridge the divide between\nEU politics and the Union's citizens.
\nIMPACT ASSESSMENT: the Commission has prepared the\ncurrent proposal in close dialogue and consultation with relevant\nstakeholders: representatives of the political parties and\nfoundations at European level, the political groups in the EP,\nnational and academic experts, the President of the EP, the EP's\nSecretary General, and the rapporteur of the EP's evaluation\nreport.
\nLEGAL BASE: Article 224 of the Treaty on the\nFunctioning of the European Union (TFEU).
\nCONTENT: In the present proposal for a Regulation on\nthe statute and funding of European political parties and European\npolitical foundations, the Commission is proposing a series of\nimprovements to Regulation (EC) No 2004/2003. Their overarching\nobjective is to increase the visibility, recognition,\neffectiveness, transparency and accountability of European\npolitical parties and foundations.
\nEuropean legal statute:\nthis proposal introduces a European legal statute. The European\nstatute provides for the possibility to register as a European\npolitical party or a European political foundation and thus obtain\na legal status based on EU law.
\n\n· \nObtaining a European legal status will be\nconditional on respecting high standards of governance,\naccountability and transparency. The specific conditions and\nrequirements for obtaining a European legal status include strict\nrespect for the values on which the EU is founded, and, in the case\nof political parties, satisfying minimum rules on internal party\ndemocracy.
\n\n· \nAlthough it will be possible to register\nstatutes as a European political party or as a European political\nfoundation but not apply for EU funding, the opposite is\nnot true.
\n\n· \nAs requested by the European Parliament, the\nCommission is proposing that only those political parties –\nand, by extension, affiliated political foundations – that are\nrepresented in the European Parliament by at least one of their\nmembers should be entitled to receive EU funding.
\nMode of funding: the\npresent proposal raises the level of donations permitted per\nyear and per donor to foster the ability of the political\nparties and foundations to generate their own resources.
\n\n· \nEuropean political parties and European\npolitical foundations may accept donations from natural or legal\npersons of up to a value of EUR 25 000 per year and per\ndonor.
\n\n· \nSingle donations exceeding a value of EUR 12\n000 that have been accepted by the European political parties\nand European political foundations shall be immediately reported to\nthe European Parliament in writing.
\nIn order to counterbalance the increased flexibility,\na comprehensive and transparent regulatory and control\nframework is established, encompassing all aspects linked to\nthe activities and financing of European political parties and\ntheir affiliated political foundations, covering all of their\nfinancial operations, irrespective of the source of\nfunding.
\nThis framework reinforces reporting and transparency\nobligations, it strengthens the accounting and control mechanisms,\nand it introduces a new regime of proportionate administrative and\nfinancial sanctions for breaches of the conditions of the\nRegulation, including breaches of the values on which the EU is\nfounded.
\nBUDGETARY IMPLICATION: the EU funding provided to\nEuropean political parties and European political foundations will\ncontinue to come from the budget of the European Parliament. The\npresent proposal has no significant additional implications for the\nEU budget.
\nPURPOSE: to improve the regulatory framework on the\nstatute and funding of European political parties and European\npolitical foundations with a view to reinforcing and encouraging\nrepresentative democracy at the European Union level.
\nPROPOSED ACT: Regulation of the European Parliament\nand of the Council.
\nCONTEXT: Article 10 of the Treaty on European Union\nstates that \"political parties at European level contribute to\nforming European political awareness and to expressing the will of\ncitizens of the Union\". Truly transnational European political\nparties and political foundations are key to\narticulating the voices of the citizens at European\nlevel.
\nNine years after the entry into force of Regulation\n(EC) No 2004/2003 on the regulations governing political parties at\nEuropean level and the rules regarding their funding, and five\nyears after its revision in 2007, which, inter alia, introduced\naffiliated political foundations at European level within the scope\nof the Regulation, the Commission has conducted a comprehensive\nassessment of the current financing and regulatory framework of\nEuropean political parties and foundations.
\nIt has done so following the adoption, on the one\nhand, of a report by the Secretary General of the European\nParliament (EP) on party funding at European level, and, on the\nother hand, of the EP's resolution of 6 April 2011 on the application of Regulation (EC) No 2004/2003\n(hereafter referred to as \"the Giannakou report\"). The Giannakou\nreport covers two main areas by:
\n· \ncalling on the Commission to propose a statute\nfor European political parties and political foundations, referring\nalso to related issues of internal party democracy; and
\n· \nsuggesting a number of changes linked to the\nfunding regime applicable to the political parties and their\naffiliated political foundations, requesting stricter conditions\nfor access to funding, on the one hand, and a more flexible system,\non the other.
\n\n
As part of its assessment of the\nexisting rules governing European-level political parties and\npolitical foundations, the Commission has taken due\nconsideration of the conclusions reached by the EP in the Giannakou\nreport. It shares the view that European political parties and\nfoundations have an important role to play to reinforce and foster\nrepresentative democracy at EU level, and bridge the divide between\nEU politics and the Union's citizens.
\nIMPACT ASSESSMENT: the Commission has prepared the\ncurrent proposal in close dialogue and consultation with relevant\nstakeholders: representatives of the political parties and\nfoundations at European level, the political groups in the EP,\nnational and academic experts, the President of the EP, the EP's\nSecretary General, and the rapporteur of the EP's evaluation\nreport.
\nLEGAL BASE: Article 224 of the Treaty on the\nFunctioning of the European Union (TFEU).
\nCONTENT: In the present proposal for a Regulation on\nthe statute and funding of European political parties and European\npolitical foundations, the Commission is proposing a series of\nimprovements to Regulation (EC) No 2004/2003. Their overarching\nobjective is to increase the visibility, recognition,\neffectiveness, transparency and accountability of European\npolitical parties and foundations.
\nEuropean legal statute:\nthis proposal introduces a European legal statute. The European\nstatute provides for the possibility to register as a European\npolitical party or a European political foundation and thus obtain\na legal status based on EU law.
\n· \nObtaining a European legal status will be\nconditional on respecting high standards of governance,\naccountability and transparency. The specific conditions and\nrequirements for obtaining a European legal status include strict\nrespect for the values on which the EU is founded, and, in the case\nof political parties, satisfying minimum rules on internal party\ndemocracy.
\n· \nAlthough it will be possible to register\nstatutes as a European political party or as a European political\nfoundation but not apply for EU funding, the opposite is\nnot true.
\n· \nAs requested by the European Parliament, the\nCommission is proposing that only those political parties - and, by\nextension, affiliated political foundations - that are represented\nin the European Parliament by at least one of their members\nshould be entitled to receive EU funding.
\nMode of funding: the\npresent proposal raises the level of donations permitted per\nyear and per donor to foster the ability of the political\nparties and foundations to generate their own resources.
\n· \nEuropean political parties and European\npolitical foundations may accept donations from natural or legal\npersons of up to a value of EUR 25 000 per year and per\ndonor.
\n· \nSingle donations exceeding a value of EUR 12\n000 that have been accepted by the European political parties\nand European political foundations shall be immediately reported to\nthe European Parliament in writing.
\nIn order to counterbalance the increased flexibility,\na comprehensive and transparent regulatory and control\nframework is established, encompassing all aspects linked to\nthe activities and financing of European political parties and\ntheir affiliated political foundations, covering all of their\nfinancial operations, irrespective of the source of\nfunding.
\nThis framework reinforces reporting and transparency\nobligations, it strengthens the accounting and control mechanisms,\nand it introduces a new regime of proportionate administrative and\nfinancial sanctions for breaches of the conditions of the\nRegulation, including breaches of the values on which the EU is\nfounded.
\nBUDGETARY IMPLICATION: the EU funding provided to\nEuropean political parties and European political foundations will\ncontinue to come from the budget of the European Parliament. The\npresent proposal has no significant additional implications for the\nEU budget.
\nThe Committee on Constitutional Affairs adopted the\nreport by Enrique GUERRERO SALOM (S&D, ES) on amendment of Rule\n70 of Parliament’s Rules of Procedure on interinstitutional\nnegotiations in legislative procedures.
\nThe proposed amendments are as follows:
\nThe Committee on Constitutional Affairs adopted the\nreport by Enrique GUERRERO SALOM (S&D, ES) on amendment of Rule\n70 of Parliament’s Rules of Procedure on interinstitutional\nnegotiations in legislative procedures.
\nThe proposed amendments are as follows:
\nPURPOSE: to set up an information exchange\nmechanism with regard to intergovernmental agreements between\nMember States and third countries in the field of\nenergy.
\nPROPOSED ACT: Decision of the European\nParliament and of the Council.
\nBACKGROUND: in its conclusions of 4 February 2011, the Council therefore invited\nMember States to inform from 1 January 2012 the Commission of all\ntheir new and existing bilateral energy agreements with third\ncountries. The aim is to facilitate coordination at Union level\nand Member States' activities with a view to ensuring consistency\nand coherence in the EU's external energy relations with key\nproducer, transit, and consumer countries.
\nNegotiations with powerful\nenergy suppliers in third countries typically demand political\nsupport in the form of the conclusion of intergovernmental\nagreements between Member States and third countries.
\nFollowing the liberalisation of the electricity and\ngas markets in the European Union, in particular with the\nimplementation of the Third Energy Package, the Member States have\nintroduced significant changes in their energy\nlegislation.
\nFacing a possible supply shortage, Member States are\nunder increasing pressure to accept regulatory concessions in their\nintergovernmental agreements with third countries which are\nincompatible with Union energy law. Such regulatory concessions\nthreaten the operation and proper functioning of the Union internal\nmarket for energy.
\nAs was demonstrated during the gas dispute between the\nRussian Federation and Ukraine in January 2009, when the internal\nmarket is not functioning properly, the EU is more vulnerable to\nsecurity of supply risks. Therefore it is important that the Member\nStates and the Commission are aware of the amount and sources of\nenergy imported.
\nTo address these problems, it is important to\nimprove the exchange of information between Member States\nand between Member States and the Commission on existing,\nprovisionally applied and future intergovernmental\nagreements.
\nIMPACT ASSESSMENT: the\nCommission has not considered it necessary to carry out a formal impact assessment.\nThe Commission nevertheless evaluated a\nnumber of options to achieve the proper transposition of the\nEuropean Council conclusions. A public consultation on the\nexternal dimension of the EU energy policy took place between 21\nDecember 2010 and 7 March 2011. In total, over 90 replies were\nreceived. The responses received highlighted the important role of\nthe Union in promoting a reliable legal and institutional\nframework in order to achieve mutually advantageous relations\nwith its main energy suppliers and transit countries.
\nLEGAL BASIS: Article 194 of\nthe Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union.
\nCONTENT: the aim of this proposal is to transform the\n4 February 2011 European Council conclusions into a mechanism\nwith detailed procedures for the exchange of information between\nMember States and the Commission with regard to\nintergovernmental agreements in order to facilitate coordination at\nUnion level to ensure security of supply, the proper operation and\nfunctioning of the Union internal energy market and create legal\ncertainty for investment decisions.
\nAs the proposed exchange of information will\nincrease the Member States' negotiating position\nvis-à-vis third countries, it will ensure the proper\nimplementation of the Union rules and policies.
\nThus:
\nScope: Intergovernmental\nagreements are defined as all legally binding agreements\nbetween Member States and third countries which are likely to have\nan impact on the operation or the functioning of the internal\nmarket for energy or on the security of energy supply in the EU. To\navoid duplication, intergovernmental agreements for which a\nspecific notification to the Commission is already foreseen in\nother acts of Union legislation are excluded from the proposal,\nexcept intergovernmental agreements which must be submitted to the\nCommission according to the Security of Gas Supply Regulation.10 It\nis also proposed that the new mechanism shall not concern\nagreements between commercial operators except and only as far as\nthe intergovernmental agreement explicitly refers to these\ncommercial agreements.
\nExchange of information between Commission and Member\nStates: Member States shall submit\nall existing and provisionally applied intergovernmental\nagreements between them and third countries in their entirety,\nincluding their annexes and other texts they refer to explicitly\nand all amendments thereto to the Commission at the latest three\nmonths after the entry into force of this Decision. When a Member\nState intends to enter into negotiations with a third country in\norder to amend an existing intergovernmental agreement or to\nconclude a new intergovernmental agreement, the Member State shall\ninform the Commission in writing of its intention at the earliest\npossible moment before the envisaged opening of the\nnegotiations.
\nAssistance from the Commission: the Commission shall also be informed as early as\npossible of their intention to open negotiations on future\nintergovernmental agreements or to amend existing intergovernmental\nagreements. The Commission shall be regularly informed on the\nnegotiations. On request, the Commission shall participate as an\nobserver to the negotiations. In this context, Member States also\nhave the right to ask the Commission for assistance during their\nnegotiations with third countries.
\nEx-ante compatibility\ncontrol: the Commission may on its\nown initiative until four weeks after it has been informed\nof the closure of the negotiations at the latest or on request from\nthe Member State which has negotiated the intergovernmental\nagreement, assess the compatibility of the negotiated agreement\nwith Union law before the agreement has been signed. The Commission\nhas an assessment period of four months. If such compatibility\ncheck has been requested, in the absence of an opinion of the\nCommission within this examination period, the Commission is deemed\nnot to have raised any objections.
