PURPOSE: to\npresent special\nreport No 12/2011 from the European Court of Auditors (ECA) on\nwhether EU measures contributed to adapting the capacity of EU\nfishing fleets to available fishing opportunities.
\nCONTENT: the\nreport recalls that the EU Common Fisheries Policy (CFP) aims to\npromote sustainable fishing by achieving a balance between fish\nresources and fishing fleets in order to avoid overexploitation\nof fish stocks. The European Fisheries Fund (EFF) provides\n€ 4.3 billion for the programming period 2007 - 2013 to\nsupport the CFP.
\nThis European\nCourt of Auditors' (ECA) performance audit assessed whether\nEU measures effectively contributed to adapting the capacity of the\nfleets to available fishing opportunities.
\nThe Court\nexamined two main questions:
\nis the framework\nfor the reduction of fleet capacity clear;
\nare specific\nmeasures well defined and implemented?
\nThe audit was\ncarried out at the Commission and in seven Member States (Denmark,\nSpain, France, Italy, Poland, Portugal and the UK) selected on the\nbasis of the size of their fishing fleets and the resources\navailable for adapting their fishing fleets under the\nEFF.
\nCourt of\nAuditor's conclusions: the audit\nconcluded that overcapacity of the fishing fleet continues to be\none of the main reasons for the failure of the CFP in assuring a\nsustainable fishing activity. The ECA has previously issued 2\nspecial reports (No 3/1993 and No 7/2007) stressing the problem\nof overcapacity.
\nAlthough the\nreduction of fishing overcapacity has been a recurrent theme in\nprevious reforms of the CFP, current measures have\nfailed.
\nThe ECA found\nimportant weaknesses in the framework:
\nCourt's\nrecommendations: the ECA makes a\nseries of recommendations to address overcapacity and the\nsustainability of the fishing sector:
\nThe Committee on Budgetary Control adopted the report\nby Marta ANDREASEN (EFD, UK)
\nOn the Special report No\n12/2011 (2011 discharge): “Have EU measures contributed to\nadapting the capacity of the fishing fleets to available fishing\nopportunities?”
\nMembers note that the\nspecial reports of the Court of Auditors provide information on\nissues of concern related to the implementation of expenditure, and\nare thus a tool for Parliament in the exercise of its role as the\ndischarge authority. They note its damning appraisal of the\nmeasures undertaken by both the Commission and Member\nStates.
\nMembers take note that,\nin spite of the reduction of fishing, overcapacity has been a\nrecurrent theme in previous reforms of the Common Fisheries Policy\n(CFP) and that the expensive measures taken to date to reduce\nfishing overcapacity by adapting the fishing fleet to fishing\nresources have been unsuccessful.
\nThey recognises that, as from 1995, the trend for\nUnion fish catches has been declining and that this decline is\nlargely due to overfishing and forms part of a vicious circle\ninvolving fishing overcapacity and low economic performance of the\nfishing fleet.
\nIn particular, they note that, since the last reform of the CFP in 2002, fish\ncatches have declined by 1 million tonnes and jobs in the fishing\nsector have declined from 421 000 to 351 000.
\nMembers therefore\ncall for:
\nThe committee also calls for:
\nImproved monitoring: Members also express concern\nat the problem of the scrapping of fishing vessels. The scrapping\nschemes have, in part, been badly implemented, with examples of tax\npayers' money being used for the scrapping of already inactive\nvessels or even being used indirectly for building new vessels.\nThey stress the need for strict safeguards when using scrapping\nschemes, as a way of reducing overcapacity in order to avoid abuse.\nMembers also want the Commission to call on the national\nauthorities to enforce stricter checks before deciding on the\nfunding of projects of investments on board.
\nCourt recommendations: lastly, Members endorse the Court’s\nrecommendations made in the conclusions of the Special Report,\nwhich are also their own conclusions:
\nLastly, Members highlight the fact that the EFF and CFP are currently an\nineffective use of our common resources; they therefore call for\nthe re-structuring of the fisheries programmes to be done in such\nas way as to ensure that they are as efficient as\npossible.
\nOBJECTIF : établissement\nd'un rapport spécial de la Cour des comptes\neuropéenne (n°\n12/2011) intitulée «Les mesures prises par l'UE\nont-elles contribué à l'adaptation de la\ncapacité des flottes de pêche aux possibilités\nde pêche existantes ?»
\nCONTENU : dans son rapport, la\nCour rappelle que la politique commune de la pêche (PCP) de\nl'UE vise à promouvoir la pêche durable en tendant\nà assurer un équilibre entre ressources halieutiques\net flottes de pêche, de manière à\néviter une surexploitation des stocks halieutiques.\nÁ titre indicatif, la Cour rappelle que le Fonds\neuropéen pour la pêche (FEP) est doté de 4,3\nmilliards EUR pour la période de programmation 2007-2013\nà l'appui de la PCP.
\nL'audit de performance\nréalisé par la Cour des comptes européenne a\nconsisté à évaluer si les mesures prises par\nl'UE ont contribué efficacement à l'adaptation de la\ncapacité des flottes aux possibilités de pêche\nexistantes.
\nLa Cour s'est penchée sur les\ndeux questions principales suivantes:
\nL'audit a été\neffectué auprès de la Commission et de sept\nÉtats membres (le Danemark, l'Espagne, la France, l'Italie,\nla Pologne, le Portugal et le Royaume-Uni)\nsélectionnés en fonction de la taille de leur flotte\nde pêche et des ressources disponibles pour adapter celle-ci\ndans le cadre du FEP.
\nConclusions de l'audit de la Cour\ndes comptes : l'audit a permis de conclure que la\nsurcapacité de la flotte de pêche continue\nd'être l'une des principales causes de l'échec de la\nPCP en ce qui concerne la viabilité des activités de\npêche. La Cour avait à cet égard\ndéjà publié deux rapports spéciaux\n(n° 3/1993 et 7/2007) qui mettaient en relief le\nproblème de la surcapacité.
\nBien que la question de la\nréduction de la surcapacité de pêche ait\nété abordée de manière\nrécurrente lors de précédentes réformes\nde la PCP, les mesures prises à ce jour se sont\navérées vaines.
\nLa Cour a notamment constaté\nque le cadre présentait des insuffisances importantes\n:
\nRecommandations de la\nCour : la Cour formule enfin un ensemble de\nrecommandations en vue de réduire la surcapacité et\nde rendre le secteur de la pêche durable:
\nPURPOSE: to\npresent special\nreport No 12/2011 from the European Court of Auditors (ECA) on\nwhether EU measures contributed to adapting the capacity of EU\nfishing fleets to available fishing opportunities.
\nCONTENT: the\nreport recalls that the EU Common Fisheries Policy (CFP) aims to\npromote sustainable fishing by achieving a balance between fish\nresources and fishing fleets in order to avoid overexploitation\nof fish stocks. The European Fisheries Fund (EFF) provides\n€ 4.3 billion for the programming period 2007 - 2013 to\nsupport the CFP.
\nThis European\nCourt of Auditors' (ECA) performance audit assessed whether\nEU measures effectively contributed to adapting the capacity of the\nfleets to available fishing opportunities.
\nThe Court\nexamined two main questions:
\nis the framework\nfor the reduction of fleet capacity clear;
\nare specific\nmeasures well defined and implemented?
\nThe audit was\ncarried out at the Commission and in seven Member States (Denmark,\nSpain, France, Italy, Poland, Portugal and the UK) selected on the\nbasis of the size of their fishing fleets and the resources\navailable for adapting their fishing fleets under the\nEFF.
\nCourt of\nAuditor's conclusions: the audit\nconcluded that overcapacity of the fishing fleet continues to be\none of the main reasons for the failure of the CFP in assuring a\nsustainable fishing activity. The ECA has previously issued 2\nspecial reports (No 3/1993 and No 7/2007) stressing the problem\nof overcapacity.
\nAlthough the\nreduction of fishing overcapacity has been a recurrent theme in\nprevious reforms of the CFP, current measures have\nfailed.
\nThe ECA found\nimportant weaknesses in the framework:
\nCourt's\nrecommendations: the ECA makes a\nseries of recommendations to address overcapacity and the\nsustainability of the fishing sector:
\nLa commission du\ncontrôle budgétaire a adopté le rapport de\nMarta ANDREASEN (ELD, UK) sur le rapport spécial n°\n12/2011 de la cour des comptes, intitulé: \"Les mesures\nprises par l'UE ont-elles contribué à l'adaptation de\nla capacité des flottes de pêche aux\npossibilités de pêche existantes ?\"
\nLes\ndéputés rappellent que les rapports spéciaux\nde la Cour des comptes fournissent des informations sur les\nproblèmes liés à l'exécution des\ndépenses et représentent ainsi un outil pour le\nParlement dans l'exercice de son rôle d'autorité de\ndécharge. Ils se félicitent dès lors du\nrapport de la Cour des comptes et s’inquiètent de\nl’évaluation accablante des mesures prises par la\nCommission et les États membres en matière de\npêche.
\nLes\ndéputés relèvent en particulier qu'en\ndépit de la réduction de la pêche, la\nsurcapacité a constitué un thème\nrécurrent des précédentes réformes de\nla politique commune de la pêche (PCP) et que les mesures\ncoûteuses prises à ce jour pour réduire la\nsurcapacité de pêche se sont soldées par un\néchec.
\nMême\ns’ils reconnaissent que depuis 1995, la tendance est à\nla diminution des captures de poisson de l'Union, le déclin\ndes possibilités de pêche est largement dû\nà la surpêche et fait partie d'un cercle vicieux\nimpliquant la surcapacité de pêche et les faibles\nrésultats économiques des flottes de pêche.
\nIls constatent\nnotamment que depuis la dernière réforme de la\nPCP en 2002, les captures de poisson ont diminué d'un\nmillion de tonnes et que les emplois dans le secteur de la\npêche ont chuté pour passer de 421.000 à\n351.000 postes.
\nLes\ndéputés appellent dès lors à :
\nLa commission\nparlementaire appelle également à :
\nMieux\ncontrôler : les députés\névoquent également la problématique de la mise\nau rebut des navires. Pour ces derniers, les plans de mise au rebut\nont été en partie mal mis en œuvre, l'argent du\ncontribuable servant, par exemple, à mettre au rebut des\nnavires qui n'étaient déjà plus actifs, ou\nmême, indirectement, à reconstruire de nouveaux\nnavires. Il convient donc de dûment contrôler les plans\nde mise au rebut pour éviter les abus. Les\ndéputés souhaitent également que la Commission\nappelle les autorités nationales à procéder\nà des contrôles plus stricts avant de décider\nde financer des projets d'investissements à bord.
\nRecommandations\nde la Cour : les députés approuvent enfin\nles recommandations faites par la Cour en guise de conclusion du\nrapport spécial, lesquelles rejoignent leurs propres\nconclusions, à savoir :
\nPour conclure, les\ndéputés soulignent qu'à l'heure actuelle, le\nFEP et la politique commune de pêche n'utilisent pas\nefficacement les ressources communes et appellent à la\nrestructuration des programmes de pêche de sorte qu’ils\nsoient les plus efficaces possible.
\nThe Committee on Budgetary Control adopted the report\nby Marta ANDREASEN (EFD, UK)
\nOn the Special report No\n12/2011 (2011 discharge): “Have EU measures contributed to\nadapting the capacity of the fishing fleets to available fishing\nopportunities?”
\nMembers note that the\nspecial reports of the Court of Auditors provide information on\nissues of concern related to the implementation of expenditure, and\nare thus a tool for Parliament in the exercise of its role as the\ndischarge authority. They note its damning appraisal of the\nmeasures undertaken by both the Commission and Member\nStates.
\nMembers take note that,\nin spite of the reduction of fishing, overcapacity has been a\nrecurrent theme in previous reforms of the Common Fisheries Policy\n(CFP) and that the expensive measures taken to date to reduce\nfishing overcapacity by adapting the fishing fleet to fishing\nresources have been unsuccessful.
\nThey recognises that, as from 1995, the trend for\nUnion fish catches has been declining and that this decline is\nlargely due to overfishing and forms part of a vicious circle\ninvolving fishing overcapacity and low economic performance of the\nfishing fleet.
\nIn particular, they note that, since the last reform of the CFP in 2002, fish\ncatches have declined by 1 million tonnes and jobs in the fishing\nsector have declined from 421 000 to 351 000.
\nMembers therefore\ncall for:
\nThe committee also calls for:
\nImproved monitoring: Members also express concern\nat the problem of the scrapping of fishing vessels. The scrapping\nschemes have, in part, been badly implemented, with examples of tax\npayers' money being used for the scrapping of already inactive\nvessels or even being used indirectly for building new vessels.\nThey stress the need for strict safeguards when using scrapping\nschemes, as a way of reducing overcapacity in order to avoid abuse.\nMembers also want the Commission to call on the national\nauthorities to enforce stricter checks before deciding on the\nfunding of projects of investments on board.
\nCourt recommendations: lastly, Members endorse the Court’s\nrecommendations made in the conclusions of the Special Report,\nwhich are also their own conclusions:
\nLastly, Members highlight the fact that the EFF and CFP are currently an\nineffective use of our common resources; they therefore call for\nthe re-structuring of the fisheries programmes to be done in such\nas way as to ensure that they are as efficient as\npossible.
\nPURPOSE: to\npresent special\nreport No 12/2011 from the European Court of Auditors (ECA) on\nwhether EU measures contributed to adapting the capacity of EU\nfishing fleets to available fishing opportunities.
\nCONTENT: the\nreport recalls that the EU Common Fisheries Policy (CFP) aims to\npromote sustainable fishing by achieving a balance between fish\nresources and fishing fleets in order to avoid overexploitation\nof fish stocks. The European Fisheries Fund (EFF) provides\n€ 4.3 billion for the programming period 2007 - 2013 to\nsupport the CFP.
\nThis European\nCourt of Auditors' (ECA) performance audit assessed whether\nEU measures effectively contributed to adapting the capacity of the\nfleets to available fishing opportunities.
\nThe Court\nexamined two main questions:
\nis the framework\nfor the reduction of fleet capacity clear;
\nare specific\nmeasures well defined and implemented?
\nThe audit was\ncarried out at the Commission and in seven Member States (Denmark,\nSpain, France, Italy, Poland, Portugal and the UK) selected on the\nbasis of the size of their fishing fleets and the resources\navailable for adapting their fishing fleets under the\nEFF.
\nCourt of\nAuditor's conclusions: the audit\nconcluded that overcapacity of the fishing fleet continues to be\none of the main reasons for the failure of the CFP in assuring a\nsustainable fishing activity. The ECA has previously issued 2\nspecial reports (No 3/1993 and No 7/2007) stressing the problem\nof overcapacity.
\nAlthough the\nreduction of fishing overcapacity has been a recurrent theme in\nprevious reforms of the CFP, current measures have\nfailed.
\nThe ECA found\nimportant weaknesses in the framework:
\nCourt's\nrecommendations: the ECA makes a\nseries of recommendations to address overcapacity and the\nsustainability of the fishing sector:
\nPURPOSE: to\npresent special\nreport No 12/2011 from the European Court of Auditors (ECA) on\nwhether EU measures contributed to adapting the capacity of EU\nfishing fleets to available fishing opportunities.
\nCONTENT: the\nreport recalls that the EU Common Fisheries Policy (CFP) aims to\npromote sustainable fishing by achieving a balance between fish\nresources and fishing fleets in order to avoid overexploitation\nof fish stocks. The European Fisheries Fund (EFF) provides\n€ 4.3 billion for the programming period 2007 - 2013 to\nsupport the CFP.
\nThis European\nCourt of Auditors' (ECA) performance audit assessed whether\nEU measures effectively contributed to adapting the capacity of the\nfleets to available fishing opportunities.
\nThe Court\nexamined two main questions:
\nis the framework\nfor the reduction of fleet capacity clear;
\nare specific\nmeasures well defined and implemented?
\nThe audit was\ncarried out at the Commission and in seven Member States (Denmark,\nSpain, France, Italy, Poland, Portugal and the UK) selected on the\nbasis of the size of their fishing fleets and the resources\navailable for adapting their fishing fleets under the\nEFF.
\nCourt of\nAuditor's conclusions: the audit\nconcluded that overcapacity of the fishing fleet continues to be\none of the main reasons for the failure of the CFP in assuring a\nsustainable fishing activity. The ECA has previously issued 2\nspecial reports (No 3/1993 and No 7/2007) stressing the problem\nof overcapacity.
\nAlthough the\nreduction of fishing overcapacity has been a recurrent theme in\nprevious reforms of the CFP, current measures have\nfailed.
\nThe ECA found\nimportant weaknesses in the framework:
\nCourt's\nrecommendations: the ECA makes a\nseries of recommendations to address overcapacity and the\nsustainability of the fishing sector:
\nThe Committee on Budgetary Control adopted the report\nby Marta ANDREASEN (EFD, UK)
\nOn the Special report No\n12/2011 (2011 discharge): “Have EU measures contributed to\nadapting the capacity of the fishing fleets to available fishing\nopportunities?”
\nMembers note that the\nspecial reports of the Court of Auditors provide information on\nissues of concern related to the implementation of expenditure, and\nare thus a tool for Parliament in the exercise of its role as the\ndischarge authority. They note its damning appraisal of the\nmeasures undertaken by both the Commission and Member\nStates.
