Parltrack

Activites

• 2013/05/21 Final act signed
• #3237
• 2013/05/13 Council Meeting
• 2013/05/13 Act adopted by Council after Parliament's 1st reading
• 2013/01/16 Text adopted by Parliament, 1st reading/single reading
  • T7-0013/2013 summary

    The European Parliament adopted by 599 votes to 27, with 68 abstentions, a legislative resolution on the proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council amending Directive 2009/65/EC on the coordination of laws, regulations and administrative provisions relating to undertakings of collective investment in transferable securities (UCITS) and Directive 2011/61/EU on Alternative Investment Funds Managers in respect of the excessive reliance on credit ratings. Parliament adopted its position at first reading under the ordinary legislative procedure. The amendments adopted in plenary are the result of a compromise reached between the European parliament and the Council. They amend the proposal as follows: Introduction of a reference to Directive 2003/41/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council: the new Directive also seeks to amend Directive 2003/41/EC which provides for regulation at Union level of institutions for occupational retirement provision (IORPs). Excessive reliance on credit ratings: the amended text underlines the need to require IORPs, managers of UCITS and managers of Alternative Investment Funds (AIFs) to avoid relying exclusively and automatically on external credit ratings or using them as the only parameter when assessing the risk involved in the investments made by IORPs, by managers of UCITS and by managers of AIFs. More specifically, Directives 2003/41/EC, 2009/65/EC and 2011/61/EU are amended in order to make provision for the competent authorities, taking into account the nature, scale and complexity of the investments of UCITS to monitor the adequacy of their credit assessment processes of the management companies, assess the use of references to credit ratings in their investment policies and, where appropriate, encourage mitigation of the impact of such references, with a view to reducing sole and mechanistic reliance on ratings. Delegated acts: the Commission shall publish the results of consultations it carries out in the course of its preparatory work with a view to the adoption of delegated acts.

  • Results of vote in Parliament
• 2013/01/15 Debate in Parliament
• #3205
• 2012/12/04 Council Meeting
• 2012/07/06 Document attached to the procedure
  • COM(2012)0367 summary

    This Communication provides detailed information to the Budgetary Authority in the form of a legislative financial statement for the proposal on credit rating agencies and the proposal on the excessive reliance on credit ratings (CRA3). It also gives a general overview of the impact of all Commission proposals on ESMA’s resources for 2013. An impact assessment of the CRA3 proposal assessed cost implications of individual measures and stated: ‘policy measures would not have an impact on the EU budget’. However, it has been estimated that the CRA3 proposal would result in a substantial increase in ESMA’s workload, requiring more human resources at the agency. Accordingly, in its Draft General Budget of the European Union for the financial year 2013, the Commission proposed an increase of 15 posts in the establishment plan for ESMA. They will be fully financed from fees paid by credit rating agencies, and hence, they will have no impact on the EU contribution to ESMA. In addition, other tasks as described above will be covered by external staff, SNEs and contract agents over the period 2014–2015: 5.8 (man years) for 2014 and 5.5 (man years) for 2015.

  • DG {u'url': u'http://ec.europa.eu/dgs/internal_market/', u'title': u'Internal Market and Services'}, BARNIER Michel
• 2012/06/28 Committee report tabled for plenary, 1st reading/single reading
  • A7-0220/2012 summary