\nCoordination: the\nCommission shall facilitate the coordination among Member States\nwith a view to reviewing developments in relation to\nintergovernmental agreements, identifying common problems and\nsolutions, and developing standard clauses that Member States can\nuse in future intergovernmental agreements.
\nBUDGETARY IMPLICATIONS: the\nproposal has no implication for the Union budget.
\nThe Committee on Industry, Research and Energy adopted\nthe report by Krišjānis KARIŅŠ (PPE, LV) on the\nproposal for a directive of the European Parliament and of the\nCouncil setting up an information exchange mechanism with regard to\nintergovernmental agreements between Member States and third\ncountries in the field of energy.
\nThe committee recommends that the European\nParliament’s position in first reading following the ordinary\nlegislative procedure should amend the Commission proposal as\nfollows:
\nTransparency: the report\nstates that a high degree of transparency with regard to agreements\nbetween Member States and third countries in the field of energy\nwould be of benefit in achieving both closer intra-Union\ncooperation in the field of external energy relations and the\nUnion's long-term policy objectives relating to energy, climate and\nsecurity of energy supply.
\nInformation exchange between the Member States and the\nCommission:
\nWhere those existing intergovernmental agreements\nrefer explicitly to other texts, Member States shall also submit\nto the Commission those other texts, insofar as they contain\nelements which have an impact on the functioning of the internal\nenergy market or on the security of energy supply in the Union.\nHowever, that obligation does not apply in respect of agreements\nbetween commercial entities.
\nBy three months after the entry into force of the\nDecision, Member States shall inform the Commission whether any\npart of such intergovernmental agreements is to be regarded as\nconfidential and whether the information provided may be\nshared with other Member States. Where the Member State concerned\nhas indicated that the information may be shared, the Commission\nshall make the information received accessible to all Member States\nin secure electronic form.
\nWhere following its first assessment, the\nCommission has doubts as to the compatibility with Union law\nof agreements, in particular with Union competition law and\ninternal energy market legislation, the Commission shall inform the\nMember States concerned accordingly within 9 months following the\nsubmission of those agreements.
\nBefore or during negotiations with a third country on\nan intergovernmental agreement or on the amendment of an existing\nintergovernmental agreement, a Member State may inform the\nCommission in writing of the objectives of, and the provisions to\nbe addressed in, the negotiations and may communicate any other\nrelevant information to the Commission.
\nWhere a Member State gives the Commission notice of\nnegotiations, the Commission may provide it with advice on\nhow to avoid incompatibility of the intergovernmental agreement or\nof the amendment to an existing intergovernmental agreement under\nnegotiation with Union law.
\nConfidentiality: when\nproviding information to the Commission, a Member State may\nindicate whether any part of the information, be it commercial or\nother information the disclosure of which could harm the activities\nof the parties involved, is to be regarded as confidential and\nwhether the information provided can be shared with other Member\nStates. The Commission shall respect those indications. Requests\nfor confidentiality under this Article shall not restrict access of\nthe Commission itself to confidential information.
\nAssistance from the Commission: at the request of the Member State concerned, or at\nthe request of the Commission and with the written approval of the\nMember State concerned, the Commission may participate in the\nnegotiations as an observer. Where the Commission\nparticipates in the negotiations as an observer, it may provide the\nMember State concerned with advice on how to avoid incompatibility\nof the intergovernmental agreement or amendment under negotiation\nwith Union law.
\nCompatibility assessment: where a Member State has been unable, on the basis\nof its own assessment, to reach a firm conclusion as to the\ncompatibility of the intergovernmental agreement or amendment under\nnegotiation with Union law, it shall inform the Commission thereof\nbefore the closure of the negotiations and submit the draft\nagreement or amendment together with any annexes to it. The\nCommission shall, within four weeks from the date of receipt of the\ndraft agreement or amendment, including annexes thereto, inform the\nMember State concerned of any doubts it may have as to the\ncompatibility of the draft intergovernmental agreement or amendment\nwith Union law. In the absence of a response from the Commission\nwithin that period, the Commission shall be deemed not to have any\ndoubts.
\nCoordination among Member States: the Commission shall facilitate and encourage\ncoordination among Member States with a view to reviewing\ndevelopments in relation to intergovernmental agreements and\nstriving for consistency and coherence in the Union’s external\nenergy relations with producer, transit, and consumer\ncountries.
\nReporting and review: by\n1 January 2016, the Commission shall submit a report on the\napplication of this Decision.
\nThe European Parliament adopted by 369 votes to 240\nwith 14 abstentions a legislative resolution on the proposal for a\nDirective of the European Parliament and of the Council setting up\nan information exchange mechanism with regard to intergovernmental\nagreements between Member States and third countries in the field\nof energy.
\nParliament adopted its position on first reading\nfollowing the ordinary legislative procedure. The amendments are\nthe result of a compromise negotiated between Parliament and\nCouncil. The main amendments are as follows:
\nTransparency: the new\ntext stresses that more transparency with regard to future\nintergovernmental agreements that will be negotiated or that are\nbeing negotiated between Member States and third countries in the\nfield of energy could contribute to consistency in Member States'\napproaches to such agreements, to compliance with Union law and to\nthe security of energy supply in the Union.
\nSharing information on bilateral\nagreements: Member States shall\nsubmit to the Commission at the latest three months after the entry\ninto force of the Decision all existing intergovernmental\nagreements between them and third countries.
\nThe Commission will then have nine months in which to\ninform the Member States concerned if its first assessment has led\nto doubts on the compatibility with Union law (EU competition law\nand internal energy market legislation).
\nObserver status for the Commission: the text states that Member States may notify the\nCommission of any new agreements, before or during negotiations.\nThe Commission could then - at the request of the EU country\nconcerned or on its own initiative, if the Member State agrees -\ntake part in the negotiations as an observer and provide advice on\nhow to avoid incompatibility of the intergovernmental agreement or\namendment under negotiation with Union law.
\nCompatibility with EU law: where a Member State negotiating an agreement has been\nunable to reach a firm conclusion on the compatibility of the\nnegotiated agreement with Union law, it must submit the agreement\nto the Commission, before closing negotiations, and the Commission\nwill then have four weeks in which to inform the Member State of\nany possible doubts. In the absence of a response from the\nCommission within that period, the Commission shall be deemed not\nto have any doubts.
\nUpon ratification of an agreement, Member\nStates would be required to submit it to the Commission.
\nConfidentiality: the\ntext states that Member States shall inform the Commission whether\nany part of intergovernmental agreements is to be regarded as\nconfidential and whether the information provided may be shared\nwith other Member States.
\nWhere the Member State concerned has indicated that\nthe information may be shared, the Commission shall make the\ninformation received accessible to all Member States in secure\nelectronic form, with the exception of those parts that are\nregarded as confidential by the Member State concerned.
\nWhere a Member State instructs the Commission not to\nmake an existing intergovernmental agreement, an amendment to an\nexisting intergovernmental agreement or a new intergovernmental\nagreement accessible to other Member States, it shall make\navailable a summary of the information submitted. That\nsummary shall contain at least the following information regarding\nthe agreement or amendment in question: (i) the subject matter;\n(ii) the aim and the scope; (iii) the duration; (iv) the\ncontracting parties; and (v) information on the main\nelements.
\nRequests for confidentiality will not restrict access of the\nCommission itself to confidential information. The Commission shall\nensure that access to the confidential information is strictly\nlimited to the Commission services for which it is absolutely\nnecessary to have the information available.
\nReporting and review: by 1 January\n2016, and every three years thereafter, the Commission shall submit\na report on the application of the Decision, and assess:
\nPURPOSE: to set up an information exchange\nmechanism with regard to intergovernmental agreements between\nMember States and third countries in the field of\nenergy.
\nPROPOSED ACT: Decision of the European\nParliament and of the Council.
\nBACKGROUND: in its conclusions of 4 February 2011, the Council therefore invited\nMember States to inform from 1 January 2012 the Commission of all\ntheir new and existing bilateral energy agreements with third\ncountries. The aim is to facilitate coordination at Union level\nand Member States' activities with a view to ensuring consistency\nand coherence in the EU's external energy relations with key\nproducer, transit, and consumer countries.
\nNegotiations with powerful\nenergy suppliers in third countries typically demand political\nsupport in the form of the conclusion of intergovernmental\nagreements between Member States and third countries.
\nFollowing the liberalisation of the electricity and\ngas markets in the European Union, in particular with the\nimplementation of the Third Energy Package, the Member States have\nintroduced significant changes in their energy\nlegislation.
\nFacing a possible supply shortage, Member States are\nunder increasing pressure to accept regulatory concessions in their\nintergovernmental agreements with third countries which are\nincompatible with Union energy law. Such regulatory concessions\nthreaten the operation and proper functioning of the Union internal\nmarket for energy.
\nAs was demonstrated during the gas dispute between the\nRussian Federation and Ukraine in January 2009, when the internal\nmarket is not functioning properly, the EU is more vulnerable to\nsecurity of supply risks. Therefore it is important that the Member\nStates and the Commission are aware of the amount and sources of\nenergy imported.
\nTo address these problems, it is important to\nimprove the exchange of information between Member States\nand between Member States and the Commission on existing,\nprovisionally applied and future intergovernmental\nagreements.
\nIMPACT ASSESSMENT: the\nCommission has not considered it necessary to carry out a formal impact assessment.\nThe Commission nevertheless evaluated a\nnumber of options to achieve the proper transposition of the\nEuropean Council conclusions. A public consultation on the\nexternal dimension of the EU energy policy took place between 21\nDecember 2010 and 7 March 2011. In total, over 90 replies were\nreceived. The responses received highlighted the important role of\nthe Union in promoting a reliable legal and institutional\nframework in order to achieve mutually advantageous relations\nwith its main energy suppliers and transit countries.
\nLEGAL BASIS: Article 194 of\nthe Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union.
\nCONTENT: the aim of this proposal is to transform the\n4 February 2011 European Council conclusions into a mechanism\nwith detailed procedures for the exchange of information between\nMember States and the Commission with regard to\nintergovernmental agreements in order to facilitate coordination at\nUnion level to ensure security of supply, the proper operation and\nfunctioning of the Union internal energy market and create legal\ncertainty for investment decisions.
\nAs the proposed exchange of information will\nincrease the Member States' negotiating position\nvis-à-vis third countries, it will ensure the proper\nimplementation of the Union rules and policies.
\nThus:
\nScope: Intergovernmental\nagreements are defined as all legally binding agreements\nbetween Member States and third countries which are likely to have\nan impact on the operation or the functioning of the internal\nmarket for energy or on the security of energy supply in the EU. To\navoid duplication, intergovernmental agreements for which a\nspecific notification to the Commission is already foreseen in\nother acts of Union legislation are excluded from the proposal,\nexcept intergovernmental agreements which must be submitted to the\nCommission according to the Security of Gas Supply Regulation.10 It\nis also proposed that the new mechanism shall not concern\nagreements between commercial operators except and only as far as\nthe intergovernmental agreement explicitly refers to these\ncommercial agreements.
\nExchange of information between Commission and Member\nStates: Member States shall submit\nall existing and provisionally applied intergovernmental\nagreements between them and third countries in their entirety,\nincluding their annexes and other texts they refer to explicitly\nand all amendments thereto to the Commission at the latest three\nmonths after the entry into force of this Decision. When a Member\nState intends to enter into negotiations with a third country in\norder to amend an existing intergovernmental agreement or to\nconclude a new intergovernmental agreement, the Member State shall\ninform the Commission in writing of its intention at the earliest\npossible moment before the envisaged opening of the\nnegotiations.
\nAssistance from the Commission: the Commission shall also be informed as early as\npossible of their intention to open negotiations on future\nintergovernmental agreements or to amend existing intergovernmental\nagreements. The Commission shall be regularly informed on the\nnegotiations. On request, the Commission shall participate as an\nobserver to the negotiations. In this context, Member States also\nhave the right to ask the Commission for assistance during their\nnegotiations with third countries.
\nEx-ante compatibility\ncontrol: the Commission may on its\nown initiative until four weeks after it has been informed\nof the closure of the negotiations at the latest or on request from\nthe Member State which has negotiated the intergovernmental\nagreement, assess the compatibility of the negotiated agreement\nwith Union law before the agreement has been signed. The Commission\nhas an assessment period of four months. If such compatibility\ncheck has been requested, in the absence of an opinion of the\nCommission within this examination period, the Commission is deemed\nnot to have raised any objections.
\nCoordination: the\nCommission shall facilitate the coordination among Member States\nwith a view to reviewing developments in relation to\nintergovernmental agreements, identifying common problems and\nsolutions, and developing standard clauses that Member States can\nuse in future intergovernmental agreements.
\nBUDGETARY IMPLICATIONS: the\nproposal has no implication for the Union budget.