\nMembers take note that,\nin spite of the reduction of fishing, overcapacity has been a\nrecurrent theme in previous reforms of the Common Fisheries Policy\n(CFP) and that the expensive measures taken to date to reduce\nfishing overcapacity by adapting the fishing fleet to fishing\nresources have been unsuccessful.
\nThey recognises that, as from 1995, the trend for\nUnion fish catches has been declining and that this decline is\nlargely due to overfishing and forms part of a vicious circle\ninvolving fishing overcapacity and low economic performance of the\nfishing fleet.
\nIn particular, they note that, since the last reform of the CFP in 2002, fish\ncatches have declined by 1 million tonnes and jobs in the fishing\nsector have declined from 421 000 to 351 000.
\nMembers therefore\ncall for:
\nThe committee also calls for:
\nImproved monitoring: Members also express concern\nat the problem of the scrapping of fishing vessels. The scrapping\nschemes have, in part, been badly implemented, with examples of tax\npayers' money being used for the scrapping of already inactive\nvessels or even being used indirectly for building new vessels.\nThey stress the need for strict safeguards when using scrapping\nschemes, as a way of reducing overcapacity in order to avoid abuse.\nMembers also want the Commission to call on the national\nauthorities to enforce stricter checks before deciding on the\nfunding of projects of investments on board.
\nCourt recommendations: lastly, Members endorse the Court’s\nrecommendations made in the conclusions of the Special Report,\nwhich are also their own conclusions:
\nLastly, Members highlight the fact that the EFF and CFP are currently an\nineffective use of our common resources; they therefore call for\nthe re-structuring of the fisheries programmes to be done in such\nas way as to ensure that they are as efficient as\npossible.
\nThe Committee on Budgetary Control adopted the report\nby Marta ANDREASEN (EFD, UK)
\nOn the Special report No\n12/2011 (2011 discharge): “Have EU measures contributed to\nadapting the capacity of the fishing fleets to available fishing\nopportunities?”
\nMembers note that the\nspecial reports of the Court of Auditors provide information on\nissues of concern related to the implementation of expenditure, and\nare thus a tool for Parliament in the exercise of its role as the\ndischarge authority. They note its damning appraisal of the\nmeasures undertaken by both the Commission and Member\nStates.
\nMembers take note that,\nin spite of the reduction of fishing, overcapacity has been a\nrecurrent theme in previous reforms of the Common Fisheries Policy\n(CFP) and that the expensive measures taken to date to reduce\nfishing overcapacity by adapting the fishing fleet to fishing\nresources have been unsuccessful.
\nThey recognises that, as from 1995, the trend for\nUnion fish catches has been declining and that this decline is\nlargely due to overfishing and forms part of a vicious circle\ninvolving fishing overcapacity and low economic performance of the\nfishing fleet.
\nIn particular, they note that, since the last reform of the CFP in 2002, fish\ncatches have declined by 1 million tonnes and jobs in the fishing\nsector have declined from 421 000 to 351 000.
\nMembers therefore\ncall for:
\nThe committee also calls for:
\nImproved monitoring: Members also express concern\nat the problem of the scrapping of fishing vessels. The scrapping\nschemes have, in part, been badly implemented, with examples of tax\npayers' money being used for the scrapping of already inactive\nvessels or even being used indirectly for building new vessels.\nThey stress the need for strict safeguards when using scrapping\nschemes, as a way of reducing overcapacity in order to avoid abuse.\nMembers also want the Commission to call on the national\nauthorities to enforce stricter checks before deciding on the\nfunding of projects of investments on board.
\nCourt recommendations: lastly, Members endorse the Court’s\nrecommendations made in the conclusions of the Special Report,\nwhich are also their own conclusions:
\nLastly, Members highlight the fact that the EFF and CFP are currently an\nineffective use of our common resources; they therefore call for\nthe re-structuring of the fisheries programmes to be done in such\nas way as to ensure that they are as efficient as\npossible.
\nThe Committee on Budgetary Control adopted the report\nby Marta ANDREASEN (EFD, UK)
\nOn the Special report No\n12/2011 (2011 discharge): “Have EU measures contributed to\nadapting the capacity of the fishing fleets to available fishing\nopportunities?”
\nMembers note that the\nspecial reports of the Court of Auditors provide information on\nissues of concern related to the implementation of expenditure, and\nare thus a tool for Parliament in the exercise of its role as the\ndischarge authority. They note its damning appraisal of the\nmeasures undertaken by both the Commission and Member\nStates.
\nMembers take note that,\nin spite of the reduction of fishing, overcapacity has been a\nrecurrent theme in previous reforms of the Common Fisheries Policy\n(CFP) and that the expensive measures taken to date to reduce\nfishing overcapacity by adapting the fishing fleet to fishing\nresources have been unsuccessful.
\nThey recognises that, as from 1995, the trend for\nUnion fish catches has been declining and that this decline is\nlargely due to overfishing and forms part of a vicious circle\ninvolving fishing overcapacity and low economic performance of the\nfishing fleet.
\nIn particular, they note that, since the last reform of the CFP in 2002, fish\ncatches have declined by 1 million tonnes and jobs in the fishing\nsector have declined from 421 000 to 351 000.
\nMembers therefore\ncall for:
\nThe committee also calls for:
\nImproved monitoring: Members also express concern\nat the problem of the scrapping of fishing vessels. The scrapping\nschemes have, in part, been badly implemented, with examples of tax\npayers' money being used for the scrapping of already inactive\nvessels or even being used indirectly for building new vessels.\nThey stress the need for strict safeguards when using scrapping\nschemes, as a way of reducing overcapacity in order to avoid abuse.\nMembers also want the Commission to call on the national\nauthorities to enforce stricter checks before deciding on the\nfunding of projects of investments on board.
\nCourt recommendations: lastly, Members endorse the Court’s\nrecommendations made in the conclusions of the Special Report,\nwhich are also their own conclusions:
\nLastly, Members highlight the fact that the EFF and CFP are currently an\nineffective use of our common resources; they therefore call for\nthe re-structuring of the fisheries programmes to be done in such\nas way as to ensure that they are as efficient as\npossible.
\nLa commission du\ncontrôle budgétaire a adopté le rapport de\nMarta ANDREASEN (ELD, UK) sur le rapport spécial n°\n12/2011 de la cour des comptes, intitulé: \"Les mesures\nprises par l'UE ont-elles contribué à l'adaptation de\nla capacité des flottes de pêche aux\npossibilités de pêche existantes ?\"
\nLes\ndéputés rappellent que les rapports spéciaux\nde la Cour des comptes fournissent des informations sur les\nproblèmes liés à l'exécution des\ndépenses et représentent ainsi un outil pour le\nParlement dans l'exercice de son rôle d'autorité de\ndécharge. Ils se félicitent dès lors du\nrapport de la Cour des comptes et s’inquiètent de\nl’évaluation accablante des mesures prises par la\nCommission et les États membres en matière de\npêche.
\nLes\ndéputés relèvent en particulier qu'en\ndépit de la réduction de la pêche, la\nsurcapacité a constitué un thème\nrécurrent des précédentes réformes de\nla politique commune de la pêche (PCP) et que les mesures\ncoûteuses prises à ce jour pour réduire la\nsurcapacité de pêche se sont soldées par un\néchec.
\nMême\ns’ils reconnaissent que depuis 1995, la tendance est à\nla diminution des captures de poisson de l'Union, le déclin\ndes possibilités de pêche est largement dû\nà la surpêche et fait partie d'un cercle vicieux\nimpliquant la surcapacité de pêche et les faibles\nrésultats économiques des flottes de pêche.
\nIls constatent\nnotamment que depuis la dernière réforme de la\nPCP en 2002, les captures de poisson ont diminué d'un\nmillion de tonnes et que les emplois dans le secteur de la\npêche ont chuté pour passer de 421.000 à\n351.000 postes.
\nLes\ndéputés appellent dès lors à :
\nLa commission\nparlementaire appelle également à :
\nMieux\ncontrôler : les députés\névoquent également la problématique de la mise\nau rebut des navires. Pour ces derniers, les plans de mise au rebut\nont été en partie mal mis en œuvre, l'argent du\ncontribuable servant, par exemple, à mettre au rebut des\nnavires qui n'étaient déjà plus actifs, ou\nmême, indirectement, à reconstruire de nouveaux\nnavires. Il convient donc de dûment contrôler les plans\nde mise au rebut pour éviter les abus. Les\ndéputés souhaitent également que la Commission\nappelle les autorités nationales à procéder\nà des contrôles plus stricts avant de décider\nde financer des projets d'investissements à bord.
\nRecommandations\nde la Cour : les députés approuvent enfin\nles recommandations faites par la Cour en guise de conclusion du\nrapport spécial, lesquelles rejoignent leurs propres\nconclusions, à savoir :
\nPour conclure, les\ndéputés soulignent qu'à l'heure actuelle, le\nFEP et la politique commune de pêche n'utilisent pas\nefficacement les ressources communes et appellent à la\nrestructuration des programmes de pêche de sorte qu’ils\nsoient les plus efficaces possible.
\nOBJECTIF : établissement\nd'un rapport spécial de la Cour des comptes\neuropéenne (n°\n12/2011) intitulée «Les mesures prises par l'UE\nont-elles contribué à l'adaptation de la\ncapacité des flottes de pêche aux possibilités\nde pêche existantes ?»
\nCONTENU : dans son rapport, la\nCour rappelle que la politique commune de la pêche (PCP) de\nl'UE vise à promouvoir la pêche durable en tendant\nà assurer un équilibre entre ressources halieutiques\net flottes de pêche, de manière à\néviter une surexploitation des stocks halieutiques.\nÁ titre indicatif, la Cour rappelle que le Fonds\neuropéen pour la pêche (FEP) est doté de 4,3\nmilliards EUR pour la période de programmation 2007-2013\nà l'appui de la PCP.
\nL'audit de performance\nréalisé par la Cour des comptes européenne a\nconsisté à évaluer si les mesures prises par\nl'UE ont contribué efficacement à l'adaptation de la\ncapacité des flottes aux possibilités de pêche\nexistantes.
\nLa Cour s'est penchée sur les\ndeux questions principales suivantes:
\nL'audit a été\neffectué auprès de la Commission et de sept\nÉtats membres (le Danemark, l'Espagne, la France, l'Italie,\nla Pologne, le Portugal et le Royaume-Uni)\nsélectionnés en fonction de la taille de leur flotte\nde pêche et des ressources disponibles pour adapter celle-ci\ndans le cadre du FEP.
\nConclusions de l'audit de la Cour\ndes comptes : l'audit a permis de conclure que la\nsurcapacité de la flotte de pêche continue\nd'être l'une des principales causes de l'échec de la\nPCP en ce qui concerne la viabilité des activités de\npêche. La Cour avait à cet égard\ndéjà publié deux rapports spéciaux\n(n° 3/1993 et 7/2007) qui mettaient en relief le\nproblème de la surcapacité.
\nBien que la question de la\nréduction de la surcapacité de pêche ait\nété abordée de manière\nrécurrente lors de précédentes réformes\nde la PCP, les mesures prises à ce jour se sont\navérées vaines.
\nLa Cour a notamment constaté\nque le cadre présentait des insuffisances importantes\n:
\nRecommandations de la\nCour : la Cour formule enfin un ensemble de\nrecommandations en vue de réduire la surcapacité et\nde rendre le secteur de la pêche durable:
\nPURPOSE: to\npresent special\nreport No 12/2011 from the European Court of Auditors (ECA) on\nwhether EU measures contributed to adapting the capacity of EU\nfishing fleets to available fishing opportunities.
\nCONTENT: the\nreport recalls that the EU Common Fisheries Policy (CFP) aims to\npromote sustainable fishing by achieving a balance between fish\nresources and fishing fleets in order to avoid overexploitation\nof fish stocks. The European Fisheries Fund (EFF) provides\n€ 4.3 billion for the programming period 2007 - 2013 to\nsupport the CFP.
\nThis European\nCourt of Auditors' (ECA) performance audit assessed whether\nEU measures effectively contributed to adapting the capacity of the\nfleets to available fishing opportunities.
\nThe Court\nexamined two main questions:
\nis the framework\nfor the reduction of fleet capacity clear;
\nare specific\nmeasures well defined and implemented?
\nThe audit was\ncarried out at the Commission and in seven Member States (Denmark,\nSpain, France, Italy, Poland, Portugal and the UK) selected on the\nbasis of the size of their fishing fleets and the resources\navailable for adapting their fishing fleets under the\nEFF.
\nCourt of\nAuditor's conclusions: the audit\nconcluded that overcapacity of the fishing fleet continues to be\none of the main reasons for the failure of the CFP in assuring a\nsustainable fishing activity. The ECA has previously issued 2\nspecial reports (No 3/1993 and No 7/2007) stressing the problem\nof overcapacity.
\nAlthough the\nreduction of fishing overcapacity has been a recurrent theme in\nprevious reforms of the CFP, current measures have\nfailed.
\nThe ECA found\nimportant weaknesses in the framework:
\nCourt's\nrecommendations: the ECA makes a\nseries of recommendations to address overcapacity and the\nsustainability of the fishing sector:
\nThe Committee on Budgetary Control adopted the report\nby Marta ANDREASEN (EFD, UK)
\nOn the Special report No\n12/2011 (2011 discharge): “Have EU measures contributed to\nadapting the capacity of the fishing fleets to available fishing\nopportunities?”
\nMembers note that the\nspecial reports of the Court of Auditors provide information on\nissues of concern related to the implementation of expenditure, and\nare thus a tool for Parliament in the exercise of its role as the\ndischarge authority. They note its damning appraisal of the\nmeasures undertaken by both the Commission and Member\nStates.
\nMembers take note that,\nin spite of the reduction of fishing, overcapacity has been a\nrecurrent theme in previous reforms of the Common Fisheries Policy\n(CFP) and that the expensive measures taken to date to reduce\nfishing overcapacity by adapting the fishing fleet to fishing\nresources have been unsuccessful.
\nThey recognises that, as from 1995, the trend for\nUnion fish catches has been declining and that this decline is\nlargely due to overfishing and forms part of a vicious circle\ninvolving fishing overcapacity and low economic performance of the\nfishing fleet.
\nIn particular, they note that, since the last reform of the CFP in 2002, fish\ncatches have declined by 1 million tonnes and jobs in the fishing\nsector have declined from 421 000 to 351 000.
\nMembers therefore\ncall for:
\nThe committee also calls for:
\nImproved monitoring: Members also express concern\nat the problem of the scrapping of fishing vessels. The scrapping\nschemes have, in part, been badly implemented, with examples of tax\npayers' money being used for the scrapping of already inactive\nvessels or even being used indirectly for building new vessels.\nThey stress the need for strict safeguards when using scrapping\nschemes, as a way of reducing overcapacity in order to avoid abuse.\nMembers also want the Commission to call on the national\nauthorities to enforce stricter checks before deciding on the\nfunding of projects of investments on board.
\nCourt recommendations: lastly, Members endorse the Court’s\nrecommendations made in the conclusions of the Special Report,\nwhich are also their own conclusions:
\nLastly, Members highlight the fact that the EFF and CFP are currently an\nineffective use of our common resources; they therefore call for\nthe re-structuring of the fisheries programmes to be done in such\nas way as to ensure that they are as efficient as\npossible.
\nPURPOSE: to present special report No 12/2011 from the\nEuropean Court of Auditors (ECA) on whether EU measures contributed\nto adapting the capacity of EU fishing fleets to available fishing\nopportunities.
\nCONTENT: the report recalls that the EU Common\nFisheries Policy (CFP) aims to promote sustainable fishing by\nachieving a balance between fish resources and fishing fleets in\norder to avoid overexploitation of fish stocks. The European\nFisheries Fund (EFF) provides € 4.3 billion for the\nprogramming period 2007 – 2013 to support the CFP.
\nThis European Court of Auditors’ (ECA)\nperformance audit assessed whether EU measures effectively\ncontributed to adapting the capacity of the fleets to available\nfishing opportunities.
\nThe Court examined two main questions:
\nis the framework for the reduction of fleet capacity\nclear;
\nare specific measures well defined and\nimplemented?
\nThe audit was carried out at the Commission and in\nseven Member States (Denmark, Spain, France, Italy, Poland,\nPortugal and the UK) selected on the basis of the size of their\nfishing fleets and the resources available for adapting their\nfishing fleets under the EFF.
\nCourt of Auditor’s conclusions: the audit concluded that overcapacity of the fishing\nfleet continues to be one of the main reasons for the failure of\nthe CFP in assuring a sustainable fishing activity. The ECA has\npreviously issued 2 special reports (No 3/1993 and No 7/2007)\nstressing the problem of overcapacity.
\nAlthough the reduction of fishing overcapacity has\nbeen a recurrent theme in previous reforms of the CFP, current\nmeasures have failed.
\nThe ECA found important weaknesses in the\nframework:
\nCourt’s recommendations: the ECA makes a series of recommendations to address\novercapacity and the sustainability of the fishing\nsector:
\nThe Committee on Budgetary Control adopted the report\nby Marta ANDREASEN (EFD, UK)
\nOn the Special report No\n12/2011 (2011 discharge): “Have EU measures contributed to\nadapting the capacity of the fishing fleets to available fishing\nopportunities?”
\nMembers note that the\nspecial reports of the Court of Auditors provide information on\nissues of concern related to the implementation of expenditure, and\nare thus a tool for Parliament in the exercise of its role as the\ndischarge authority. They note its damning appraisal of the\nmeasures undertaken by both the Commission and Member\nStates.