    The Committee on Economic and Monetary Affairs adopted the report by Leonardo DOMENICI (S&D, IT) on the proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council amending Directive 2009/65/EC on the coordination of laws, regulations and administrative provisions relating to undertakings of collective investment in transferable securities (UCITS) and Directive 2011/61/EU on Alternative Investment Funds Managers in respect of the excessive reliance on credit ratings. The Committee recommended that the European Parliament’s position at first reading under the ordinary legislative procedure should be to amend the Commission’s proposal as follows: Placement rules: institutions shall not adopt investment rules that would result in the automatic sale of assets in the event of a downgrade of their creditworthiness by an external credit rating agency. Definitions: Members propose incorporating in Directive 2004/109/EC definitions of “financial instrument”, “securitisation”, “structured finance instrument”, “originator” and “sponsor”. Additional information requirements for issuers whose structured finance instruments are admitted to trading on a regulated market: an amendment stipulates that the issuer shall ensure that either the originator or the sponsor of a structured finance instrument established in the Union shall disclose to the public: information on the credit quality and performance of the individual underlying assets of that structured finance instrument, the structure of the securitisation transaction, the cash flows and any collateral supporting a securitisation exposure as well as any information that is necessary to conduct comprehensive and well-informed stress tests on the cash flows and collateral values supporting the underlying exposures. This obligation to disclose information shall not extend to the provision of such information that would breach statutory provisions governing the protection of confidentiality of information sources or the processing of personal data. Moreover, the European Securities and Markets Authority (ESMA) shall develop draft regulatory technical standards to specify: (i) the information that the persons are to disclose; (ii) the frequency with which such information is to be updated; and (iii) a template by which to disclose the information. Members call for ESMA to submit those draft regulatory technical standards to the Commission by 1 January 2013 and to set up a webpage for the publication of the information on structured finance instruments. Method of risk management (Directive 2009/65/EC): a UCITS shall not include in its fund rules any rule that would result in the automatic sale of its assets in the event of a downgrade of its creditworthiness by an external credit rating agency. Use of external ratings (Directive 2011/61/EU): Members consider that investment firms, management companies and insurance undertakings shall not suggest that their customers insert, in their standard investment agreements, fund rules or insurance contracts, references to reliance on ratings. Members feel that in the medium term, further initiatives should be evaluated with a view to taking ratings out of financial regulation.

  • ECON ECON/7/07818 DOMENICI Leonardo S&D
  • JURI BODU Sebastian Valentin EPP
• #3178
• 2012/06/22 Council Meeting
• 2012/06/19 Vote in committee, 1st reading/single reading
  • ECON ECON/7/07818 DOMENICI Leonardo S&D
  • JURI BODU Sebastian Valentin EPP
• 2012/05/23 Economic and Social Committee: opinion, report
  • CES1296/2012
• 2012/04/02 European Central Bank: opinion, guideline, report
  • OJ C 167 13.06.2012, p. 0002
  • CON/2012/0024 summary