\nThe Committee on Industry, Research and Energy adopted\nthe report by Krišjānis KARIŅŠ (PPE, LV) on the\nproposal for a directive of the European Parliament and of the\nCouncil setting up an information exchange mechanism with regard to\nintergovernmental agreements between Member States and third\ncountries in the field of energy.
\nThe committee recommends that the European\nParliament’s position in first reading following the ordinary\nlegislative procedure should amend the Commission proposal as\nfollows:
\nTransparency: the report\nstates that a high degree of transparency with regard to agreements\nbetween Member States and third countries in the field of energy\nwould be of benefit in achieving both closer intra-Union\ncooperation in the field of external energy relations and the\nUnion's long-term policy objectives relating to energy, climate and\nsecurity of energy supply.
\nInformation exchange between the Member States and the\nCommission:
\nWhere those existing intergovernmental agreements\nrefer explicitly to other texts, Member States shall also submit\nto the Commission those other texts, insofar as they contain\nelements which have an impact on the functioning of the internal\nenergy market or on the security of energy supply in the Union.\nHowever, that obligation does not apply in respect of agreements\nbetween commercial entities.
\nBy three months after the entry into force of the\nDecision, Member States shall inform the Commission whether any\npart of such intergovernmental agreements is to be regarded as\nconfidential and whether the information provided may be\nshared with other Member States. Where the Member State concerned\nhas indicated that the information may be shared, the Commission\nshall make the information received accessible to all Member States\nin secure electronic form.
\nWhere following its first assessment, the\nCommission has doubts as to the compatibility with Union law\nof agreements, in particular with Union competition law and\ninternal energy market legislation, the Commission shall inform the\nMember States concerned accordingly within 9 months following the\nsubmission of those agreements.
\nBefore or during negotiations with a third country on\nan intergovernmental agreement or on the amendment of an existing\nintergovernmental agreement, a Member State may inform the\nCommission in writing of the objectives of, and the provisions to\nbe addressed in, the negotiations and may communicate any other\nrelevant information to the Commission.
\nWhere a Member State gives the Commission notice of\nnegotiations, the Commission may provide it with advice on\nhow to avoid incompatibility of the intergovernmental agreement or\nof the amendment to an existing intergovernmental agreement under\nnegotiation with Union law.
\nConfidentiality: when\nproviding information to the Commission, a Member State may\nindicate whether any part of the information, be it commercial or\nother information the disclosure of which could harm the activities\nof the parties involved, is to be regarded as confidential and\nwhether the information provided can be shared with other Member\nStates. The Commission shall respect those indications. Requests\nfor confidentiality under this Article shall not restrict access of\nthe Commission itself to confidential information.
\nAssistance from the Commission: at the request of the Member State concerned, or at\nthe request of the Commission and with the written approval of the\nMember State concerned, the Commission may participate in the\nnegotiations as an observer. Where the Commission\nparticipates in the negotiations as an observer, it may provide the\nMember State concerned with advice on how to avoid incompatibility\nof the intergovernmental agreement or amendment under negotiation\nwith Union law.
\nCompatibility assessment: where a Member State has been unable, on the basis\nof its own assessment, to reach a firm conclusion as to the\ncompatibility of the intergovernmental agreement or amendment under\nnegotiation with Union law, it shall inform the Commission thereof\nbefore the closure of the negotiations and submit the draft\nagreement or amendment together with any annexes to it. The\nCommission shall, within four weeks from the date of receipt of the\ndraft agreement or amendment, including annexes thereto, inform the\nMember State concerned of any doubts it may have as to the\ncompatibility of the draft intergovernmental agreement or amendment\nwith Union law. In the absence of a response from the Commission\nwithin that period, the Commission shall be deemed not to have any\ndoubts.
\nCoordination among Member States: the Commission shall facilitate and encourage\ncoordination among Member States with a view to reviewing\ndevelopments in relation to intergovernmental agreements and\nstriving for consistency and coherence in the Union’s external\nenergy relations with producer, transit, and consumer\ncountries.
\nReporting and review: by\n1 January 2016, the Commission shall submit a report on the\napplication of this Decision.
\nThe European Parliament adopted by 369 votes to 240\nwith 14 abstentions a legislative resolution on the proposal for a\nDirective of the European Parliament and of the Council setting up\nan information exchange mechanism with regard to intergovernmental\nagreements between Member States and third countries in the field\nof energy.
\nParliament adopted its position on first reading\nfollowing the ordinary legislative procedure. The amendments are\nthe result of a compromise negotiated between Parliament and\nCouncil. The main amendments are as follows:
\nTransparency: the new\ntext stresses that more transparency with regard to future\nintergovernmental agreements that will be negotiated or that are\nbeing negotiated between Member States and third countries in the\nfield of energy could contribute to consistency in Member States'\napproaches to such agreements, to compliance with Union law and to\nthe security of energy supply in the Union.
\nSharing information on bilateral\nagreements: Member States shall\nsubmit to the Commission at the latest three months after the entry\ninto force of the Decision all existing intergovernmental\nagreements between them and third countries.
\nThe Commission will then have nine months in which to\ninform the Member States concerned if its first assessment has led\nto doubts on the compatibility with Union law (EU competition law\nand internal energy market legislation).
\nObserver status for the Commission: the text states that Member States may notify the\nCommission of any new agreements, before or during negotiations.\nThe Commission could then - at the request of the EU country\nconcerned or on its own initiative, if the Member State agrees -\ntake part in the negotiations as an observer and provide advice on\nhow to avoid incompatibility of the intergovernmental agreement or\namendment under negotiation with Union law.
\nCompatibility with EU law: where a Member State negotiating an agreement has been\nunable to reach a firm conclusion on the compatibility of the\nnegotiated agreement with Union law, it must submit the agreement\nto the Commission, before closing negotiations, and the Commission\nwill then have four weeks in which to inform the Member State of\nany possible doubts. In the absence of a response from the\nCommission within that period, the Commission shall be deemed not\nto have any doubts.
\nUpon ratification of an agreement, Member\nStates would be required to submit it to the Commission.
\nConfidentiality: the\ntext states that Member States shall inform the Commission whether\nany part of intergovernmental agreements is to be regarded as\nconfidential and whether the information provided may be shared\nwith other Member States.
\nWhere the Member State concerned has indicated that\nthe information may be shared, the Commission shall make the\ninformation received accessible to all Member States in secure\nelectronic form, with the exception of those parts that are\nregarded as confidential by the Member State concerned.
\nWhere a Member State instructs the Commission not to\nmake an existing intergovernmental agreement, an amendment to an\nexisting intergovernmental agreement or a new intergovernmental\nagreement accessible to other Member States, it shall make\navailable a summary of the information submitted. That\nsummary shall contain at least the following information regarding\nthe agreement or amendment in question: (i) the subject matter;\n(ii) the aim and the scope; (iii) the duration; (iv) the\ncontracting parties; and (v) information on the main\nelements.
\nRequests for confidentiality will not restrict access of the\nCommission itself to confidential information. The Commission shall\nensure that access to the confidential information is strictly\nlimited to the Commission services for which it is absolutely\nnecessary to have the information available.
\nReporting and review: by 1 January\n2016, and every three years thereafter, the Commission shall submit\na report on the application of the Decision, and assess:
\nPURPOSE: to lay down the\nmultiannual financial framework for the years 2014-2020.
\nPROPOSED ACT: Council\nRegulation
\nBACKGROUND: the Commission\npresented, on 3 March 2010, proposals for a Council\nRegulation laying down the\nmultiannual financial framework (MFF) for 2007-2013 and for\na new Interinstitutional Agreement\n(IIA) on cooperation in\nbudgetary matters. These two proposals, once adopted, will replace\nthe current IIA\nand bring the provisions on the 2007-2013\nfinancial framework and on cooperation of the institutions in the\nbudgetary procedure in line with the Treaty. Meanwhile, the\nprovisions of the current IIA that are not rendered obsolete by the\nTreaty remain valid.
\nThese proposals deal with\nthe new elements as compared with the March 2010 proposals, for\nboth the proposal for a Regulation laying down the MFF for the\nyears 2014 to 2020 and the draft IIA on cooperation in budgetary matters and sound\nfinancial management. This proposal for the MFF Regulation\naccompanied by the draft IIA represents the legal transposition of\nthe Commission Communication on \"A Budget for Europe\n2020\". It will be complemented\nby a proposal amending the Commission's proposal for a Regulation\non the financial rules applicable to the annual budget of the Union\nin order to introduce a few new provisions which are part of the\npackage of proposals for the 2014-2020 financial\nframework.
\nA financial framework\nthat is flexible: the financial\nframework must provide for adequate levels of flexibility to allow\nfor effective resources allocation and a swift Union response to\nunforeseen circumstances. Recent experience demonstrates that\nchallenges resulting from unforeseen events with global\nrepercussions have reached a new quality. The Union will\nincreasingly be exposed to the effects of globalisation of the\neconomy and society, to climate change, energy dependency,\nmigratory pressure and other global challenges, most of which in\nareas for which the Lisbon Treaty has increased the Union's\nresponsibility and role. This is why the Commission is proposing a\nfinancial framework that seeks to strike the right balance between\nstrict budgetary discipline and predictability of expenditure, on\nthe one hand, and the flexibility needed to enable the Union to\nrespond to unforeseen challenges.
\nLEGAL BASIS: Article 312 of\nthe Treaty on the functioning of the European Union (TFEU), in\nconjunction with the Treaty establishing the European Atomic Energy\nCommunity, and in particular Article 106a thereof.
\nCONTENT: in view of the\noverall objective of flexibility, the rules applicable to the next\nfinancial framework may be defined as follows:
\nDuration of the MFF and\nthe overall framework proposed: the\nMFF will run for the period from 2014 to 2020. An Annex details the\namounts year by year. The overall amount proposed for the 7-year\nperiod is EUR 1,025 billion in commitments (1.05% of EU GNI)\nand EUR 972.2 billion (1% of EU GNI) in payments.
\nRespect of MFF ceilings\nand possibility to exceed them: the\nproposal lays down the principle of a requirement for the\ninstitutions to respect the ceilings in the course of the budget\nprocedure in accordance with the provisions of the Treaty. However,\nthe proposal introduces the possibility to exceed the\nceilings, if necessary, when the instruments not included in\nthe financial framework are mobilised. The Emergency Aid\nReserve, the Solidarity Fund, the Flexibility\ninstrument, the European Globalisation Adjustment Fund\nand the newly created Reserve for crises in the agriculture\nsector and the Contingency Margin are defined in Points 10 to\n15 of the draft IIA. They are not included in the financial\nframework and ensure that financing in specific circumstances\nis provided in excess of the ceilings of the financial framework,\nif needed. They increase the flexibility of the financial framework\nand are mobilised jointly by the two arms of budgetary authority.\nIn order to maintain the current level of flexibility and the roles\nof the institutions in the mobilisation of these instruments, the\nprovisions governing them are included in the draft IIA. The\nprocedure of mobilising the guarantees from the Union's budget for\nthe loans provided under the Balance of Payments Facility\nand European Financial Stabilisation Mechanism is excluded\nfrom the obligation to respect the ceilings of the financial\nframework and therefore from a need to revise the MFF. The relevant\nceiling that needs to be respected is the own resources\nceiling.
\nRespect of own resources\nceiling: a change to this Article is\nproposed compared to the March 2010 proposal - an explicit\nreference to the fact that the use made of instruments which can be\nmobilised from outside the financial framework and of guarantees\nfor a loan covered by the Union's budget according to Regulation (EC) No\n332/2002 or Regulation (EU) No\n407/2010 also need to respect\nthe own resources ceiling.
\nTechnical adjustment of\nthe financial framework: the\nfinancial framework is presented in 2011 prices. The procedure for\nits technical adjustment is maintained as well as the 2% deflator.\nA new element is introduced in paragraph 1(c) - the presentation of\nthe absolute amount of the Contingency margin at the level of 0.03%\nof EU GNI as defined in Point 15 of the draft IIA.
\nAdjustment of cohesion\npolicy envelopes: this Article\nreproduces the text of point 17 of the current IIA and Article 5 of\nthe March 2010 proposal. Thus, in 2018, if it is established that\ncumulated Gross Domestic Product (GDP) of any Member State for the\nyears 2014-2016 has diverged by more than +/- 5 % from the\ncumulated GDP estimated in 2011 for the establishment of cohesion\npolicy envelopes for Member States for the period 2014-2020, the\nCommission shall adjust the amounts allocated from funds supporting\ncohesion to the Member State concerned for that period. The total\nnet effect, whether positive or negative, of the adjustments\nreferred to in paragraph 1 may not exceed EUR 3 billion.
\nAdjustments related to\nimplementation: the wording of this\narticle, which lays down rules for the adjustments related to\nimplementation, corresponds to Point 18 of the current IIA. The\npreparation of the legal bases and then programming documents is\nusually quite lengthy and therefore a late adoption of the legal\ntexts or programmes needs to be envisaged. The adjustment\nconcerning the transfer of unused allocation for the year 2014\nshall be adopted before 1 May 2015.