\nMembers take note that,\nin spite of the reduction of fishing, overcapacity has been a\nrecurrent theme in previous reforms of the Common Fisheries Policy\n(CFP) and that the expensive measures taken to date to reduce\nfishing overcapacity by adapting the fishing fleet to fishing\nresources have been unsuccessful.
\nThey recognises that, as from 1995, the trend for\nUnion fish catches has been declining and that this decline is\nlargely due to overfishing and forms part of a vicious circle\ninvolving fishing overcapacity and low economic performance of the\nfishing fleet.
\nIn particular, they note that, since the last reform of the CFP in 2002, fish\ncatches have declined by 1 million tonnes and jobs in the fishing\nsector have declined from 421 000 to 351 000.
\nMembers therefore\ncall for:
\nThe committee also calls for:
\nImproved monitoring: Members also express concern\nat the problem of the scrapping of fishing vessels. The scrapping\nschemes have, in part, been badly implemented, with examples of tax\npayers' money being used for the scrapping of already inactive\nvessels or even being used indirectly for building new vessels.\nThey stress the need for strict safeguards when using scrapping\nschemes, as a way of reducing overcapacity in order to avoid abuse.\nMembers also want the Commission to call on the national\nauthorities to enforce stricter checks before deciding on the\nfunding of projects of investments on board.
\nCourt recommendations: lastly, Members endorse the Court’s\nrecommendations made in the conclusions of the Special Report,\nwhich are also their own conclusions:
\nLastly, Members highlight the fact that the EFF and CFP are currently an\nineffective use of our common resources; they therefore call for\nthe re-structuring of the fisheries programmes to be done in such\nas way as to ensure that they are as efficient as\npossible.
\nPURPOSE: to\npresent special\nreport No 12/2011 from the European Court of Auditors (ECA) on\nwhether EU measures contributed to adapting the capacity of EU\nfishing fleets to available fishing opportunities.
\nCONTENT: the\nreport recalls that the EU Common Fisheries Policy (CFP) aims to\npromote sustainable fishing by achieving a balance between fish\nresources and fishing fleets in order to avoid overexploitation\nof fish stocks. The European Fisheries Fund (EFF) provides\n€ 4.3 billion for the programming period 2007 - 2013 to\nsupport the CFP.
\nThis European\nCourt of Auditors' (ECA) performance audit assessed whether\nEU measures effectively contributed to adapting the capacity of the\nfleets to available fishing opportunities.
\nThe Court\nexamined two main questions:
\nis the framework\nfor the reduction of fleet capacity clear;
\nare specific\nmeasures well defined and implemented?
\nThe audit was\ncarried out at the Commission and in seven Member States (Denmark,\nSpain, France, Italy, Poland, Portugal and the UK) selected on the\nbasis of the size of their fishing fleets and the resources\navailable for adapting their fishing fleets under the\nEFF.
\nCourt of\nAuditor's conclusions: the audit\nconcluded that overcapacity of the fishing fleet continues to be\none of the main reasons for the failure of the CFP in assuring a\nsustainable fishing activity. The ECA has previously issued 2\nspecial reports (No 3/1993 and No 7/2007) stressing the problem\nof overcapacity.
\nAlthough the\nreduction of fishing overcapacity has been a recurrent theme in\nprevious reforms of the CFP, current measures have\nfailed.
\nThe ECA found\nimportant weaknesses in the framework:
\nCourt's\nrecommendations: the ECA makes a\nseries of recommendations to address overcapacity and the\nsustainability of the fishing sector:
\nLa commission du\ncontrôle budgétaire a adopté le rapport de\nMarta ANDREASEN (ELD, UK) sur le rapport spécial n°\n12/2011 de la cour des comptes, intitulé: \"Les mesures\nprises par l'UE ont-elles contribué à l'adaptation de\nla capacité des flottes de pêche aux\npossibilités de pêche existantes ?\"
\nLes\ndéputés rappellent que les rapports spéciaux\nde la Cour des comptes fournissent des informations sur les\nproblèmes liés à l'exécution des\ndépenses et représentent ainsi un outil pour le\nParlement dans l'exercice de son rôle d'autorité de\ndécharge. Ils se félicitent dès lors du\nrapport de la Cour des comptes et s’inquiètent de\nl’évaluation accablante des mesures prises par la\nCommission et les États membres en matière de\npêche.
\nLes\ndéputés relèvent en particulier qu'en\ndépit de la réduction de la pêche, la\nsurcapacité a constitué un thème\nrécurrent des précédentes réformes de\nla politique commune de la pêche (PCP) et que les mesures\ncoûteuses prises à ce jour pour réduire la\nsurcapacité de pêche se sont soldées par un\néchec.
\nMême\ns’ils reconnaissent que depuis 1995, la tendance est à\nla diminution des captures de poisson de l'Union, le déclin\ndes possibilités de pêche est largement dû\nà la surpêche et fait partie d'un cercle vicieux\nimpliquant la surcapacité de pêche et les faibles\nrésultats économiques des flottes de pêche.
\nIls constatent\nnotamment que depuis la dernière réforme de la\nPCP en 2002, les captures de poisson ont diminué d'un\nmillion de tonnes et que les emplois dans le secteur de la\npêche ont chuté pour passer de 421.000 à\n351.000 postes.
\nLes\ndéputés appellent dès lors à :
\nLa commission\nparlementaire appelle également à :
\nMieux\ncontrôler : les députés\névoquent également la problématique de la mise\nau rebut des navires. Pour ces derniers, les plans de mise au rebut\nont été en partie mal mis en œuvre, l'argent du\ncontribuable servant, par exemple, à mettre au rebut des\nnavires qui n'étaient déjà plus actifs, ou\nmême, indirectement, à reconstruire de nouveaux\nnavires. Il convient donc de dûment contrôler les plans\nde mise au rebut pour éviter les abus. Les\ndéputés souhaitent également que la Commission\nappelle les autorités nationales à procéder\nà des contrôles plus stricts avant de décider\nde financer des projets d'investissements à bord.
\nRecommandations\nde la Cour : les députés approuvent enfin\nles recommandations faites par la Cour en guise de conclusion du\nrapport spécial, lesquelles rejoignent leurs propres\nconclusions, à savoir :
\nPour conclure, les\ndéputés soulignent qu'à l'heure actuelle, le\nFEP et la politique commune de pêche n'utilisent pas\nefficacement les ressources communes et appellent à la\nrestructuration des programmes de pêche de sorte qu’ils\nsoient les plus efficaces possible.
\nOBJECTIF : établissement\nd'un rapport spécial de la Cour des comptes\neuropéenne (n°\n12/2011) intitulée «Les mesures prises par l'UE\nont-elles contribué à l'adaptation de la\ncapacité des flottes de pêche aux possibilités\nde pêche existantes ?»
\nCONTENU : dans son rapport, la\nCour rappelle que la politique commune de la pêche (PCP) de\nl'UE vise à promouvoir la pêche durable en tendant\nà assurer un équilibre entre ressources halieutiques\net flottes de pêche, de manière à\néviter une surexploitation des stocks halieutiques.\nÁ titre indicatif, la Cour rappelle que le Fonds\neuropéen pour la pêche (FEP) est doté de 4,3\nmilliards EUR pour la période de programmation 2007-2013\nà l'appui de la PCP.
\nL'audit de performance\nréalisé par la Cour des comptes européenne a\nconsisté à évaluer si les mesures prises par\nl'UE ont contribué efficacement à l'adaptation de la\ncapacité des flottes aux possibilités de pêche\nexistantes.
\nLa Cour s'est penchée sur les\ndeux questions principales suivantes:
\nL'audit a été\neffectué auprès de la Commission et de sept\nÉtats membres (le Danemark, l'Espagne, la France, l'Italie,\nla Pologne, le Portugal et le Royaume-Uni)\nsélectionnés en fonction de la taille de leur flotte\nde pêche et des ressources disponibles pour adapter celle-ci\ndans le cadre du FEP.
\nConclusions de l'audit de la Cour\ndes comptes : l'audit a permis de conclure que la\nsurcapacité de la flotte de pêche continue\nd'être l'une des principales causes de l'échec de la\nPCP en ce qui concerne la viabilité des activités de\npêche. La Cour avait à cet égard\ndéjà publié deux rapports spéciaux\n(n° 3/1993 et 7/2007) qui mettaient en relief le\nproblème de la surcapacité.
\nBien que la question de la\nréduction de la surcapacité de pêche ait\nété abordée de manière\nrécurrente lors de précédentes réformes\nde la PCP, les mesures prises à ce jour se sont\navérées vaines.
\nLa Cour a notamment constaté\nque le cadre présentait des insuffisances importantes\n:
\nRecommandations de la\nCour : la Cour formule enfin un ensemble de\nrecommandations en vue de réduire la surcapacité et\nde rendre le secteur de la pêche durable:
\nPURPOSE: to\npresent special\nreport No 12/2011 from the European Court of Auditors (ECA) on\nwhether EU measures contributed to adapting the capacity of EU\nfishing fleets to available fishing opportunities.
\nCONTENT: the\nreport recalls that the EU Common Fisheries Policy (CFP) aims to\npromote sustainable fishing by achieving a balance between fish\nresources and fishing fleets in order to avoid overexploitation\nof fish stocks. The European Fisheries Fund (EFF) provides\n€ 4.3 billion for the programming period 2007 - 2013 to\nsupport the CFP.
\nThis European\nCourt of Auditors' (ECA) performance audit assessed whether\nEU measures effectively contributed to adapting the capacity of the\nfleets to available fishing opportunities.
\nThe Court\nexamined two main questions:
\nis the framework\nfor the reduction of fleet capacity clear;
\nare specific\nmeasures well defined and implemented?
\nThe audit was\ncarried out at the Commission and in seven Member States (Denmark,\nSpain, France, Italy, Poland, Portugal and the UK) selected on the\nbasis of the size of their fishing fleets and the resources\navailable for adapting their fishing fleets under the\nEFF.
\nCourt of\nAuditor's conclusions: the audit\nconcluded that overcapacity of the fishing fleet continues to be\none of the main reasons for the failure of the CFP in assuring a\nsustainable fishing activity. The ECA has previously issued 2\nspecial reports (No 3/1993 and No 7/2007) stressing the problem\nof overcapacity.
\nAlthough the\nreduction of fishing overcapacity has been a recurrent theme in\nprevious reforms of the CFP, current measures have\nfailed.
\nThe ECA found\nimportant weaknesses in the framework:
\nCourt's\nrecommendations: the ECA makes a\nseries of recommendations to address overcapacity and the\nsustainability of the fishing sector:
\nThe Committee on Budgetary Control adopted the report\nby Marta ANDREASEN (EFD, UK)
\nOn the Special report No\n12/2011 (2011 discharge): “Have EU measures contributed to\nadapting the capacity of the fishing fleets to available fishing\nopportunities?”
\nMembers note that the\nspecial reports of the Court of Auditors provide information on\nissues of concern related to the implementation of expenditure, and\nare thus a tool for Parliament in the exercise of its role as the\ndischarge authority. They note its damning appraisal of the\nmeasures undertaken by both the Commission and Member\nStates.
\nMembers take note that,\nin spite of the reduction of fishing, overcapacity has been a\nrecurrent theme in previous reforms of the Common Fisheries Policy\n(CFP) and that the expensive measures taken to date to reduce\nfishing overcapacity by adapting the fishing fleet to fishing\nresources have been unsuccessful.
\nThey recognises that, as from 1995, the trend for\nUnion fish catches has been declining and that this decline is\nlargely due to overfishing and forms part of a vicious circle\ninvolving fishing overcapacity and low economic performance of the\nfishing fleet.
\nIn particular, they note that, since the last reform of the CFP in 2002, fish\ncatches have declined by 1 million tonnes and jobs in the fishing\nsector have declined from 421 000 to 351 000.
\nMembers therefore\ncall for:
\nThe committee also calls for:
\nImproved monitoring: Members also express concern\nat the problem of the scrapping of fishing vessels. The scrapping\nschemes have, in part, been badly implemented, with examples of tax\npayers' money being used for the scrapping of already inactive\nvessels or even being used indirectly for building new vessels.\nThey stress the need for strict safeguards when using scrapping\nschemes, as a way of reducing overcapacity in order to avoid abuse.\nMembers also want the Commission to call on the national\nauthorities to enforce stricter checks before deciding on the\nfunding of projects of investments on board.
\nCourt recommendations: lastly, Members endorse the Court’s\nrecommendations made in the conclusions of the Special Report,\nwhich are also their own conclusions:
\nLastly, Members highlight the fact that the EFF and CFP are currently an\nineffective use of our common resources; they therefore call for\nthe re-structuring of the fisheries programmes to be done in such\nas way as to ensure that they are as efficient as\npossible.
\nLa commission du\ncontrôle budgétaire a adopté le rapport de\nMarta ANDREASEN (ELD, UK) sur le rapport spécial n°\n12/2011 de la cour des comptes, intitulé: \"Les mesures\nprises par l'UE ont-elles contribué à l'adaptation de\nla capacité des flottes de pêche aux\npossibilités de pêche existantes ?\"
\nLes\ndéputés rappellent que les rapports spéciaux\nde la Cour des comptes fournissent des informations sur les\nproblèmes liés à l'exécution des\ndépenses et représentent ainsi un outil pour le\nParlement dans l'exercice de son rôle d'autorité de\ndécharge. Ils se félicitent dès lors du\nrapport de la Cour des comptes et s’inquiètent de\nl’évaluation accablante des mesures prises par la\nCommission et les États membres en matière de\npêche.
\nLes\ndéputés relèvent en particulier qu'en\ndépit de la réduction de la pêche, la\nsurcapacité a constitué un thème\nrécurrent des précédentes réformes de\nla politique commune de la pêche (PCP) et que les mesures\ncoûteuses prises à ce jour pour réduire la\nsurcapacité de pêche se sont soldées par un\néchec.
\nMême\ns’ils reconnaissent que depuis 1995, la tendance est à\nla diminution des captures de poisson de l'Union, le déclin\ndes possibilités de pêche est largement dû\nà la surpêche et fait partie d'un cercle vicieux\nimpliquant la surcapacité de pêche et les faibles\nrésultats économiques des flottes de pêche.
\nIls constatent\nnotamment que depuis la dernière réforme de la\nPCP en 2002, les captures de poisson ont diminué d'un\nmillion de tonnes et que les emplois dans le secteur de la\npêche ont chuté pour passer de 421.000 à\n351.000 postes.
\nLes\ndéputés appellent dès lors à :
\nLa commission\nparlementaire appelle également à :
\nMieux\ncontrôler : les députés\névoquent également la problématique de la mise\nau rebut des navires. Pour ces derniers, les plans de mise au rebut\nont été en partie mal mis en œuvre, l'argent du\ncontribuable servant, par exemple, à mettre au rebut des\nnavires qui n'étaient déjà plus actifs, ou\nmême, indirectement, à reconstruire de nouveaux\nnavires. Il convient donc de dûment contrôler les plans\nde mise au rebut pour éviter les abus. Les\ndéputés souhaitent également que la Commission\nappelle les autorités nationales à procéder\nà des contrôles plus stricts avant de décider\nde financer des projets d'investissements à bord.
\nRecommandations\nde la Cour : les députés approuvent enfin\nles recommandations faites par la Cour en guise de conclusion du\nrapport spécial, lesquelles rejoignent leurs propres\nconclusions, à savoir :
\nPour conclure, les\ndéputés soulignent qu'à l'heure actuelle, le\nFEP et la politique commune de pêche n'utilisent pas\nefficacement les ressources communes et appellent à la\nrestructuration des programmes de pêche de sorte qu’ils\nsoient les plus efficaces possible.
\nOBJECTIF : établissement\nd'un rapport spécial de la Cour des comptes\neuropéenne (n°\n12/2011) intitulée «Les mesures prises par l'UE\nont-elles contribué à l'adaptation de la\ncapacité des flottes de pêche aux possibilités\nde pêche existantes ?»
\nCONTENU : dans son rapport, la\nCour rappelle que la politique commune de la pêche (PCP) de\nl'UE vise à promouvoir la pêche durable en tendant\nà assurer un équilibre entre ressources halieutiques\net flottes de pêche, de manière à\néviter une surexploitation des stocks halieutiques.\nÁ titre indicatif, la Cour rappelle que le Fonds\neuropéen pour la pêche (FEP) est doté de 4,3\nmilliards EUR pour la période de programmation 2007-2013\nà l'appui de la PCP.
\nL'audit de performance\nréalisé par la Cour des comptes européenne a\nconsisté à évaluer si les mesures prises par\nl'UE ont contribué efficacement à l'adaptation de la\ncapacité des flottes aux possibilités de pêche\nexistantes.
\nLa Cour s'est penchée sur les\ndeux questions principales suivantes:
\nL'audit a été\neffectué auprès de la Commission et de sept\nÉtats membres (le Danemark, l'Espagne, la France, l'Italie,\nla Pologne, le Portugal et le Royaume-Uni)\nsélectionnés en fonction de la taille de leur flotte\nde pêche et des ressources disponibles pour adapter celle-ci\ndans le cadre du FEP.
\nConclusions de l'audit de la Cour\ndes comptes : l'audit a permis de conclure que la\nsurcapacité de la flotte de pêche continue\nd'être l'une des principales causes de l'échec de la\nPCP en ce qui concerne la viabilité des activités de\npêche. La Cour avait à cet égard\ndéjà publié deux rapports spéciaux\n(n° 3/1993 et 7/2007) qui mettaient en relief le\nproblème de la surcapacité.