    OPINION OF THE EUROPEAN CENTRAL BANK on a proposal for a regulation amending Regulation (EC) No 1060/2009 on credit rating agencies and a proposal for a directive amending Directive 2009/65/EC on the coordination of laws, regulations and administrative provisions relating to undertakings of collective investment in transferable securities (UCITS) and Directive 2011/61/EU on alternative investment funds managers in respect of the excessive reliance on credit ratings. The ECB shares the general objective pursued under the proposed regulation and the proposed directive which is to contribute to reducing financial stability risks and restoring the confidence of investors and market participants in financial markets and ratings quality. The ECB shares the Commission’s specific objective of reducing excessive reliance on external credit ratings, which is in line with the principles established by the Financial Stability Board (FSB) in this field. The ECB also supports the comprehensive powers entrusted to the European Securities and Markets Authority (ESMA) relating to authorisation and supervision of credit rating agencies (CRAs). The ECB makes the following observations: 1. Excessive reliance on external credit ratings - Credit risk assessment by financial institutions : the ECB supports the FSB’s and the Commission’s common objective of reducing overreliance on external credit ratings. More specifically, the ECB notes that the proposal for a directive of the European Parliament and of the Council on the access to the activity of credit institutions and the prudential supervision of credit institutions and investment firms and amending Directive 2002/87/EC (proposed CRD IV Directive) includes provisions addressing this issue. The ECB also notes the corresponding amendments introduced in Directive 2009/65/EC and Directive 2011/61/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 8 June 2011 on alternative investment fund managers and amending Directives 2003/41/EC and 2009/65/EC and Regulations (EC) No1060/2009 and (EU) No 1095/2010. Therefore, in order to ensure consistency between the proposed regulation and corresponding provisions in the sectoral legislation, the ECB recommends clarifying the nature of the obligation imposed on financial institutions in the proposed regulation. - References to external ratings in Union legislation : the ECB understands that all the proposed amendments are aimed at implementing the FSB principles, which invite ‘standard setters and authorities to assess references to CRA ratings in standards, laws and regulations and, wherever possible, remove them or replace them by suitable alternative standards of creditworthiness’. However, while it might be advisable to remove provisions imposing compulsory recourse to external ratings from Union and national legislation or even all references to external ratings to the extent that these requirements or references to external ratings might be perceived as encouraging ‘mechanistic’ recourse to such ratings, the ECB would recommend caution regarding the drafting proposed in the above provisions of the proposed regulation, as this could prove difficult to apply. The ECB supports the gradual approach advocated by the FSB and notes that references to CRAs’ ratings should be removed or replaced only once credible alternatives have been identified and can safely be implemented. In this context, it is necessary that standard setters and authorities develop transition plans and timetables to enable the removal or replacement of references to CRAs’ ratings wherever possible and the associated enhancement in risk management capabilities to be safely introduced. The ECB recommends replacing Article 1(6) of the proposed regulation by a recital in the proposed regulation that reminds public authorities of the importance of contributing where appropriate to the abovementioned objective of reducing excessive reliance on external credit ratings. Moreover, the ECB recommends that the ESAs, after having taken account of the contributions of the ECB and of the ESRB, report to the Commission on possible alternative or complementary solutions with regard to references to external ratings in Union and national legislation. 2. Credit rating agencies and external credit assessment institutions (ECAIs) - External credit assessments and eligibility of ECAIs : under the proposed CRD IV regulation, the procedure of ECAI recognition by competent authorities results in ‘automatic’ eligibility of CRAs that are registered or certified in accordance with Regulation (EC) No 1060/2009. This also applies to central banks issuing credit ratings which are exempt from that Regulation. The ECB supports the new procedure contained in the proposed CRD IV regulation, as it will contribute to simplifying the recognition procedure for ECAIs and ensuring cross-sectoral consistency. For the sake of legal clarity and transparency, the ECB would however suggest further clarifying in a recital of the proposed regulation that the entry into force of the proposed CRD IV regulation will imply an automatic recognition of the above CRAs and central banks (as ECAIs) and that there is a need to define the correspondence between credit assessments and credit quality steps, i.e. mapping. - Mapping and European rating index : whilst the ECB supports enhanced transparency, interoperability and comparability of ratings by market participants, it should however be ensured, in view of the possible negative effects on competition and on the diversity of rating methods, that a harmonised rating scale does not exert pressure on CRAs to harmonise methodologies and processes. Moreover, the ECB notes that mapping procedures will be developed by EBA and EIOPA in the banking and in the insurance sectors. In view of the cross-sectoral nature of these issues, it would be appropriate to coordinate the mapping exercises, possibly through the Joint Committee of the ESAs. In this context, the ECB recommends deleting the reference to the harmonised rating scale and suggests that, by December 2015, ESMA, in cooperation with EBA, EIOPA and the ECB, reviews the feasibility of establishing a harmonised rating scale for ratings issued by registered and certified CRAs and reports to the Commission on this issue. 3. Other observations - Sovereign ratings : the ECB supports the initiatives taken to enhance transparency and disclosure of the methodology and rating process in relation to sovereign debt. The proposed regulation introduces a special regime as regards the frequency of review and the procedure for the issuance of sovereign ratings. The ECB welcomes these proposed changes and notably the proposal to request CRAs to assess sovereign ratings more frequently. While ratings should only be published after the close of business and at least one hour before the opening of trading venues in the Union, the ECB considers that other initiatives could be taken to alleviate the potential pro-cyclical effects of changes in ratings. The ECB recommends exploring ways of reducing the volatility induced by the timing of the rating changes, notably when an issuer is on ratings watch and is close to losing its investment grade status as well as when a potential downgrade of several notches is being contemplated. - Independence of CRAs : since the current ‘issuer-pays’ financing model of ratings could be a source of conflict of interest and thus may have a distorting influence on ratings, more far-reaching solutions on alternative compensation models are warranted. The ECB welcomes therefore the Commission’s continued work on monitoring the appropriateness of CRAs’ remuneration models and looks forward to the submission of a report thereon to the European Parliament and the Council by the end of 2012. While the ECB supports the proposals for stricter rules as regards shareholder structure of CRAs, the ECB recommends that the Commission reviews the proposed threshold of 5 % in order to ensure its effectiveness. - Rotation principles : while the ECB supports the Commission’s intention relating to the introduction of a rotation rule, i.e. that long-lasting relationships with the same rated entities could compromise the independence of ratings, possible unintended consequences may need to be further assessed. - Methodologies : the ECB supports the proposed tasks conferred upon ESMA with regard to the compliance of new or amended CRAs methodologies. The ECB recommends clarifying that ESMA’s role is limited to verifying compliance of the methodologies with the applicable rules. - Rules on structured finance instruments : with a view to ensuring cross-sectoral consistency and avoiding duplication of rules, the relationship between the disclosure requirements for issuers, originators and sponsors of structured finance products in the proposed regulation and similar disclosure requirements for securitisations in specific sectors should be clarified. Second, the Eurosystem asset-backed securities (ABSs) loan-level information initiative establishes specific loan-by-loan information requirements for ABSs accepted as collateral in Eurosystem credit operations. It aims to increase transparency and make available more timely information on the underlying loans and their performance to market participants in a standardised format. Lastly, the ECB welcomes initiatives contributing to the enhancement of transparency requirements in the structured finance instruments and covered bonds markets and the harmonisation of disclosure requirements in this area. It notes that initiatives related to the transparency of the covered bonds market are considered in other ongoing legislative initiatives, for instance in the proposed CRD IV regulation. Therefore, it is important to ensure the consistency of these various initiatives.