\nAdjustments related to\nexcessive government deficit: the\nwording of this article, which lays down rules for the adjustments\nrelated to excessive government deficit, has not been changed\ncompared to the March 2010 proposal. Thus, in the case of the\nlifting of a suspension of budgetary commitments concerning the\nCohesion Fund in the context of an excessive government deficit\nprocedure, the Council, in accordance with the Treaty and in\ncompliance with the relevant basic act, shall decide on a transfer\nof suspended commitments to the following years. Suspended\ncommitments of year n may not be re-budgeted beyond year\nn+2.
\nRevision of the\nfinancial framework: the wording of\nthis Article corresponds to the Points 21 to 23 of the current IIA\nand Article 8 of the March 2010 proposal. A few changes have been\nintroduced: i) the general rule concerning the timing of a proposal\nfor a revision has been dropped as it did not correspond to current\npractice given the need to deal with unforeseen circumstances when\nthey arise; ii) the possibility to adapt the financial framework by\nqualified majority as proposed in March 2010 has been withdrawn\n(given the proposed widening of flexibility instruments, including\nthe introduction of the Contingency Margin); and iii) a new\nparagraph 5 was introduced which specifies which of the adjustments\nto the financial framework provided for in other articles are also\nto be considered as a revision of the financial\nframework.
\nAdjustment of the\nfinancial framework in the case of enlargement: the wording of this Article reproduces the text of\nPoint 29 of the current IIA and Article 11 of the March 2010\nproposal. A new paragraph is introduced with particular reference\nto a possible comprehensive settlement of the Cyprus problem during\nthe period covered by the financial framework.
\nInterinstitutional\ncooperation in budgetary procedure:\nthe general rules of the cooperation in budgetary procedure are\nincluded in the MFF Regulation, whilst the draft IIA and its annex\ncontain more detailed provisions.
\nFinancing of the Common\nForeign and Security Policy (CFSP):\nthe provision of the March 2010 proposal is maintained with an\nexception of establishing the minimum amount for CFSP.
\nContribution to the\nfinancing of large scale projects:\nspecific provisions are needed for major technological development\nprogrammes based on large scale infrastructure projects, notably\nthe European satellite navigation programmes EGNOS and\nGalileo. Such provisions are warranted by the specific features\nof those projects, i.e. a duration largely exceeding the\nmultiannual financial framework, project risks liable to produce\nsubstantial cost-overruns, limited or no participation of private\ncapital, and no or only a modest ability to generate revenues from\ncommercial exploitation in the short to medium term. Consequently,\nthe proposed provision foresees a 'ring-fencing' of the\namount available for the European satellite navigation programmes\nEGNOS and Galileo under the 2014-2020 financial\nframework.
\nMid-term assessment of\nimplementation of the financial framework: a new provision establishes the timing for a mid-term\nassessment of the functioning of the financial framework\n(2016).
\nTransition towards the\nnext financial framework: this\narticle lays down the obligation for the Commission to present a\nnew financial framework before 1 January 2018, i.e. three years\nbefore the end of the financial framework. Provision is also made\nin case no new financial framework is agreed by the end of the\nfinancial framework covered by the Regulation.
\nEntry into\nforce: the final Article of the MFF\nregulation sets the date of entry into force of the Regulation. The\nIIA should enter into force on the same day as the two legal texts\ncomplement each other.
\nThe Council took note of\nthe presentation by the Commission of its proposals for the EU's\nmultiannual financial framework (MFF) for the 2014-20\nperiod.
\nThe presidency intends to\nhold an initial exchange of views on the new MFF at an informal\nmeeting of ministers in Sopot (Poland) on 28 and 29 July. Technical\nwork on the proposals will proceed subsequently.
\nThe MFF limits EU\nexpenditure over a fixed period by laying down annual maximum\namounts for each heading (i.e. category) of expenditure in\ncommitments and for total annual expenditure in commitments and\npayments. It thus imposes budgetary discipline on the EU by making\nsure that the annual EU budget does not exceed agreed ceilings and\nthereby facilitates adoption of the budget each year. At the same,\nit translates the EU's policy priorities into figures.
\nThe presidency informed the\nCouncil, on the basis of a note (doc 13127/11) of progress in technical discussions on the\nduration, structure and flexibility of the EU's next multiannual\nfinancial framework (MFF).
\nMinisters held an exchange\nof views over lunch.
\nAll delegations agreed with\nthe proposed seven-year duration (2014-2020), which in their\nview strikes the right balance between stability and predictability\nin EU expenditure.
\nMinisters in general also\nwelcomed the proposed structure of the next MFF. Doubts were\nexpressed however on the proposed merger of the current\nsub-headings 1a and 1b into a single heading 1 (\"smart and\ninclusive growth\") and on the consequent creation under the new\nheading 1 of a subceiling for expenditure on economic, social and\nterritorial cohesion. Some ministers considered that a separate\nsub-heading should be maintained for cohesion policy, whilst\nothers asked for guarantees that cohesion expenditure would not be\nundermined by the proposed structure; others still raised concerns\nabout the link between cohesion expenditure and the proposed\nConnecting Europe Facility.
\nSome ministers raised\ndoubts about the Commission's proposal to create further\ninstruments outside the financial framework (such as a new\nreserve fund for crises in the agricultural sector or a fund for\nITER, the International Thermonuclear Experimental Reactor), in\naddition to the existing ones (European development fund,\nsolidarity fund, flexibility instrument, emergency aid reserve and\nEuropean globalisation fund). Other ministers saw a need to discuss\neach item individually.
\nConcerning\nflexibility, ministers in general\nwelcomed the Commission's proposals as striking a balance between\nthe need for budgetary discipline, on the one hand, and the need to\nprovide sufficient means to address new challenges, on the other.\nMinisters agreed that appropriate flexibility is needed in the MFF.\nThis however may not mean simply spending above the limit, as\nbudgetary discipline is a must.
\nThe\npresidency intends to continue discussions until the end of the\nyear so as to gain a better understanding of the proposals and of\nthe positions of Member States, and thus to allow the subsequent\npresidency to oversee negotiations aimed at a successful and timely\nconclusion of the new framework.
\nThe Council held a policy debate on the EU's\nmultiannual financial framework for the 2014-2020 period, focusing\non the following parts of the proposal:
\nThe presidency indicated its intention to include the\nmain outcome of the debate, together with the results of work\nconducted since July, in a report to be presented to the Council on\n5 December. The negotiation phase is due to start in January 2012\nwith the beginning of the Danish presidency.
\nThe Council took note of a progress report from the\npresidency on the EU's multiannual financial framework (MFF)\nfor the 2014-2020 period.
\nMinisters generally supported the progress report,\nwhich they considered to be balanced and a good basis for future\nwork.
\nThe incoming Danish presidency expressed its intention\nto continue the technical exploration of the Commission proposals\nbefore trying to narrow the gaps between member states' positions.\nThe aim is to ensure adoption of the MFF by the end of\n2012.
\nAll delegations agreed with the Commission’s\napproach and supported the proposed duration of seven years\nfor the next MFF. The general principle of flexibility was\nwelcomed by delegations, provided it was not to the detriment of\nbudget discipline.
\nIn particular, whilst at this stage of the negotiation\nspecific discussions on the overall amounts of expenditure\nallocated to the different headings were not held, several\ndelegations underlined the general need for the MFF to reflect\nefforts made at the national level as regards fiscal\nconsolidation. In this context they felt a lower overall level\nof expenditure than in the Commission’s proposal would be\nmore appropriate. At the same time, several delegations stressed\nthe importance of ensuring appropriate financing of EU common\npolicies so that the multiannual financial framework contributes\nadequately to addressing common challenges.
\nThe key issues discussed are as\nfollows:
\n(1) Structure: two\nissues were discussed in detail:
\n\n· \nHeading 1: the\noption of keeping the expenditure for economic, social and\nterritorial cohesion separate was supported by several\ndelegations. Concerns were also expressed over the interplay\nbetween the cohesion policy and the \"Connecting Europe Facility\"\nand there were some calls in favour of keeping the two areas\nseparate from each other.
\n\n· \nInstruments outside the MFF: a group of Member States called for putting all\ninstruments inside the MFF, in particular for reasons of\ntransparency, control and unity of EU expenditure. Among these\ndelegations, some insisted in particular on the inclusion of ITER\nand GMES. Some delegations would however differentiate and could\naccept that the European Development Fund would remain outside the\nMFF, due to its specific modalities and purpose. Some delegations\nconsidered that the unpredictability of expenditure linked to ITER\nand GMES also called for keeping them outside the MFF. Some Member\nStates expressed the view that these instruments should be examined\non a case-by-case basis. Some delegations considered that the\nflexibility instruments should continue to remain outside the MFF\nas is the case today.
\n(2) Smart and Inclusive Growth (except cohesion and\nCEF): many delegations pointed to\nthis area as bringing a true added value of EU action. In\nthis context, they welcomed the concentration on areas promoting\ngrowth, competitiveness and job creation such as research,\ninnovation small and medium-sized enterprises, job creation and\neducation in line with the Europe 2020 strategy.
\n10. The general effort for simplification was\nwelcomed.
\nAt the same time, some stressed that\nsimplification should not only mean the reduction and\nrationalisation of the instruments themselves, but also the\nstreamlining of procedures for managing the funds. In this context,\na few delegations regretted that the merger of instruments resulted\nin a decreased visibility of some important programmes, in\nparticular in the field of Education, Youth and Culture.
\nThe proposed main areas for expenditure in the field\nof research and innovation (\"excellence in the science base\";\n\"tackling societal challenges\"; \"creating industrial leadership and\nboosting competitiveness\") were broadly welcomed.
\n(3) Economic, social and territorial\ncohesion: a majority of delegations\nsuggested that support from cohesion policy should be concentrated\nto the less developed regions and Member States, others supported\nthe Commission's proposals for a broader geographical scope of\nsupport. Delegations were split on the level of allocation,\nsome finding it too low, others too high.
\nThe different types of conditionality proposed\nby the Commission raised questions.
\nThe creation of the category of \"transition\nregions\" was challenged by most delegations, in particular\nbecause of the need to concentrate support on the less developed\nregions. Some delegations insist that the normal phasing-out\nsolutions (i.e. similar to the current and past MFFs) for the\nregions leaving the current convergence objective would be\nsufficient, while others pointed to a fair phasing-out regime\n(\"safety net\"). Others welcomed it as a measure of ensuring equal\ntreatment for regions with similar conditions. A flexible solution\nfor capital regions was advocated by a number of delegations. A\nnumber of delegations had difficulties with the proposed\ncapping (at 2.5%). Some delegations expressed the wish to\nmaintain the co-financing rates at their current level, whilst\nothers agreed on those proposed by the Commission and a few asked\nfor them to be lowered.
\n(4) Connecting Europe Facility: the objectives pursued with the proposed creation of\nthe Connecting Europe Facility were largely supported, even though\na number of delegations requested more clarifications from the\nCommission. Some delegations also flagged that the proposed\nincreases for the 3 policy areas as compared to the current\nframework are too high. The ring-fencing of EUR 10 billion in\nthe Cohesion Fund for TEN-T projects raised the concerns of\nsome delegations, in particular as regards its implications for the\nallocations of cohesion funding, the process of selecting projects\nand the way they are managed. The enhanced use of innovative\nfinancial instruments was received positively, even though it was\nstated that more analysis is required. Some delegations expressed\nmore reserved views by calling for the need to analyse deeper the\nfunctioning of existing instruments.
\n(5) Common Fisheries Policy: delegations gave a positive welcome to the general\nprinciples of the Common Fisheries Policy. Given that the proposals\nconcerning the European Maritime and Fisheries Fund were not yet\nadopted by the Commission, further work will be needed on the\nspecificities.
\nViews diverged on the level of the budget with\nsome delegations supporting the Commission proposal to stabilize\nspending on 2013 level in nominal terms, while some others arguing\nfor a more restrictive approach to agriculture related spending.\nThe proposed modalities for the convergence of direct payments in\nthe Common Agriculture Policy raised some questions. Further\ngreening of the direct payments was not opposed as such, but\nseveral delegations stressed the need for this to be done\nefficiently and proportionally. As regards rural\ndevelopment, some delegations welcomed its inclusion in the\nCommon Strategic Framework, but questioned it being subject to\nmacro-fiscal conditionality.
\n(6) Security and Citizenship: particular emphasis was put on the large scope for\nadded value of the EU action in the field of security and\ncitizenship. In this context, some delegations pointed in\nparticular to the need for enhanced EU action in the area of\nmigration, borders and the external aspects of EU policies in this\ndomain. In this context, a few delegations questioned the inclusion\nof the Return Fund into the Migration and Asylum\nFund, in particular as regards its implications for the\napproach to external borders and internal security.