\nBien que la question de la\nréduction de la surcapacité de pêche ait\nété abordée de manière\nrécurrente lors de précédentes réformes\nde la PCP, les mesures prises à ce jour se sont\navérées vaines.
\nLa Cour a notamment constaté\nque le cadre présentait des insuffisances importantes\n:
\nRecommandations de la\nCour : la Cour formule enfin un ensemble de\nrecommandations en vue de réduire la surcapacité et\nde rendre le secteur de la pêche durable:
\nPURPOSE: to present special report No 12/2011 from the\nEuropean Court of Auditors (ECA) on whether EU measures contributed\nto adapting the capacity of EU fishing fleets to available fishing\nopportunities.
\nCONTENT: the report recalls that the EU Common\nFisheries Policy (CFP) aims to promote sustainable fishing by\nachieving a balance between fish resources and fishing fleets in\norder to avoid overexploitation of fish stocks. The European\nFisheries Fund (EFF) provides € 4.3 billion for the\nprogramming period 2007 – 2013 to support the CFP.
\nThis European Court of Auditors’ (ECA)\nperformance audit assessed whether EU measures effectively\ncontributed to adapting the capacity of the fleets to available\nfishing opportunities.
\nThe Court examined two main questions:
\nis the framework for the reduction of fleet capacity\nclear;
\nare specific measures well defined and\nimplemented?
\nThe audit was carried out at the Commission and in\nseven Member States (Denmark, Spain, France, Italy, Poland,\nPortugal and the UK) selected on the basis of the size of their\nfishing fleets and the resources available for adapting their\nfishing fleets under the EFF.
\nCourt of Auditor’s conclusions: the audit concluded that overcapacity of the fishing\nfleet continues to be one of the main reasons for the failure of\nthe CFP in assuring a sustainable fishing activity. The ECA has\npreviously issued 2 special reports (No 3/1993 and No 7/2007)\nstressing the problem of overcapacity.
\nAlthough the reduction of fishing overcapacity has\nbeen a recurrent theme in previous reforms of the CFP, current\nmeasures have failed.
\nThe ECA found important weaknesses in the\nframework:
\nCourt’s recommendations: the ECA makes a series of recommendations to address\novercapacity and the sustainability of the fishing\nsector:
\nPURPOSE: to\npresent special\nreport No 12/2011 from the European Court of Auditors (ECA) on\nwhether EU measures contributed to adapting the capacity of EU\nfishing fleets to available fishing opportunities.
\nCONTENT: the\nreport recalls that the EU Common Fisheries Policy (CFP) aims to\npromote sustainable fishing by achieving a balance between fish\nresources and fishing fleets in order to avoid overexploitation\nof fish stocks. The European Fisheries Fund (EFF) provides\n€ 4.3 billion for the programming period 2007 - 2013 to\nsupport the CFP.
\nThis European\nCourt of Auditors' (ECA) performance audit assessed whether\nEU measures effectively contributed to adapting the capacity of the\nfleets to available fishing opportunities.
\nThe Court\nexamined two main questions:
\nis the framework\nfor the reduction of fleet capacity clear;
\nare specific\nmeasures well defined and implemented?
\nThe audit was\ncarried out at the Commission and in seven Member States (Denmark,\nSpain, France, Italy, Poland, Portugal and the UK) selected on the\nbasis of the size of their fishing fleets and the resources\navailable for adapting their fishing fleets under the\nEFF.
\nCourt of\nAuditor's conclusions: the audit\nconcluded that overcapacity of the fishing fleet continues to be\none of the main reasons for the failure of the CFP in assuring a\nsustainable fishing activity. The ECA has previously issued 2\nspecial reports (No 3/1993 and No 7/2007) stressing the problem\nof overcapacity.
\nAlthough the\nreduction of fishing overcapacity has been a recurrent theme in\nprevious reforms of the CFP, current measures have\nfailed.
\nThe ECA found\nimportant weaknesses in the framework:
\nCourt's\nrecommendations: the ECA makes a\nseries of recommendations to address overcapacity and the\nsustainability of the fishing sector:
\nPURPOSE: presentation by the Commission of the\nconsolidated annual accounts of the European Union for the\nfinancial year 2010, as part of the 2010 discharge\nprocedure.
\nAnalysis of the accounts of the EU Institutions:\nSection III - European Commission.
\nCONTENT: this Commission document sets out the\nconsolidated annual accounts of the European Union for the\nfinancial year 2010 as prepared on the basis of the information\npresented by the institutions, organisations and bodies of the EU,\nin accordance with Article 129 (2) of the Financial Regulation\napplicable to the EU's General Budget, including the European\nCommission.
\n(1) Purpose: the\ndocument helps to bring insight into the EU budget mechanism and\nthe way in which the budget has been managed and spent in\n2010. It recalls that European Union's operational expenditure\ncovers the various headings of the financial framework and takes\ndifferent forms, depending on how the money is paid out and\nmanaged.
\nIn accordance with the Financial Regulation, the\nCommission implements the general budget using the following\nmethods: direct centralised management: direct implementation of\nthe budget by the Commission services; indirect centralised\nmanagement: the Commission confers tasks of implementation of the\nbudget to bodies of EU law or national law, such as the EU agencies\nof public law or with public service missions; decentralised\nmanagement: the Commission delegates certain tasks for\nimplementation of the budget to third countries; shared management:\nunder this method of management budget implementation tasks are\ndelegated to Member States. The majority of the expenditure falls\nunder this mode \"Shared Management\" involving the delegation of\ntasks to Member States, covering such areas as agricultural\nspending and Structural Actions.
\nThe document also presents the different financial\nactors involved in the budget process (accounting officers,\ninternal officers and authorising officers) and recalls their\nrespective roles in the context of the tasks of sound financial\nmanagement.
\nAmongst the other legal elements relating to the\nimplementation of the EU budget presented in this document, the\npaper focuses on the following issues:
\nTo recall, the final control is the discharge of\nthe budget for a given financial year. The discharge represents\nthe political aspect of the external control of budget\nimplementation and is the decision by which the European\nParliament, acting on a Council recommendation, \"releases\" the\nCommission from its responsibility for management of a given budget\nby marking the end of that budget's existence (please refer to the\nfollow-up reports presented in this procedure file).
\nLastly, the document presents a series of tables and\ndetailed technical indicators on (i) the balance sheet; (ii) the\neconomic outturn account; (iii) cashflow tables; (iv) technical\nannexes concerning the financial statements.
\n(2) Balance sheet of financial implementation:\nachievements and difficulties of implementation: in addition to the legal elements of how expenditure\nof the Union is executed, the document highlights the difficulties\nas regards the management and the implementation of certain\nexpenditure of the Union:
\n(a) the issue of pre-financing: Pre-financing is a payment intended to provide the\nbeneficiary with a cash advance, i.e. a float. If the beneficiary\ndoes not incur eligible expenditures, he has the obligation to\nreturn the prefinancing advance to the European Union.
\nAt year-end, outstanding pre-financing amounts are\nvalued at the original amount(s) paid less: amounts returned,\neligible amounts expensed, estimated eligible amounts not yet\ncleared at year-end, and value
\nreductions. Total Pre-financing at the year end\namounted to EUR 49 421 million compared to EUR 48 827\nmillion in 2009. The most significant long-term\npre-financing amounts relate to Structural Actions for the\n2007-2013 programming period. In this\nregard, it was found that although initially these payments had\nbeen made, until 2010 included, as expenditure in the accounting\nsystem of the Commission, all resources were not used. The\nCommission therefore considers that it would be more appropriate to\nconsider them as assets on the balance sheet. It also found a lack\nof information on the intended destination of these amounts (the\nMember States are not required to submit specific reports on these\nfunds). Further details are expected in the future. Other direct\neffects of the increase of pre-financing amounts, appears in\nincreased amounts to be paid by Member States within the budget of\naround EUR 2.6 billion.
\n(b) irregularities and financial\ncorrections: the document highlighted\nthe correction of errors and irregularities discovered, especially\nin the part of the EU budget that is implemented under the shared\nmanagement mode (about 80% of the total budget). Financial\ncorrections are made by the European Commission so as to exclude\nfrom EU funding expenditure that is not in accordance with\napplicable rules and regulations. The total financial corrections\nfor cohesion policy alone amounts to EUR 925 million for\n2010.
\n(c) recoveries: based on\ndata received so far, in terms of EU contribution, Member States\nhave reported a total of some EUR 5.1 billion of cumulative\nfinancial corrections resulting from their national audit work for\nthe 2000-2006 programmes (of which withdrawals total some EUR 4\nbillion and recoveries approximately EUR 1.1 billion). The\non-the-spot audit work undertaken by DG Regional Policy for\nrecoveries related to the 2000-2006 programming period was\ncompleted in 2010 for the six remaining Member States, having\ncovered thus all 25 concerned Member States (there was no reporting\nobligation for Bulgaria and Romania for the 2000-2006 period).\nSignificant weaknesses still existed in respect of the completeness\nof data and the system for recording and reporting irregularities\nfor some 2000-2006 programmes in Italy, Spain, France and the\nNetherlands. To a lesser extent, weaknesses also existed in\nprogrammes in the UK, Slovenia, Finland, Sweden and Latvia. Even if\nimprovements have been identified in all Member States during the\nyears 2007-2010 by the Commission audits, the Commission remains\nprudent at closure and requested all programmes authorities to\nreport on the follow-up (including financial corrections) that was\nmade at national level for all irregularities registered for each\nprogramme. The Commission will not close programmes until it\nassesses this information as being consistent and\ncomplete.
\nThe main amount, EUR 1 775 million, relates to\nshared management and is made up of:
\n(d) RAL (budgetary\ncommitments made, payments still pending: the budgetary RAL\n(\"Reste à Liquider\")) is an amount representing the open\ncommitments for which payments and/or de-commitments have not yet\nbeen made. At 31 December 2010, the RAL amounted to EUR\n194 395 million compared to EUR 177 272 million at\nthe end of 2009.
\n(3) Implementation of appropriations under Section III\nof the budget for the financial year 2010 : the annexes include the\nfollowing tables:
\n(a) Table showing the commitment appropriations by\nheading (including the % of\nimplementation):
\nTotal commitments: EUR 142 744 million\n(96.93%).
\n(b) Table showing the implementation of payments by\nheading:
\nTotal payments: EUR 122 231 million;\n93.64%.
\n(c) budget implementation -\nconclusions: lastly, the document\nprovides details on budget implementation itself (in more political\nterms). The year 2010, the fourth year of the current programming\nperiod, saw programmes reaching their cruising speed and the start\nof the final closure of old programmes. At the end of the year\noutstanding commitments made before 2007 represent some 10% of the\ntotal RAL.
\nFor commitments, the\ninitial budget and hence the political targets set were carried out\nvirtually as planned. The implementation rate, excluding the\nunused reserve of EUR 415 million for European Globalisation\nAdjustment Fund and EUR 28 million of unused provisional\nappropriations (amounts placed in reserve pending the fulfilment of\ncertain conditions, which remain in reserve at the end of the\nbudgetary year) reached 99.4%. Adjustments during the year\nconcerned EUR 80 million for the European Solidarity Fund,\nunforeseeable expenditure by nature, and for administrative\nexpenditure EUR 10 million related to the setting-up of the\nEuropean External Action Service and EUR 10 million for the\nEuropean Parliament following the entry into force of the Lisbon\ntreaty.
\nThe total implementation of EUR 140 554 left EUR 554\nmillion unused. After the carryover\nof EUR 259 million to 2011, the largest item being Energy Projects\nto aid Economic Recovery for EUR 147 million, an amount of EUR 295\nmillion lapsed.
\nThe implementation rate for payments, excluding un-mobilised Emergency Aid Reserve (EUR\n193 million) and provisional appropriations (EUR 48 million), was\n97.4% of the budget.
\nContrary to previous years, there was no reduction in\npayment appropriations via an amending budget at the year-end. The\nmain adjustment was carried out via the global transfer which\nreinforced Regional policy by EUR 1 125 million by reducing\nappropriations for Rural Development. The Commission reinforced\nalso the Cohesion Fund with some EUR 600 million via internal\ntransfers. The unused voted appropriations, excluding reserves,\namounted to EUR 3 243 million and after the carryover of EUR 1 513\nmillion, a total of EUR 1 730 million spread across the\nMulti-annual Financial Framework (\"MFF\") headings\nlapsed.
\nFor more detailed information as regards the budgetary\nimplementation of expenditure of Section III of the budget, please\nrefer to: EU budget 2010 Financial\nReport and the Commission's annual activity\nreports.
\nPURPOSE: presentation by the Commission of the\nconsolidated annual accounts of the European Union for the\nfinancial year 2010, as part of the 2010 discharge\nprocedure.
\nAnalysis of the accounts of the EU Institutions:\nSection III - European Commission.
\nCONTENT: this Commission document sets out the\nconsolidated annual accounts of the European Union for the\nfinancial year 2010 as prepared on the basis of the information\npresented by the institutions, organisations and bodies of the EU,\nin accordance with Article 129 (2) of the Financial Regulation\napplicable to the EU's General Budget, including the European\nCommission.
\n(1) Purpose: the\ndocument helps to bring insight into the EU budget mechanism and\nthe way in which the budget has been managed and spent in\n2010. It recalls that European Union's operational expenditure\ncovers the various headings of the financial framework and takes\ndifferent forms, depending on how the money is paid out and\nmanaged.
\nIn accordance with the Financial Regulation, the\nCommission implements the general budget using the following\nmethods: direct centralised management: direct implementation of\nthe budget by the Commission services; indirect centralised\nmanagement: the Commission confers tasks of implementation of the\nbudget to bodies of EU law or national law, such as the EU agencies\nof public law or with public service missions; decentralised\nmanagement: the Commission delegates certain tasks for\nimplementation of the budget to third countries; shared management:\nunder this method of management budget implementation tasks are\ndelegated to Member States. The majority of the expenditure falls\nunder this mode \"Shared Management\" involving the delegation of\ntasks to Member States, covering such areas as agricultural\nspending and Structural Actions.
\nThe document also presents the different financial\nactors involved in the budget process (accounting officers,\ninternal officers and authorising officers) and recalls their\nrespective roles in the context of the tasks of sound financial\nmanagement.
\nAmongst the other legal elements relating to the\nimplementation of the EU budget presented in this document, the\npaper focuses on the following issues:
\nTo recall, the final control is the discharge of\nthe budget for a given financial year. The discharge represents\nthe political aspect of the external control of budget\nimplementation and is the decision by which the European\nParliament, acting on a Council recommendation, \"releases\" the\nCommission from its responsibility for management of a given budget\nby marking the end of that budget's existence (please refer to the\nfollow-up reports presented in this procedure file).
\nLastly, the document presents a series of tables and\ndetailed technical indicators on (i) the balance sheet; (ii) the\neconomic outturn account; (iii) cashflow tables; (iv) technical\nannexes concerning the financial statements.
\n(2) Balance sheet of financial implementation:\nachievements and difficulties of implementation: in addition to the legal elements of how expenditure\nof the Union is executed, the document highlights the difficulties\nas regards the management and the implementation of certain\nexpenditure of the Union:
\n(a) the issue of pre-financing: Pre-financing is a payment intended to provide the\nbeneficiary with a cash advance, i.e. a float. If the beneficiary\ndoes not incur eligible expenditures, he has the obligation to\nreturn the prefinancing advance to the European Union.
\nAt year-end, outstanding pre-financing amounts are\nvalued at the original amount(s) paid less: amounts returned,\neligible amounts expensed, estimated eligible amounts not yet\ncleared at year-end, and value
\nreductions. Total Pre-financing at the year end\namounted to EUR 49 421 million compared to EUR 48 827\nmillion in 2009. The most significant long-term\npre-financing amounts relate to Structural Actions for the\n2007-2013 programming period. In this\nregard, it was found that although initially these payments had\nbeen made, until 2010 included, as expenditure in the accounting\nsystem of the Commission, all resources were not used. The\nCommission therefore considers that it would be more appropriate to\nconsider them as assets on the balance sheet. It also found a lack\nof information on the intended destination of these amounts (the\nMember States are not required to submit specific reports on these\nfunds). Further details are expected in the future. Other direct\neffects of the increase of pre-financing amounts, appears in\nincreased amounts to be paid by Member States within the budget of\naround EUR 2.6 billion.
\n(b) irregularities and financial\ncorrections: the document highlighted\nthe correction of errors and irregularities discovered, especially\nin the part of the EU budget that is implemented under the shared\nmanagement mode (about 80% of the total budget). Financial\ncorrections are made by the European Commission so as to exclude\nfrom EU funding expenditure that is not in accordance with\napplicable rules and regulations. The total financial corrections\nfor cohesion policy alone amounts to EUR 925 million for\n2010.