• 2012/03/29 Amendments tabled in committee
  • PE486.063
• 2012/02/07 Committee draft report
  • PE480.851
• 2011/11/30 Committee referral announced in Parliament, 1st reading/single reading
  • ECON ECON/7/07818 DOMENICI Leonardo S&D
  • JURI BODU Sebastian Valentin EPP
• 2011/11/15 Legislative proposal
  • COM(2011)0746 summary

    PURPOSE: to reduce the risk of over-reliance on credit ratings by financial market participants, including undertakings for collective investment in transferable securities (UCITS) and alternative investment funds (AIFs). PROPOSED ACT: Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council. BACKGROUND: Regulation (EC) No 1060/2009 on credit rating agencies (CRA Regulation) entered into full application on 7 December 2010. It requires credit rating agencies (CRAs) to comply with rigorous rules of conduct in order to mitigate possible conflicts of interest, ensure high quality and sufficient transparency of ratings and the rating process. The Regulation was amended by Regulation (EU) No 513/2011 which entrusted the European Securities and Markets Authority (ESMA) with exclusive supervisory powers over CRAs registered in the EU in order to centralise and simplify their registration and supervision at European level. However, a number of issues related to credit rating activities and the use of ratings have not been sufficiently addressed in the existing CRA Regulation. One of these issues is the risk of overreliance on credit ratings by financial market participants, including UCITS and AIFS who do not necessarily conducting their own assessments of the creditworthiness of issuers of such debt instruments. The European Commission pointed to these open issues in its Communication of 2 June 2010 on Regulating financial services for sustainable growth, and announced the need for a targeted review of the CRA Regulation. On 8 June 2011, the European Parliament adopted a non-legislative resolution on CRAs, which supports the need to enhance the regulatory framework for credit rating agencies and to take measures to reduce the risk of over-reliance of ratings. The European Council of 23 October 2011 concluded that progress is needed on reducing overreliance on credit ratings.  On the international level, the Financial Stability Board (FSB) issued in October 2010 principles to reduce authorities’ and financial institutions’ reliance on external ratings. IMPACT ASSESSMENT: an impact assessment has been produced for this proposal. It can be found at http://ec.europa.eu/internal_market/securities/agencies/index_en.htm. LEGAL BASIS: Article 53 (1) TFEU. CONTENT: in order to reduce the risk of over-reliance of managers of UCITS and AIFs on credit ratings, the Commission proposes to introduce amendments to Directive 2009/65/EC on the coordination of law, regulations and administrative provisions relating to the undertakings for collective investment in transferable securities (UCITS) and Directive 2011/61/EU on Alternative Investment Fund Managers. The Commission is presenting in parallel a proposal of Regulation for the amendment of the CRA Regulation. Amendment of Directive 2009/65/EC on UCITS:  the proposal amends Article 51 of Directive 2009/65/EC as regards the risk management process: §        it introduces a requirement for the management or investment company not to solely or mechanistically rely on external credit ratings for assessing the creditworthiness of the UCITS assets. External credit ratings may be used as one factor among others in this process but shall not prevail; §        it proposes corresponding amendments to the existing powers of the Commission to adopt delegated acts with  a view to specifying the provisions of Article 51(1) of 2009/65/EC. Amendment of Directive 2011/61/EC on managers of AIFs: the proposal amends Article 15 of Directive 2011/61/EU as regards the risk management systems: §        it introduces a requirement for  the AIF Manager not to solely or mechanistically rely on external credit  ratings for assessing the creditworthiness of the AIF assets. External credit ratings may be used as one factor among others in this process but shall not prevail; §        it proposes corresponding amendments to the existing powers of the Commission to adopt delegated acts with  a view to specifying the provisions of Article 15(1) of Directive 2011/61/EU.  The proposal provides for a transposition period of 12 months. BUDGETARY IMPLICATIONS: the proposal has no implications for the EU budget. DELEGATED ACTS: the proposal contains provisions empowering the Commission to adopt delegated acts in accordance with Article 290 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the EU.