\n(7) Global Europe:\nseveral delegations welcomed the Commission proposal relating to\n\"Global Europe\". They insisted on the need to reflect, through the\nEU budget, the priorities, values and interests of the\nEuropean Union in the world.
\nA number of delegations supported the priority to\nrespect the EU's formal undertaking to commit 0.7% of gross\nnational product (GNP) to official development assistance\n(ODA) by 2015. Some however expressed doubts on the fact that as\nmuch as 15% of the collective EU ODA effort should come from the EU\nbudget and the EDF.
\nViews were divided over the treatment of the\nEuropean Development Fund (EDF). While a number supported\nthe Commission proposal to keep, for the time being, the EDF\noutside the MFF, some called for its budgetisation. Some\ndelegations favoured an increased focus on the European\nNeighbourhood Instrument and the Pre-Accession Instrument,\nwhilst a few others questioned the rationale of keeping their\nallocations at the proposed levels.
\n(8) Administration: a\nlarge number of delegations welcomed the Commission proposal to\nrationalise administrative expenditure. In this context, they\nwelcomed the Commission proposal for a 5% reduction in the\nstaffing levels of each institution, service, agency and other\nbodies In addition, some delegations called for enhanced specific\nsolutions relating to a sustainable pensions\nsystem.
\n(9) Own resources: the\ngeneral principles underlying the new proposal for the system of\nown resources of the European Union were welcomed by a large\nmajority of delegations. Most delegations took a positive view\nabout the elimination of the current VAT-based own resource\non 31 December 2013. Many delegations abstained from taking\nposition on the new VAT own-resource for the time being as the\nCommission proposals would need further examination.
\nLastly, some delegations raised the question of the\nmacro-economic assumptions on which the Commission based its\nproposals. These delegations favoured the use of actual growth data\nfrom the past - the 10 year historical average - rather than the\nforecasts for future GDP, arguing that such forecasts are difficult\nand error prone.
\nThe Council discussed the main priorities and the\nbudgetary framework including the overall amounts presented in\nthe Commission's proposals for the EU's multiannual financial\nframework (MFF) for the 2014-2020 period. The debate enabled a\nclearer picture to be obtained of the Member States' positions on\nthe main issues and of the state of negotiations.
\nIt also provided guidance to the presidency and\nnotably indicated the areas where it could face difficulties in\nfinding common ground.
\nThe Danish presidency announced that the MFF would be\non the agenda of each General Affairs Council meeting until the end\nof June, with the exception of February. It also expressed its\nintention to
\norganise a conference on the MFF, probably on 22 and\n23 March in Brussels.
\nIt is expected that as from May, work on the MFF\nproposals will have reached sufficient maturity for negotiations to\nbe conducted through a \"negotiating box\", a draft structure of the\nconclusions of the European Council, setting out the main issues\nand options and reflecting the outcome of the orientation debates\nheld in the General Affairs Council.
\nIn line with a mandate of the European Council from 9\nDecember, the intention of the Danish presidency is to produce a\nsolid basis for a substantial discussion on the MFF at the\nEuropean Council meeting in June 2012.
\nThe European Council has called for the MFF to be\nadopted by the end of this year. This would allow a smooth\ntransition to the next MFF from the one currently in\nforce.
\nThe Council discussed the first elements of the\nnegotiating box outlining the most central issues and options for\ncertain parts of the multiannual financial framework (MFF) for\nthe 2014-2020 period.
\nThe negotiating box discussed by ministers covers\nbudget headings 1 (smart and inclusive growth), with the exception\nof cohesion policy and the \"Connecting Europe\" facility (CEF), 3\n(security and citizenship), 4 (global Europe) and 5\n(administration), as well as some horizontal issues, in particular\nthe question of whether some instruments should be placed inside or\noutside the MFF.
\nMany delegations called for consolidation efforts\nundertaken at national level to be reflected in the EU budget\nframework for 2014-2020. Some highlighted the contribution\nthat the EU budget may make in terms of enhancing growth and\ncreating jobs. Nearly all referred to the importance of\nsimplifying EU legislation. Many member states asked that\nmacro-economic conditionality be included in the horizontal\npart of the negotiating box rather than limiting it to the cohesion\npart of the box.
\nHeading 1 (Smart and inclusive growth): all delegations agreed that excellence should be a\ncore criterion in research and development financing. Some\nhighlighted, however, the need for balanced access to funding for\nall member states. Some member states asked that nuclear\ndecommissioning be mentioned in the negotiating box.
\nHeading 3 (Security and citizenship): many delegations stressed the importance of EU\naction in the area of asylum and migration. Some suggested that the\ncurrent structure of this heading be maintained, with a sub-heading\n3a dedicated to freedom, security and justice and a sub-heading 3b\ncovering citizenship.
\nHeading 4 (Global Europe): many member states emphasised enlargement and\nneighbourhood policy as priority areas. A number of delegations\nhighlighted the importance of reaching the goal of spending 0.7% of\nthe EU's Gross National Income (GNI) on official development\nassistance by 2015. Some insisted on a fixed percentage for\nassistance meeting the criteria of the development assistance\ncommittee (DAC) of the OECD, while others preferred not to have a\nquantitative objective.
\nHeading 5 (Administration): the need to consolidate administrative expenditure\nwas raised by many delegations, and various proposals for savings\nwere made. At the same time, delegations underlined the need for\nthe European civil service to remain efficient.
\nOn the question of whether some instruments should be\nplaced inside or outside the MFF,\nsome member states considered that, for the sake of transparency\nand budget discipline, all instruments should be placed inside the\nMFF. Others considered that, on account of their specific\ncharacteristics, some instruments should be placed outside the MFF,\nas proposed by the Commission. Some member states objected to the\nproposed new contribution key for the European Development Fund\n(EDF).
\nSome opposed increased flexibility for enabling the\nEuropean Union to respond to unforeseen circumstances. Some\ndelegations advocated the elimination of certain instruments which\nare outside the 2007-2013 MFF. Several delegations mentioned the\nissue of unused commitments (\"reste à liquider\", RAL); some\ncalled for concrete measures to reduce the scope of RAL, whereas\nothers considered unused commitments to be a normal feature of the\nEU budget procedure.
\nIn the coming weeks, the presidency will supplement\nthe negotiating box with the remaining elements of the MFF\nnegotiating package, i.e. cohesion, CEF, heading 2 (sustainable\ngrowth: natural resources and own resources).
\nTimetable:
\nThe European Council on 28\nand 29 June will discuss the negotiating box as the basis for the\nfinal stage of negotiations. The aim is to finalise the\nnegotiations on the MFF by the end of this year.
\nThe Council discussed, in public session, for the\nfirst time on the basis of the negotiating box, the following areas\nof the multiannual financial framework (MFF) for the 2014-2020\nperiod:
\ncohesion policy,
\nDuring the debate, a number of delegations voiced\nconcerns about the proposed overall level of expenditure in\ntimes of fiscal consolidation and asked for cuts to be made in\nall headings.
\nSome member states considered the proposed amount for\ncohesion policy as a minimum, whereas others viewed the amount\nproposed for the common agricultural policy as a\nminimum.
\nCohesion policy:
\nSeveral member states expressed concerns relating\neither to the new category of transition\nregions per se or to its scope.
\nSome of these member states supported, however, the\nidea of a safety net, providing for a minimum allocation level to\neach member state, compared to its level during the 2007-2013\nperiod.
\nOther member states supported the concept of\ntransition regions but were sceptical on the safety net.
\n\"Connecting Europe\" facility: many delegations welcomed the concept of the\n\"Connecting Europe\" facility, but some had difficulties with the\nproposed transfer to the facility of EUR 10 billion from the\ncohesion fund.
\nCommon agricultural policy:
\nConcerning the rules governing the five funds under\nthe common strategic framework, some\nmember states stressed the importance of macro-economic\nconditionality. Others were sceptical about it, unless it was\nextended to other types of expenditure. In the coming weeks, the\npresidency intends to supplement those parts of the negotiating box\nthat have already been presented with language on own resources,\nthe remaining element belonging to the MFF negotiating\npackage.
\nTimetable:
\nThe European Council will\ndiscuss the MFF for the first time on 28 and 29 June. The aim is to\nfinalise the MFF negotiations by the end of this year.
\nThe Council\ndiscussed the EU's multiannual financial framework (MFF) for\nthe 2014-2020 period on the basis of a negotiating box which, for\nthe first time, covers all elements of the MFF on both the\nexpenditure and the revenue side.
\nMinisters welcomed\nthe work undertaken by the Danish presidency to date and considered\nthe latest version of the negotiating box as a good basis for\nfurther discussion.
\nMany ministers\ninsisted on the need for the MFF 2014-2020 to promote job\ncreations, growth and
\ninvestments. They\nalso agreed on the need to improve the quality of expenditure. Some\ndelegations considered that better spending does not necessarily\nentail less spending, while others stressed that improving the\nquality of expenditure does not preclude EU budgetary consolidation\nin times of crisis.
\nAs regards\nexpenditure, ministers focused on :
\nAs regards\ncohesion policy, some delegations opposed the proposed level\nof capping, limiting the level of transfer to each member state\nto a certain percentage of its gross domestic product. Several\ndelegations also objected to the so-called reversed safety net,\nlimiting the scope of support to a certain percentage compared to\nits level during the 2007-2013 period. Some member states
\nexpressed concerns\nabout the new category of transition regions, whereas others\nsupported it.
\nIn respect of\nthe CAP, some delegations considered the proposed convergence\nof direct aids per hectare in terms of scope and timeframe as\ninsufficiently ambitious. Others, however, found it too drastic.\nSome ministers opposed possible cuts to overall spending under\nheading 2 (sustainable growth: natural resources). Others supported\nthis idea, some considering it as a means to improving the\nconvergence of direct aids.
\nSome ministers\nwelcomed the so-called macro-economic conditionality aimed at\nensuring that the effectiveness of expenditure of the five funds\nunder the common strategic framework is underpinned by sound\neconomic policies, or considered the wording in the negotiating box\non the subject to be a good basis. Others had reservations on\nthis.
\nAs regards\nrevenue, which was included in the negotiating box for the\nfirst time, ministers stressed the importance of the rules\nbeing simple, transparent and fair. Some delegations supported the\nabolition of the current VAT-based own resource, as proposed by the\nCommission. Some were ready to examine this proposal, while others\nopposed it.
\nThe proposed new\nown resource based on a financial transaction tax was supported by\nsome member states and opposed by others.
\nMany ministers were\nin favour of abandoning completely all corrections to the system of\nown resources, but considered the proposed lump sums as a step in\nthe right direction. Others insisted on maintaining the existing\ncorrection mechanisms, or at least keeping a guarantee of the\ncurrent amount of correction under a new mechanism. For the time\nbeing, the negotiating box only contains a small number of figures\nin square brackets. Later in the negotiation process, figures for\nthe ceilings of the individual headings of the MFF will be added.\nThe Commission is also expected to submit an updated proposal on\nthe MFF which, amongst other things, will integrate its spring\neconomic forecast into the proposals.
\nThe European\nCouncil will hold a first substantial discussion on the MFF\n2014-2020 on 28 and 29 June. It will also discuss the issue of\nhow the new MFF can best contribute to the creation of growth. It\nis expected to approve procedural conclusions to guide the\nnegotiation process in line with the agreed timetable.
\nThe aim is to reach\nan agreement and adopt the MFF regulation before the end of this\nyear.
\nThe Council\ndiscussed the EU's multiannual financial framework (MFF) for\nthe 2014-2020 period on the basis of a revised negotiating box. The\ndiscussion was aimed at preparing the first substantial\ndiscussion that the European Council will hold on this subject\nat its meeting on 28-29 June. Ministers welcomed the work\nundertaken by the Danish presidency and the progress achieved so\nfar. Views diverged as to whether the negotiating box should be\nregarded as the or a basis for further work.
\nOn the issue of\nbudget headings : as regards the amendments made to the\nnegotiating box in the last few weeks the presidency's suggestion\nto keep separate sub-headings for \"competitiveness for growth and\njobs\" and \"economic, social and territorial cohesion\" was broadly\nwelcomed.
\nOn island\nregions : the proposed additions on island regions\n and the cohesion policy's contribution for investment, growth\nand job creation were supported by some delegations. Others were\nopposed to any special consideration being given to island regions\nin the allocation method of the structural funds or asked for a\nreference to the contribution that other EU policies, notably the\nCommon Agricultural Policy, where making in terms of enhancing\ngrowth and creating jobs. ITER and GMES : the\npresidency suggestion to include the international thermonuclear\nexperimental reactor (ITER) and the European Programme for the\nestablishment of a European capacity for Earth Observation (GMES)\nin the MFF was welcomed by some member states but rejected by\nothers.
\nAs regards the\nother elements of the negotiating box some member states asked\nto remove the so-called reversed safety net, limiting the\nscope of cohesion policy support to a certain percentage compared\nto its level during the 2007-2013 period. Others, however, stressed\nthe importance of this provision and insisted on keeping it in the\nnegotiating box. Some ministers voiced doubts on the so-called\nmacro-economic conditionality (aimed at ensuring that the\neffectiveness of expenditure of the five funds under the common\nstrategic framework is underpinned by sound economic policies) and\nexpressed fears of a possible double punishment, in combination\nwith the rules on European governance. Others, however, insisted on\nkeeping it in the text.