\n(c) recoveries: based on\ndata received so far, in terms of EU contribution, Member States\nhave reported a total of some EUR 5.1 billion of cumulative\nfinancial corrections resulting from their national audit work for\nthe 2000-2006 programmes (of which withdrawals total some EUR 4\nbillion and recoveries approximately EUR 1.1 billion). The\non-the-spot audit work undertaken by DG Regional Policy for\nrecoveries related to the 2000-2006 programming period was\ncompleted in 2010 for the six remaining Member States, having\ncovered thus all 25 concerned Member States (there was no reporting\nobligation for Bulgaria and Romania for the 2000-2006 period).\nSignificant weaknesses still existed in respect of the completeness\nof data and the system for recording and reporting irregularities\nfor some 2000-2006 programmes in Italy, Spain, France and the\nNetherlands. To a lesser extent, weaknesses also existed in\nprogrammes in the UK, Slovenia, Finland, Sweden and Latvia. Even if\nimprovements have been identified in all Member States during the\nyears 2007-2010 by the Commission audits, the Commission remains\nprudent at closure and requested all programmes authorities to\nreport on the follow-up (including financial corrections) that was\nmade at national level for all irregularities registered for each\nprogramme. The Commission will not close programmes until it\nassesses this information as being consistent and\ncomplete.
\nThe main amount, EUR 1 775 million, relates to\nshared management and is made up of:
\n(d) RAL (budgetary\ncommitments made, payments still pending: the budgetary RAL\n(\"Reste à Liquider\")) is an amount representing the open\ncommitments for which payments and/or de-commitments have not yet\nbeen made. At 31 December 2010, the RAL amounted to EUR\n194 395 million compared to EUR 177 272 million at\nthe end of 2009.
\n(3) Implementation of appropriations under Section III\nof the budget for the financial year 2010 : the annexes include the\nfollowing tables:
\n(a) Table showing the commitment appropriations by\nheading (including the % of\nimplementation):
\nTotal commitments: EUR 142 744 million\n(96.93%).
\n(b) Table showing the implementation of payments by\nheading:
\nTotal payments: EUR 122 231 million;\n93.64%.
\n(c) budget implementation -\nconclusions: lastly, the document\nprovides details on budget implementation itself (in more political\nterms). The year 2010, the fourth year of the current programming\nperiod, saw programmes reaching their cruising speed and the start\nof the final closure of old programmes. At the end of the year\noutstanding commitments made before 2007 represent some 10% of the\ntotal RAL.
\nFor commitments, the\ninitial budget and hence the political targets set were carried out\nvirtually as planned. The implementation rate, excluding the\nunused reserve of EUR 415 million for European Globalisation\nAdjustment Fund and EUR 28 million of unused provisional\nappropriations (amounts placed in reserve pending the fulfilment of\ncertain conditions, which remain in reserve at the end of the\nbudgetary year) reached 99.4%. Adjustments during the year\nconcerned EUR 80 million for the European Solidarity Fund,\nunforeseeable expenditure by nature, and for administrative\nexpenditure EUR 10 million related to the setting-up of the\nEuropean External Action Service and EUR 10 million for the\nEuropean Parliament following the entry into force of the Lisbon\ntreaty.
\nThe total implementation of EUR 140 554 left EUR 554\nmillion unused. After the carryover\nof EUR 259 million to 2011, the largest item being Energy Projects\nto aid Economic Recovery for EUR 147 million, an amount of EUR 295\nmillion lapsed.
\nThe implementation rate for payments, excluding un-mobilised Emergency Aid Reserve (EUR\n193 million) and provisional appropriations (EUR 48 million), was\n97.4% of the budget.
\nContrary to previous years, there was no reduction in\npayment appropriations via an amending budget at the year-end. The\nmain adjustment was carried out via the global transfer which\nreinforced Regional policy by EUR 1 125 million by reducing\nappropriations for Rural Development. The Commission reinforced\nalso the Cohesion Fund with some EUR 600 million via internal\ntransfers. The unused voted appropriations, excluding reserves,\namounted to EUR 3 243 million and after the carryover of EUR 1 513\nmillion, a total of EUR 1 730 million spread across the\nMulti-annual Financial Framework (\"MFF\") headings\nlapsed.
\nFor more detailed information as regards the budgetary\nimplementation of expenditure of Section III of the budget, please\nrefer to: EU budget 2010 Financial\nReport and the Commission's annual activity\nreports.
\nPURPOSE: presentation of the Court of Auditors’\nreport on the implementation of the budget in 2010 (Section III -\nCommission).
\nCONTENT: the Court of auditors presents its 34th\nAnnual Report on the implementation of the EU budget for the year\n2010.
\nThe report contains two parts:
\n\n1. \nthe first part contains a summary of the results\nof the Court’s audit on the reliability of accounts and on the\nregularity of transactions;
\n\n2. \nthe second part provides detailed audit findings\nof EU revenue and expenditure (by groups of policy areas which\ncorrespond broadly to the headings used in the 2007-2013 Financial\nFramework) and an analysis of the expenditure of the other EU\ninstitutions and organs.
\nThe central part of the annual report is the\nCourt’s statement of assurance (the ‘DAS’) on the\nreliability of the annual accounts of the EU and on the legality\nand regularity of transactions.
\nDAS: payments, basis\nfor the Court’s adverse opinion: the Court considers that\noverall the supervisory and control systems are partially\neffective in ensuring the legality and regularity of payments\nunderlying the accounts. On the other hand, taken together, the\nCourt’s best estimate of the rate of error for overall\nspending in 2010 is 3.7%.
\nSpecific observation: pre-financing: a significant component of payments made by the\nCommission provide funding in advance for costs which will be\nincurred by outside bodies at a later date. There has been a\nsubstantial increase of pre-financing in the EU budget during the\nlast financial framework period. The Commission corrected material\nproblems concerning the completeness of pre-financing through\ncut-off bookings and adjustments. Nonetheless, the lack of\ncurrent information on the EU funds actually used by the Member\nStates reduces significantly the usefulness for management of the\naccounting information, notably for the Commission in its\nresponsibilities for implementing the budget. The increased use of\npre-financing makes it urgent for the Commission to revisit the\nrelevant accounting rule in order to provide adequate guidance on\nthe recognition and clearing of pre-financing. This should be\naccompanied by improved supervision.
\nThe legality and regularity of transactions underlying\nthe accounts: in the Court’s\nopinion, revenue underlying the accounts for the year ended 31\nDecember 2010 is legal and regular in all material respects. On the\nother hand, the Court concludes that overall the supervisory and\ncontrol systems are only partially effective in ensuring the\nlegality and regularity of payments underlying the\naccounts.
\nThe following policy areas: (i) agriculture and\nnatural resources (ii) cohesion, energy and transport are\nmaterially affected by error. The Court’s estimate for\nthe most likely error rate for payments underlying the accounts is\n3.7%. The rate of error is:
\n\n· \n7.7% for policy group ‘cohesion, energy and\ntransport’
\n\n· \n2.3% for the policy group ‘agriculture and\nnatural resources.’
\nThe Court’s estimate of the most likely error\nconcerning the payments for the other policy groups remained\nrelatively stable. Direct payments to farmers covered by the IACS\n(Integrated Administration and Control System) were free from\nmaterial error.
\nGenerally, the Court considers that during the\nplanning of EU expenditure programmes, the Commission and the\nMember States should pay greater attention to defining SMART\nobjectives - specific, measurable, achievable, relevant and timed -\nas well as to identifying and mitigating the risks which may occur\nduring implementation.
\nAnalysis of budgetary implementation by policy group\nand Court’s recommendations:
\n\nDISCHARGE 2010 – COMMISSION: ANNUAL REPORT\nON INTERNAL AUDITS
\nPURPOSE: this report informs the Discharge\nAuthority about the work carried out by the Commission's Internal\nAudit Service (IAS)in 2010. It is based on IAS audit and consulting\nreports completed in 2010 relating to Commission departments and\nexecutive agencies. It does not cover the results of audit work in\nother agencies or bodies audited by the IAS, for which separate\nannual reports are drawn up.
\nThe\nCommission’s replies to the remarks and findings of the\ninternal auditor are contained in the summary report of the annual\nactivity reports of the Directors-General (that are covered by the\nsummary of the document SEC(2011)1189 of 7 November 2011).
\nCONTENT: the work of the IAS contributes to a\nculture of efficiency and effectiveness. Its audit work helps the\nCommission to identify synergies as well as risks, and consequently\nstrengthens the Commission's management.
\nImplementation of the IAS’s\ncoordinated audit plan: the Commission notes the positive\nco-operation between the IAS and the audited DGs and with their\nInternal Audit Capabilities. Implementation of the action plans\ndrawn up this year and in previous years in response to audit\nrecommendations contributes to steady improvement of the\nCommission's internal control framework.
\nThe report also\nunderlines that the Strategic Audit Plan for 2008-2010 was\nregularly updated to take account of specific needs (the first\noverall opinion, the results of management’s annual risk\nassessment and other changes in the external and internal\nenvironments). In 2010, the IAS completed 88% (compared with 87%\nin 2009) of its work programme and 85 reports were issued (30\naudits, 49 follow-ups, 1 consultancy, 4 management letters and 1\nreport on the overall opinion). In 2010, the acceptance rate of\ncritical and very important audit recommendations by the auditees\nwas 100% (98.8% in 2009).
\nMain IAS\nfindings for 2010: as far as IAS findings for 2010 are\nconcerned, the report highlights the two main points that\nfollow:
\n1)\nControl procedures: the highlights the need to obtain\nadequate information from the Heads of Delegation in order to\nsubstantiate the assurance provided annually by the Authorising\nOfficer by Delegation (AOD) to assess the adequacy and\neffectiveness of DG AIDCO’s control strategy; it also\nindicates a need for DG EAC to avoid unnecessary overlaps of\ncontrols conducted by its services and by National Agencies.
\nDG ELARG should\ncomplement its initiative requiring Heads of Delegation to submit\nan Annual Assurance Strategy by developing checklists applicable to\nall delegations.
\nThe IAS recommended\nto DG REGIO and DG EMPL improvements deemed necessary in order to\nobtain adequate assurance for multi-annual programmes.
\nAt the\nlevel of control strategies the Commission has adopted an\nimportant number of measures to allow its services to set up\nadequate audit and control systems. Action plans have been drawn up\nand implemented in the domains where the risks are highest,\nallowing for better planning and monitoring of control activities,\neliminating administrative burdens and overlaps and improving the\neffectiveness of the Commission's internal control systems.
\nControls for\nchecking compliance with legal time limits for payment were\nless effective in some DGs where. the shorter time limits requested\nby the Commission were not always applied. Management needs to\nimprove its monitoring over the proper implementation of control\nprocedures for the processing of payments. The Commission has taken\nseveral measures to improve both payment performance and associated\ncontrol mechanisms, namely at the levels of the IT system (ABAC),\nof the validation of local IT systems and of the guidelines and by\nmeans of regular and more effective monitoring.
\nThe IAS’s work\nhas raised issues for consideration with the aim of improving the\nefficiency and effectiveness of IT start-up projects in order to\nfurther enable the Commission to achieve its goals in a\ncost-effective, efficient and secure manner.
\nFollowing the\nrecommendations of the Task Force on IT, the Commission has\nreformed its IT governance: the ABM + IT Steering Committee\nwas set up in 2010 followed by the Information Systems Project\nManagement Board and High Level Committee on IT in 2011, which\nrepresent a major improvement in the way IT strategy is designed\nand implemented.
\nThe IAS’s\naudit work on recently split-up DGs has identified lessons\nwhich should be learned ahead of any future divisions of DGs in\norder to soften the impact of change on DGs, central and horizontal\nservices and staff. The Commission considers it is too early to\ndraw definitive conclusions on the benefits/drawbacks of shared\ndirectorates and it will take stock, later on, when the services\nconcerned have gained more experience with the new organisational\nstructure.
\nFraud: in\nthis area, the IAS’s efforts have highlighted, in particular\nthe lack of clarity in organisational accountability for fraud\nprevention and detection and the need for an updated anti-fraud\nstrategy at Commission level. A new anti-fraud strategy,\nprepared by OLAF in cooperation with the central services and\noperational DGs, has been adopted by the Commission and fully\naddresses the issues raised by the IAS.
\n\nDISCHARGE 2010 – COMMISSION: ANNUAL REPORT\nON INTERNAL AUDITS
\nThis Commission staff working paper accompanies the\nAnnual Report to the Discharge Authority on internal audits carried\nout in 2010, presented in parallel to the following document\n(please refer to COM(2011)0643).
\nIt consists of a technical annex containing a\nsynthesis of the audit carried out by the Commission’s\nInternal Audit Service (IAS) in 2010.
\nThe document proposes in particular a series of\nanalytic tables on the audits of the Directorates-General (DG) of\nthe Commission as well as recommendations made to each of them to\nimprove governance issues.
\n\nFOLLOW-UP TO THE 2009 COMMISSION DISCHARGE:\nFOLLOW-UP ON THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AND COUNCIL\nRECOMMENDATIONS
\nPreliminary comment:\nthis document is the Commission's report to the European Parliament\n(EP) and the Council on the follow-up to the discharge for the 2009\nfinancial year, pursuant to Article 319(3) of the Treaty on the\nFunctioning of the European Union. The Commission’s replies to\nthe key requests from the EP and the Council are available in two\nCommission Staff Working Documents (SEC(2011)1350 and SEC(2011)1351\nattached to this procedure file).
\nThis report summarise the Commission’s responses\nto the main requests of the European Parliament and the Council (a\ntotal of 298).
\nCONTENT: the report indicates that in the EP discharge\nresolutions the Commission has identified a total of 213\nrequests addressed to it by the European Parliament. For\n89 of these, the Commission agrees to take the action requested by\nParliament. The Commission considers that for 112 requests the\nrequired action has already been taken or is ongoing, though in\nsome cases the results of the actions will need to be assessed.\nLastly, for reasons related to the existing legal framework or its\ninstitutional prerogatives, the Commission cannot accept 12\nrequests.
\nThe Commission has also identified 85 requests\naddressed to it by the Council in its recommendation to the\nParliament. For 43 of these the Commission agrees to take the\naction requested by the Council. The Commission considers that for\n42 requests the required action has already been taken or is\nongoing, though in some cases the results of the actions will need\nto be assessed. There are no requests that the Commission cannot\naccept for reasons related to the existing legal framework or\nits institutional prerogatives.
\nThe Commission’s replies to the requests of the\nEP and Council may be summarised as follows:
\n1) Priority actions: in\nits resolution, the Parliament specifically highlighted seven\npriority actions of institutional and organisational nature.. These\nrelate to the following points:
\n2) Sectorial issues: the\nCommission states that it has put in place an accounting system\nthat has for the last 3 years resulted in an unqualified opinion on\nthe reliability of the accounts. Through the establishment of an\nex-ante approval procedure of the management and control\nsystems and the setting up of programme audit authorities, the\nCommission is now in a position to assure the legality and\nregularity of operations audited independently.
\nAs far as a tolerable risk of error is\nconcerned, this concept is meant as a managerial tool to measure\neffectiveness of controls. The Commission does however pursue a\nzero-tolerance approach to all cases of mismanagement and\nfraud. It also indicates that that it is fulfilling the\nrequirements of transparency. The Commission is of the opinion that\nthe Synthesis Report is not the right instrument to report on the\nmonitoring of the follow-up by Member States of their obligations\nto publish data on beneficiaries in a timely manner. Such follow-up\nwould best be annexed to the DGs’ AARs.
\nThe Commission then\naddresses the following sectorial issues:
\n\nFOLLOW-UP TO THE COMMISSION’S 2009\nDISCHARGE : REPLIES TO REQUESTS FROM THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT\nAND THE COUNCIL
\nThis Commission staff working paper seeks to\ncomplement the Commission’s report on the follow-up to the\nEuropean Parliament and Council’s recommendations on the 2009\ndischarge. It presents in detail the 85 specific requests made by\nthe Council in its remarks accompanying its recommendations\nregarding the 2009 discharges.
\nAn outline of these replies is provided in the summary\nof the document COM (2011)0736 (please refer to the summary of the\ndocument in question).
\nThis Commission working document which is of a\ntechnical nature, only seeks to detail the responses already\ncovered in the main COM document.
\n\nFOLLOW-UP TO THE COMMISSION’S 2009\nDISCHARGE : REPLIES TO REQUESTS FROM THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT\nAND THE COUNCIL
\nThis Commission staff working paper seeks to\ncomplement the Commission’s report on the follow-up to the\nEuropean Parliament and Council’s recommendations on the 2009\ndischarge. It includes all of the Commission’s replies to each\nof the 213 recommendations formulated by Parliament in its\nresolution of 10 May 2011, in the form of an annex to the general\nreport.
\nAn outline of these replies is provided in the summary\nof the document COM (2011)0736 (please refer to the summary of the\ndocument in question).
\nThis Commission working document which is of a\ntechnical nature, only seeks to detail the responses already\ncovered in the main COM document.
\nIn accordance with Article 319 of the Treaty on the\nFunctioning of the European Union, the Council approved a\nrecommendation on the discharge to be given to the Commission in\nrespect of the implementation of the general budget of the European\nUnion for the financial year 2010.
\nBreakdown of the expenditure:
\nCancelled payment appropriations for the financial\nyear amounted to EUR 740 844 913.80.
\nEUR 1 018 014 697.57 (58 %) of the EUR 1 758 859\n611.37 in appropriations for payments carried over have been\nused.
\nBased on the observations contained in the report by\nthe Court of Auditors, the Council calls on the European Parliament\nto grant discharge to the Commission in respect of the\nimplementation of the 2010 budget. However, the Council issues a\nseries of comments that need to be fully taken on board when\ngranting discharge.