  • SEC(2011)1354
  • SEC(2011)1355
  • DG {u'url': u'http://ec.europa.eu/dgs/internal_market/', u'title': u'Internal Market and Services'}, BARNIER Michel

Documents

• Legislative proposal published: COM(2011)0746
• Document attached to the procedure: SEC(2011)1354
• Document attached to the procedure: SEC(2011)1355
• Committee draft report: PE480.851
• Amendments tabled in committee: PE486.063
• European Central Bank: opinion, guideline, report: OJ C 167 13.06.2012, p. 0002
• European Central Bank: opinion, guideline, report: CON/2012/0024
• Economic and Social Committee: opinion, report: CES1296/2012
• Committee report tabled for plenary, 1st reading/single reading: A7-0220/2012
• Document attached to the procedure: COM(2012)0367
• Decision by Parliament, 1st reading/single reading: T7-0013/2013
• Results of vote in Parliament: Results of vote in Parliament

Votes

A7-0220/2012 - Leonardo Domenici - Bloc 1

Position	Total	ALDE	ECR	EFD	GUE/NGL	NI	PPE	S&D	Verts/ALE	correctional
For	609	79	0	15	25	12	249	174	55	1
Against	25	0	3	12	2	8	0	0	0	0
Abstain	58	0	46	7	1	4	0	0	0	0

A7-0220/2012 - Leonardo Domenici - Block 1

Position	Total	ALDE	ECR	EFD	GUE/NGL	NI	PPE	S&D	Verts/ALE	correctional
For	609	79	0	15	25	12	249	174	55	1
Against	25	0	3	12	2	8	0	0	0	0
Abstain	58	0	46	7	1	4	0	0	0	0

A7-0220/2012 - Leonardo Domenici - Am 4

Position	Total	ALDE	ECR	EFD	GUE/NGL	NI	PPE	S&D	Verts/ALE	correctional
For	68	1	0	11	23	13	19	0	1	0
Against	616	77	49	20	6	10	225	175	54	4
Abstain	13	1	0	3	2	1	5	1	0	0

A7-0220/2012 - Leonardo Domenici - Am 5

Position	Total	ALDE	ECR	EFD	GUE/NGL	NI	PPE	S&D	Verts/ALE	correctional
For	34	0	0	13	2	13	5	0	1	0
Against	629	79	49	17	6	9	241	175	53	2
Abstain	29	0	0	4	22	1	1	0	1	0

A7-0220/2012 - Leonardo Domenici - Am 7

Position	Total	ALDE	ECR	EFD	GUE/NGL	NI	PPE	S&D	Verts/ALE	correctional
For	50	1	0	12	22	12	3	0	0	0
Against	616	74	49	20	6	11	240	166	50	2
Abstain	6	0	0	2	2	1	0	0	1	0

A7-0220/2012 - Leonardo Domenici - Am 8

Position	Total	ALDE	ECR	EFD	GUE/NGL	NI	PPE	S&D	Verts/ALE	correctional
For	25	0	0	10	4	10	1	0	0	0
Against	643	74	49	20	22	11	242	173	52	1
Abstain	9	0	0	3	1	2	1	0	2	0

A7-0220/2012 - Leonardo Domenici - Am 10

Position	Total	ALDE	ECR	EFD	GUE/NGL	NI	PPE	S&D	Verts/ALE	correctional
For	46	0	0	10	23	12	0	1	0	0
Against	625	78	49	19	6	11	246	165	51	0
Abstain	7	0	0	4	1	1	0	0	0	0

A7-0220/2012 - Leonardo Domenici - Am 11

Position	Total	ALDE	ECR	EFD	GUE/NGL	NI	PPE	S&D	Verts/ALE	correctional
For	27	0	0	11	6	10	0	0	0	0
Against	654	79	48	20	23	11	247	173	53	0
Abstain	7	0	0	3	1	2	0	0	0	0