\nWith regard to\nthe CAP, some delegations considered the proposed convergence\nof direct aids per hectare in terms of scope and timeframe as\ninsufficiently ambitious whilst others found it too drastic.\nOnly a few ministers commented on the revenue side of the\nnegotiating box. Some stressed the need to reform the own\nresources system whereas others preferred to keep the current\nrules.
\nThe incoming Cyprus\npresidency expressed its intention to use the work of the Danish\npresidency as point of departure for future discussion.
\nThe European\nCouncil of 28-29 June is expected to approve procedural\nconclusions to guide the negotiation process. It will also discuss\nthe issue of how the new MFF can best contribute to the creation of\ngrowth. The aim is to reach an agreement before the end of this\nyear.
\nFollowing the adoption of its proposal for a Council\nRegulation laying down the multiannual financial framework for the\nyears 2014-2020 (\"MFF Regulation\"), the Commission submitted\nproposals for all the legislative acts concerning the multiannual\nprogrammes for that period. Two of these proposals imply\namendments to the proposal for a MFF Regulation.
\nIt is also necessary to update the multiannual\nfinancial framework table included in the annex to the MFF\nRegulation to take into account the following elements:
\nThe proposed changes to the financial framework are as\nfollows:
\n(1) Horizontal “Asylum and migration”\nRegulation: on 15 November 2011, the\nCommission presented a proposal for a Regulation of the European\nParliament and of the Council laying down general provisions on the\nAsylum and Migration Fund and on the instrument for financial\nsupport for police cooperation, preventing and combating crime, and\ncrisis management (Horizontal Regulation) as\nwell as:
\nThese three specific Regulations provide that the\nprovisions of the Horizontal Regulation shall apply to\nthem.
\nIn the Horizontal\nRegulation, the Commission announced that it will amend its\nproposal for a MFF Regulation to extend the provisions of\nArticle 7 to the programmes implemented under shared management\nunder the Asylum and Migration Fund and Internal Security Fund.\nThis is part of the Commission's endeavour to harmonise rules\napplicable to shared management. Accordingly, whilst every effort\nshould be made to ensure that the national programmes under both\nFunds are adopted in 2014, a transfer to subsequent years of\nallocations not used in 2014 should be possible so as to avoid the\nloss of related commitment appropriations.
\n(2) Horizontal “Cohesion”\nRegulation: on 6 October 2011, the\nCommission presented a proposal for a Regulation of the European\nParliament and of the Council laying down common provisions on the\nEuropean Regional Development Fund, the European Social Fund, the\nCohesion Fund, the European Agricultural and Rural Development Fund\nand the European Maritime and Fisheries Fund covered by the Common\nStrategic Framework and laying down general provisions on the\nEuropean Regional Development Fund, the European Social Fund and\nthe Cohesion Fund and repealing Regulation (EC) No 1083/2006\n(\"CSF Regulation\"). Article 21\nof the CSF Regulation provides for rules on conditionality linked\nto the coordination of the Member States' economic policies,\nincluding the possible suspension of commitments and payments for\nprogrammes supported from the Funds covered by the Common Strategic\nFramework.
\nArticle 21(8), last paragraph, of that Regulation\nprovides that, when the conditions for lifting a suspension of\ncommitments or payments are met, the Council shall, at the same\ntime, decide, on a proposal of the Commission, to\nre-budget the suspended commitments.
\nConsequently, Article 8 of the MFF has to be amended\naccordingly to allow for the transfer and re-budgeting of suspended\ncommitments.
\nThe Commission also proposes:
\nBUDGETARY IMPACT:
\n(1) Incorporating the\nallocations for Croatia in the MFF table: the specific\nallocations for Croatia need to be added to the Commission’s\nproposals for the following funds:
\nThese allocations are calculated on the basis of the\nsame methodology applied for the EU-27, subject to the transitional\nprovisions laid down in the Act of Accession whether in regard to\ncohesion or the common agricultural policy (progressive approach\nwith a two-fold adjustment of allocations from\n2014-2015).
\nBesides benefiting from these pre-allocated amounts,\nCroatia shall also fully participate in all other internal\npolicies. Therefore all the non pre-allocated envelopes need to\nbe adjusted accordingly. The same approach as for the 2013\namounts for the closure of the Accession negotiations has been\napplied – i.e. the amounts are calculated in proportion to the\nshare of Croatia in the GDP and the population of EU-27, resulting\nin an increase of all the proposed non pre-allocated envelopes by\n0.62%
\nAs regards adjustments to Heading 5 (Administration),\nfor the Commission, the net reinforcement will amount to 384\nadditional full time equivalent units, mostly in the form of\nposts to be added to the establishment plan with their phasing in\nto be completed by 2014. The other Institutions will need\nadditional resources mainly for linguistic and legal expenditure,\nequipment and operating expenditure, communication activities and\nIT management tasks, requiring a net reinforcement of some 274\nadditional full time equivalent units. The additional cost over the\nperiod 2014-2020 for all institutions is estimated at EUR 536\nmillion (2011 prices).
\nThe total allocation for Croatia thus amounts to\nEUR 13.741 billion in commitment appropriations and EUR\n9.956 billion in payment appropriations.
\n(2) Updating of the ceiling for Smart and Inclusive\nGrowth and the subceiling for Economic, social and territorial\ncohesion: following the publication\nof regional GDP data for 2009, regional education and labour market\ndata for 2010, and of GNI data for 2010, these Commission\nproposals now need to be updated: The three-year average\ndetermining eligibility shifts to 2007-2009 for regional GDP and to\n2008-2010 for GNI. Furthermore, the maximum envelopes for those\nMember States subject to a cap of 2.5% of national GDP are now\ncalculated on the basis of the Spring 2012 forecast and updated\nmedium-term projections.
\nThe following changes result in the overall allocation\nfor the EU-27: -EUR 5.506 billion in commitment\nappropriations over the 2014-2020 period.
\n(3) Updating of the global ceilings for payment\nappropriations: the annual global\nceilings for payments need to be updated on the basis of the most\nrecent information available:
\n(4) Updating of the overall annual ceilings for\ncommitments and payments expressed as a percentage of\nEU-GNI: the overall annual\nceilings for commitments and payments of the MFF table, according\nto the changes outlined above, need to be expressed in terms of a\npercentage of EU-28 GNI, calculated on the basis of the\nCommission's Spring 2012 macro-economic forecast and updated\nmedium-term projections.
\n\nTHE MULTIANNUAL FINANCIAL FRAMEWORK 2014-2020
\n\nPRESENTATION/GENERAL REMARKS: the multiannual\nfinancial framework (MFF):
\nThe\nTreaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU):
\nThe\ncurrent MFF started in 2007 and will finish at the end of 2013.
\n\nTOWARDS A NEW FINANCIAL FRAMEWORK\n2014-2020:
\n\nAhead of the publication by the Commission of its communication\nentitled \"A\nbudget for Europe 2020\", the European\nParliament was the first institution to present its\nstarting position on the next MFF.
\n\n- 16 June 2010: the European Parliament decides to\ncreate a new Special Committee on Policy\nChallenges and Budgetary Resources for a Sustainable European Union\nafter 2013 (SURE). This was with the purpose of\npresenting a report to Parliament before the Commission adopted its\ndetailed proposals for the next MFF. The SURE Committee's tasks\nwere six-fold:
\n\n- 8 June 2011: on the basis of the report by\nSalvador Garriga (EPP, ES) on behalf of the SURE Special Committee,\nthe European Parliament adopts by a large majority - 468 votes to\n164, with 54 abstentions - a non-legislative\nresolution entitled \"Investing in the Future: a new Multiannual\nFinancial Framework (MFF) for a competitive, sustainable and\ninclusive Europe\".
\n\nIn this resolution, the European Parliament:
\n\nOn 29 June 2011, the Commission:
\nIn\ndrawing up its proposals regarding the European Union's future\nbudget, the Commission faced the challenge of being able to fund\nthe growing number of policy areas where the EU can be more\neffective by acting through the EU level in the current climate of\nnational austerity and fiscal consolidation.
\nThe\nMFF, as proposed by the Commission, seeks to increase growth and\njobs in Europe, encourage greener agriculture and establish a more\nenvironment-conscious and internationally prominent Europe.
\n\nIn the course of 2011, the strategy outlined in\nthe Commission's communication is detailed in a series of\nsectorial legislative proposals in respect of the\nspending programmes and instruments foreseen for each field. The\nproposals foresee funding increases for research and innovation,\neducation and training and external relations. Specific funds will\nbe used to fight crime and terrorism, and for migration and asylum\npolicies. Climate spending is expected to increase some 20% across\ndifferent policy fields.
\n\nThe commitment appropriations in the MFF are\npresented under five headings:
\n\nHeading 1: SMART AND INCLUSIVE GROWTH: EUR 491\nbillion (of which EUR 376 billion for social, economic and\nterritorial cohesion):
\n\nHeading 2: SUSTAINABLE GROWTH - NATURAL RESOURCES:\nEUR 383 billion (of which EUR 282 billion for spending on markets\nand direct payments).
\n\nHeading 3: SECURITY AND CITIZENSHIP: EUR 18.54\nbillion.
\n\nHeading 4: GLOBAL EUROPE: EUR 70 billion.
\n\nHeading 5: ADMINISTRATION: EUR 62.6 billion.
\nThe\nCommission recommends limiting the growth of\nadministrative costs over the next programming\nperiod based on 2013 ceilings. For the period\n2014-2020, this would mean no increase in operational\nadministrative expenditure, without prejudice to additional costs\nresulting from future enlargements.
\nThe\noverall amount proposed by the Commission for the 2014-2020 period\nis EUR 1 025 billion (2011 prices) in\ncommitment appropriations - 1.05% of the EU's GNI - and\nEUR 972.2 billion - 1% of the EU's GNI - in payment appropriations.\nThis proposal represents an increase of 3.16%\ncompared with the current MFF but a reduction of\n-0.1% compared to the 2013 level.
\n\nThe following are the main milestones in the debate on the\nMFF to date:
\n\n- 21 October 2011 and 22 March 2012: conferences\non the MFF bringing together representatives of the European\nParliament, the European Commission, the Council Presidency of the\nEU (Poland and Denmark respectively), the Member States and the\nnational parliaments.
\n\n- 13 June 2012: with a view to the preparation of\nthe European Council meeting of 28 and 29 June 2012, the Parliament\nadopts a resolution\non the MFF and own resources.
\n\n- 28 and 29 June 2012: the European Council has an\nexchange of views on the MFF with the President of the European\nParliament.
\n\nCHALLENGES: the parties involved in the\nnegotiations on the MFF are the European Parliament, the Commission\nand the Council. Two main challenges need to be\naddressed:
\n\n1) The Commission proposes freezing the next 2014-2020 MFF\nat the level of the 2013 ceilings. It proposes a financial\nframework with 1.05% of GNI in commitments\ntranslating into 1% in payments coming from the EU budget. A\nfurther 0.02% in potential expenditure outside the\nMFF, and 0.04% in expenditure outside the MFF.
\n\n2) The European Parliament opposes a freeze in the\nbudget: in its resolution of 13 June\n2012, Parliament restated its view that the EU needs\na budget that is both robust in order to respond\nto its political objectives and sufficiently\nflexible to deal with new challenges.
\n\nThe key elements of Parliament's position are the\nfollowing:
\nIn\nregard to Global Europe, Parliament considers this\naspect requires funding that is in line with the European\nUnion's ambitions. It therefore calls for adequate\nfinancial resources and efficient flexibility mechanisms\nin order to enable the Union to perform its new tasks in this area.\nIt also calls for sufficient resources to be granted to the\nEuropean External Action Service (EEAS). Parliament's consent is\nrequired before the Council can adopt the MFF. This is why\nParliament:
\n\nParliament also states that it is not prepared to give its\nconsent to the next MFF regulation without political\nagreement having been reached on the reform of the system of own\nresources.
\n\n3) Update on negotiations within the Council: the\nnegotiations on the 2024-2020 MFF have begun. Since February 2012,\nthe MFF has been on the agenda of each \"General Affairs\nCouncil\" meeting. As the negotiations progress, the\nnegotiating box set in place by the Presidency will be continuously\nupdated with a view to reducing and ultimately reconciling the gaps\nbetween the Member States' positions, to enable an agreement to be\nreached before the end of 2012.
\nThe\nPresidency of the Council has decided to apply the principle\naccording to which \"nothing is agreed until everything is\nagreed\", a principle that the European Parliament has made\nits own.