\nStatement of assurance (DAS): the Council notes that for the fourth consecutive\nyear, the annual accounts of the EU gave a fair presentation of the\nfinancial position of the Union and the results of its operations\nand cash flows. Nevertheless, it draws attention to the\nimplications of the substantial increase in pre-financing\npayments, in particular to create or to contribute to financial\nengineering instruments, and the need to record their establishment\nand clearance properly in the accounts. It recalls the importance\nof having comprehensive, consistent and timely information on the\nactual use of pre-financed amounts available. It asks the\nCommission to continue to improve its supervision of the use of\npre-financed amounts, to revisit the relevant accounting rules, and\nto systematically collect the necessary data from Member States in\na timely manner.
\nThe Council regrets that, in the overall assessment\nmade by the Court of Auditors, payments from the budget\ncontinued to be materially affected by error and that\nsupervisory and control systems for payments audited by the Court\nremained only partially effective in ensuring the legality and\nregularity of transactions. However, it welcomes the Court of\nAuditors' Statement of Assurance (DAS) on the implementation of the\nbudget for the financial year 2010 which shows evidence of a\ngenerally stable quality in the implementation of the\nbudget compared to the financial year 2009, and of a most\nlikely error rate level considerably lower than found in years\nprior to 2009. It deduces from the Court's findings that there has\nbeen an improvement in the evolution of financial management by the\nCommission and Member States over recent years. It nevertheless\nreaffirms its wish to see year-on-year improvements creating the\nbasis for an unqualified audit opinion from the\nCourt.
\nThe Council urges the Commission to i) fully assume\nits responsibilities in the implementation of the budget, and to\ncarefully exercise its supervisory role within the existing legal\nprovisions in order to limit the risks to the legality and\nregularity of transactions, notably through the interruption and\nsuspension of payments whenever significant deficiencies in the\nfunctioning of management and control systems are identified; ii)\ncorrect identified errors without delay through the recovery of\namounts unduly paid and through financial corrections ; and\niii) report about the progress made in the implementation of\ncorrective action.
\nThe Council also encourages the Commission to\nthoroughly evaluate the functioning of existing regulations,\nto identify weaknesses and possibilities for improvement, and to\npropose the necessary modifications in the context of the ongoing\nrevision of the Financial Regulation. The Council recalls the\nimportance of simplifying policy objectives, thus enabling a\nsubsequent simplification of programme structures and management\nsystems at the level of beneficiaries. In this regard, Council\nunderlines the need to modernise the rules relating to public\nprocurement.
\nThe Council takes note of the considerable increase in\nthe volume of outstanding budgetary commitments and calls on\nthe Commission to settle or decommit them as soon as\npossible.
\nIt also makes the following\nremarks:
\nRevenue: the Council\nnotes with satisfaction the Court's conclusions that EU revenue was\nfree from material error and that overall the related supervisory\nand control systems were assessed as effective in ensuring the\nregularity of transactions. It encourages the Commission to\ncontinue to improve its management in order to reduce the risk of\nbudget losses from waivers of amounts to be recovered. It\nencourages the Commission to further improve the management of\nreservations, in order to pursue lifting VAT\nreservations.
\nThe Council then returns to\neach of the budget areas and makes the following\ncomments:
\nThis document sets out Member States' replies to the\nCourt of Auditors' Annual Report for the year 2010.
\nIn accordance with the Treaty, the Court of Auditors,\nin its annual report, issues a Statement of Assurance (DAS). This\nis submitted to the European Parliament and the Council and is the\nCourt's formal opinion on the reliability of the accounts and on\nthe legality and regularity of the underlying\ntransactions.
\nThe Financial Regulation applicable to the General\nBudget of the European Union states in Article 143(6) that as soon\nas the Court of Auditors has transmitted the Annual Report, the\nCommission shall inform the Member States concerned immediately of\nthe details of that report which relate to management of the funds\nfor which they are responsible, under the rules applicable. Member\nStates should reply to the Commission within sixty days and the\nCommission transmits a summary of the replies to the Court of\nAuditors, the European Parliament and the Council before 28\nFebruary of the following year.
\nFollowing publication on 10 November 2011 of the\nCourt's Annual Report for the budgetary year 2010, the Commission\nduly informed Member States of details of the report. This\ninformation was presented in the form of a letter and three\nquestionnaires which Member States were required to\ncomplete:
\n\n· \nAnnex I was a questionnaire on the paragraphs in\nthe report referring to individual Member States;
\n\n· \nAnnex II was a questionnaire on the audit\nfindings which refer to each individual Member State and
\n\n· \nAnnex III was a questionnaire on general\nfindings related to the policies and programmes under shared\nmanagement.
\nThis report is an analysis of the Member States'\nreplies and is accompanied by a Staff Working Document which\ncomprises Member States' replies to Annex I and Annex III (see SWD(2012)0024).
\nMain conclusions: the\nresults of the Court's 2010 Annual Report are generally encouraging\nsince they indicate that the overall most likely error rate for\nall EU spending is below 4%. These results are particularly\npositive for policies directly managed by the Commission. Policy\nareas such as research and other internal policies, external aid,\ndevelopment and enlargement as well as administrative and other\nexpenditure indicate continuous improvement.
\nIn policy area “agriculture and natural\nresources”, the situation remained relatively stable with\na level of error close to the materiality threshold of\n2%.
\nIn the policy area “cohesion, energy and\ntransport”, it is important to emphasise that the error\nrate was still below the rates for DAS years 2006 - 2008.\nThis is an indication that the management and control systems in\nthe policy area, although still partially effective, are working\nmore efficiently for the current programming period, as compared to\nthe previous period.
\nMember States replies to the report indicate that\nthere is a continuing trend towards improvement in the management\nof EU funds. They outlined several\ninitiatives taken and also stated their commitment to even further\nimprovements. Simplification and training at all levels remain a\ntop priority. In addition, some Member States provided some\ncomplementary suggestions with regard to ensuring efficient\nmanagement of EU funds and a more transparent discharge\nprocedure.
\nThe Council was informed by the Danish presidency of\nissues discussed when it presented the Council's recommendation\non discharge of the EU's general budget for 2010 to\nthe European Parliament's committee on budgetary\ncontrol.
\nThe recommendation was adopted by the Council on 21\nFebruary 2012. (Please see the summary of the\nrecommendation.)
\nThe Committee on Budgetary Control adopted the report\nby Christofer FJELLNER (EPP, SE) in which it recommends the\nEuropean Parliament to grant the Commission discharge in respect of\nthe implementation of the general budget of the European Union for\nthe financial year 2010 as well as to the Directors of the\nEducation, Audiovisual and Culture Executive Agency, the Executive\nAgency for Competitiveness and Innovation, the Executive Agency for\nHealth and Consumers, the European Research Council Executive\nAgency, the Trans-European Transport Network Executive Agency on\nthe implementation of their respective budgets for the financial\nyear 2010.
\nThe Commission also recommends that the European\nParliament gives closure to the accounts of the general budget of\nthe European Union for 2010.
\n1. The Court of Auditors' Statement of\nAssurance:
\nII. Horiziontal issues:
\nFinancial Engineering Instruments\n(FEIs): Members recall that the\nCommission promotes an increased use of FEIs for the next\nmultiannual financial framework despite the fact that the\nCommission itself considers FEIs to be of high risk. They\nunderstand that FEIs complement rather than replace existing grant\nfunding and have the potential benefit of being able to be used\nmore than once. They deplore the absence of formal reporting\nrequirements and note that FEIs with a total commitment of\napproximately EUR 8.1 billion have been created and have received\npayments of approximately EUR 5.2 billion from 2007-2013\noperational programmes. Members regret the lack of transparency\nwhich characterises the implementation of these instruments and the\nuncertainty as regards the legal basis. Members invite the\nCommission to consider it a priority action to closely monitor the\nuse of FEIs inter alia by:
\nResponsibility of the Commission and its management\nrepresentations: Members\nstress once again that the Commission\ntherefore has the primary responsibility in the management of the Union\nfunds concerned and that, as a\nconsequence, the Commission has the obligation to take measures\nthat are aimed at ensuring legality and regularity as well as sound\nfinancial management. For Members, it is not possible for the\nCommission to transfer its financial responsibility to the Member\nStates, even in cases where a managerial weakness or irregularity\nhas been identified at the level of a Member State.
\nThey note the close link between the Commission's\nultimate responsibility for implementing the budget and the\nsignificance of the discharge procedure and stress that the\nCommission's final responsibility regarding the implementation of\nthe budget also covers weaknesses in Member States' management and\ncontrol systems. Financial responsibility is and shall remain\nindivisible.
\nMembers underline that the College and the\nCommissioners thereby take the final responsibility for the\nreliability and completeness. They consider that the Commission\nhas made great progress as regards adequate corporate governance\nwithin the Commission. Further, they invite the Commission to\nconsider it a priority\naction to improve and strengthen\nthe accountability chain,\ninter alia by:
\nResponsibility of Member States: Members recall that the Commission implements the\nUnion budget on its own responsibility but also in cooperation with\nMember States. They underline that the two policy areas prone to\nthe highest error rates (‘Cohesion, transport and energy’\nand ‘Agriculture and natural resources’) are implemented\nunder shared management, and deplore the fact that the estimated\nmost likely error rates amount to 7.7 % and 2.3 %,\nrespectively.) They welcome the fact that for the first time it is\npossible to identify the errors and their origin: for ERDF and\nCohesion Fund, three Member States (Spain, Italy and the UK) have\ncontributed 59 % to the cumulative quantifiable errors identified\nduring this period and for the ESF four Member States (Spain,\nPortugal, the UK and Germany) have contributed 68 % to the\ncumulative quantifiable errors. The committee recalls its\nrepeated invitations to the Commission to present a proposal for\nthe introduction of mandatory national management declarations\n(NMDs) issued, made public and duly audited by the responsible\naudit authority, as part of the Commission's final and overall\nresponsibility for the implementation of the Union budget. It notes\nthat NMDs should contain full information about the use of Union\nfunds.
\nIt proposes that the substance of national\ndeclarations signed at directorate-general level should comply with\ninternational auditing standards and that those declarations should\nbe used by the Court of Auditors in its audit work and based on,\namong other things, the declarations by authorities to which\nmanagement power is delegated. Members point to the existence of\nsignificant differences in Member States' administrative\nperformance in the field of revenue and expenditure in shared\nmanagement, especially related to detecting irregularities, fraud\nand errors and financial follow-up in both the customs field\nand spending of Union funds. They note that the Commission so far\nmonitors administrative performance in a reactive way and on case\nlevel and thus does not perform sufficient trend analysis to\nidentify fields of risk. They call on the Commission to apply the\nmethod of trend analysis to identify financial risks and to take\nmeasures to improve Member States' administrative\nperformance.
\nThe committee notes with great concern the cases of\nBulgaria and Romania where there are serious cases of\nalleged fraud and high levels of corruption. It calls on the\nCommission to increase pressure on the Romanian government to\nimplement the Commission’s recommendations and to ensure that\nthe Romanian government’s efforts to develop a consistent\njurisprudence in public procurement trials are\nincreased.
\nPre-financings: noting\nthat pre-financings are considered necessary in order for\nbeneficiaries to start the agreed action, Members are nevertheless\nconcerned about the influence pre-financings have had mainly in the\npolicy areas ‘External aid, Development and Enlargement’\nand ‘Research and Internal Policies’. They believe that\nby paying high volumes of pre-financings, the Commission takes\non an increased financial risk, for example in cases of\ninsolvency of beneficiaries, as well as an increased risk to\nlegality and regularity as acceptance of the cost declared by\nbeneficiaries is postponed to a later date. Since it is more\nefficient to prevent irregularities than to correct undue payment\nex-post through recoveries. Members invite the Commission to make\nit a priority action to reconsider the increased use\nof pre-financing as well as control and audit mechanisms by\nadapting the level of pre-financings in the various programmes to a\nlevel that will ensure the necessary float for the beneficiary to\nstart the project, while also safeguarding the financial interest\nof the Union and informing Parliament accordingly.
\nOutstanding budgetary commitments (RAL):\nMembers recall that outstanding budgetary\ncommitments are commitment appropriations made, but not used (i.e.\npaid) and that they derive mainly from multi-annual programmes\n(e.g. Cohesion) where commitments are made in the earlier years of\nthe programming period while the corresponding payments are made\ngradually during the whole programming period. A high level of\noutstanding commitments might indicate difficulties experienced by\nMember States in absorbing the amounts allocated. They note that in\n2010, those outstanding commitments increased by nearly 10 % to\napproximately EUR 194 billion. There is a risk that the\ncommitted funds will have to be spent quicker than usual, thereby\nincreasing the risk of error.
\nMembers invite the Commission to provide information\non the size of outstanding commitments per Member State as well as\non its cooperation with the Member States to identify and address\nrisk areas in relation to absorption and regularity.
\nBudgetary contribution to decentralised agencies and\njoint undertakings: Members note that\nthe Union contribution for the financial year 2010 amounted to over\nEUR 620 million to the decentralised Agencies and to over EUR\n500 million for the Joint Undertakings. As these sums are quite\nconsiderable, they expect the Commission, in such time of financial\ncrisis, to avoid increases in the Agencies' budgets and to even\nconsider reducing the Union contribution to their budgets based\non an assessment of its priorities. They also call on the\nCommission to provide Parliament with a detailed overview of the\ncriteria and verification mechanisms applied to avoid conflicts of\ninterest and 'revolving door' cases for Agencies/Joint\nUndertakings.
\nUnion budget and the financial and budgetary\ncrisis: in view of the continuing\nfinancial and budgetary crisis in Member States and the\ndifficulties faced by Greece, Hungary, Ireland, Latvia, Portugal\nand Romania, some of these countries are receiving assistance in\nthe form of balance of payments (BOP) facility loans (loans\ndisbursed as at 31 December 2010 amounting to approximately EUR 12\nbillion). Members are concerned about the fact that the Court of\nAuditors did not pay sufficient attention to these new challenges\nin the Union in its annual report on 2010. They recall that there\nis no guarantee fund established to protect the budget from calls\non those guarantees and therefore invite the Commission to evaluate\nthe potential need to set up a guarantee fund to cover for\npotential losses similarly to the Guarantee Fund for External\nActions with the aim to protect the Union budget. They are of the\nopinion that the more severe the financial situation in certain\nMember States becomes, the more difficult it will be for those\nMember States to contribute to the Union budget. They believe\nthat this puts at risk the revenue of the Union budget stemming\nfrom 'Member States in difficulties'. They criticise the fact that\nthe Council used Article 122 of the TFEU in 2010 for setting up the\nEuropean Stability Facility (EFSF) because that Article is only\napplicable for natural disasters and not for economic catastrophes;\nis concerned that the EFSF neither contains an element of\ndemocratic control by Parliament nor gives the Court of\nAuditors any audit rights. They reiterate their invitation to the\nCouncil and Member States to ensure in the by-laws of the ESM\nappropriate arrangements for public external audit of legality,\nregularity as well as performance in line with internationally\naccepted auditing standards, to ensure the reliability of data and\nstatistics, to clarify the responsibility and reporting\narrangements of all actors whose liabilities will be involved in\nthe establishment of the mechanism and to urge the Commission to\nreport to Parliament and the Council twice a year on the risk that\nis incurred on the Union's budget by its guarantee to the\nEFSM.
\nTransparency: Members\nreiterate the vital role transparency plays in ensuring\naccountability for the use of public funds and recalls that it is\none of the main instruments in achieving legal and regular\nexpenditure. They also reiterate their call for all grant\npayments from Union funds to be recorded in a user-friendly online\ndatabase paying due regard to data protection law. They believe\nthat the payment of Union funds should be explicitly conditional on\nthe acceptance by the beneficiaries that the basic details be a\nmatter of public record. They note that in the policy area\nCohesion full transparency of beneficiaries of ERDF and Cohesion\nFund is not ensured. Improvements in this regard are therefore\nexpected in the context of the next financial framework.
\nStatement of Assurance methodology: Members consider that the Commission, the Court of\nAuditors, the Parliament and other stakeholders should focus their\nattention and make recommendations concerning those areas in which\nthe management needs to improve, in particular the areas of\nCohesion and agriculture. They stress once again the need to\nclosely examine pre-financings which they believe are exposed to a\nlower level of risk to legality and regularity than interim or\nfinal payments. They also note that the Court of Auditors\napplies a common methodology to quantify public procurement errors\nin the two policy areas Agriculture and natural resources, on the\none hand, and Cohesion, Energy and Transport, on the other. They\ncall on the Commission and the Court of Auditors to harmonise the\ntreatment of public procurement errors in these two policy areas\nurgently and to report back to the Parliament's competent committee\non the progress made by the end of 2012.
\nIII. Specific issues:
\nPerformance: Getting results from the Union\nbudget: Members welcome the new\nChapter in the Annual Report including the Court of Auditors'\nobservations on the Commission's se-assessment of performance in\nits AARs. They take the view that those important findings\nillustrate that Parliament cannot fully rely on the Commission's\nreporting on performance. They invite the Court of Auditors to\nconsider whether it would be possible to include the new insight on\nperformance on the different policy groups in the related chapters\nof the Annual Report. The Commission is invited to improve its\nreporting on performance. Members reiterate the call for the\nCommission to review the briefing and training given to staff\nregarding 'Title II: Rights and Obligations of officials' of the\nStaff Regulations so as to ensure that all staff are fully\nconversant with its terms.