A7-0220/2012 - Leonardo Domenici - Résolution législative

Position	Total	ALDE	ECR	EFD	GUE/NGL	NI	PPE	S&D	Verts/ALE	correctional
For	599	79	1	15	20	10	248	171	55	1
Against	27	0	3	12	1	8	0	3	0	0
Abstain	68	0	45	6	10	6	1	0	0	0

A7-0220/2012 - Leonardo Domenici - Legislative resolution

Position	Total	ALDE	ECR	EFD	GUE/NGL	NI	PPE	S&D	Verts/ALE	correctional
For	599	79	1	15	20	10	248	171	55	1
Against	27	0	3	12	1	8	0	3	0	0
Abstain	68	0	45	6	10	6	1	0	0	0

Amendments

Dossier

10

2011/0360(COD) Undertakings of collective investment in transferable securities (UCITS) and Alternative Investment Funds Managers: risk management 2012/03/29 ECON 10 amendments... Amendment 1 # Evelyn REGNER Proposal for a directive Recital 2 (2) An effect of the financial crisis has been that investors, including UCITS and AIFs, rely excessively on credit ratings to carry out their investments on debt instruments, without necessarily conducting their own assessments of the creditworthiness of issuers of such debt instruments. In order to improve the quality of the investments made by UCITS and AIFs and, therefore, to protect investors in those funds, it is appropriate to require the persons managing UCITS and AIFs to avoid relying exclusively and automatically on external credit ratings when assessing the risk involved in the investments made by the UCITS and AIFs they manage. The geninternal principle on the avoidance of excessive reliance on external credit ratingsk management processes and systems of the managers of UCITS and AIFs should therefore be inteupgratded intoand the risk management processes and systems of the managers of UCITS and AIFs, and adapted to their specificities.general principle adopted of avoiding excessive reliance on external credit ratings Amendment 5 # Gianni PITTELLA Proposal for a directive Recital 2 (2) An effect of the financial crisis has been that investors, including UCITS and AIFs, rely excessively on credit ratings to carry out their investments on debt instruments, without necessarily conducting their own assessments of the creditworthiness of issuers of such debt instruments. In order to improve the quality of the investments made by UCITS and AIFs and, therefore, to protect investors in those funds, it is appropriate to require the persons managing UCITS and AIFs to avoid relying exclusively and automatically on external credit ratings when assessing the risk involved in the investments made by the UCITS and AIFs they manage. The general principle on the avoidance of excessive reliance on external credit ratings should therefore be integrated into the risk management processes and systems of the managers of UCITS and AIFs, and adapted to their specificities. However, internal models for risk assessment have not proven to be a more reliable option and a mere shift from external ratings to internal evaluations is unlikely to be beneficial. In the medium term, further initiatives should be evaluated in order to take ratings out of financial regulation and eliminate risk- weighting of assets through external rating or internal models". Amendment 6 # Ildikó GÁLL-PELCZ Proposal for a directive Recital 2 (2) An effect of the financial crisis has been that investors, including UCITS and AIFs, rely excessively on credit ratings to carry out their investments on debt instruments, without necessarily conducting their own assessments of the creditworthiness of issuers of such debt instruments. In order to improve the quality of the investments made by UCITS and AIFs and, therefore, to protect investors in those funds, it is appropriate to require the persons managing UCITS and AIFs to avoid relying exclusively and automatically on external credit ratings or making excessive use thereof when assessing the risk involved in the investments made by the UCITS and AIFs they manage. The general principle on the avoidance of excessive reliance on external credit ratings should therefore be integrated into the risk management processes and systems of the managers of UCITS and AIFs, and adapted to their specificities. Amendment 7 # Ildikó GÁLL-PELCZ Proposal for a directive Recital 3 (3) In order to specify further the general principle on overreliance that should be introduced into Directives 2009/65/EC and 2011/61/EU, the power to adopt acts in accordance with Article 290 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union should be delegated to the Commission in particular to ensure that managers of UCITS and AIFs are effectively prevented from over-relying on external credit ratings for assessing the creditworthiness of the assets held by UCITS or AIFs. It is appropriate in this regard to amend the powers of the Commission in those Directives to adopt delegated acts in respect of the general provisions regarding risk management processes and systems employed by the managers of UCITS and AIFs. It is of particular importance that the Commission carry out appropriate consultations during its preparatory work, including at expert level, after which it should publish the results of the consultations. Amendment 8 # Ildikó GÁLL-PELCZ Proposal for a directive Recital 5 (5) Since the objective of this Directive, namely to