\n\nCurrently, several Member States (Austria, the Czech Republic,\nFinland, Germany, the Netherlands, Sweden and the United Kingdom)\nare expressing concern about the general level of proposed spending\nin these times of budgetary consolidation and have requested that\nthe figures should be reduced. On the other hand, a good number of\ncountries, in particular the so-called Cohesion countries are\nopposed to a reduction in the overall size of the EU budget. The\nmajority of ministers stress that the 2014-2020 MFF should\nstimulate employment, growth and investment.
\n\na) As far as spending is concerned, Ministers have\nfocused mainly on cohesion policy and the common agricultural\npolicy (CAP).
\n\nb) As regards revenue, the replacement of the\ncurrent statistically-based VAT with a truly VAT own resource is\ncontroversial, as is the new own resource, the tax on\nfinancial transactions proposed by the Commission. The\nissue of abandoning completely all correction\nmechanisms to the system of own resources is also\ncontroversial.
\n
\nNEXT STEPS: the relevant legislative texts now\nneed to be adopted following the procedures enshrined in the Treaty\nand respecting the role of the different institutions. This will\ninvolve, in particular, the following stages:
If\nno agreement is reached by the end of 2013, the 2013 ceilings and\nother instruments will be extended to 2014 until a new MFF is\nadopted.
\nThe Council discussed the EU's multiannual financial\nframework (MFF) for the 2014-2020 period on the basis of a revised\nnegotiating box prepared by the Cyprus presidency. It also took\nnote of the presentation by the Commission of its proposal\nfor a new value added tax (VAT)-based own resource.
\nMinisters welcomed the work undertaken by the Cyprus\npresidency and expressed their willingness to reach agreement at a\nspecial European Council scheduled for 22-23 November.
\nComments focused on the following issues:
\nProcedure: the Cypriot\nPresidency held an exchange of views with representatives of the\nEuropean Parliament before the Council meeting and debriefed them\nafterwards. The Presidency will reflect on the comments made by\ndelegations and endeavour to fine-tune the negotiating box in order\nto further narrow down Member States' positions. The objective\nis to reach agreement on the MFF package at the special European\nCouncil on 22-23 November.
\nTimetable: the General\nAffairs Council will meet twice before the November European\nCouncil, on 16 October in Luxembourg and 20 November in Brussels.\nAfter the European Council of 18-19 October, the Presidency intends\nto issue a newly revised negotiating box with some ranges of\nfigures. The President of the European Council, Herman Van Rompuy,\nwill hold bilateral consultations starting from 5\nNovember.
\nFurther information on the negotiations may be found\non the Council's MFF webpages:
\n\nThe Committee on Budgets adopted the interim report by\nIvailo KALFIN (S&D, BG) and Reimer BÖGE (EPP, DE)\nin the interests of achieving a positive\noutcome of the Multiannual Financial Framework 2014-2020\napproval procedure.
\nMembers recall that it is necessary for the EU to have\nboth a budget and a budgetary procedure which fully reflect the\ntransparent and democratic essence of the parliamentary\ndecision-making and control process, on the basis of respect\nfor the general principles of unity and universality, which require\nthat all revenue and expenditure be entered in full with no\nadjustment against each other, and that there be a parliamentary\ndebate and vote on both revenue and expenditure in line with Treaty\ncompetences.
\nAlthough Members are fully\naware that the negotiations on the MFF 2014-2020 are taking place\nin a very difficult social, economic and financial context, in\nwhich Member States are engaging in considerable efforts to make\nfiscal adjustments to their national budgets, they insist that the\nUnion cannot be seen as adding an extra fiscal burden on\ntaxpayers.
\nMembers are convinced that\nthe EU budget is a part of the solution to enable Europe to emerge\nfrom the current crisis by promoting investments in growth and jobs\nand helping Member States tackle, collectively and in concerted\nfashion and on a sustainable basis, the present structural\nchallenges, in particular loss of competitiveness, rising\nunemployment and poverty.
\nMembers also stress that the EU budget is primarily\nan investment budget and that 94% of its total returns are\ninvested in the Member States themselves or for external priorities\nof the Union. They emphasise that, for the regions and Member\nStates, public investment would be minimised or impossible without\nthe contribution of the EU budget. Members insist that \nthe EU budget is a key tool\nto deliver smart, sustainable and inclusive\ngrowth for the entire EU
\nAgainst budget cuts that would result in imbalances in\nthe EU’s economy: Members feel\nthat any cuts in the EU’s budget would inevitably increase imbalances and hamper the\ngrowth and competitive strength of the entire Union economy, as\nwell as its cohesiveness, and would undermine the principle of\nsolidarity as a core EU value.
\nMembers also note certain priorities for the agreement\nof future budgets and in particular two major ones:
\n\n1) More money for\nresearch and competitiveness to help EU out of the\ncrisis: MEPs point out that the\nmeasures taken since 2008 have not yet brought about an end to the\neconomic and financial crisis. They believe that a well-targeted,\nrobust and sufficient EU budget is needed to help coordinate and\nenhance national efforts. They therefore call for significant\nincreases in the budget for competitiveness, SMEs,\nentrepreneurship, sustainable infrastructure and research and\ninnovation funding.
\n\n2) New life to be breathed into Cohesion\nPolicy and the CAP: given the\npressing need to secure public investment in growth and jobs, MEPs\nwant the budget for cohesion policy to be maintained at least at\nthe level of the 2007-2013 period. Equally, the budget for the\ncommon agricultural policy (CAP), which contributes to job creation\nin rural areas, should be at least maintained, while being used\nmore effectively and efficiently.
\nMembers challenge the\nCouncil, if it proposes cuts, to identify clearly and publicly\nwhich of its political priorities or projects should be dropped\naltogether.
\nOwn resources: given the\nserious crisis situation facing Member States, balanced\nstructural reforms at both national and EU level are necessary,\nin particularly in regard to own resources. To encourage a\nfavourable outcome in terms of the current negotiations, Members\nconsider that any political agreement will have to include the\nfollowing aspects:
\nInterinstitutional negotiations: Members stress that a stringent majority is required\nin both Parliament and Council to adopt the MFF, and points to the\nimportance of exploiting to the full the provisions of Article\n312(5), which imposes on the institutions the duty to carry out\nnegotiations in order to reach agreement on a text to which\nParliament can give its consent. They emphasise that this will be\nthe first time an MFF regulation is adopted under the new\nprovisions of the Treaty of Lisbon, which entail new\ncooperation arrangements among the institutions combining efficient\ndecision-making and respect for the respective\nprerogatives.
\nMembers also note that any political agreement\nreached at European Council level constitutes no more than a\nnegotiating mandate for the Council. They insist that after the\nEuropean Council has reached a political agreement, fully-fledged\nnegotiations between Parliament and the Council need to take place\nbefore the Council formally submits for Parliament’s\nconsent its proposals on the MFF Regulation.
\nThey also recall that according to the TFEU,\nParliament and the Council are the legislative bodies and\nthe European Council does not have the role of legislator; stresses\nthat the negotiations on the legislative proposals relating to the\nmultiannual programmes will be pursued under the ordinary\nlegislative procedure. They insist on a qualitative approach to the\nMFF Regulation and related multiannual programmes negotiations;\nstresses that they are to be considered as a package, and reaffirms\nthe principle that ‘nothing is agreed until everything is\nagreed’.
\nThey also draw Council’s\nattention to the annexed Working Document highlighting\nmodifications to the proposal for a Council Regulation laying down\nthe MFF for the years 2014-2020 and to the proposal for an\nInterinstitutional Agreement on cooperation in budgetary matters\nand sound financial management; advises that further modifications\nmay become necessary depending on how negotiations on the MFF\nprogress; points out that the Interinstitutional Agreement can\nbe finalised only after the MFF procedure has been\ncompleted.
\nAt a breakfast discussion on 16 October, ahead of the\nGeneral Affairs Council meeting, ministers for European Affairs and\nrepresentatives of the European Parliament took stock of the\nongoing negotiations on the Multiannual Financial Framework for\n2014-2020.
\nThe discussion covered only qualitative aspects\nof the next EU financial framework.
\nThe talks provided the Cyprus Presidency with a basis\nfor revising the \"negotiating box\" on the following four\nissues:
\nMacro-economic conditionality: this is about ensuring that the effectiveness of EU\nexpenditure is underpinned by sound economic policies. The\nprinciple is broadly agreed upon, but how to put it into practice\nneeds to be looked at in more detail.
\nBetter spending: the\nneed to improve the quality of spending is also widely recognised.\nWhat remains to be agreed upon is what measures are most\neffective in achieving this objective.
\nFlexibility: this is\nabout enabling the EU to respond to unexpected financial\nneeds. The task here is to strike the right balance between\nbudgetary discipline and the possibility of mobilising additional\nresources if need be.
\nOutstanding commitments (remainder to be liquidated or\n\"RAL\" (reste à liquider): the\ntask here is to ensure that the level of payments remains\nmanageable when a high level of outstanding commitments builds up.\n\"Commitments\" are legal promises in the EU budget to make payments\nwhich need not necessarily be paid out in the same year, but may be\npaid out over several financial years.
\nThe Cypriot presidency will publish a revised\nnegotiating box before the end of October this year.
\nThe President of the European Council Herman Van\nRompuy will hold bilateral consultations with the member states,\nstarting on 5 November. The objective is to reach agreement on\nthe MFF package at the special European Council on 22 and 23\nNovember.
\nThe European Parliament adopted by 517 votes to 105\nwith 63 abstentions a resolution aiming to achieve a positive\noutcome of the Multiannual Financial Framework 2014-2020 approval\nprocedure.
\nParliament begins by recalling that pursuant to the\nTreaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU), the\nCouncil, acting in accordance with a special legislative procedure,\nmust adopt a regulation laying down the Multiannual Financial\nFramework and all items of revenue and expenditure of the Union\nmust be shown in the budget.
\nThe EU budget as a key tool to deliver smart,\nsustainable and inclusive growth for the entire EU:\nParliament states that it is fully aware that\nthe negotiations on the MFF 2014-2020 are taking place in a very\ndifficult social, economic and financial context, in which Member\nStates are engaging in considerable efforts to make fiscal\nadjustments to their national budgets. It insists, however, that\nthe Union cannot be seen as adding an extra fiscal burden on\ntaxpayers. Parliament is convinced that the EU budget is a part\nof the solution to enable Europe to emerge from the current\ncrisis by promoting investments in growth and jobs and helping\nMember States tackle, collectively and in concerted fashion and on\na sustainable basis, the present structural challenges, in\nparticular loss of competitiveness, rising unemployment and\npoverty. Balanced structural reforms at both national and EU level\nare required with the aim of promoting employment, improving public\nspending on innovation, research and development, meeting our\nclimate change and energy objectives, improving education levels\nand promoting social inclusion.
\nWith respect to the current crisis, Parliament\nconsiders that the EU budget should be at the heart of\nsolidarity between Member States.
\nIt goes on to note that the EU budget represents\nonly some 2 % of total government expenditure in the\nUnion, and is hence more than 45 times smaller than the sum of\ngovernment expenditure in the Member States, and that the EU\nbudget is primarily an investment budget and that 94 % of its total\nreturns are invested in the Member States themselves or for\nexternal priorities of the Union. Parliament emphasises that,\nfor the regions and Member States, public investment would be\nminimised or impossible without the contribution of the EU\nbudget.
\nIt also highlights the following issues:
\n\n· \ndelivering on the Europe 2020 strategy's seven\nflagship initiatives which will require a substantial amount of\nfuture-oriented investment, estimated at no less than EUR 1 800\nbillion up to 2020, while at the same time applying severe\nbudgetary measures at national level;
\n\n· \nthe alarming situation young people face\nacross the EU requires a particular effort;
\n\n· \nmeasures are needed for a strong, diversified,\ncompetitive industrial base to support competitiveness and job\ncreation in the EU;
\n\n· \nat least 20 % of expenditure must be\nclimate-related mobilising investment for a sustainable and\nprosperous low-carbon economy.
\nLevel of expenditure:\nParliament states that the shrinkage of the EU budget with\nrespect to the national budgets is in flagrant contradiction with\nthe extension of competences and tasks conferred on the Union by\nthe Treaty. Since 2000 the gap between the EU own resources\nceiling (1.29 % of GNI in commitment and 1.23 % in payment\nappropriations) and the MFF ceilings has grown dramatically.\nParliament recalls furthermore that the MFF only sets maximum\nlevels of expenditure, while the EU budget has always remained far\nbelow those levels. It considers that the Commission proposal,\nwhich represents a freeze of the MFF 2014- 2020 ceilings at the\nlevel of the 2013 ceilings, will not be sufficient to finance the\nEU’s existing policy priorities.
\nParliament warns the Council against any attempt to\nreduce further the level of EU expenditure as proposed by the\nCommission. It firmly opposes any plea for linear,\nacross-the-board cuts that would jeopardise the implementation and\neffectiveness of all EU policies, and challenges the Council, in\ncase it proposes cuts, to clearly and publicly identify which of\nits political priorities or projects should be dropped\naltogether.
\nIn all, Parliament reaffirms its position in favour\nof a significant increase in the funding available for the\nUnion programmes in the fields of: (i) competiveness, (ii) SMEs,\nentrepreneurship and (iii) sustainable infrastructure.