\nMembers also focus on each of its policies\nindividually. The following is noted:
\n- Cohesion, energy and transport – adverse\nconclusion: Members are concerned about the increase of the error rate to 7.7%\nin the policy area 'Cohesion, energy and transport' and call on the\nCourt of Auditors to present error rates for the European Regional\nDevelopment Fund, the Cohesion Fund, the European Social Fund,\nenergy and transport separately and not on an aggregate basis. They\ndeplore the fact that, year after year, non-respect of public\nprocurement rules accounts for a large proportion of the errors.\nThey call on the Commission to pursue the ongoing reform of public\nprocurement taking due account of these worrying results and to\nfollow up on infringements rigorously.
\nOther issues concern:
\nThe Commission is invited to consider it a priority\naction to support Parliament in its efforts in the ordinary\nlegislative procedure concerning the proposal for a regulation\nlaying down common provisions on the structural\ninstruments to create an effective sanctioning\nmechanisms so that the Commission can fully assume its final and\noverall responsibility for the implementation of the budget. This\nshould, inter alia, include the following elements: (i) making net\nreductions the rule for financial corrections imposed by the\nCommission and abolishing the possibility to declare retrospective\nprojects; (ii) obliging Member States to recover ineligible\nexpenditure from final beneficiaries as far as possible so that\nfinal beneficiaries bear the consequences of ineligible expenditure\nand not the national taxpayer; (iii) allowing the Commission to\ngive Member States incentives not only to comply with the rules;\n(iv) ensuring that a full range of sanctions (interruptions,\nsuspensions, financial corrections, and penalties) are available\nfor all funds.
\n- Agriculture and natural resources – qualified\nconclusion: Members recall that IACS\nmust ensure that correct and traceable payments are made to farmers\nwhich doesn’t seem to be the case. They encourage the\nCommission to further reduce the duration of the conformity\nclearance procedure while ensuring that Member States' right of\ndefence is preserved. They reiterate the belief that agricultural\nfunds unduly paid have to be recovered from the final beneficiaries\nas much as possible to avoid the taxpayer being hit twice. These\nsystems should be examined.
\n- External aid, development and enlargement –\nqualified conclusion: Members state\nthat the overall most likely error estimated by the Court of\nAuditors is 1.7%. They regret, however, that a material level of\nerror was found in interim and final payments. They recall that the\nmain risks linked to budget support (risk to effectiveness of the\naid as well as risks of fraud and corruption) also do not\nmaterialise in the Statement of Assurance audit. The committee\ninvites the Commission to encourage EuropeAid to complete as soon\nas possible the work on a methodology to calculate the level of\n'residual error' which might remain after all controls have been\nexecuted.
\nMembers note that the Heads of Union Delegations,\nwhere they are the only EEAS staff in a delegation, may not\ndelegate, even on a temporary basis, their powers as authorising\nofficers for the Union Delegation's administrative expenditure when\nthey are absent. In addition, the UN is expected to grant\nintergovernmental donor organisations similar rights to access\ninternal audit reports as are granted to UN Member\nStates.
\n- Research and other internal policies –\nqualified conclusion: Members\nunderstand that the Commission estimates the representative error\nrate without prefinancings on a multi-annual basis to be 3.4% for\nFramework Programme 6 and the provisional representative error rate\nfor Framework Programme 7 to be a little above 4 % on a\nmulti-annual basis. They note that the Commission is simplifying ex\nante control procedures as far as possible with a view to\nfacilitate the processing of payments with the consequence that\nonly administrative requirements and arithmetical checks can be\nmade. They are worried that even in the case of doubt about the\neligibility of cost declared, only limited ex ante checks were\ncarried out. A balance has to be struck between facilitating\npayments and controlling the eligibility of cost\ndeclared.
\nIV. Views from specific policy\nperspectives: lastly, Members make a\nseries of observations on the Commission’s sectoral\npolicies:
\nThe European Parliament adopted by 427 votes to 134,\nwith 66 abstentions, a decision to grant discharge to the\nCommission discharge in respect of the implementation of the\ngeneral budget of the European Union for the financial year 2010.\nIt also adopted separation decisions granting discharge to the\nDirectors of the Education, Audiovisual and Culture Executive\nAgency, the Executive Agency for Competitiveness and Innovation,\nthe Executive Agency for Health and Consumers, the European\nResearch Council Executive Agency, the Trans-European Transport\nNetwork Executive Agency on the implementation of their respective\nbudgets for the financial year 2010.
\nAt the same time, Parliament closed the accounts of\nthe general budget for the European Union for 2010.
\nParliament also adopted, by 552 votes to 75, with 15\nabstentions, a resolution including a series of recommendations\nthat need to be taken into account when the discharge is\ngranted.
\nAmongst these include the achievement of the following\npriority actions:
\n1. The Court of Auditors' Statement of\nAssurance:
\nII. Horiziontal issues:
\nFinancial Engineering Instruments\n(FEIs): Parliament recalls that the\nCommission promotes an increased use of FEIs for the next\nmultiannual financial framework despite the fact that the\nCommission itself considers FEIs to be of high risk. It understands\nthat FEIs complement rather than replace existing grant funding and\nhave the potential benefit of being able to be used more than once.\nIt deplores the absence of formal reporting requirements and note\nthat FEIs with a total commitment of approximately EUR 8.1 billion\nhave been created and have received payments of approximately EUR\n5.2 billion from 2007-2013 operational programmes. Members regret\nthe lack of transparency which characterises the implementation of\nthese instruments and the uncertainty as regards the legal basis.\nMembers invite the Commission to consider it a priority action to\nclosely monitor the use of FEIs inter alia by:
\nResponsibility of the Commission and its management\nrepresentations: Parliament stresses\nonce again that the Commission therefore has the primary\nresponsibility in the management of the Union funds concerned\nand that, as a consequence, the Commission has the obligation to\ntake measures that are aimed at ensuring legality and regularity as\nwell as sound financial management. For Members, it is not possible\nfor the Commission to transfer its financial responsibility to the\nMember States, even in cases where a managerial weakness or\nirregularity has been identified at the level of a Member State.\nParliament notes the close link between the Commission's\nultimate responsibility for implementing the budget and the\nsignificance of the discharge procedure and stress that the\nCommission's final responsibility regarding the implementation of\nthe budget also covers weaknesses in Member States' management and\ncontrol systems. Financial responsibility is and shall remain\nindivisible. Parliament underlines that the College and the\nCommissioners thereby take the final responsibility for the\nreliability and completeness of the reservations made by the\nDirectors-General and Heads of Units acting as ‘Authorising\nOfficers by Delegation’ and stresses that the act of\ndelegation in no way takes away final responsibility from the\nCollege and the Commissioners.
\nPlenary recalls, in this regard, that mandatory\nnational management declarations issued and signed at ministerial\nlevel and duly audited by an independent auditor are a necessary\nmean to counter some national authorities‘ lack of\nresponsibility as regards the use and management of Union\nmoney.
\nMembers underline that the College and the\nCommissioners thereby take the final responsibility for the\nreliability and completeness. They consider that the Commission has\nmade great progress as regards adequate corporate governance within\nthe Commission.
\nFurther, Parliament invites the Commission to\nconsider it a priority action to improve and strengthen the\naccountability chain, inter alia by:
\nCommission's administration: Parliament calls on the Commission to clarify its\nrelocation plans, the costs this will entail, how much office space\nwill become available and how much will be added, and the number of\nstaff in each Directorate-General who will be affected. Plenary\nalso calls on the Commission to complete, without delay, the\nreclassification scheme for all the temporary staff of the European\nAnti-Fraud Office on open-ended contracts. Parliament points out\nthat in 2010, during the procedure to approve flexitime and\ncompensatory leave as a voluntary benefit, the Commission approved\naround 90 000 additional days of leave for its staff, which is the\nequivalent of some 445 posts – even though the Staff\nRegulations states that overtime worked by certain staff shall not\nbe compensated.
\nResponsibility of Member States: Parliament recalls that the Commission implements\nthe Union budget on its own responsibility but also in cooperation\nwith Member States. It underlines that the two policy areas prone\nto the highest error rates (‘Cohesion, transport and\nenergy’ and ‘Agriculture and natural resources’) are\nimplemented under shared management, and deplores the fact that the\nestimated most likely error rates amount to 7.7 % and\n2.3 %, respectively.) It welcomes the fact that for the first\ntime it is possible to identify the errors and their origin: for\nERDF and Cohesion Fund, three Member States (Spain, Italy and the\nUK) have contributed 59 % to the cumulative quantifiable errors\nidentified during this period and for the ESF four Member States\n(Spain, Portugal, the UK and Germany) have contributed 68 % to\nthe cumulative quantifiable errors. Plenary recalls that the\nfinance ministers of Greece, Italy and Spain were invited to an\nexchange of views in Parliament's Committee on Budgetary Control\nand regrets that none of the invited finance ministers appeared to\ndiscuss with members of that committee the Court of Auditors’\nresults with a view to improving the management of Structural Funds\nand eventually the legal basis. It calls on its President to\naddress, at the next meeting of the Heads of State, the refusal by\nthose finance ministers to discuss these important matters in\npublic with Parliament's responsible committee. Members recall its\nrepeated invitations to the Commission to present a proposal for\nthe introduction of mandatory national management declarations\n(NMDs) issued, made public and duly audited by the responsible\naudit authority, as part of the Commission's final and overall\nresponsibility for the implementation of the Union budget. They\nnote that NMDs should contain full information about the use of\nUnion funds. Parliament proposes that the substance of national\ndeclarations signed at directorate-general level should comply with\ninternational auditing standards and that those declarations should\nbe used by the Court of Auditors in its audit work and based on,\namong other things, the declarations by authorities to which\nmanagement power is delegated. It points to the existence of\nsignificant differences in Member States' administrative\nperformance in the field of revenue and expenditure in shared\nmanagement, especially related to detecting irregularities, fraud\nand errors and financial follow-up in both the customs field\nand spending of Union funds. It notes that the Commission so far\nmonitors administrative performance in a reactive way and on case\nlevel and thus does not perform sufficient trend analysis to\nidentify fields of risk. It calls on the Commission to apply the\nmethod of trend analysis to identify financial risks and to take\nmeasures to improve Member States' administrative\nperformance.
\nMembers note with great concern the cases of\nBulgaria and Romania where there are serious cases of\nalleged fraud and high levels of corruption. They call on the\nCommission to increase pressure on the Romanian government to\nimplement the Commission’s recommendations and to ensure that\nthe Romanian government’s efforts to develop a consistent\njurisprudence in public procurement trials are\nincreased.
\nPre-financings: noting\nthat pre-financings are considered necessary in order for\nbeneficiaries to start the agreed action, Members are nevertheless\nconcerned about the influence pre-financings have had mainly in the\npolicy areas ‘External aid, Development and Enlargement’\nand ‘Research and Internal Policies’. They believe that\nby paying high volumes of pre-financings, the Commission takes\non an increased financial risk, for example in cases of\ninsolvency of beneficiaries, as well as an increased risk to\nlegality and regularity as acceptance of the cost declared by\nbeneficiaries is postponed to a later date. Since it is more\nefficient to prevent irregularities than to correct undue payment\nex-post through recoveries. Members invite the Commission to make\nit a priority action to reconsider the increased use\nof pre-financing as well as control and audit mechanisms by\nadapting the level of pre-financings in the various programmes to a\nlevel that will ensure the necessary float for the beneficiary to\nstart the project, while also safeguarding the financial interest\nof the Union and informing Parliament accordingly.
\nOutstanding budgetary commitments\n(RAL): Parliament recalls that outstanding budgetary\ncommitments are commitment appropriations made, but not used (i.e.\npaid) and that they derive mainly from multi-annual programmes\n(e.g. Cohesion) where commitments are made in the earlier years of\nthe programming period while the corresponding payments are made\ngradually during the whole programming period. A high level of\noutstanding commitments might indicate difficulties experienced by\nMember States in absorbing the amounts allocated. It notes that in\n2010, those outstanding commitments increased by nearly 10 % to\napproximately EUR 194 billion. There is a risk that the\ncommitted funds will have to be spent quicker than usual, thereby\nincreasing the risk of error. Members invite the Commission to\nprovide information on the size of outstanding commitments per\nMember State as well as on its cooperation with the Member States\nto identify and address risk areas in relation to absorption and\nregularity.
\nBudgetary contribution to decentralised agencies and\njoint undertakings: Parliament notes that the Union contribution for the\nfinancial year 2010 amounted to over EUR 620 million to the\ndecentralised Agencies and to over EUR 500 million for the Joint\nUndertakings. As these sums are quite considerable, they expect the\nCommission, in such time of financial crisis, to avoid increases in\nthe Agencies' budgets and to even consider reducing the Union\ncontribution to their budgets based on an assessment of its\npriorities. It also calls on the Commission to provide Parliament\nwith a detailed overview of the criteria and verification\nmechanisms applied to avoid conflicts of interest and 'revolving\ndoor' cases for Agencies/Joint Undertakings.
\nUnion budget and the financial and budgetary\ncrisis: in view of the continuing\nfinancial and budgetary crisis in Member States and the\ndifficulties faced by Greece, Hungary, Ireland, Latvia, Portugal\nand Romania, some of these countries are receiving assistance in\nthe form of balance of payments (BOP) facility loans (loans\ndisbursed as at 31 December 2010 amounting to approximately EUR 12\nbillion). Members are concerned about the fact that the Court of\nAuditors did not pay sufficient attention to these new challenges\nin the Union in its annual report on 2010. They recall that there\nis no guarantee fund established to protect the budget from calls\non those guarantees and therefore invite the Commission to evaluate\nthe potential need to set up a guarantee fund to cover for\npotential losses similarly to the Guarantee Fund for External\nActions with the aim to protect the Union budget. They are of the\nopinion that the more severe the financial situation in certain\nMember States becomes, the more difficult it will be for those\nMember States to contribute to the Union budget. They believe\nthat this puts at risk the revenue of the Union budget stemming\nfrom 'Member States in difficulties'. They criticise the fact that\nthe Council used Article 122 of the TFEU in 2010 for setting up the\nEuropean Stability Facility (EFSF) because that Article is only\napplicable for natural disasters and not for economic catastrophes;\nis concerned that the EFSF neither contains an element of\ndemocratic control by Parliament nor gives the Court of\nAuditors any audit rights. They reiterate their invitation to the\nCouncil and Member States to ensure in the by-laws of the ESM\nappropriate arrangements for public external audit of legality,\nregularity as well as performance in line with internationally\naccepted auditing standards, to ensure the reliability of data and\nstatistics, to clarify the responsibility and reporting\narrangements of all actors whose liabilities will be involved in\nthe establishment of the mechanism and to urge the Commission to\nreport to Parliament and the Council twice a year on the risk that\nis incurred on the Union's budget by its guarantee to the\nEFSM.
\nTransparency: Parliament\nreiterates the vital role transparency plays in ensuring\naccountability for the use of public funds and recalls that it is\none of the main instruments in achieving legal and regular\nexpenditure. It also reiterates its call for all grant payments\nfrom Union funds to be recorded in a user-friendly online\ndatabase paying due regard to data protection law. It believes\nthat the payment of Union funds should be explicitly conditional on\nthe acceptance by the beneficiaries that the basic details be a\nmatter of public record. Members note that in the policy area\nCohesion full transparency of beneficiaries of ERDF and Cohesion\nFund is not ensured. Improvements in this regard are therefore\nexpected in the context of the next financial framework.
\nStatement of Assurance methodology: Parliament considers that the Commission, the Court\nof Auditors, the Parliament and other stakeholders should focus\ntheir attention and make recommendations concerning those areas in\nwhich the management needs to improve, in particular the areas of\nCohesion and agriculture. It stresses once again the need to\nclosely examine pre-financings which it believes are exposed to a\nlower level of risk to legality and regularity than interim or\nfinal payments. Parliament also notes that the Court of\nAuditors applies a common methodology to quantify public\nprocurement errors in the two policy areas Agriculture and natural\nresources, on the one hand, and Cohesion, Energy and Transport, on\nthe other. They call on the Commission and the Court of Auditors to\nharmonise the treatment of public procurement errors in these two\npolicy areas urgently and to report back to the Parliament's\ncompetent committee on the progress made by the end of\n2012.
\nIII. Specific issues:
\nPerformance: Getting results from the Union\nbudget: Members welcome the new\nChapter in the Annual Report including the Court of Auditors'\nobservations on the Commission's se-assessment of performance in\nits AARs. They take the view that those important findings\nillustrate that Parliament cannot fully rely on the Commission's\nreporting on performance. They invite the Court of Auditors to\nconsider whether it would be possible to include the new insight on\nperformance on the different policy groups in the related chapters\nof the Annual Report. The Commission is invited to improve its\nreporting on performance. Members reiterate the call for the\nCommission to review the briefing and training given to staff\nregarding 'Title II: Rights and Obligations of officials' of the\nStaff Regulations so as to ensure that all staff are fully\nconversant with its terms.
\nMembers also focus on each of its policies\nindividually. The following is noted:
\n- Cohesion, energy and transport – adverse\nconclusion: Members are concerned\nabout the increase of the error rate to 7.7% in the policy area\n'Cohesion, energy and transport' and call on the Court of Auditors\nto present error rates for the European Regional Development Fund,\nthe Cohesion Fund, the European Social Fund, energy and transport\nseparately and not on an aggregate basis. They deplore the fact\nthat, year after year, non-respect of public procurement rules\naccounts for a large proportion of the errors. They call on the\nCommission to pursue the ongoing reform of public procurement\ntaking due account of these worrying results and to follow up on\ninfringements rigorously.