contribute to the reduction of the excessive reliance of UCITS and AIFs on external credit ratings when making their investments, cannot be sufficiently achieved at the Member State level acting in a coordinated manner and can therefore, by reason of the pan-Union structure and impact of the activities of UCITS, AIFs and credit rating agencies, be better achieved at the Union level, the Union may adopt measures, in accordance with the principle of subsidiarity as set out in Article 5 of the Treaty on the European Union. In accordance with the principle of proportionality, as set out in that Article, this Directive does not go beyond what is necessary in order to achieve those objectives. Amendment 9 # Pascal CANFIN, Emilie TURUNEN Proposal for a directive Article -1 (new) 2003/41/EC Article 18 Article -1 Amendments to Directive 2003/41/EC Directive 2003/41/EC is amended as follows: In Article 18, the following paragraph is inserted: "1a. Institutions shall not include investment rules that would result in the automatic sale of assets in the event of a downgrade of their creditworthiness by an external credit rating agency." Amendment 10 # Sharon BOWLES Proposal for a regulation Article - 1 a (new) – point 1 Directive 2004/109/EC Article 2 – paragrapg 1 – point pa to pd (new) and Article 18a Directive 2004/109/EC is amended as follows: 1. In Article 2(1) the following points are added: "(pa) 'financial instrument' means an instrument listed in Section C of Annex I to Directive 2004/39/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 21 April 2004 on markets in financial instruments; (pb) 'securitisation' means securitisation within the meaning of Article 4(36) of Directive 2006/48/EC; (pc) 'structured finance instrument' means a financial instrument or other assets resulting from a securitisation; (pd) 'originator' means originator within the meaning of Article 4(41) of Directive 2006/48/EC; (pe) 'sponsor' means sponsor within the meaning of Article 4(42) of Directive 2006/48/EC;" 2. The following article is inserted: Additional information requirements for issuers whose structured finance instruments are admitted to trading on a 1. The issuer shall ensure that either the originator or the sponsor of a structured finance instrument established in the Union shall disclose to the public, in accordance with paragraph 4, information on the credit quality and performance of the individual underlying assets of that structured finance instrument, the structure of the securitization transaction, the cash flows and any collateral supporting a securitisation exposure as well as any information that is necessary to conduct comprehensive and well informed stress tests on the cash flows and collateral values supporting the underlyingArticle -1a "Article 18a regulated market exposures. 2. The obligation to disclose information under paragraph 1 shall not extend to the provision of such information that would breach statutory provisions governing the protection of confidentiality of information sources or the processing of personal data. 3. ESMA shall develop draft regulatory technical standards to specify: (a) the information that the persons referred to in paragraph 1 are to disclose; (b) the frequency with which such information shall be updated; (c) the presentation of the information by means of a standardised disclosure template. ESMA shall submit those draft regulatory technical standards to the Commission by 1 January 2013. Power is delegated to the Commission to adopt the regulatory technical standards referred to in the first subparagraph in accordance with the procedure laid down in Articles 10 to 14 of Regulation (EU) No 1095/2010. 4. ESMA shall set up a webpage for the publication of the information on structured finance instruments in accordance with paragraph 1." Amendment 11 # Pascal CANFIN, Emilie TURUNEN Proposal for a directive Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 1 a (new) 2009/65/EC Article 51 – paragraph 3 a (new) (1a) the following paragraph is inserted: "3a. A UCITS shall not include in its fund rules any rule that that would result in the automatic sale of its assets in the event of a downgrade of its creditworthiness by an external credit rating agency." Amendment 12 # Pascal CANFIN, Emilie TURUNEN Proposal for a directive Article 2 – paragraph – point 1 a (new) 2011/61/EU Article 15 – paragraph 3 a (new) (1a) the following paragraph is inserted: "3a. The AIFM shall ensure that the AIF is not required automatically to sell any of its assets in the event of a downgrade of its creditworthiness by an external credit rating agency." Amendment 13 # Krišjānis KARIŅŠ Proposal for a directive Article 3 – paragraph 1 – subparagraph 1 Member States shall bring into force the laws, regulations and administrative provisions necessary to comply with this Directive by XX XXXX [12 months from the date of entry into force of the directive] at the latest. They shall forthwith communicate to the Commission the text of those provisions and a correlation table between those provisions and this Directive. source: PE-486.063

History

(these mark the time of scraping, not the official date of the change)