\nFurthermore, the European Parliament :
\n\n· \nunderlines the importance of research and\ninnovation and calls on the EU institutions and the Member States\nto agree on a specific roadmap for achieving the 3 % GDP\ntarget of investment in research;
\n\n· \nstrongly rejects any attempt to further decrease\nthe allocation for programmes, such as COSME\nprogramme;
\n\n· \nmaintains its position that cohesion policy\nfunding should be maintained at least at the level of the 2007-2013\nperiod and supports earmarking 25 % of the total cohesion policy\nallocation to the ESF;
\n\n· \nsupports the maintenance of the amounts\nallocated to the CAP in the budget year 2013 during the next\nfinancial programming period, with a more efficient allocation of\nits budget, via a fair distribution of direct payments and rural\ndevelopment allocations between Member States, regions and\nfarmers;
\n\n· \nsupports the strengthening of the Union\nprogramme for environment and climate;
\n\n· \nurges an increase in the financing of the\nconcrete youth-specific instruments proposed by the\nCommission;
\n\n· \nstresses the need to continue the programme for\nthe most deprived persons;
\n\n· \nreiterates that the new responsibilities at\ninternational level conferred on the EU by the Treaties will\nrequire the achievement of Member States' 0.7 % GNI spending\ntargets for Official Development Aid and the Commission's proposals\nfor ‘Global Europe’ and the need to match the\nresponsibilities of EEAS with adequate budgetary\nresources.
\nBetter spending:\nParliament believes that in the present context of public budgetary\nconstraints, Union added value is to be found notably in long-term\ninvestments that are beyond the reach of individual Member States.\nTit stresses the need for coherence and simplification to further\nreduce the administrative burdens. Stressing again the principle of\nsound financial management, Parliament reminds Member States of\ntheir legal obligation to ensure that appropriations entered in the\nbudget are used in accordance with this principle (90 % of the\nerrors detected by the European Court of Auditors have been in\nMember States). It supports the introduction of ex ante\nconditionality provisions to ensure that EU funding, particularly\nin respect of the Cohesion Fund, the Structural Funds and the rural\nand fisheries funds, are better targeted to the achievement of the\nEurope 2020 objectives. Members consider that the regions should\nnot be punished for the failure of the national level to comply\nwith procedures related to economic governance.
\nGenerally, Parliament agrees on the need to\nrationalise administrative expenditure, so long as the institutions\ncan perform their tasks and duties in accordance with their\nobligations and powers under the Treaties. It profoundly\ndisagrees with the application of a linear staff reduction to all\ninstitutions, bodies and agencies, as their roles and\nresponsibilities under the Treaties differ widely. It points again\nto the significant savings that could be made if the European\nParliament were to have a single seat, and urges the budgetary\nauthority to raise this issue in the negotiations on the next MFF\n2014-2020.
\nDuration and mid-term revision: Parliament takes the view that for the next MFF, a\n7-year period set until 2020 should be considered as a transitional\nsolution, given that it makes a clear link with the Europe 2020\nstrategy. It believes, however, that a 5- or a 5+5-year period\nwould better align the MFF's duration with that of the\ninstitutions' terms of office, thereby enhancing democratic\naccountability and responsibility. It also stresses the need for a\nmid-term revision to be enshrined in the MFF regulation, with a\nspecific procedure including a binding calendar ensuring the full\ninvolvement of the next Parliament.
\nNeed for a more flexible MFF: Parliament believes that 5% flexibility is\nindispensable as regards the ceilings for the (sub)headings, to\nmake it possible to adapt to new circumstances without increasing\nthe overall amount and without requiring revision of the MFF. It\nwelcomes the Commission's proposal to increase the level of\nlegislative flexibility (possibility of departing from a given\namount for the entire duration of the programme concerned) from\n5 % to 10 %. It proposes to this end that the margins\nleft under the commitment appropriations ceilings in one year's\nbudget should be carried over to the next year when the need\narises.
\nIt also stresses the need to introduce a global MFF\nmargin for payment appropriations, enabling the carry-over of\nmargins left under the payment appropriations ceiling to following\nyears and mobilised in the framework of the annual budgetary\nprocedure.
\nOnce again, Parliament expresses its concern about the\ncurrent ever-growing level of outstanding commitments (RALs) and\ncalls for a joint interinstitutional strategy for keeping the level\nof RALs under control to avoid, as much as possible, the risk of\nhampering the implementation of EU programmes because of a lack of\npayment appropriations at the end of the financial\nframework.
\nParliament also raises: i) the issue of budget\nsurpluses; ii) the Council's regular linear cuts to the\nCommission's estimations for payment appropriations, which is not\ngood budgeting (to this effect, Parliament considers it would be\nbetter to use the surpluses by reinjecting them back into the EU\nbudget), iii) the issue of contingency margins; iv)the increase in\nthe envelop of the Flexibility Instrument proposed by the\nCommission; v) its support for the Commission’s proposal that\nthe Emergency Aid Reserve, the European Union Solidarity Fund, the\nEuropean Globalisation Adjustment Fund and the reserve for crises\nin the agriculture sector, given their non-programmable nature,\nshould be entered in the budget over and above the ceilings for the\nrelevant headings.
\nUnity of the budget:
\nOnce again, Parliament recalls that the EU budget\ncovers all revenue and expenditure resulting from decisions taken\nby the EU institutions within the framework of their\ncompetences, and that it takes into account separately the Union's\nfinancial operations in the form of lending, borrowing and\nguarantees. It strongly urges the Commission and Council to list\nin a separate annex the budgetary or financial commitments and\nguarantees undertaken by the Union or by some of Member States in\nthe framework of the European stabilisation mechanisms (EFSM,\nEFSF, ESM) in accordance with the relevant provisions of the TFEU.\nIn an amendment adopted in plenary, Parliament expresses its firm\nconviction that any new fiscal capacity for eurozone Member\nStates aiming at adjustments to country- specific asymmetric\nshocks and structural reforms and whose fiscal functions are not\ncovered by the MFF must be developed within the Union framework\nand must be subject to proper democratic accountability through the\nexisting institutions. It recalls that any new budgetary\ncapacity must be part of the EU budget, thereby respecting its\nunity and to improve visibility and ensure the additionality of\nsuch a new budgetary capacity, a special new heading of the MFF\nshould be created. In this regard, it strongly rejects any\nattempt to reduce the ceilings of the Commission's proposal on the\nMFF in order to secure resources for this new capacity.
\nParliament confirms its intention in the future to\norganise a specific public debate and hold a vote on the revenue\nside of the budget, as part of its examination of the annual draft\nbudget. It believes that, in this way, a permanent debate on the\nfinancing system of the Union will be maintained.
\nOwn resources: Parliament regrets the current stalemate in the\nnegotiations created by the lack of a genuine own resources\nsystem. These negotiations are organised in Council around two\nopposing camps, led by the net contributor countries to the EU\nbudget, on the one hand, and by the net beneficiary countries of\nthe EU budget, on the other, in a system which creates a purely\naccounting-based vision of ‘fair return’
\nParliament reiterates its belief that the financing of\nthe Union budget should return to a genuine system of own\nresources, as provided for in the Treaty of Rome and all\nsuccessive EU treaties. It deeply regrets the fact that the\ncurrent system, whereby the vast majority of the financing\ncomes from national contributions, is non-transparent and unfair\nand is not subject to parliamentary control at either European or\nnational level.Such a system violates, in essence, the letter and\nspirit of the Treaty. Parliament reaffirms its basic position, as\nstated in its resolution of 13 June 2012, that it is not\nprepared to give its consent to the next MFF Regulation without\npolitical agreement on reform of the own resources system, in\nline with the Commission's proposals of 29 June 2011, including its\nlegislative proposals for genuine new own resources. Such a reform\nshould aim at reducing the share of Member States' GNI-based\ncontributions to the EU budget to a maximum of 40 % by 2020,\nthereby contributing to the consolidation efforts of Member\nStates.
\nParliament then indicates what, in its eyes, should\nconstitute the basis of the necessary political\nagreement:
\nInterinstitutional negotiations: Parliament stresses that a stringent majority is\nrequired in both Parliament and Council to adopt the MFF, and\npoints to the importance of exploiting to the full the provisions\nof Article 312(5), which imposes on the institutions the duty to\ncarry out negotiations in order to reach agreement on a text to\nwhich Parliament can give its consent. It emphasises that this will\nbe the first time an MFF regulation is adopted under the new\nprovisions of the Treaty of Lisbon, which entail new\ncooperation arrangements among the institutions combining efficient\ndecision-making and respect for the respective prerogatives. It\nwelcomes, in this respect, the steps taken by the Hungarian,\nPolish, Danish and Cypriot Council Presidencies-in-office to\nestablish a structured dialogue and regular information exchange\nwith Parliament.
\nIt notes that any political agreement reached at\nEuropean Council level constitutes no more than a negotiating\nmandate for the Council. After the European Council has reached\na political agreement, fully-fledged negotiations between\nParliament and the Council need to take place before the Council\nformally submits for Parliament's consent its proposals on the MFF\nRegulation.
\nParliament reiterates that, according to the TFEU,\nParliament and the Council are the legislative bodies and\nthe European Council does not have the role of legislator; stresses\nthat the negotiations on the legislative proposals relating to the\nmultiannual programmes will be pursued under the ordinary\nlegislative procedure. It stresses that they are to be considered\nas a package, and reaffirms the principle that ‘nothing is\nagreed until everything is agreed’. It draws Council's\nattention to the annexed Working Document highlighting\nmodifications to the proposal for a Council Regulation laying down\nthe MFF for the years 2014-2020 and to the proposal for an\nInterinstitutional Agreement on cooperation in budgetary matters\nand sound financial management. It advises that further\nmodifications may become necessary depending on how negotiations on\nthe MFF progress and points out that the Interinstitutional\nAgreement can be finalised only after the MFF procedure has been\ncompleted.
\nWith respect to the negotiations, Parliament expresses\nits readiness to enter into substantial discussions with the\nCouncil on both the MFF regulation and the IIA, and asks the\nCouncil to intensify contacts at all levels with a view to the\n22-23 November European Council; stresses the need to reach the\nfinal agreement on the MFF as soon as possible. It points out,\nfinally, that if no MFF has been adopted by the end of 2013, the\nceilings and other provisions corresponding to 2013 will be\nextended until such time as a new MFF is adopted. It signals that,\nin this eventuality, Parliament would be ready to reach a swift\nagreement with the Council and Commission to adapt the internal\nstructure of the MFF to reflect the new political\npriorities.
\nIt should be noted that an alternative motion for\nresolution tabled by the ECR group was rejected in\nplenary.
\nIn a public session, the Irish presidency informed\nministers on the state of play in the discussions with the European\nParliament on the next multiannual financial framework (MFF) and\nreceived guidance from ministers for the negotiations with the\nEuropean Parliament.
\nSince the February 2013 European Council, the Irish\npresidency has had extensive contacts with the European Parliament\non the MFF. Work has also started in Council on the MFF regulation\nand the interinstitutional agreement on cooperation in budgetary\nmatters and on sound financial management.
\nThe Irish presidency's objective is to reach agreement\nwith the Parliament on the MFF by the end of June and to translate\nthe overall MFF agreement into legal texts. It also aims to reach\nagreement on the around 70 pieces of sector-specific\nlegislation underpinning the EU’s funding programmes. This\nwould allow the new programmes to start on time in January\n2014.
\nMinisters supported the presidency's efforts to find a\ncompromise with the European Parliament on the next MFF in a timely\nmanner. They expressed their willingness to discuss the four key\nelements of the European Parliament's resolution:
\nSome ministers also stressed that substantial elements\nof the Parliament's demands had already been agreed by the European\nCouncil in February, in particular as regards\nflexibility.
\nFollowing the Council's discussion the presidency will\nrenew its contacts with the European Parliament and ask Coreper to\ncontinue work on the MFF regulation and the interinstitutional\nagreement. The General Affairs Council will return to the MFF for a\nmore substantial discussion on 21 May 2013.
\nFollowing the adoption of its proposal for a Council\nRegulation laying down the multiannual financial framework for the\nyears 2014-2020 (\"MFF Regulation\"), the Commission submitted\nproposals for all the legislative acts concerning the multiannual\nprogrammes for that period. Two of these proposals imply\namendments to the proposal for a MFF Regulation.
\nIt is also necessary to update the multiannual\nfinancial framework table included in the annex to the MFF\nRegulation to take into account the following elements:
\nThe proposed changes to the financial framework are as\nfollows:
\n(1) Horizontal “Asylum and migration”\nRegulation: on 15 November 2011, the\nCommission presented a proposal for a Regulation of the European\nParliament and of the Council laying down general provisions on the\nAsylum and Migration Fund and on the instrument for financial\nsupport for police cooperation, preventing and combating crime, and\ncrisis management (Horizontal Regulation) as\nwell as:
\nThese three specific Regulations prov