\nOther issues concern:
\nThe Commission is invited to consider it a priority\naction to support Parliament in its efforts in the ordinary\nlegislative procedure concerning the proposal for a regulation\nlaying down common provisions on the structural\ninstruments to create an effective sanctioning\nmechanisms so that the Commission can fully assume its final and\noverall responsibility for the implementation of the budget. This\nshould, inter alia, include the following elements: (i) making net\nreductions the rule for financial corrections imposed by the\nCommission and abolishing the possibility to declare retrospective\nprojects; (ii) obliging Member States to recover ineligible\nexpenditure from final beneficiaries as far as possible so that\nfinal beneficiaries bear the consequences of ineligible expenditure\nand not the national taxpayer; (iii) allowing the Commission to\ngive Member States incentives not only to comply with the rules;\n(iv) ensuring that a full range of sanctions (interruptions,\nsuspensions, financial corrections, and penalties) are available\nfor all funds.
\n- Agriculture and natural resources – qualified\nconclusion: Members recall that IACS\nmust ensure that correct and traceable payments are made to farmers\nwhich doesn’t seem to be the case. They encourage the\nCommission to further reduce the duration of the conformity\nclearance procedure while ensuring that Member States' right of\ndefence is preserved. They reiterate the belief that agricultural\nfunds unduly paid have to be recovered from the final beneficiaries\nas much as possible to avoid the taxpayer being hit twice. These\nsystems should be examined.
\n- External aid, development and enlargement –\nqualified conclusion: Parliament\nstates that the overall most likely error estimated by the Court of\nAuditors is 1.7%. It regrets, however, that a material level of\nerror was found in interim and final payments. It recalls that the\nmain risks linked to budget support (risk to effectiveness of the\naid as well as risks of fraud and corruption) also do not\nmaterialise in the Statement of Assurance audit. The Commission is\ninvited to rigorously monitor those risks; however, considers\nsectoral budget support an effective measure for long-term capacity\nbuilding. Parliament calls on the Commission to introduce budget\nsupport only under rigorous and well-defined\nconditions.
\nParliament invites the Commission to encourage\nEuropeAid to complete as soon as possible the work on a\nmethodology to calculate the level of 'residual error' which might\nremain after all controls have been executed.
\nOther more technical recommendations are made, such\nas:
\nUnion's aid to Haiti: in\na number of amendments adopted in plenary, Parliament recalls the\nearthquake in Haiti and its disastrous consequences. It regrets the\ninsufficient level of coordination of humanitarian aid and\ndevelopment aid (linking relief, rehabilitation and development)\nand takes the view that provision of humanitarian aid should be\nbased on an exit strategy. The Commission should direct its efforts\nand funding to rehabilitation and development. Members regret the\ninsufficient coordination between the Union Delegation and the\nECHO representation and support a reinforced coordination\nbetween all Union actors in the country. The Commission is urged to\nensure better coherence and complementarity between humanitarian\naid and development aid, both at a policy level and in practice.\nParliament deplores the lack of sustainability of some projects and\nstress that projects should principally aim at creating employment\nand sustainable growth which would allow the Haitian State to\nincrease its own revenues in order to depend less on foreign\nassistance. It therefore requests the Commission to provide\nParliament with a list of projects which have been carried out\nduring the last 15 years in Haiti with a detailed assessment of\ntheir current situation in order to see how sustainable they are\nsince. Lastly on this issue, Parliament points to the lack of\nvisibility of the Union aid in Haiti. It takes the view that, in\norder to enhance visibility, not only the flag but also the name of\nthe European Union should appear in PR documents rather than simply\nthat of the Commission or of DG ECHO, which are much less\nidentifiable to average Haitian citizens.
\n- Research and other internal policies –\nqualified conclusion: Members\nunderstand that the Commission estimates the representative error\nrate without prefinancings on a multi-annual basis to be 3.4% for\nFramework Programme 6 and the provisional representative\nerror rate for Framework Programme 7 to\nbe a little above 4 % on a multi-annual basis. They note that the\nCommission is simplifying ex ante control procedures as far as\npossible with a view to facilitate the processing of payments with\nthe consequence that only administrative requirements and\narithmetical checks can be made. They are worried that even\nin the case of doubt about the eligibility of cost declared, only\nlimited ex ante checks were carried out. A balance has to be struck\nbetween facilitating payments and controlling the eligibility of\ncost declared.
\nIV. Views from specific policy\nperspectives: lastly, Parliament\nmakes a series of observations on the Commission’s sectoral\npolicies:
\n\nFOLLOW-UP TO THE COMMISSION’S 2009\nDISCHARGE : REPLIES TO REQUESTS FROM THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT\nAND THE COUNCIL
\nThis Commission staff working paper seeks to\ncomplement the Commission’s report on the follow-up to the\nEuropean Parliament and Council’s recommendations on the 2009\ndischarge. It presents in detail the 85 specific requests made by\nthe Council in its remarks accompanying its recommendations\nregarding the 2009 discharges.
\nAn outline of these replies is provided in the summary\nof the document COM (2011)0736 (please refer to the summary of the\ndocument in question).
\nThis Commission working document which is of a\ntechnical nature, only seeks to detail the responses already\ncovered in the main COM document.
\nPURPOSE: to present the report of the Court of\nAuditors on the implementation of the budget for the financial year\n2010 (Section VII – Committee of the Regions).
\nCONTENT: this is the Court’s 34th Annual Report\non the implementation of the EU budget. It covers the 2010\nfinancial year.
\nPursuant to the provisions of the Treaty on the\nFunctioning of the European Union (TFEU) the Court has audited: (a)\nthe annual accounts of the European Union which comprise the\nconsolidated financial statements and the consolidated reports on\nimplementation of the budget for the financial year ended 31\nDecember 2010; and (b) the legality and regularity of the\ntransactions underlying those accounts.
\nThe central part of the annual report is the\nCourt’s statement of assurance (the ‘DAS’) on the\nreliability of the annual accounts of the EU and on the legality\nand regularity of transactions (referred to in the report as\n‘regularity of transactions’). The statement of assurance\nitself begins the report; the material which follows reports mainly\non the audit work underlying the statement of assurance.
\nThis particular audit concerns the budget\nimplementation of the Committee of the Regions.
\nBased on its audit testing, the ECA concludes\nthat the payments for the policy group Administrative and other\nexpenditure were on the whole free from material error. The\nestimated error rate was 0.4%.
\nThe Court found that supervisory and control\nsystems for administrative and other expenditure were effective in\nensuring the regularity of payments. However, the ECA found a\nnumber of errors and weaknesses in the implementation of\nprocurement procedures by the EU institutions and bodies, and in\none institution repeated under-utilisation of certain budget lines\nresulting in significant budget transfers to finance building\nprojects. Recruitment decisions were also not always appropriately\ndocumented. These weaknesses were not material for the policy group\nas a whole, but were significant in the context of the individual\ninstitution or body concerned and need to be addressed by their\nadministrations.
\nFor 2010, the ECA recommends the EU\ninstitutions and bodies should ensure that:
\nThe Court makes a\ncertain number of particular observations as regards each EU\ninstitution or body of the European Union and which do not call\ninto question the overall positive assessments set out above\nbecause they do not affect significantly\nadministrative expenses as a whole.
\nIn the particular case of the Committee of the\nRegions, the Court notes the following issues:
\nPURPOSE: presentation of the Court of Auditors’\nreport on the implementation of the budget concerning the financial\nyear 2010 (Section IX - European Data Protection\nSupervisor).
\nCONTENT: the Court of Auditors presents its 34th\nannual report on the implementation of the budget concerning the\nfinancial year 2010.
\nPursuant to the provisions of the Treaty on the\nFunctioning of the European Union (TFEU) the Court presents to the\nEuropean Parliament and to the Council in the framework of the\ndischarge procedure, the statement of assurance (the\n‘DAS’) on the reliability of the annual accounts of the\nEU and on the legality and regularity of transactions underlying\nthose accounts for each institution and organ of the EU, on the\nbasis of an external audit.
\nThis audit included the financial implementation of\nthe European Data Protection Supervisor (EDPS).
\nBased on its audit work, the Court concludes that the\npayments as a whole for administrative and other expenditure were\nfree from material error. The most likely rate of error is 0.4\n%.
\nThe Court again concludes that the supervisory and\ncontrol systems for administrative and other expenditure were\neffective in ensuring the regularity of payments. However, the\nCourt noted a certain number of errors and weaknesses in the\nimplementation of public procurement procedures by the institutions\nand bodies of the EU. Decisions regarding recruitment were not\nalways correctly recorded. These weaknesses are not significant for\nall policy groups taken together, but are significant in the\ncontext of each institution or body and must be taken into\nconsideration by administrators.
\nAccordingly, the Court recommends to the institutions\nand bodies of the EU:
\nThe Court makes a certain number of particular\nobservations as regards each EU institution or body of the European\nUnion and which do not call into question the overall positive\nassessments set out above because they do not affect significantly\nadministrative expenses as a whole.
\nIn the specific case of the EDPS, the Court\nparticularly notes the following points:
\nPURPOSE: presentation of the report of the Court of\nAuditors on the implementation of the 2010 EU Budget (Section I\n– European Parliament.
\nCONTENT: the European Court of Auditors (ECA)\npublished its 34th annual report on the implementation\nof the 2010 EU General Budget.
\nIn accordance with the tasks and objectives assigned\nto it by the Treaty on the Functioning of the EU (TFEU), in the\ncontext of the discharge procedure, the Court of Auditors provides,\nboth for the European Parliament and the Council, a statement of\nassurance (“DAS”) on the reliability of the accounts, as\nwell as the legality and regularity of transactions of each EU\ninstitution, body or agency, on the basis of an independent\nexternal audit.
\nThis audit also dealt with the European\nParliament’s financial implementation.
\nOn the basis of these audits, the Court considers that\nthe payments in the policy group “Administrative and other\nexpenditure” were free from material error. The estimated\nrate of error is 0.4%.
\nThe ECA found that supervisory and control systems for\nadministrative and other expenditure were effective in ensuring the\nregularity of payments. However, the ECA found a number of\nerrors and weaknesses in the implementation of procurement\nprocedures by the EU institutions and bodies. Recruitment\ndecisions were also not always appropriately documented. These\nweaknesses were not material for the policy group as a whole, but\nwere significant in the context of the individual institution or\nbody concerned and need to be addressed by their\nadministrations.
\nThe ECA recommends the EU institutions and bodies\nshould ensure that:
\nThe Court also makes a number of observations in\nregard to each EU institution or body and do not call into question\nthe overall positive assessments given that they do not have a\nsignificant effect on the overall administrative expenditures\nundertaken.
\nIn the specific case of the audit of the European\nParliament, the ECA notes the following points:
\nFollow-up on the observations in the ECA’s 2009\nannual report: in regard to the\npayment of social allowances to staff members, the Court\nindicated that staff should be requested to deliver at appropriate\nintervals documents confirming their personal situation. In\naddition, the Parliament should implement a system for the timely\nmonitoring and control of these documents. Parliament indicated in\nresponse that it had implemented measures to mitigate the risk:\nlaunching of a campaign to check eligibility for some allowances,\nwhich led to the recovery of more than 70 000 euro;
\nPURPOSE: presentation of the Court of Auditors’\nreport on the implementation of the budget concerning the financial\nyear 2010 (Section IX - European Data Protection\nSupervisor).
\nCONTENT: the Court of Auditors presents its 34th\nannual report on the implementation of the budget concerning the\nfinancial year 2010.
\nPursuant to the provisions of the Treaty on the\nFunctioning of the European Union (TFEU) the Court presents to the\nEuropean Parliament and to the Council in the framework of the\ndischarge procedure, the statement of assurance (the\n‘DAS’) on the reliability of the annual accounts of the\nEU and on the legality and regularity of transactions underlying\nthose accounts for each institution and organ of the EU, on the\nbasis of an external audit.
\nThis audit included the financial implementation of\nthe European Data Protection Supervisor (EDPS).
\nBased on its audit work, the Court concludes that the\npayments as a whole for administrative and other expenditure were\nfree from material error. The most likely rate of error is 0.4\n%.
\nThe Court again concludes that the supervisory and\ncontrol systems for administrative and other expenditure were\neffective in ensuring the regularity of payments. However, the\nCourt noted a certain number of errors and weaknesses in the\nimplementation of public procurement procedures by the institutions\nand bodies of the EU. Decisions regarding recruitment were not\nalways correctly recorded. These weaknesses are not significant for\nall policy groups taken together, but are significant in the\ncontext of each institution or body and must be taken into\nconsideration by administrators.
\nAccordingly, the Court recommends to the institutions\nand bodies of the EU:
\nThe Court makes a certain number of particular\nobservations as regards each EU institution or body of the European\nUnion and which do not call into question the overall positive\nassessments set out above because they do not affect significantly\nadministrative expenses as a whole.
\nIn the specific case of the EDPS, the Court\nparticularly notes the following points:
\n\nDISCHARGE 2010 – COMMISSION: ANNUAL REPORT\nON INTERNAL AUDITS
\nPURPOSE: this report informs the Discharge\nAuthority about the work carried out by the Commission's Internal\nAudit Service (IAS)in 2010. It is based on IAS audit and consulting\nreports completed in 2010 relating to Commission departments and\nexecutive agencies. It does not cover the results of audit work in\nother agencies or bodies audited by the IAS, for which separate\nannual reports are drawn up.
\nThe\nCommission’s replies to the remarks and findings of the\ninternal auditor are contained in the summary report of the annual\nactivity reports of the Directors-General (that are covered by the\nsummary of the document SEC(2011)1189 of 7 November 2011).
\nCONTENT: the work of the IAS contributes to a\nculture of efficiency and effectiveness. Its audit work helps the\nCommission to identify synergies as well as risks, and consequently\nstrengthens the Commission's management.
\nImplementation of the IAS’s\ncoordinated audit plan: the Commission notes the positive\nco-operation between the IAS and the audited DGs and with their\nInternal Audit Capabilities. Implementation of the action plans\ndrawn up this year and in previous years in response to audit\nrecommendations contributes to steady improvement of the\nCommission's internal control framework.
\nThe report also\nunderlines that the Strategic Audit Plan for 2008-2010 was\nregularly updated to take account of specific needs (the first\noverall opinion, the results of management’s annual risk\nassessment and other changes in the external and internal\nenvironments). In 2010, the IAS completed 88% (compared with 87%\nin 2009) of its work programme and 85 reports were issued (30\naudits, 49 follow-ups, 1 consultancy, 4 management letters and 1\nreport on the overall opinion). In 2010, the acceptance rate of\ncritical and very important audit recommendations by the auditees\nwas 100% (98.8% in 2009).
\nMain IAS\nfindings for 2010: as far as IAS findings for 2010 are\nconcerned, the report highlights the two main points that\nfollow:
\n1)\nControl procedures: the highlights the need to obtain\nadequate information from the Heads of Delegation in order to\nsubstantiate the assurance provided annually by the Authorising\nOfficer by Delegation (AOD) to assess the adequacy and\neffectiveness of DG AIDCO’s control strategy; it also\nindicates a need for DG EAC to avoid unnecessary overlaps of\ncontrols conducted by its services and by National Agencies.
\nDG ELARG should\ncomplement its initiative requiring Heads of Delegation to submit\nan Annual Assurance Strategy by developing checklists applicable to\nall delegations.
\nThe IAS recommended\nto DG REGIO and DG EMPL improvements deemed necessary in order to\nobtain adequate assurance for multi-annual programmes.
\nAt the\nlevel of control strategies the Commission has adopted an\nimportant number of measures to allow its services to set up\nadequate audit and control systems. Action plans have been drawn up\nand implemented in the domains where the risks are highest,\nallowing for better planning and monitoring of control activities,\neliminating administrative burdens and overlaps and improving the\neffectiveness of the Commission's internal control systems.
\nControls for\nchecking compliance with legal time limits for payment were\nless effective in some DGs where. the shorter time limits requested\nby the Commission were not always applied. Management needs to\nimprove its monitoring over the proper implementation of control\nprocedures for the processing of payments. The Commission has taken\nseveral measures to improve both payment performance and associated\ncontrol mechanisms, namely at the levels of the IT system (ABAC),\nof the validation of local IT systems and of the guidelines and by\nmeans of regular and more effective monitoring.
\nThe IAS’s work\nhas raised issues for consideration with the aim of improving the\nefficiency and effectiveness of IT start-up projects in order to\nfurther enable the Commission to achieve its goals in a\ncost-effective, efficient and secure manner.
\nFollowing the\nrecommendations of the Task Force on IT, the Commission has\nreformed its IT governance: the ABM + IT Steering Committee\nwas set up in 2010 followed by the Information Systems Project\nManagement Board and High Level Committee on IT in 2011, which\nrepresent a major improvement in the way IT strategy is designed\nand implemented.
\nThe IAS’s\naudit work on recently split-up DGs has identified lessons\nwhich should be learned ahead of any future divisions of DGs in\norder to soften the impact of change on DGs, central and horizontal\nservices and staff. The Commission considers it is too early to\ndraw definitive conclusions on the benefits/drawbacks of shared\ndirectorates and it will take stock, later on, when the services\nconcerned have gained more experience with the new organisational\nstructure.
\nFraud: in\nthis area, the IAS’s efforts have highlighted, in particular\nthe lack of clarity in organisational accountability for fraud\nprevention and detection and the need for an updated anti-fraud\nstrategy at Commission level. A new anti-fraud strategy,\nprepared by OLAF in cooperation with the central services and\noperational DGs, has been adopted by the Commission and fully\naddresses the issues raised by the IAS.